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ART. I.—MODERN SOCIETY AND THE SACRED  
HEART.

*Der alte und der neue Glaube* von D. F. STRAUSS. Bonn. 1874.

*Sartor Resartus*. By THOMAS CARLYLE (fortieth thousand of this Edition).  
London : Chapman & Hall. 1873.

*Twenty Essays*. By R. W. EMERSON. London : Bell & Daldy. 1870.

*Civiltà Cattolica*. No. 599. Firenze : Manuelli.

AT the present moment, and for some time now, public opinion has been impressed with the great fact that we are passing through a crisis. In this judgment, not only Catholics and their opponents of the Revolution, but grave and impartial lookers-on, and statesmen, with the weight of government upon their shoulders, concur, as it would seem, with a strange unanimity—nay, we are informed again and again, that there never was an era so pregnant with great issues since Christianity appeared amongst men ; that the times have a tragic cast, and a fulness of energy, by which we may estimate the approach of some catastrophe, some dénouement without example, in the social order. Catholic readers will call to mind the passage, remarkable for its keen sagacity, in which Joseph de Maistre looks forward to the event, the resolution, as he predicts, of our complicated history, and prays that it may be favourable to the Church. Is there a man, indeed, let him be never so prosaic, who does not now and then ask himself, “How shall these things end?” And the reason is plain. For a long while past we have stood by as witnesses of the break-up, the all but total ruin, of that time-honoured civilization, which, itself a manifest wonder, was created under the influence of the Church, on the ruins of the Pagan world. Centuries upon centuries of vigorous life ; the prescription of Imperial law ; the overshadowing protection of kings and senates ; the loyalty of populations far and wide ; all these have not availed to save the Christian and Catholic

πολιτεία : the public influence of that august code is, in more than one country, suspended ; and the Latin, in hardly less proportion than the Teutonic race, is exposed to a novel experiment, on the widest scale, and at the utmost peril of all involved. That experiment is nothing else than to direct Society in the whole, and in its parts without the aid of religion.

But as S. Thomas, in his lucid reasoning, bids us remember, human society is no mechanical contrivance, much less a chance result, or a blind combination of forces ; it is the concurrence, as its danger is the shock, of many elements, guided to their end by a Divine wisdom, which can plan and can bring to an issue what it has marked out in its design ; and even the beings who go to make it up—since they are in part “of uncompoundd essence,” and are not of material mould—even they, in all their endeavouring, work towards the realization of an end. Whether they take evil for good, or the apparent for the real, they must first apprehend and then labour : they must know before they can love. Not that, in every contest, the many have a firm grasp, have anything beyond a glimpse now and then, of principles or objects ; but it is possible for an historian, or a philosopher, to disengage from the confusion whatever has been the ruling idea, and the motive-power, to light up facts by the principles to which they must be referred, and to indicate the logical path along which any great theory has been realized. He is not to be carried away in the heat of an engagement ; and whilst others hurry forward to gain the next position, or get absorbed in the effort to defend what has been gained, he is calmly surveying the field, tracking the plan of operations, and is learning to judge with accuracy of the duration and the result of a doubtful contest.

Christianity is engaged along the whole line, and there can be little doubt as to the enemy with whom it has to deal. Viewed as an attacking and aggressive force, it has styled the Revolution ; in its normal state, or rather in its essential form and interior life, we have heard of it as that Modern Civilization with which the Church cannot come to terms. But now, since the Revolution is a movement in the social order, it must have an end ; and we may fairly inquire, “What does it undertake to do ? What does it aim at ?” This is a period of transition ; and its legitimate outcome we are told, is the triumph of modern ideas. It is surely seasonable to ask, what are these ideas, and what is their object ? We know what Christianity means ; can we learn the meaning of its competitor ? Let us make an attempt. If we are patient, perhaps the Modern Idea will disclose itself to our view. But our first effort should be to get some explanation of an Idea in the abstract ; this will throw an unexpected light on our researches, and will clear away the mist ; and instead of

laying down a definition to be afterwards resolved into its parts, we will indicate the process by which an Idea is formed and comes to its perfection, so that not only its nature, but the history of its growth, may be sketched in outline.

We mean, however, to bring out the Christian Idea too, not indeed in its fulness, or with the breadth of description, which it requires in its own place, but simply and so far as it is opposed to prevailing notions, and aims at breaking their strength. Since we believe in a Divine Ruler of this busy world ; since we know Him to be infinite in those perfections, which the conceiving and carrying out of such vast counsels imply, we cannot but feel that, though He is looking on with patience now, He has already in His Hands the times which are to succeed our own. Many a one among those outside the Church is tempted to despair of mankind ; but such a temptation is not likely to trouble a Catholic. Doubtless he too would give up his hopes and anticipations, were they not in the keeping of the highest wisdom and the most persevering love. Even the eyes of faith, as they gaze abroad, are drawn in anxiety and distress to the hurried strivings, and the fluctuating advance and retreat, of the men who are playing their parts in our current history. But those eyes can discern, amid much hesitation and uncertainty, that all these changes were long ago present to the mind of God ; and that He has devised, if we may use the expression, a counter-scheme, a further unfolding of the hidden strength of the Incarnation, in which, by the merciful blending of tenderness with suffering, and suffering with love, the restlessness of His sinful creatures may find a respite, and come to a perfect peace. The fresh instance of God's Providence over men is the spread of devotion to the Sacred Heart. This, we may well believe, is to be the chief means of rescuing society at large, no less than the family and the individual, from lawless desires, from the spirit of revolt, and from the insane pride in momentary achievements, which have led the multitudes astray.

Whilst, therefore, we are engaged in discoursing of modern principles, we must not put out of our minds what is the end of these researches. We are to come at length to the supernatural devotion which is meant to overthrow those principles ; or, rather, is meant to elicit from them whatever they have of good, and to make them subserve a Divine purpose. Our analysis will conduct the reader through a variety of topics, and may be a long way, at first, from suggesting the nature of our concluding remarks. But the disadvantage is common to all large prospects, and the end, we trust, will justify the course we have pursued. We will now do as we promised a moment ago : instead of taking a definition ready to our hands, we will endeavour to construct one from the facts of the case ; and we must first show how any idea what-

ever, true or false, is received into the mind, and comes to have a bearing on the practical duties of life.

Every one, nowadays, has heard of the threefold stage, and the fatal course of development, by which Hegel traced the ascent of knowledge from its primal elements to its term. What amount of truth lies mixed up with falsehood in this theory of his, it is not our purpose to inquire; but undoubtedly there are such stadia, and they can be separated off in some cases, quite easily—not indeed, in the growth of being, but in the acquisition of reflex certitude. This will be made clear by a moment's thought. When a youth goes through his education, he is taught very much—indeed, almost everything—not by the method of argument, but by the method of authority; he gets treated, not to the Socratic dialogue, with its irony and its inductive defining, but to the *Αὐτὸς ἔφα* of an earlier master, and if the teacher be not vacillating and uncertain himself, he will leave upon the mind of his pupil a consistent impression—what many would call a view, and we, in the course of these remarks, shall dignify with the name of an Idea. It may be poetical, religious, philosophical, in its outward dress, or in the illustrations and instances by which it is recommended to his notice. But the clothing matters little, for from the very beginning there will be a pervading influence at work, and it will tend to give uniformity and evenness to all that may befall him. Now a boy's experience is limited and shallow; nor can he apply to his Idea the touchstone of reality—his world is a world of dreams. If he is a clever boy, he will live much to himself, but without scepticism or doubting, and will fashion his little universe according to the pattern set him; he will be full of eagerness to enter the great world beyond—

“And his spirit leaps within him to be gone before him then,  
Underneath the light he looks at, in among the throngs of men.”

So far he has neither difficulty nor misgiving; how should he suspect that the views upon which he has been brought up are now to be tried, as by a sevenfold assay, in the fire and the crucible? This, indeed, is what few, comparatively, can be drawn to think upon, that experience of life is a searching test of opinion; they cannot measure views by facts, but remain boys all their time. The many, according to Carlyle, have no creed, but only cant; they profess one thing, and, as if the very course of nature demanded it, act up to another; and though we must except to so general a statement, there will be no difference of opinion as to the existence of such a class. Well, then, suppose our young man has gone through his university career with honour, and has come, at all events, to know the use of his eyes; suppose him to have ability and understanding, and his temperament and manners to be directed by the religion he

has learned—this is a very favourable and a rare case—if, then, you were to ask him the state of his mind, when he was a little way forward in the world, when the great scene is just opening upon him, you would discover him to be very different from his former self. His feelings might be as fresh, his affections as sound, his moral principles followed out as in the days of his home or school education ; but you would observe a gradual unsettlement of mind, a gathering, so to speak, of novel temptation upon him, and a consequent bewilderment, under the pressure of which he would answer yea and nay, by turns, to the self-same question. The first period of unclouded faith and serene acquiescence in, if we may say it, the word-pictures of his teacher, has been followed by darkness. The sight of this world, its complications and coils, its disputes, rancours, enthusiasms, its endless jarring and momentary calms ; all this wide-reaching, far illuminated spectacle, has put to flight the rest and quietness of early days, when he learned to speak the speech of others, and to think those sentiments and opinions true, which yet he had not examined. So again, there may be tokens visible to his companions of the conflict within ; it may be spiritual dryness and hardness of temper in men of a religious cast ; it may be uneasy suspicion and distrust in those who have long been hankering after the world's liberty, and now enjoy themselves as they please, and without fear of reproach ; in any case, there is a marked change, tending, it would seem, to an intellectual new-birth, a palingenesis of thought. The darkness and the loneliness remind one of the pilgrim's Valley of the Shadow of Death ; but Carlyle (who doubtless had a bitter experience of its pain and anguish) has pictured its forms, in his Titanic style, as the "Baphometric fire-baptism." So many discordant realities thrust themselves upon our gaze ; nature and history make such a vivid impression on sense and imagination ; opinions which summed up the universal aspect of things, are all at once become frail and shifting ; and whilst the truth shows itself in gleams—

"Quale per incertam Lunam sub luce malignâ,  
Est iter,"

the eyes are ever seeking for a constant light, and do not find it. What a theatre it is, if one may allude to the intense words of Shakespere ; what a mighty drama, with its ten thousand acts, and its hidden catastrophes ; to a philosophic mind, what a monotonous unending repetition, like the movements of a chorus, where the same reality is ever putting on a strange face, and mocking us to the belief that the strangeness is new ! Analytic habits will, to be sure, make us keen observers of the recurring elements, and will mark them with a name : the philosopher finds only likeness and similitude in everything : love, hatred, pleasure, revenge,

youth and its visions, age with its uncertain retrospect, manhood in the thick of its toil, it is all to him a multiplicity of action, but an almost identity of force. But our young man is not a philosopher, nor has he begun to analyze; he craves communion with whatsoever things are true, holy, beautiful, humanizing; he has unaccountable sympathies even with the terrible, the painful, the wicked; and this twofold, or it may be, triple tendency, has its utmost scope and expansion in this second stage, before the discords have been drawn into harmony, or have found simplicity in agreement. How much more if he has a share "in the prophetic soul of the wide world," if for him the perspective lengthens and draws out on every side, and the thousand-year processions of history pass into the field of his vision; if he can gather up the energy, the passion, the reckless surging to and fro of nations from East and West, till the "one touch of nature" making him kin to all, has pierced him through and mastered his power of judgment. What a hopeless task to digest all this into a chronicle of times and seasons! What a weariness in the march and recoil of all things under the sun! How is it to be framed in a mental vision that shall record the sameness and the diversity, that shall reconcile opposition, and bring high and low, celestial and terrene, into the compass of dutiful measurement or the proportions of a law?

We do not pretend that such a process of antagonism (the dialectic moment of our German writers) falls to the lot of every one. But, if a man once begins to think, he will undergo something like it, though his temperament may not allow more than a vague sense of oppression and difficulty to be perceived. In a century like ours, and in a society where each is his own master; where too, he has more philosophies within reach than can easily be reckoned; the agony of doubt, or the struggle against doubt, is sure to be more prevalent than in other countries and periods, where the Church has been the witness to every mind of the eternal, unwavering truth. In like manner we cannot affirm that, when once the temptation has begun, the clinging uncertain mist of opinion and unbelief will grow clear again. In the case of many there is never an unclouded sky over them; many others are content to leave things unsettled rather than incur the trouble of investigation, and few indeed could explain how they arrive at their final resting-place. But, from all we have said, it appears that there *is* a resting-place; and whilst the many have never left it, others, and they are the brain of a society which the Church does not enlighten, return after a search of varying duration, not indeed to the opinions they held, but to the calmness with which they held them.

The final stage of thought, which Hegel, for his own reasons, called the higher synthesis, consists, then, in the full and firm ac-

ceptance of a philosophy. Our books tell us that every system which is at one with itself, should be taken as an extensive series of conclusions, not brought together anyhow, but drawn from principles which, in their turn, repose on a comparison of certain apprehensions of the mind. Hence, if the philosophy stands to its first principles, and does not merely *seem* to have a unity, there will be such an intercourse between all its parts, that to accept one is to accept all. Hence too, if single apprehensions, which are a mental transcript of the object seen from only one point, may be termed Ideas (though this is not the Platonic or Thomistic use of the word), much more is the entire transcript, the combined view of the whole reality, to be called an Idea. And nothing, just now, is of more importance, than to insist on the force and cogency, in a system, of its hidden unity. We may halve a philosophy, at least, as it is written ; but an Idea refuses to be broken ; it must be taken or left, and does not allow of a compromise.

As, therefore, the mind's conceptions are not images in the fancy, nor a retention of the bare sensible experience in some fold of the brain ; as they are immaterial, nay, spiritual reproductions and intelligible copies of objects without, and of the soul reflecting on itself, so, but in a far nobler degree, the primal Idea of a system is beyond sense and its belongings, is unity in variety, and extension in intensity, because it gathers up the scattered elements and draws them into relations with itself. And, as the number of constituent parts is ever growing, so are the relations between them ; so that language fails to express their complexity and the closeness of their mutual dependence. Here is the starting-point of a whole philosophy. Take reason, that is, the instrument by which we draw conclusions, as the means of adjusting these elements or partial ideas, apply the conclusions so gained to the unfathomable realities all around us, and you will construct a system according to the admitted rules of its formation. Since, then, philosophy is the application of an Idea to the whole sum of things, and to the Maker of them ; since its province is to hold up the largest and clearest account, to give the last word (as far as human reason can do so) on the nature of God and man, of the universe visible and invisible, and the principles of its origin and scope, we seem to have touched upon its very definition, and may now reckon that we know some, at any rate, of the pretensions of the latest philosophy. If the mind acquiesces in any such account, whether discovered or learned, and the will is determined not to move from its position, this may be called certitude, on the proviso, that, to be certain of a thing is not indeed to know that it is true, but to think so without a misgiving. Whether a man can ever be so rooted in prejudice as to entertain security about a falsehood, does not concern us here. Practically we must admit a kind of mental

repose, the counterfeit of certitude in its proper sense ; for there seems to be a darkening of the intellect which is final, as there is also a final illumination.

Schlegel, in a very remarkable book, has delineated the philosophy of life—the term, we think, is an apt one, and may bring yet more strongly before us the characteristics of the final synthesis into which we build up our knowledge. A world-wide Idea must have its roots in speculation, and could not exist without abstract principles, or, so to say, axiomatic formulæ ; but these are seldom put into words, and are held unconsciously. The rival systems of which we hear are *living*, and have all the properties of life, implicit and explicit. A philosophy, worth the name, is no mere edifice—no piling up of dead stones into proportion, however beautiful it may look. Rather it is a keen, intelligent spirit, swift and mobile, whole in the whole, but also whole in every part, quickening with its own animation the remotest members, and drawing all the elements into a breathing, attractive unity. It has more within it than circumstances have yet unfolded, and, when seemingly exhausted, is capable of new and astonishing efforts. Its life, its vigour, its ceaseless activity, all these make it persuasive and efficient, for evil no less than for good, to an untold extent. If the Idea is indeed true, and in so far as it is true, that vital beauty and coherence will endure in fruitfulness ; if it be false, as it may be in the whole, though its materials, in another form or mould, be useful and true, still it will flourish for a season, and to know the measure of its life will be given to few or none. But while it lasts, it will judge of all things, and be judged by no man ; it will seek in itself the justification of every fact. It will claim “to dream,” and more than dream, of all things in heaven and earth. The spiritual man, says the Apostle, judges of all things, for he discerns all, and enjoys the guidance of a higher light. Our varying philosophies do not always discern, but they lose the faculty of judging only at death ; and meanwhile what a power they become in the world at large !

For, as we observed in the outset, every Idea is also an Ideal, since it is concerned not only with “the starry heavens above,” but after all, and chiefly, with “the moral law within.” Our speculation is directed to practice, and our whole being finds its quintessence in free-will. The possibilities of history, no less than the abiding presence of nature, are spoken of in that majestic discourse which man, since he looks before and after, cannot but make with himself. But history comes out of civil society, is elicited by the orderly contests of men whose warfare has limits that it dare not transgress, and seems to depend, in great measure, on the energy, perseverance, and heroism of single individuals. This is why, directly any one has learned to take an interest in

this or that philosophy, he is anxious to convince others, and, according to the bent of his character, to realize his thought in things around him. "The great science of man warrants," he will say, "the conclusions to which I have come, but how far is mankind from shadowing forth the beauty and strength of their ideal nature. I cannot change the laws of my being, much less can I hope to reverse any part of the universal order of things: but the society of men, to which I belong, passes through changes, and is capable of improvement, and upon that society I can impress my activity." Thus, philosophy lives for him, and he thinks of becoming its apostle. And since minds are affected in pretty nearly the same way, so that they are drawn to each other by certain affinities, or are instantly repelled and ranged in opposition, we have not merely the efforts of this or that man, but the combined movements and the increased momentum of numbers. We have the Idea no longer engaged upon abstractions; it will make the universe square with the pattern conceived, and will therefore seek its own actuation in the only flexible and plastic element that remains, in the moulding of society.

But with the change of period comes a danger hitherto not apparent. The test of such a theory is not logical consistency (though this be required), but success in meeting difficulties and overcoming them. If it goes from the schools and the lecturer's chair, nay, from books and newspapers and common talk, down into the world of action; if it is busied with great schemes, not to be planned and set forth in eloquent discourse, but to be carried out, and to have enduring results, there is put upon it a strain to which few theories have been equal. That must be a deep philosophy that shall be faithful to the experience of ages, and shall allow for the free play of the mind and heart of man. How many names are there from Homer all through the centuries to Goethe, and whatsoever great thinkers we can cite for our own time, who have studied with awe and wonder, confessing at last that the soul of man, as it is made visible in our common life, is beyond comprehension, and too subtle to be searched out? Is there an axiom or a formula which even comes nigh to exhausting the universe? Does the cunning of man reach to more than a promise of the all but infinite that lies beyond him? To a Catholic it seems that none but God knows the way of men upon earth—that His Providence is no less wonderful than the first creative act: He is justified by the glory of inanimate nature; and the course of ages, by reason of their mysterious connection and their strange succession, declares no less that the riches of His Wisdom are beyond our thought. If He should deign to teach us, our philosophy will not be in vain: should He be silent, or we not listen to His voice, how can we hope that our Idea has in it a promise or a blessing?

Hegel is sure that man is the conscious intellect in which nature comes to know itself: then there is no infinite intelligence, and the course of history is blind or fatal—is, in one word, a contradiction. Are we to believe that a limited mind, such as we know ours to be, can measure the height of heaven, alone and without help? If not, it follows that a finite Idea can never be established as the Ideal of society; and facts will be too stubborn for what is, at best, a parable without an interpreter. Nothing but a Divine economy, with the Spirit of God breathing life into it, can suffice for every emergency, and every crisis; can guide to its destined issue what has been begun.

Here, at length, we have reached the heart of the agitation; we discern with varying distinctness the forces as they meet in battle, and are afforded a means of conjecturing how it must end. Catholicity professes to have a message direct from heaven, and to know all truth, because the source of truth has enlightened her with a divine, a supernatural light. Revelation, as contained in Holy Scriptures and the living tradition handed down from Christ, is the sum of philosophy, since it holds within it the moral law, involves a distinct theory of human nature, and lays down principles to which all our investigation must conform. The Christian Ideal has borne the test of greatness and success: neither its consistency nor its life has been impaired by the shocks it has encountered in its long duration. How much can be said in favour of the opposite view? Will it bear to be made real? There have been, indeed, in the farther East, and on the shores of the Mediterranean, speculative teachings which have formed and directed nations in their culture, science, literature, social and political life. The founders of them were men of vast genius, endowed with the piercing intuition which has long been an Oriental gift. Can any one predict with confidence that the recent speculations are a solid foundation upon which to rear society? that out of them will emerge a polity, a civil hierarchy, or a fruitful epoch of literary and scientific progress? These are questions to which some true answer can be given, and upon that answer depends the future, not so much of this or that country, as of civilized Europe.

It has not been easy to get authors on the other side to speak out; they have preferred, for the most part, the easy task of criticising, in the midst of a learned leisure, those doctrines and practices of religion which seemed to allow them a prompt victory. Received opinions might be combated, it seemed, with any arguments, and the critic was not bound either to defend a theory in his turn, or to guarantee that his objections were not mutually destructive. So far, it was possible to be vague in one's confession of faith, and to assume an air of respect when Christianity chanced to be mentioned. But the right of free speech has now been

allowed, even to extreme and blasphemous teaching; and society does not shut its ears, as formerly, when a polished author declares, in a calm and assuring tone, that atheism is good morality and is likely to ameliorate our present troubles. The difficulty that once existed, of getting to know our adversaries' meaning, is therefore at an end: to reticence has succeeded a categorical statement, which may be likened, for its regularity, to one of the ancient creeds. We are admitted into the confidence of Stuart Mill, of Comte, of Moleschott, of Bruno Bauer, of Friedrich Strauss. By the aid of a little reading, and a little logic, we may gather, for ourselves, the scope and significance of their theories. Variety of colour and tone is to be expected; nay, since the theory is a false one, it is natural that contention and dispute should arise as to the compatibility of the different elements: but, overlooking what is personal or the result of circumstances, we discover that all these writers, and a great many more, are agreed as to fundamentals, and are swayed by the same motives in their attack on Christianity.

There are good reasons for selecting, from the number of recent books, the exposition which Strauss has bequeathed to posterity in his well-known confession of the new faith. The reception it met with in Germany and England proved that the author had dealt with his subject in a novel and interesting manner; the call for fresh editions is a sign that many are still taken with what he has said; and, whatever judgment we must pass on his sentiments, there is still room to deal fairly with him. He has been able to lay open to his readers a prospect of the future, and, whilst putting far away from him a controversial tone, to raise the issue between Faith and Infidelity to the level of a speculation. This, and it is done with candour, is, in spite of his grievous mistakes, a step in the right direction. Nothing comes of isolated argument: but oppose view to view, and the rational, the religious instinct, will do much for those in whom it is still alive. Here is the work done to our hands, which we might have had to go through for ourselves; the author is, in some respects, outspoken, and makes it his boast that he has kept nothing back. This much we may record, lest we should be accused of seeing no good in those who differ from us. But, assuredly, our first thought on looking into the book is not to praise the author: we cannot but feel pained and overcome at the sight of all that patience and ingenuity (for we allow the man had an intellect and a logical grasp of some things) expended in a base attack upon the purest and most venerated of human beliefs. We cannot thank such a one for being a blasphemous and a tempter of his brethren; we are not to be impressed by his velvet politeness, his courtesy with its touch of affectation and occasional scorn, or his sensibility to what European society holds to be decorous and right-minded. He would fain discuss, as it were, an abstract

question, and will hardly refrain from being sharp with us, if we grow excited in our answers to him. This indeed has been witnessed before, and is very striking in an age of criticism. The enthusiasm, the quickness, the anxiety of a Christian seem nothing else than bigotry to a man who says he has consecrated himself to reason. The one is all aglow with the sense of injury done to his Master: the other has no master; his gods are algebraic signs and the formulæ of chemistry; and devotion, in his eyes, is mawkish sentiment. Hence, we are said to be passionate, we overstep the bounds of politeness, we import declamations, and appeal to human nature in disputes that should be wholly impersonal. As if a discussion on the truth of our religion must be conducted like a piece of dialectic fence, or were no more than the debate of a literary association! So long as we avoid the arts of which we have no need; so long as we do not garble, interpolate, or misrepresent; so long as we are open antagonists on a fair field; it cannot be a matter of offence to any one that we describe in plain words the moral perversion, the dreadful, determined wickedness, of those who are wilfully blind.

The view which Strauss adopts is not, in its present form, the work of a single mind, but is rather the efflorescence of unbelieving theories, English and German and French, which have found a voice in almost every science, in most branches of industry, and in the press of all Europe, for now half a century. Hardly a day passes without some portion of it being argued in our journals; it has been touched with colour, sometimes delicately laid on, in the literature of fiction, in popular poems, in thoughtful dissertations; it has been clothed with Gospel imagery in more pulpits of Protestant Germany than can easily be reckoned; it is heard in the sermons of men to whom Pantheism and Liberalism are odious. Scientific men, politicians, the great commercial classes, are all under the same influence, and do little more than vary its outward tokens. In Germany, it has been exalted as the law of the land, objective and supreme, before which conscience must observe a respectful silence. In England, it is exerting the charm of a new religion with high speculations and an easy moral code, upon such as are learned enough to study it. It is worth while to point out how all this has come to pass.

At present we derive our intellectual life from intercourse with German writers, and are content to supply them with materials for their shaping; England, in this, as in so many other things, being a hewer of wood and drawer of water for the temple of the future. But, at the beginning of this century, the Fatherland was a region of mist and romance, of unknown speech, and, apparently, a backward civilization. A great revolution in philosophy was going forward beyond the Rhine; but philosophy, from its very

nature, does not address the multitude ; and German philosophy seemed to have become, like Fichte's universe, " the dream of a dream." However, time, which brought round other changes, directed German energy and German acuteness to the investigation of science, history, language, and religion. Here were points that all the world could discuss. The eighteenth century, as it exists in the writings of the French, was no match for the profound and painstaking erudition of a later day ; and the sudden expansion of thought, after the French Revolution, drove crowds of inquiring men to the mysterious oracles of Berlin and Weimar. But there is a law of give-and-take in most things ; and as the master acts on the pupils, so, in time, do they react upon him. Free Trade in thought once established, it was to be supposed that the English genius would be powerfully felt in Germany. The result has surpassed belief. Recent philosophy, unlike its predecessors for many a day, is no less real than ideal. It speculates and experiments ; and, though the speculation is ill-directed, and the experiments are not sufficiently combined, we see the dawning of a new era in the attempt now making to unite what should never have been disjoined.

In the rapid process of enlightenment two men are to be distinguished, whose names have a direct bearing on our subject. The mould into which all speculation during the last thirty years has been cast, is the work of Hegel and Goethe, and wears upon it the impress of their great and artistic genius. No two men could be less alike, to judge by what showed outwardly ; no two, as it seems, could have given such aid to the enterprise they had at heart. We have all enjoyed our laugh at the in comprehensible philosopher of Berlin, at his wild assertions and utterly grotesque defacing of axioms old as the world ; and every one remembers the date when no answer beyond a note of exclamation was appended to the quotations made from him. This, of course, was the pardonable ignorance of common men ; any system, clothed in such questionable shape as his, would have met with a like reception. His teaching is more ravelled and perplexed in manner, than all the subtlety of Scotus or all the barbarous Latin of the Nominalists could have made it. But Hegel was a deep thinker and enjoyed the gift of intuition, though some fairy had denied him the use of speech. His mistakes, not indeed on all points, but in certain fundamental theses, are the mistakes of a speculative understanding, and may be paralleled with the overpowering imaginations of those Oriental mystics to whom we owe Buddhism. He so far perfected the science of method, and sketched the lines of his encyclopædia in such strict accord with his principles, that, his first propositions agreed to, there is no choice but to close with his method and his doctrines. In him the heterodox philosophy reached its consumma-

tion; and those who had been pleased with its separate elements, found themselves compelled to take the whole. That whole was, at first sight, unsubstantial and dreamy, a play of dialectics in the mind of genius gone mad: but Hegel had pointed out a way back to the world of men, and shrewd observers predicted that Idealism would evoke its contrary, and strengthen the philosophy of sense. The saying of Hegel himself, that men ought not to dispute about the object, since the phenomena are nothing but that object, "the painted scenes are the reality," preluded the return of, not the method, to be sure, but many of the assertions, of eighteenth century teaching. That a group of phenomena make up a substance, or that substance is the phenomena *as* they are grouped; this will be intelligible in the system of Hegel, no less than in the system of Locke. Under all such sentences, there lies indeed the feeling of infinite identity, which Locke could scarcely conceive, much less worship; still, in every Pantheistic system, confusion of the higher and lower is inevitable. The ambiguity of the word Thought—since the time of Descartes—allows a man to uphold the Hegelian evolution, and to pursue it through its fatal course of affirmation, negation, and the final synthesis, whilst taking the whole of experience to be nothing but the changing forms of matter as expressed in the terms of a more or less perfect sense. Free observant science, therefore, possessed of every material appliance as an instrument of search, and the world of things visible and invisible within easy compass, now, to its great surprise, was reconciled with the axioms of a recondite and hitherto fruitless speculation. From that time we hear little or nothing of the air-drawn pictures that belong to the earlier days of German literature. Speculation, having reached its utmost limit, has been in part relinquished, and the application of its principles to the various departments of life and morals has issued in the present triumph of Hegelianism.

But the prophet of the nineteenth century is Goethe; in him the age found a voice. Dante has drawn the life of mediæval Christendom into a point of light in his divine song: Shakespere is the culmination of the heroism and high noble thought of many generations of Catholic England: such a greatness, too, belongs to the mind that alone has known how to combine and illuminate the ten thousand elements of our own wide-spread experience. To him the countless materials were no hindrance: they were the condition—so piercing and intuitive was his intellect, so faultless, as though it were of crystal, his imagination—of the very highest beauty and the subtlest order. He then, to whom the tranquil forms of sculpture became a model for his own creations, though he breathed the modern life into that long past beauty, grew persuaded of the fresh truth that dawned upon his contemporaries, and threw around it the halo of his steady light. So it is, alas!

the lesson taught in all the lyric prose and verse, in the abundant flowing style, and unembarrassed conversation of this polished gentleman, did but contain, though in a superlative perfection, maxims which hitherto had escaped the world's notice because of their uncouth vesture. No one, as Strauss remarks, unless he has been strange to the course of modern education, but has felt the influence of Goethe, and learned to think in his way. Here was a man who understood the times, and whilst careless of what went on around him, was busied with a chronicle and reflection of the spirit of the age. He made no pretence of teaching, yet those who have a right to speak tell us there is a profound philosophy in Wilhelm Meister, in Faust, in the *Dichtung und Wahrheit*. He would have been impatient of Hegel and the speculative school, although to him, no less than to Hegel, are due the form and the attractiveness of the newest philosophy. In truth, the many imperceptible causes that decide the aspect of things for a generation or an epoch were then at work, and minds of every rank and genius were holding communion with each other.

The doctrine they believed, like every other false philosophy, was made up of a truth and a fallacy. That truth is the reality of a physical universe, the reality of the indefinite expanse of things as they come into contact with sense and understanding. It was, to quote once more the phrase of an earlier time, "the starry heavens above," which they beheld and reached upwards to, as to their God. Side by side with this undeniable truth came the ever recurring fallacy, that behind or beyond the physical universe there is no reality. Some call this pantheism, others atheism; to us the name is of slightest consequence. What we know is, that for the infinite, these men mistook the finite, and brought the spiritual down to the level of matter. They were so conscious of earth and sky and sea, so deeply impressed with the life that slept or woke above and beneath, so captivated, as Wisdom tells us of their forefathers, "by the beauty of the creature," that to take a bolder flight seemed impossible. Men of quiet disposition, as they went to and fro, were surprised or bewildered at the enthusiasm, unknown to their own times and manners, with which mother Nature, the Great Reality, the Eternal Silences were invoked by the rising stars in literature and the physical sciences. It seemed to be mere rhapsody: yet we venture to say that, for this once, enthusiasm was partly in the right. A man who does not see can hardly criticise one who has eyes. For a long time the universe had been a mere background to the genteel comedy in which cultivated society took part. The Revolution came; science, in its modern sense, mapped out the world, conquered its secret elements, left nothing untouched or unexplored, and men,

at last, returned to the aboriginal fear and wonder which are recorded in the Vedas and the Homeric poems. We are long past the day of myths of the storm and the rain, myths of dawn and sunset, but science records the changes in the heavens, and speaks in a language that impresses the intellect still more than the fancy. The wide universe, instinct with life, harmonious with the beauty of a subtle and apparently unbroken order, fruitful too with consequence beyond the day-star and the frame of things itself (for something is eternal, were it only silence); all this majesty, vastness, and terrible unfathomed mystery, was so borne in upon this generation, that, instead of glorying in man's wisdom, they drew back and fell on their faces, they sought a refuge from the living yet unintelligent reality as it enclosed them on every side. Those who have read Hegel, or his commentators, will remember how strangely he describes the Vision of Being in the first moment of its dawn, how he lavishes words, and heaps together attributes, and after all, confesses that the object is beyond words. Strauss, in the name of modern philosophy, lays down as self-evident propositions, gained by a mere comparison of terms, that the universe is one, infinite, eternal, and is ever like itself and absolute. This he conceives to be the Buddhist and even the Stoic view of the world; nor, probably, is he far out in thinking so. There is a well-known passage in the second book of Cicero's *De Naturâ Deorum*, in which we are told, "*nihil omnium rerum esse melius mundo, nihil præstabilius, nihil pulchrius, nec solum nihil esse, sed ne cogitari quidem quicquam melius posse.*" Like expressions are to be met with in other works by the same author, in the *Tusculans*, *De Finibus*, and the *Republic*: so also in various places of Seneca and the later philosophers who followed, in whole or in part, the Stoic opinions. The opening of Pliny's second book of Natural History anticipates Strauss, as though it were a prophecy. It is right to hold, he says, that the universe, which the celestial sphere does but enclose, is a deity, eternal, immense, unborn, or uncreated, and destined never to pass away. To seek what is outside of this, is not the work of man, whose mind, in such an inquiry, does not even reach a conjecture of the truth. So then the world is all in all, nay, is itself *the all*, finite indeed, but as though infinite; embracing all things in itself, the work of nature, yet not differing from nature; so extensive that the mind cannot take it in, nor any measurement exhaust its greatness. But gods, in the proper sense of the word, there are none: and the whole mythology of the people is only an interpretation of nature.

However, it is to little purpose, one may observe, to liken the old and the new philosophies in this manner. There is a gulf not to be passed over between the calm half-supercilious investigation

of Stoics or Epicureans, and the passionate sense of mystery by which our own times are agitated. We should be tempted to say that the Christian temper, conversant with eternal thoughts and an unspeakable future, has bestowed a superior insight even into things natural, and has invested the world around us with a fresh light "that never was on land or sea"; a man, who has fallen from Christianity, still bears within him something of that high contemplative sense to which the mysterious and the infinite are not altogether unknown. Science is eager to confess that light, colour, magnetism, the pulsations of air, the combination of atoms, the grouping of forces in crystals and the strata of past ages, the transmission of forces vital and inorganic, that all these somehow elude search at the last, and not seldom appear a contradiction to the reason. And then the revelation hourly gathers light, of how much is near us, lying on the surface of things and yet impervious to sight and touch; the applications moreover of a single principle grow so complex and bewildering, or again meet us so unexpectedly, that the material seems to be, like a spirit, whole and entire everywhere. It is not to be wondered at, since all this is true and falls under every day's experience, that men, not trained to a practical religious life, are thrown out of the natural course, and wander into a region where the bearings are strange, and the issues of speculation uncertain. Whatever they have gained from the Christianity which they cannot help breathing, is applied, not to the correction, but to the adornment of their favourite theories; just as a poet, if he be a great genius and unhappily led wrong, will lavish his gifts and his melody on unworthy themes. Paganism, on the contrary, had not learned the noblest idea of God, and at best, could frame an imperfect hymn to the universal soul.

Nor is the modern Idea to be judged by its affinities with Buddhism, however startling and undeniable they may be. The same speculation admits of a thousand renderings, and, what is more, is acted upon, and moulded into a system by the circumstances of age, civilization, and social manners, among which it takes its rise. Present the world of to-day with the classic Stoicism, and you have achieved nothing—you are an antiquarian, not a statesman or a leader of the people. Teach in like manner the whole cycle of that strange oriental doctrine, of which we now hear from some as the rival of Christianity, and you incur the fate of a dreamer—the age turns away in scornful contempt. It is the revolt against established creeds that gives form, and colour, and practical influence to the theory of Hegel and his compeers. Buddhism agrees with the moderns in considering this visible universe as the only reality, and as neither beginning nor ending ever; it is further consistent with Hegel in alternately declaring that nothing

is, and that the sensible is somehow objective. But note how widely different are the conclusions from identical premises. The Eastern withdraws himself into contemplation, subdues every movement of passion, and longs vehemently for one only consummation, that the semblance of life, which he has, may be taken from him, and pain may cease with annihilation. The Western cannot learn this hopeless asceticism; he believes that the cycle of things is an evolution from mere potentiality to some large perfection; he worships progress, and looks out for the means of advancing society and mankind in its onward path. He does not esteem life to be evil, though he must admit pain and disappointment to be the common lot, and therefore his lot also. "The remedy for all wrong," says Strauss, "is unceasing labour." And in this he echoes the spirit of the age—a spirit, not of the finer sort, but base-born and earthy.

The law of progress is not, at first, connected with that sacred fear, that trembling in the presence of the universe, which we have called the basis of the modern Idea. We need a middle term; and are furnished with it by the distinction, first indicated, it would seem, in the pages of Kant, between the world absolute, and the world relative. The world absolute is the sum of necessary laws, and all their manifestations, in whatsoever fashion. It is the all, to which belong properties and predicates the most various; nay, to it must be referred all predicates, though they mutually deny each other. The great universe (which is really the objective Idea of the Pantheists) must be at the same time, one and many, inner and outer, matter and spirit, or, if Christian language is to be admitted, God and Creation. These are only different sides or aspects of the unnameable, which is itself beyond "the reaches of our soul." It is, then, not only the phenomena, but the abiding law, according to which they come into being, and after a season disappear. But the world, in relative sense, is any group of such phenomena as exist at one time, and is, therefore, limited and fleeting. In a yet stricter sense, it is the sun and planets, with their mutual relations and influences. The universe is an infinite complexity of lesser worlds, which pass through all the stages of growth and decay. There was a time when neither Earth, nor Sun, nor Fixed Star had any existence; there never was a time when the possibility of such things was not. Hence it may be said, with Kant, that the universe is a phoenix, which does indeed burn upon the funeral pyre, but only to receive thereby a newer and a fresher life; all the parts live and die in succession; the whole never dies. A system, in the course of ages, exhausts all the multiplicity of which it was capable, puts forth its perfections, so ripens, and so at length comes to its grave, which is none the less "the womb of all things." So vast is the universe, that a galaxy of stars may be as

the blossoming of a season, ready to be shaken off in the first wind ; and so we are brought, by a descending process, to the law of evolution in each part, and notably, in the part which most concerns us ; we are able to take up the history of our earth, and trace it through physical changes, right on till it dictates the vicissitudes of mankind, the building up of society, and the teachings of morality. Without the idea of an *Ens in potentiâ*, which expands from within, and contains in itself infinite possibilities, the law of development can have no force against Christianity ; once allow Hegel to speak, and Darwin becomes a master of the age. With Darwinism, in its proper place, resting on the foundations which German speculation has got in readiness, the whole scheme of religion, in its hitherto received significance, dwindles into a phase of imperfect civilization.

The two elements of progress, according to Strauss, may be expressed in the words "Kreislauf und Wechsel" ; the infinite and immovable whole is ever, in some one of its parts, going through a cycle of change, until the highest perfection has been reached. For this author does not think there is a progress without end anywhere : although, strangely enough, he makes out the law of development to rest upon an infinitesimal advance in an infinite time. This, perhaps, is one of the gaps which he confesses may still not have been filled up in the modern theory. So again, he accepts pretty nearly the hypothesis of Laplace as to the formation of the sun and the planets, whilst other philosophers are not disposed to set much store by it. However, these are incidental differences : writers of every shade have come to admit the law of evolution both in physics and morals ; and no other is so frequently called upon to explain the tangled phenomena, whether of geology in the material world, or history and politics in the world of men. To a Christian, no less than to Hegel, the world is a scheme, carried through successive parts to a final term ; and divine truth itself is declared to be "first the seed, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear." But without dwelling on the restrictions necessary in the use of such a doctrine, we must point out two fundamental ideas which, in the modern theory, are wholly wanting. The man who believes in God will admit development and progress, if it be simply the unfolding and making explicit of what was contained in germ from the beginning, and if it be the operation of a divine intelligence and will. In other words, the development allowed by a Theist, is either a dispensation from God, on the grand principle of S. Dionysius and S. Thomas, that divine things must be received humanly, since "*Quidquid recipitur, secundum modum recipientis recipitur*" ; or it is an outshadowing in time of the eternal, an imitation that endeavours by its multiplicity, by its

πολυμέρειαν καὶ πολυτροπίαν,\* to make more perfect representation of the incomprehensible. But the intelligent is the personal, and the personal, in its highest perfection, is God ; nay, adds Strauss, the conception of the absolute lends itself easily to the doctrines of natural theology. But in nature, according to the moderns, the sum of laws and the sum of phenomena come to the same thing : the personal being whom man cannot help imagining, when he looks abroad, is only a reflex of man himself, just as the traces of design which seem to lie open to us when we reason about the system of the world, are fancies of our own, and must be discarded by the philosopher. Everything is as though it were the offspring of a mind, yet there is no such mind. This is a bold antithesis to the time-honoured and well-established doctrine that "where there is order, there also mind must be." We question whether any part of the modern lines of defence could be more easily assaulted and broken through ; to say nothing of the Kantian fallacy which lies hidden in this assumption, viz. that man *cannot* argue from himself to the objective world. It is a comfort to think that, at last, in spite of the very great subtlety we have to combat, there is a matter short and easy to decide, by which the whole theory must stand or fall. As chance cannot produce a regular succession of events, so neither can there be subordination of part to part, without a mind to which the means, and the end, and their mutual relations, were known ere they came to be. This is by the way ; our task is not to argue, but to make an exposition.

Even when a guiding intelligence has been thrust on one side, there is a gulf not easily overpassed ; or rather a number of chasms, each wider than the other. How from unshapen matter arrive at the exquisite balance of force, as we perceive it in the crystals ? The atomic theory is not an explanation, only a stubborn refusal to inquire. Still, suppose order to have arisen out of chaos ; how does the inorganic produce the organic ?—how does the principle of vegetation, whatever be its nature, bring forth, out of itself, the animal soul ? Matter, in this theory has become immaterial, and, still more wonderful, has even so far increased its powers as to have reached the topmost perfection, and been transformed into spirit. Is there any explanation of this, plausible enough for the scientific world to receive, specious enough to be tricked out in poetic beauty and expounded in lectures for the million ? What genius will do us this good turn ? Well, we suppose Mr. Charles Darwin has achieved the crowning deliverance of embarrassed science. He it is who gives rest to the wearied head of German philosophy, and changing men into the lower forms has allowed them a pleasant time of it.

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\* Cf. Hebr. i. ab init.

O Melibœe, Deus nobis hæc otia fecit ;  
Namque erit ille mihi semper Deus ; illius aram  
Sæpe tener nostris ab ovilibus imbuet agnus.  
Ille meas errare boves, ut cernis, et ipsum  
Ludere quæ vellem, calamo permisit agresti.

We are not here concerned with what this or that holder of Darwinism thinks, but with the logical sequence of ideas. It is nothing but this that gives to harmless pigeon-fancying, and the recreations of a country gentleman, their absorbing and world-wide interest. Change one species into another, and you have come upon the philosopher's stone, not now to transmute all things into gold, but that you may for ever confound quantity and quality, and resolve morals, history, politics, religion itself, into the undesigned concurrence of mere floating weeds, the atoms (if atoms they are) of some primal matter. Darwin is at the beginning of a great induction, which, by the logic of facts, is to drive Christianity out of the field. Not much has been done ; the protoplasmic theory has to fight its way amid resolute opponents, who deny every inference from experience that Mr. Huxley would fain deduce : it will take many a weary battle before the world in general has changed its point of view, and come to believe that the laws of justice, love, and humanity are of so base an origin. But, waiving this consideration, we will suppose the full Darwinian speculation to be proved, and reckon up, with Strauss, its applications in the sphere of history. The physical world culminates in man : to the Hegelian as to the Christian, man is king of the visible creation, and takes up into himself the good qualities, the perfections, and, to some extent, the aims of the lower creatures : but he does much more. Human nature, the nature of the first man (however he came to be), has within it the elements of law and order as we see them in the ascending series of the Family, the State, and the Church. The difference of contention between Theist and atheist lies here ; that, if man be sprung from the earth, if he be nothing else than, to speak according to Strauss, "an incarnation of the brute," all the seeming nobility of his life is utterly quenched, and he remains, to the end of the chapter, such as fate made him at the beginning : his rhetoric and passionate glow of speech only serve to disguise and extenuate "the thing most brutish" that he is. But the reader would be more impressed, could he go through the pages of Strauss, as, line upon line and precept upon precept, they lay bare, with the authority of a teacher, what was man's first estate, and what the successive steps by which he came hither.

The beginning is like a poem of Lucretius. The unconscious, working without an aim, but producing what shows as if it were the work of design, moved onward, by fatal instinct, from age to

age, till the more perfect organisms rose out of the "battle for existence"; and then, by further selection and joining of best with best, that one of the ape races was evolved from which man, with the endowment of speech and reason, derives his origin. The first men (who wandered over the earth, or found shelter in caves by the sea and in mountain-sides, at an immemorial time beyond the Mosaic records), were nothing like so cultivated as the tribes of savages now to be met with; they had no religion, nor morality; they were cannibals, and had a community of wives. It was not till after many ages that these customs changed; experience, and the survival of the fittest, brought about some higher form of society—speech enabled the young race to gather the fruit of mutual thought and observation; then, at last, the rule of utility got to be established. The earliest dawn of civilization enjoyed, it would seem, a very large insight into Benthamism, and reasoned closely (though by instinct) on the benefits of what was afterwards called universal benevolence. Marriage was instituted, and even monogamy began to find favour. As culture advanced, religion grew up also; and the process was very similar to that which Comte and the Positivists have made so famous. However, Strauss here agrees with Schleiermacher, that the essential part of religion is a sense of dependence, and makes this the keystone of his theory. To complete it, he quotes the dictum of Feuerbach, that the origin of religion is Wish or Desire. Join these together, and contemplate the savage under the influence of them, defenceless in his canoe or his cave-dwelling, against the wild, unrelenting nature above and around him;—he cannot appease its wrath nor propitiate its favour; but he would fain comfort himself with an illusion, and he begins to conceive of the cloud and the rain, the thunderbolt and the hailstorm which ruins his harvest, as though they were persons, living and understanding like himself. It would be interesting to compare with this the study of religion contained in Browning's "Caliban upon Setebos." The leading thought seems identical. But Strauss multiplies his Calibans till they have peopled the world, and concludes that their rude Polytheism was the first religion. After this, Comte would have pointed out Monotheism as the final stage, by the philosophic reflection that unity is more economical than plurality, and quite as reasonable. Not so Strauss: Polytheism goes on its own way, till some line of royal poets—a Hesiod, a Homer, an Æschylus—have cast round it the freshness and majesty of their own high thoughts: Monotheism has a different origin. It is the religion of a horde, and is the projection into space and the heaven above them, of their feeling of unity and loneliness, as they go to and fro in the wilderness. It is, therefore, the invention of such races as the Jewish, the Arabian, and the Tartar, and these are inferior, in point of civilization, to

the Aryan races of Greece and India. And as the religion of Olympus lost the grossness of its early forms, so Judaism, in course of ages, more and more refined the idea of a national deity with which it set out. At length, if we may believe Strauss, the personal God of Israel was fused with the Absolute, not of the Greek myths, but of the Greek philosophy, and the result was the God of Christianity. Thus has a speculation, which started from the void inane, come into collision, on historic ground, and in the most practical way, with ideas and beliefs that, since the beginning of the world, have ruled the populations of East and West.

Hereupon should follow an exposition of the theory, by which Christian teaching and Christian history are made the natural and inevitable sequence, strange as it may appear, of the influences at work when Our Lord came amongst men. Morals, as Carlyle somewhere has it, are but "mores"; and since custom and utility are the ultimate explanation and sanction of right and wrong, we must look upon the axiomatic truths and wise sayings of the ancients as terse formulæ, embodying much experience, or, since we ought to use scientific language, expressing the sum of various inductions. This, and no other, is the account Strauss has to give of the Ten Commandments, and of that notable outcome of the mind reasoning rightly, the Ethics of Aristotle. "Thou shalt not kill" means, that an immense number of cases have shown the manifest utility of not taking away our neighbour's life, whilst an equally decisive experience predicts evil consequences to those who shall neglect the lesson of past ages. It would be easy to say "Risum teneatis"; but, calmly and simply, does this view bear the least likeness to what every man knows? A theory should explain facts, not change them into their opposites. Experience, then, had led to the acceptance of morality both among the Semitic and the Aryan races; the philosophic thought of God was rapidly filtering through the lower strata of the population; and Alexandria was bringing the two master-literatures of Israel and Hellas into close contact. This was the origin of Christianity.

What follows we cannot bring ourselves to transcribe; neither does it seem needful to pursue the odious task of recording blasphemies, which are only the dreadful conclusions of a dreadful first principle. Strauss has been at great pains to set the Life and Person of our ever-blessed and eternal Lord in the light of modern ideas. The method which explains that genius is the efflorescence of a necessary and fatal evolution, does not spare the majesty of the Incarnate Word; He, too, must be no more than a Teacher, of whom such things may be said as are lawful, when we endeavour to range and classify the great men of the earth; He, too, must belong to the age and circumstances, in the midst of which He deigned to pass through the cities of Judæa, and teach in the streets of

Jerusalem. It is not necessary to say more on this head ; but there are some remarks in place, and, were they to be omitted, our estimate of modern thought would lose in clearness, and would help us very little in our attempt to realize the character of the times.

It has long since been observed that one main difference between pantheism and belief in God is this, that the former explains away persons, making them simply an instance (and not properly a concrete one), of some law or assemblage of laws, whilst Theism founds the Ideal in the Real, and Law in a Lawgiver. "Of Law," says Hooker in the well-known passage, "there can be no less acknowledged than that her seat is the bosom of God," and therefore "her voice is the harmony of the world." The True, the Good, the Beautiful have their source in the essences of things created ; yes, but not their primal source. Beyond the categories of time and space, of substance and accident,—beyond the attributes of Being as it is found in matter and spirit,—is the One, the Unchangeable, of whom all our speech can be uttered only in an eminent, an ineffable significance. And whilst order, grace, beauty, conformity to law and decree, flow forth from Him, and are in the Universe because He made all things, He Himself is not an Abstraction, nor an Idea, nor a Law, but a living personal Being, three Persons in the Unity of an undivided substance. Take away the notion of personality from God, and there remains no ground for hope or prayer, for love or desire. The world is suddenly a blank, or a painted scene, with none to act in it.

Now this has been the conviction of all who have lifted up their voices in prayer and thanksgiving ; it is the keynote of those unapproachable communings with "the High and Holy One who inhabits Eternity," which have made the Book of Psalms the finest commentary we know upon the human heart ; and it is the kernel of Christianity. We preach Christ, the Second Person of the most Holy Trinity, as He appeared in the Flesh. Jesus our Lord is the type of all justice ; and His every act is the formula, the summing-up, of some Divine principle, is the realization of a moral idea ; He is Justice itself, and the pattern of Perfection. But the prevailing opinion would take His morality without Him, and, judging according to the light within (which is darkened), would break up a living form into detached pieces, hoping still that they might live. To do this is nothing else than to dissolve Christianity, and by degrading it to the level of a school, or a philosophy, to make it an element, and not the essential element, in some polity and civilization of the future. This is the whole enterprise of modern science, as embodied in the speculation of Hegel, Strauss, Moleschott, Feuerbach, and their imitators, or disciples, in France and England. They recognize that

unity of the Christian Idea, which Protestantism and Rationalism have failed to grasp or appreciate; they see the dependence of Christendom upon Christ, and, somehow or other, have learned from S. Paul that the Church is the fulness of Christ and His Body. But since it is plain that the future must overtop the present excellence, they desire to find some chemical by which to separate this unity into its parts, and so to preserve what will assimilate with their new synthesis, as to reject every particle of mere refuse and antiquated dross. For instance:

Christian civilization has ever been noted for a characteristic way of acting, and is, in fact, the realization of Christ in all the walks of life, in the society of man, and in his energizings, of whatsoever kind. It implies a world beyond the grave; it takes for granted the soul's immortality, and, considering riches, honours, learning, genius, and all other gifts below, to have a relation as means to an end not yet reached, nor to be attained in the flesh, it subordinates the present to the future. Asceticism, self-denial, purity, obedience, poverty,—all these things are lawful and praiseworthy, since they bring a man into likeness with his model. Man, by painful effort, and by the exercise of free-will, clothes himself with the sorrows and the virtues of Christ upon earth, that hereafter he may be crowned with Christ, in the kingdom of everlasting peace, the final state of humanity made like unto God. This is what every child learns in the Catechism, and it contains the postulates and definitions of a practical science of life. But if so, it clashes with the unmistakable principles of our own day.

For modern philosophy cannot believe in the future life of anything that man calls his own; nay, it would accept, as Strauss puts it, the words of Tertullian, "*Quod non est corpus, nihil est,*" were it suffered to interpret them in their obvious sense. If the grave closes all, then man has only such happiness to seek as he may find in this life, and his whole cunning must be directed to lessening pain and heaping up pleasure. In fact, he is but a highly-organized brute, with refined appetites, and a more subtle apprehension of means and ends. We do not chide the brutes for being led by their desires, and neither must we chide man. Free-will, as we are insolently told, has long been put aside as an anomaly by every philosopher of note; and, though man has some sort of control over circumstances, he is what the hereditary transmission of moral and physical qualities has made him. He is acted upon by training, temperament, climate, the spirit of the age, and cannot take himself in hand, or master the elements of his nature as he would like. Let him learn to be content; to conform him-

self and his views to the great universe; let him grow up in harmony with facts; and whether he take the Stoic or the Kantian morality, he will have acted wisely. Prayer is out of the question in a system where the law never alters and free-will is unknown; good works are useful in this life or nowhere; to restrain the appetites may be of service in the long run, to mortify them is a crime. Celibacy, poverty, contemplation, are, of their essence, immoral; and though they belong to the Christianity of Christ, they are vestiges of Oriental indolence, and have come to their present honour by an unwarrantable recoil from the indulgences of the Pagan religions. All that rests upon these worn-out virtues must pass away with the civilization of which they are the tokens; and restrictions, hitherto thought sacred, are to disappear before the march of the new ideas. Into this part of the subject we prefer not to enter: readers of Mill's autobiography will not have forgotten his expression of gratitude to Saint Simon and the Socialists, for their outspoken opinions on this momentous topic.

When, at last, the epic has been made prose, turned into the stuff of daily life, will there be anything to compensate for the visions man once believed in? Heaven is gone, immortality is gone, our Father, Who guided us by His Providence, is to be no more. Can we find solace anywhere, now that the infinite horizon draws in, and we are condemned to the present life? Who can brighten the clouds, as they take a sober colouring from man's mortality? This is not the question of a philosopher, rejoicing in his strength, and conscious (if we can allow the hypocrisy) that his only ambition is to possess the truth: it is a heartfelt cry, rising up from the people who have to earn their daily bread, and are not provided with the amenities of life. There is to be a religion of the future, since the human race can never forget its dependence; but there can be no cultus where sacrifice, prayer, invocation, mystery, are wanting to justify or support it. Hitherto, no people have lived without religion. Man has looked up to heaven, and thought it the dwelling-place of omnipotent love. Art, literature, and political life have found their inspiration and encouragement in religion, and the greatest empire the world has ever seen, was ruled over by a city which its citizens called "*Templum et fanum deorum omnium*." Religion, true or false, has ruled for thousands of years. Is the new philosophy also a religion?

To these anxious queries, felt rather than expressed, and demanding an answer right down in the heart of the people, we have not yet discovered any luminous or satisfactory replies. The future is to be the reign of Industry, carried through upon principles of Induction; it is to study and consecrate the classic

models of Art, whether Music or Painting ; it is to assiduously cultivate the universal Literature in which all names and nations are destined to take a share. The educated have, therefore, some resource ; their imagination—for this is the religious faculty—will be quieted or exalted by the contemplation of what the greatest men, their brethren in every generation, have been able to copy from all-creating nature. Future civilization will sum up all its work and nobility in the famous motto, "Ernst ist das Leben, heiter ist die Kunst." Every day will bring its earnest task to be fulfilled ; every evening will furnish some occasion for joy and enlargement of heart, in the drama, the opera in its highest forms, and the mutual interchange of social courtesies. This looks fair, in fair weather ; but still we are the result of circumstances, and the many are not yet capable of these airy, unsubstantial pleasures, of the fancy and the intellect. There is another view, not the modern, though far removed from Christianity ; it is the Buddhist pessimism, which, in a hundred passages, Schopenhauer has expressed with appalling energy. Strauss himself is affected by it, and, at the very end, is struck by a painful misgiving that all is not right. The passage in which he expresses the result of all his labours is justified, he thinks, because it is true ; but to our mind no more saddening words are to be found in the range of our present literature. We will translate what he has written, or rather (for it is of small consequence to preserve the wording), we will express its sense, as closely as possible to the original. He says pretty nearly this : "To take away belief in a Divine Providence, is to incur one of the most serious and striking losses which are involved in a rejection of Christian and ecclesiastical teaching. Here is the system of things, one huge machine, with its jagged iron wheels ever going round amid a roaring din, its heavy hammers and giant-pistons which ring out a deafening crash as they come down ; and man, without help or protection, looks upon himself, and discovers that he is placed in the centre of all the wild commotion ; he has no security, not for a single moment, that the wheels, in some unforeseen movement, may not lay hold of him and tear him asunder,—that some fall of a hammer may not smash him to atoms in its descent. The sensation of being abandoned and at the mercy of something else, something which no prayer can reach, is terrible indeed. But what does it avail to delude ourselves ? Our wishes cannot alter the constitution of things, and reason demonstrates that the world is a machine like this. Our comfort must be in the thought of eternal necessity and unbroken order ; for the inevitable course of fate is not merely reasonable, it is Reason itself. Then again we may grow used

to the spectacle of such a world, and take refuge in ourselves, in that inner life which is our own, and is still pleasant." Yes, but with the last faint gleam of day all is over, and "every yesterday hath lighted fools the way to dusky death." This is not a description of God's world, in which we are to strive with hope; it is an account of the abyss and its doomed inhabitants,—of their trembling, their unavailing supplication, their final despair. Surely it is the most complete answer we could have imagined, a refutation, in every sense, of the philosophy from which the everliving God is excluded. What does not satisfy the cravings of our human nature for help and grace and illumination, will never be the religion of mankind. The soul is naturally Christian, and knows its Father's voice.

We may sum up this discussion very briefly. There is a speculation whose roots are in the Life itself, whose development and application bring peace to the conscience, and abiding light, the calmness of a full assurance, to the intellect that is ruled by it. That divine law centres in the Person of Christ, the Son of the Father, but also the First-born of every creature, and the only way to our resting-place. It is humility always, penance and sorrow for sin in a race upon which are the trammels of bondage, hope in the promise of entire redemption, love, full of fear but not cast down, before the Lord of heaven and earth. It goes on from age to age, gathering up into its bosom all that mankind has to offer of beauty, holiness, chastened joy, goodness in thought and deed. No height is above it, no depth below it; no man, till death comes, is wholly shut out from its influence. It is the light of God's countenance, just, and merciful, and compassionate, as He turns to earth and views its children with desire of their love. It is the pledge of a triumph yet to be, when God's grace and man's free will shall have built up the heavenly Sion, and the Vision of Peace shall be for ever.

And there is a speculation, whose roots are in death, and its going forth into the world as the shadow of death. Its accompaniment is pride in the will, doubt in the understanding, rebellion in every lower appetite. Its object is the visible universe, but severed from the Mind and the Hands by which all things were fashioned. Its instrument is a short-sighted logic, arguing swiftly from distorted principles, and making more of difficulties than of evident truths. Its scope is to bring man down from all his hopes and longings, if they tend upwards, and to cheat him with the phantom of an earthly paradise. Its strength is in the passions of lust, the hunger after forbidden knowledge, the weariness of divine things which sets in upon a course of in-

dulgence, whether in avarice, luxury, or concupiscence. Its success would be the ruin of the firmest civilization; its predominance cannot but mean the reign of lawlessness; its defeat, which every human heart must long for, would be the kingdom of the Word Incarnate, fulfilled and manifest in the heart within, in our homes and our cities, in the empires that overspread the earth, in Christendom gathering the human race into one, and recognized as the One Fold of the One Shepherd.

But whilst we are alive to the gravity of our present situation, and especially to the strength and the wonderful success of the Revolution, we are none the less impelled to believe in some divine interference, which may restore Christendom to its normal peace and unity. The very greatness of the evil, and our own inability to cope with it, are motives for a rational expectation, in those at least who admit the teachings of the Church, that all these complications are working towards the accomplishment of the will of Providence. It may be fanatical to predict the manner or the details of the Christian Restoration, and yet be no more than the dictate of enlightened sense to look for the realization of our better hopes. The facts and principles upon which we have touched warrant as much as this, and of those facts and principles no sane man can entertain a doubt. It may even be alleged that the promoters of the Revolution themselves, whether they are to be called Liberals, Conservatives, or Communists, are in a state of alarm about the future, and do not reckon on keeping a permanent hold on the hearts and affections of the people. They are fond of crying out that, at last, the reign of progress has begun, and that their arduous struggle towards the light has brought them into the upper world and to the pleasant sunshine. But for how long? we may inquire. What does their ill-conditioned fear of "Ultramontanes" point to? Can they ignore the Church and its influence upon the millions of faithful throughout the world? Events taking place before our eyes are a sufficient answer, and of a sort that cannot be mistaken. No question that a struggle for supremacy is going on between the old and the new faith: no question either that the partisans of the latter have strong misgivings, which even now may serve to paralyze their efforts. They may possibly believe in their cause: they do not believe in its success.

It is at this turning point in European history that a solemn Act of the Roman Pontiff and the Universal Church is to be recorded as the promise of happier times. We have no wish to indulge our fancy, or to allow enthusiasm to warp our

calmer judgment ; and yet we fear that however we soften our expressions, they will seem far-fetched and unreal to those who do not hold with us. That, perhaps, we cannot help. It may be permitted us to see, in the consecration of the Church to the Sacred Heart,\* an act of the Sovereign Ruler of all things ; and to gather from the circumstances attending it, some part of the designs of our merciful Lord, even though we run the risk of being called mystical and obscure. What interposition of heaven has been rightly taken by men ? Must it not always be the case that they will hit beside the mark, when an event does not square with their previous anticipations and beliefs ? They can make no account of what, if admitted, would ruin their whole philosophy ; nor are we asking them to accept our view. All we say is this, that Catholics who argue from revealed premises will look upon this great occurrence as due, in some special way, to the care and oversight which our Lord has always exercised towards His Church. Seeing the importance of such an act in itself, they will judge that it must be important, too, as happening at this time : and further inspection will lead them to see how admirably it meets the wants and wishes of the servants of God, and to what an extent it satisfies even the desires of those who have wandered from the ways of peace. They will discover the tokens of God's presence in the unnoticed origin, the secret yet steady growth, the final acceptance on all hands, of a devotion, which brings the Incarnation into the centre of our hearts, and Christ into the midst of modern life. We will try to make our meaning clearer.

There is always a close correspondence between things that are antagonistic. It is their very nature to abolish, to negative, to destroy each other. And that is why philosophers tell us that "the knowledge of contraries is one." Since one is the undoing of the other, they must, in some way, be possessed of opposite qualities ; and it is not too much to say, that things which so act upon each other, were meant to do so, and that this is the appointment of the Author of Nature. Now the like may be observed in the order of history ; and similar conclusions will be drawn by every one who does not believe in the theory of Epicurus. The God of History is not Chance

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\* This does not seem too strong an expression. These are the Cardinal Prefect's words, "Many requests from Bishops throughout the world and almost innumerable petitions from the faithful, come daily to our Most Holy Lord Pius IX., earnestly praying that he would be pleased to consecrate the whole world to the Most Sacred Heart. Wherefore His Holiness, in order to fulfil in some way these pious desires, has approved of the accompanying prayer, &c. &c."

or Fate, but the All-seeing, the All-merciful, the All-powerful, to whom free-will itself is no obstacle, even when it is freest. But as the Incarnation was the unravelling of the ancient superstitions, and the answer to the longings of a hundred generations of men, so some further manifestation of that unfathomable mystery will give the solution of our own tangled problems. The Faith once delivered to the Saints cannot be altered, cannot be added to, cannot be increased; but it shines in many lights and adapts itself to any change of circumstances. The light has been broadening and deepening as the objects brought before it have grown more numerous; and if the structure of society be elaborate, multiplied, and complex, what wonder that the truth of God, which knows in itself no vicissitude, should be found equal to the finest wrought machinery of our nineteenth century! As axioms contain a science, so the Faith contains, and contained from the first, an answer to the questions of the day. But that answer is no barren speculation, it is the exhibition to the world of Christ Jesus, the Author and Finisher of our faith, yesterday, and to-day, and the same for ever. Ever since the foundation of the Church, the Sacred Heart was worshipped with divine worship, and contemplated with supernatural love: in these latter days it has been yet more dwelt upon, more constantly invoked, more lovingly studied. The object of our love and worship is ever the same, Christ, the Son of God made flesh; we have only learned to think of Him in this special way as showing us His divine Heart, the living, beating Heart of flesh that suffered and was pierced for us, in which was treasured up the love by which He did all these things, by which He sought us, and saved us, and brought us into His fold.

Devotion to the Sacred Heart draws us to the meditation of a love which is as human as the love a father bears to his children, or a friend to his friend. It sets before us all the pathos and tenderness of such a love, its unwearied service, its generous self-forgetfulness, its constancy under trials and hardships, its enduring fervour even when it meets with ingratitude and neglect. The world has not tired yet—it never will tire—of hearing how love has overcome death, and has triumphed in its own sufferings. Let the story be told ever so brokenly, men will always stay to listen, and will find a consolation in the thought of love itself, though the issue is not triumph, but tragedy and ruin. Much more will the heart be constrained and conquered, as the pages of Holy Writ are unfolded, and the love that endured the passage through our mortal life, that beat in the heart of a child and a boy, that bore with outrage, homelessness, and sorrow, that wept at the grave of Lazarus,

that drew to itself the affection of the poor, the lonely, the desolate, that endured at last to die in an agony of grief and pain, is shown to men for their comfort and imitation. The love itself is so winning, who will not be touched by it? But now, in this is the mystery: that human heart is also the heart of God, that patient love is a love of infinite price, those tears are the tears of our Maker come in the flesh. The story is no longer a beautiful imagination; it is the revelation of the All-perfect, the account divinely-inspired of what He did and wrought amongst men for their salvation; it is the free gift of God which He will never take back from His creatures. Finite and infinite, visible and invisible, knowledge and love, all are united in One person, and that One is like to ourselves, clothed in such flesh as ours, speaking our speech, smiling with our smile, loving with a Heart that throbs like our own. This, we say, is Christ in modern life, and in this is the seasonableness of devotion to the Sacred Heart.

It is the answer to that cry which goes up continually to heaven,—not from the men of knowledge and science, nor from those who are intoxicated with their great power,—but from the many to whom life is a burden, to whom no morning brings joy, no evening offers a prospect of repose. Our Father in heaven is thinking of the millions of poor and ignorant, upon whom the weight of modern civilization presses so heavily. They cannot live without hope, and hope is banished from the reigning philosophy. Man is not immortal, there is no God, and no heaven: and as for those who have not been illumined by science, they are beasts of the field, or, as the pagans said, living chattels; and they should be well content to contribute, by their own immolation, to the spread of knowledge and the advance of mankind. But the Christian Faith tells every man that he is destined to live for ever, that his lot is in the hands of a just, patient, merciful God, that he has a Friend near him to whom he can always speak, and that his whole life may be spent, if he will only choose, under the shelter of God's wings and in the shadow of the Sacred Heart. Hope, joy, strength, encouragement,—all these are contained in the thought of that human love divine.

Distrust of Providence is the sin of our times; and not merely a chance crime, but the outcome of the philosophy which we have described at such length. It implies that the lower life is all we can look for; and experience tells us that, on this side of the grave, most men are filled with hopes which never come to be realized. The pioneers of the new civilization bid us be resigned: but resignation, if it can discover no outlet from its present captivity, is only despair. Now the invitation

to love and imitate the Heart of God is a pledge to us that our mourning shall be turned into joy, and itself holds within it an untold consolation. We know how men work when under the influence of love. Once let the poor and the troubled gain a glimpse of that prospect of future happiness, let them be assured that it is a Divine Friend and Master Who is laying the cross upon them, and they will bear their lot contentedly. The heroic resignation, which is often demanded of the poor, cannot exist, unless the love of Jesus is there to justify it with heavenly motives, and to soothe them with the thought that He has gone into lower depths of sorrow than they can comprehend. The joys of life are mainly anticipations and hopes. What more pleasant than to be able to look forward and count upon a day, when our very trials shall be the cause of abundant and lasting thankfulness! We need go no further into the subject; for it is a matter of experience, and any one can test it for himself, that those who live up to their religion,—that is, those who live in the company of their Lord and Master,—are full of trust and hope, whatever may befall them. And once again, the life of practical religion, at this moment, is and must be derived from devotion to the Sacred Heart. It is essential, therefore, if the multitudes of men are not to lose their belief in Providence, that they should realize in this clear and unmistakable manner the love of God in the Incarnation. Certainly, there are few who would deny that a universal daily homage to the Heart of our Lord is an admirable means to bringing about the end of divisions, and to appeasing the dull monotony under which the greater part of mankind now pass an embittered existence.

We are convinced, too, that cultivated society would be changed to an unheard-of degree for the better, if the like devotion could make its way among the wealthy and educated classes. The calamity of these classes is that knowledge and riches are pursued on their own account, or for the sake of the position they help men to gain. That is the signification of the common lament, that the age of chivalry is gone. Chivalry meant devotion to a person; it meant an heroic service, freely accorded to the merits of one who was recognized as the mirror of beauty and virtue. It was the denial of selfishness, inspiring a generous courage which could draw back from no sacrifice, and thought itself repaid by being allowed to express itself so nobly. How stirring would the times become once more, if men were labouring for this great unseen Monarch, and, instead of referring all to their own advantage, were intent upon heightening the glory, and, so far as in them lay, upon extending the influence of Him Whom they believe to be the sum of all

perfection, and the type of every good thing! Science at the present day is bold, presumptuous, rash,—is without modesty and vitiated by envy and pride; each man works for himself, and thinks he is capable of weighing the universe in his balance, and wresting her secrets, by main force, from nature. How much better to study at the feet of a Master Whose knowledge is infinite, Who is none else than the Word of God, and the ultimate reason of whatsoever is contained in heaven and earth! How men would gain in humility of the intellect, would learn to set the natural below the supernatural, and to confess bravely and constantly that God's wisdom is greater than man's power of penetration! Science then would be fruitful, not only in poor mechanical results, but in the truths which enrich life and which fill us with a spirit of adoration, whilst they lift us out of our petty cares into a region of sublime contemplation. We should have begun, at last, to bring our scattered investigations into the unity which has so long been sought for, and hitherto in vain.

The reflections that suggest themselves are too numerous and intricate to be properly dealt with here; and we must leave them to our readers who are interested in such a train of thought. We will content ourselves with one word more, designed to show what would be the legitimate result of such a devotion to our Lord, in society, whether high or low, and what it is that lies at the foundation of the present system of things. S. Paul has described the time of the great revolt as an age of coldness, of want of love, of heartless concentration in self. These are the characteristics of the nineteenth century. Charity has grown cold, because the hearts of men are given to the perishable creature, and there is enthusiasm everywhere except in the service of God. What is the consequence? The light of reason, as implanted in man, and increasing or diminishing with the whole being to which it belongs, that light, we say, has grown very dim; it has been all but put out by the strength and violence of the passions, or by the exclusive use of the logical faculty. Instead of trying to enlarge their apprehensions of the primary ideas, many have been content to argue from their first weak and vague conceptions, and to admit nothing that could not be fully explained by them. Had they been desirous to know about God, or the soul within them, or the life hereafter, they would have been more accurate and painstaking in their researches, they would not have seized the first opportunity to throw the whole subject aside, and declare that it was a part of the unknowable. Love would have given them light, an ardent desire for the truth would have led them, step by step, to the conclusion, that nothing can be true,

except what confirms the anticipations of the soul. They would have learned that truth is a great treasure, and is not bestowed upon the careless, the haughty, or the self-sufficient; and they would have been patient in difficulties, in the hope of sometime meeting with the amplest reward. The same disposition would have put them on their guard against insidious half-truths, would have kept them from accepting statements which ran counter to the universal sense of mankind and the imperative necessities of the heart. They would have caught, in fine, some glimpse of the momentous doctrine, that our moral being is a help, to an extent which we can hardly surmise, towards the speedy attainment and permanent possession of the truths that most nearly concern us.

But, it may be asked, to what purpose is all this reiterated? If modern society were filled with the love of Jesus Christ, no doubt it would put off its present opinions and manners; but it is not so filled, and how can the consecration of the Church affect that society which is lying in the outer darkness? This is the point to which we were coming. No one would be so foolish as to expect an immediate change in society, consequent on the solemn act in which we have just been engaged. The world can only be drawn to the Sacred Heart by first entering the Church; we do not quarrel with such an assertion, nor are we sanguine as to any visible or wide-spread conversion amongst the adherents of modern views. Our notion is of a different sort.

The Church of Christ is the only messenger of salvation from God, and her credentials are always legible to such as care to inquire into them. But there may come a crisis of unbelief; and then the light, set up by our Lord in the world, must be yet more bright and shining, if men are to gain its testimony and to be convinced of its existence. Devotion to the Sacred Heart seems to be intended to fill the Church with light and fervour, to deliver us from the careless indifference out of which so many of our troubles have sprung, and to kindle into a living faith the languid and sometimes conventional belief of the higher and middle classes. The spirit of independent thought, the greed after hasty and unlawful gain, the desire to forget that mortification is a necessity whilst we are in the flesh, all these evils have been raging outside the Church, and have at last infected many within it. On all hands, indeed, it is confessed, that the multitude of believers are of one heart and one mind; the original notes of unity in doctrine and communion in charity are still the heritage of the Apostolic Church; and yet, we have to deplore the stubbornness of those who wish to be at once Liberals and Catholics, we have to lament that many

among the laity are given over to frivolity, and are hardly to be distinguished from ordinary men of the world. These are sad admissions to have to make, nor are we at all willing to go beyond the mark; we are only referring to what has been repeatedly stated of Italy and France, and is true, to some extent, even of England. The Holy Father himself has declared, again and again, that the present state of things is a chastisement on Christendom, for its coldness in the service of our Lord. What we need is an earnest, enthusiastic loyalty, a steadfastness in word and deed, which refuses to truckle with the principles and opinions of those who call themselves enlightened. It is the half-heartedness of Catholics which paralyzes the action of the Church; for, as we have learned by recent experience, there is no task so disagreeable and difficult as that of dealing with the so-called moderate and Liberal party. The Roman Pontiff has told us all, that Liberal Catholics are, not indeed in intention but in effect, the worst enemies of the Church. Their prudence is of the world, worldly; and their policy, if traced to its legitimate principles, would involve the slavery of the spiritual to the temporal, would secularize every branch of education, and leave us only the name of Christians. We do not speak of the Revolution; we are pointing to those who think a compromise between the Church and modern society not only feasible, but right and becoming. How very alien they are to the mind of the Episcopate and its Supreme Head, may be gathered from the terms in which the Prayer of Consecration has been drawn up. We should imagine that there is absolutely no parallel instance, where the Pope and the whole Church have solemnly prayed against the spirit of disloyalty; and we think no course could be better for a Catholic than to meditate on the force of those words. We are bidden to ask for the conversion of such as are indifferent to the interests of the Church; then we are to go on and pray for the enlightenment of others, Catholics indeed, but obstinate in clinging to their own opinions, who refuse to submit to the decisions of the Holy See, and cherish sentiments at variance with her teaching. This is a most remarkable enumeration; too remarkable to be lightly passed over. It seems to be the case, unhappily, that some have grown tired of loyalty, and take all that comes from the Holy See in a spirit of cold criticism, not resisting, yet not furthering the wishes of the Vicar of our Lord. They look on, make remarks, indulge themselves in sarcasm, and have their highest interest fixed on anything rather than the public universal good of mankind. If once they could learn to be lovers of the Sacred Heart, they would find all this to disappear; they would

no longer be a prey to chagrin or bitterness. And the unity resulting thence would infuse a new vigour into the whole Church, and would allow of that persevering and successful effort by which modern society, in spite of all its imposing defences and its manifold prejudices, would be won over to the kingdom of Christ, and a reconciliation be at last effected. The Holy See cannot put forth its strength in overcoming the world, because so many influential Catholics think it no shame or scandal to be out of sympathy with the Holy See. Were things otherwise, then we might say, in the grand words of a Roman Pontiff, "*Christus vincit, Christus regnat, Christus imperat, Christus ab omni malo populum suum defendat.*"

This is how the world must be converted once more, and the great apostasy of the nations brought to a desirable end. The truth, as it is made known to us in Jesus, must reconcile dissensions, root out abuses, restore the perfect form of Christian science, consecrate the researches and laborious toil which without love would remain fruitless. It has pleased God to prolong the years of our Holy Father to the time of the Universal Jubilee, in which we commemorate the revelations made, two centuries ago, to Blessed Margaret Mary. It has pleased Him also to put this design into the heart of His Vicar, and to fill the whole Church with an expectation of triumph through the Sacred Heart. We hail the act of consecration as a token that God is with us still; as an opening in the clouds to show us the serene sky beyond them; and as the beginning, if we are not unfaithful to our engagements, of a period of growth and expansion in the Church, which must bring with it finally the solution of all problems, social and religious, by the divine light of faith, and the prevailing efforts of love.

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It seems proper to append here the translation of the Prayer of Consecration, italicising the words to which we have above referred. After what has been said, our readers will judge for themselves how far we have rightly interpreted its meaning:—

ACT OF CONSECRATION.

O JESUS, my Redeemer and my God! notwithstanding the great love which Thou bearest to mankind, for whose redemption Thou hast shed all Thy Precious Blood, Thou art yet so little loved by them in return; nay, so much offended and outraged, by blasphemies especially and by profanation of holy days. Oh!—that I could make some reparation to Thy Divine Heart; that I could make amends for the great ingratitude and unmindfulness which Thou dost meet with from the greater part of men! Would that I could prove to Thee how much I desire to love and honour this

adorable and most loving Heart in the sight of all mankind, and more and more to increase Thy glory ! Would that I could obtain the conversion of sinners ; and that I could arouse from their indifference so many others who although they belong to Thy Church, have not the interests of Thy glory at heart, nor of the Church that is Thy Spouse ! *Would that I could obtain also for those Catholics who still prove themselves to be such by many outward works of charity, but who through obstinacy in their own opinions, refuse to submit to the decisions of the Holy See, or cherish sentiments at variance with its teaching, should see their errors, and become persuaded that he who heareth not the Church in all things heareth not God who is with her !*

To obtain these holy desires ; to obtain moreover the triumph and lasting peace of this Thy Immaculate Spouse, the welfare and prosperity of Thy Vicar upon earth, and the fulfilment of his holy intentions ; that the whole Clergy may become more and more sanctified and acceptable to Thee ; for the many other intentions which Thou hast, O my Jesus, in conformity with Thy Divine will, and which may help in any way for the conversion of sinners and for the sanctification of the just, so that we may all one day obtain the eternal salvation of our souls ; and lastly because I know that it will be pleasing to Thy most sweet Heart, O my Jesus,—prostrate at Thy feet, in the presence of Most Holy Mary and of all the Heavenly Court, I solemnly acknowledge that by every title of justice and gratitude I belong wholly and solely to Thee my Redeemer Jesus Christ, the only source of every good that I have in soul and body : and joining in the intention of the Sovereign Pontiff, I consecrate myself and all that I have to this Most Sacred Heart, which alone I intend to love and to serve with all my soul, with all my heart, and with all my strength, making Thy will to be mine, and uniting to Thy desires all the desires that I have.

And, as a public sign of this my consecration, I declare to Thyself, O my God, that I wish in future, in honour of the same Sacred Heart, to keep according to the rules of Holy Church the Feasts of Obligation, and to procure their observance from all persons over whom I have influence and authority.

Uniting therefore in Thy Sacred Heart all these holy desires and resolutions, with which Thy grace inspires me, I trust to be able to give to It compensation for the great injuries It receives from the ungrateful children of men ; and to find for my own soul, and for the souls of all my neighbours, happiness for me and for them all in this life and in the next.

AMEN.

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## ART. II.—A REPLY TO TWO CRITICISMS.—CIVIL SOVEREIGNTY, AND NECESSARY TRUTH.

*Letter on "the Sovereignty in Modern States" ; DUBLIN REVIEW for April, 1875 : signed, " W. P."*

*Letter on " Necessary Truth " ; " Tablet " for March 24th, 1875 : signed " A. P. B."*

THESE two letters have no other connection with each other, except only that they are respectively criticisms of two theories which we have recently advocated. The two subjects, to which they respectively refer, differ from each other as widely in importance as in kind. The doctrine which we have expressed on civil sovereignty, is one which we believe to be true, and which at all events is not to our mind at all shaken by our correspondent's remarks: but we should abandon it without the slightest wrench or conflict of mind, if the weight of adverse argument appeared to predominate; nor can we see that any vitally momentous interests are compromised, whether it be decided one way or the other. On the other hand the doctrine which we have been maintaining in successive articles on necessary truth, is one which (in our humble view) is exceeded by no other as regards its immeasurable importance; inasmuch that we do not see how the Existence of God could be argumentatively established at all, if the doctrine in question were surrendered. We should add however, that " A. P. B." does not surrender it; nor in fact can we see that his difference from us on his main point is other than purely verbal. And now, without further preface, let us proceed to deal with these respective criticisms. As " W. P.'s" letter appeared in our own pages, we suppose it ought to have precedence.

### I.—CIVIL SOVEREIGNTY.

There is one retraction and apology, which is due from us at the outset. When we wrote our article of last October, we had no notion that any educated thinker doubted, as a matter of scientific theory, the correctness of Joseph DeMaistre's statement (quoted by us in p. 273, note), that the Legislature, and not the Monarch acting individually, possesses in England sovereign authority. We find however in various ways that, not only our present correspondent, but other persons also of education and intelligence, dissent from De Maistre on this matter. Had

we known as much last October, we should not have used such unseemly language as we did. We should not have declared that "it would be talking like a baby to say in serious argument that the Monarch is sovereign"; or that to press such "popular language" "in argument, would be to build science on a pun." We must apologize for so speaking (though it was quite unintentionally) concerning persons, who deserve every possible respect at our hands. Nevertheless, as a matter of argument, we venture still to think that their opinion is quite destitute of foundation.

Those who regard the Monarch as *de jure* sovereign over England, must of course inclusively regard her as *de facto* sovereign; because otherwise they would hold, that no allegiance is due from Englishmen to the country's *existing* Constitution and Laws. We must of necessity therefore credit "W. P." with this doctrine, though (as we shall presently point out) some of his language sounds differently; because we know well, that no man living more distinctly recognizes than he does, the obligation which exists in conscience of loyalty to the existing English Government. But the doctrine that the English Monarch is *de facto* sovereign, is to our mind so simply perplexing and bewildering, that we hardly know how to answer it; we hardly know what premisses we can adduce, more self-evident than is the conclusion for which we would adduce them. And then further, when we have managed to put together the various premisses on which we rely, they all seem so undeniable, that we cannot even guess which are those that our correspondent would repudiate. Our best course therefore will be simply to set them down in skeleton outline. He will thus be able to put his finger on those to which he demurs; and we shall be most happy to insert a second letter from him—though it extended to much greater length than the first—expressing his reasons for the demur. Here then follow our premisses, expressed with the greatest attainable brevity.

I. The primary end, for which civil government was instituted, and on account of which it is most absolutely and imperatively necessary, is the protection of person and property; or (as theologians often call it) the preservation of exterior peace. Civil government has also various secondary ends,\* the consideration of which would still further strengthen our argument; but there is no need of introducing such consideration for our present purpose.

II. Any country which possesses no civil ruler must be a

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\* We treated the "intrinsic end of civil government" in our number for July, 1863. We would refer especially to our remarks in pp. 221-224.

prey to savage desolation and degrading anarchy, such as that described by Bossuet in the very powerful passage which we quoted in Oct. 1874 (pp. 269, 270). On the other hand, in any country in which there is *more than one* authority claiming (and admitted by a considerable proportion of the community) to be the supreme acting civil ruler,\* civil war is ipso facto raging. In every peaceful and civilized country therefore, there is one and one only universally recognized supreme civil ruler. Now the "supreme civil ruler" is simply synonymous with the "civil sovereign." And for convenience' sake we will use the phrase "ruler" or "sovereign," and speak of "he" and "him," whether the sovereignty be vested in one individual, or in some organically constituted body.†

III. The *de facto* sovereign then is he, who decides supremely

\* We introduce the word "acting," in order to exclude such cases as those of the Count de Chambord; who claims indeed to be *de jure* sovereign, but does not attempt to act on his claim.

† In fuller elucidation of our meaning, we may be allowed to quote some extracts from our article on the End of Civil Government:—

"If men are to rise from a state of barbarism and civil conflict, if they are to live together even in tolerable ease and tranquillity, it is absolutely necessary that in any given place there shall be some one authority, having so much physical power at its command as to render permanent resistance hopeless. If there be no one authority thus transcendent in physical power,—the peace and tranquillity of society will be disturbed to the very foundation by each man's conflict with his neighbours. On the other hand, if there be more than one body thus pre-eminent in strength,—peace and tranquillity will be hardly less disturbed by the conflict of such bodies with each other. Civil war, if prolonged for any length of time, is nothing less than an inchoate relapse into anarchy; and the same thing may truly be said of protracted invasion, so far as regards the particular region occupied by invaders.

"A state of barbarism and anarchy is so manifestly and so very deeply injurious to men's best and highest interests, that no other proof is needed to show the Divine origin and sanction of civil government.

"This one authority, having so much physical power at its command as to render permanent resistance hopeless, is, of course, the civil government. It may be vested absolutely in one prince, or a number of persons may have an integral share in its administration. In the latter case there must be certain defined relations between those who have a share in it, according to which the supreme authority is exercised; and the sum of all these various relations is the political constitution.

"A man, or body of men, who should give no protection to person or property, would have no claim to the very title of civil government. A civil government which should in some small degree preserve exterior peace, but should not have sufficient power to do so with reasonable completeness, is, as it were, an infant and immature government. A civil government which has power sufficient for that purpose but fails to use it, is ipso facto tyrannical and unjust. The preservation of exterior peace appertains characteristically to the civil government; appertains in a certain special sense, in which no other duties can possibly appertain to it."

and in the last resort, what measures shall be taken by the community for protection of person and property.

IV. As Bellarmine points out ("De Laicis," c. x.), the sovereign might imaginably preserve exterior peace, without the enactment of laws; viz. by interfering, himself or by his deputies, on each particular occasion of disturbance, according to his or their arbitrary judgment. But such a mode of government would be no less degrading and calamitous to the people, than anarchy itself. As a matter of fact therefore, every sovereign governs through a code of laws; which are accepted by the people as issuing from him, and which they recognize in him the power to change at his will.

V. The protection of person and of property is a very large duty, requiring for its performance a legal code of some complication. Let us consider the former item alone. The sovereign must decide (1) by what officials the community shall be protected from violence; (2) by what officials offenders shall be tried; (3) what shall be the rules and forms of trial; (4) with whom shall rest the power of imposing punishment; (5) what shall be the scale of punishment for various offences; (6) by means of what taxes, or how otherwise, these various officials shall be paid; (7) what is to be the constitution of the army and how it is to be paid; (8) what shall be the relation to foreign states; &c. &c. And as regards protection of *property*, a much *more* complicated body of law is necessary, as any one may see on the surface.

VI. He therefore is *de facto* civil sovereign, who is treated by the community as having supreme power over all these arrangements; or in other words, as having power to enact or repeal laws.

VII. In England, to the Monarch as an individual no power whatever is conceded of enacting and repealing laws; and he cannot therefore be the sovereign.

VIII. The Legislature is *ipso facto* and by force of terms the Sovereign. In England the Legislature consists of Monarch, Lords, and Commons, acting towards each other in a certain given relation, which is called the Constitution.

IX. The same thing may be put in a somewhat different way. The English Monarch is bound to obey the Law, just as is any other individual Englishman. Our critic admits this; for he admits in effect (p. 533), that the monarch may not rightly do "a single unlawful act." Since therefore the Monarch is subject to the Law, while the Law is subject to the Legislature,—*a fortiori* the Monarch is subject to the Legislature; and is not therefore sovereign.

To us then it seems an obvious and even elementary matter of fact, that the Sovereign, who at this moment supremely de-

termines how Englishmen's persons and property shall be protected, is the Legislature. And if any one says on the contrary that it is Queen Victoria, we are simply bewildered by such a statement. It is evident to our mind, from our correspondent's language in p. 533, that whereas his theory requires him to hold the latter proposition, facts are too strong for him. He says that "the House of Commons have usurped *practically* [his own italics] the sovereignty"; by which he must mean, that the *de facto* Sovereign of England is the Legislature, whereof the House of Commons is by far the most powerful element. Surely any other view is paradoxical and repugnant to common sense, in a degree which can hardly be exaggerated.

So much on the *de facto* English sovereignty; and we now proceed to our second question, which is this:—Does the English *de jure* sovereignty reside in the same authority, which possesses it *de facto*? In other words, do Englishmen owe conscientious allegiance to the existing English Laws and Constitution? Of course no one, with whom we are now in controversy, would hesitate in giving at once an affirmative answer to this question; but it is for many reasons important to understand the grounds, on which this affirmative answer reasonably rests. In last October (pp. 264–276) we entered into this question at some length, corroborating our argument throughout by the dicta of Catholic theologians. We must hope that persons interested in the present controversy will refer to those pages, as we cannot do justice to our meaning by any abridgment or analysis. The substance however of our doctrine is this:—

1. The authority of civil government is derived immediately, not from God, but from the people. God has imposed on every people the obligation of submitting to some sovereign; but has left it in each people's hands, to decide at starting who that sovereign shall be. Our correspondent "had thought that some theologians hold the contrary opinion"; viz., that civil sovereigns receive their authority immediately from God. We can only say, that we do not ourselves happen to know of any such theologian; and that (as we pointed out) Bossuet, with all his Bourbonite proclivities, on this head agrees entirely with Suarez.

2. When the sovereign has once been appointed, the people are bound in conscience to pay him and his laws faithful allegiance and obedience, within the legitimate sphere of civil government. Whether there be certain extreme cases of tyranny under which such obligation ceases—this is a question, on which theologians differ, and on which it would have been irrelevant to our purpose to express an opinion.

3. In the event of some people having sinfully resisted and

overthrown their legitimate sovereign, it does not follow (however grave their sin may have been), that he continues for an indefinite period to be their *de jure* sovereign. We submitted the question to theologians (p. 292, note) what those principles are, which determine how long his *de jure* sovereignty continues. By consenting to crown Napoleon I., Pius VII. expressed officially his deliberate judgment, that, by that time at all events, Louis XVIII. had lost his right.

4. The ordinary and almost universal means, whereby it may be known whether any given claimant of sovereignty be authorized by the people, is the fact itself of his peaceful possession.

5. Every *de facto* sovereign therefore is *de jure* sovereign, except in certain rare cases, viz., where there is an adverse claimant, who has been *de jure* sovereign; who has been unjustly and sinfully deposed; and who has not yet lost his right. This exception, we need hardly say, has now no application whatever to England.

Whereas then the Legislature — Monarch, Lords, and Commons, acting together in accordance with the Constitution,—is the *de facto* sovereign of England,—so also it is the *de jure* sovereign.

Our correspondent does not, so far as we can discover, argue against any part of this reasoning. But he objects to the conclusion itself (p. 532), and his objection is well worthy of careful notice. The mere fact indeed, that (by what is called a constitutional fiction) the title of "sovereign" is given to the Monarch, will not (we think) on consideration be much pressed by him in argument. But the *oath of allegiance* cannot be slurred over. On our critic's showing, Englishmen who accept our theory could not honestly take that oath; or in other words, could not swear "true allegiance to Her Majesty, Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors." We reply however in the first place, that he himself would never dream of taking that oath, except in the very sense which we ascribe to it. If he really swore allegiance to Queen Victoria as being (in the strict scientific sense) sovereign of England, he would pledge himself (if he will allow us, even as an hypothesis, to make so offensive a supposition) to be on occasion a rebel and a traitor. He would swear that he is prepared to obey any ordinance, falling within the legitimate sphere of civil government, which any future English monarch might issue, though that ordinance were not sanctioned by Parliament or even by any constitutional adviser. Of course he has never sworn, nor ever will swear, anything of the kind. What he intends by his oath is, that he will pay allegiance to the English Constitution and Laws; to those Laws

which the Legislature (represented by Queen Victoria) sanctions, and which the Executive (represented by Queen Victoria) carries into action. This is substantially the sense in which every Englishman takes the oath; though various distinguished persons differ more or less from each other, in their precise way of *expressing* that sense. The Bishop of Clifton, e.g., in his Pastoral of last autumn, gave the sanction of his name to a mode of speech, which has been adopted by various able and learned men. He says that an Englishman, in taking the oath of allegiance, enters upon a "bilateral contract" with the Monarch; he promises to pay her due allegiance, if she will govern according to law. Now as to this mode of speech, we say (1) that it is in no respect a more obvious and literal interpretation of the wording of the oath, than is our own; and we say (2) that it is in substance simply identical with our own. I promise obedience to the Queen, only on condition that she govern legally; i. e. only on condition that she obey the Law; i. e. only on condition that she obey the Legislature. If I only promise to obey the Queen so long as she obey the Legislature, it is plain that my paramount civil allegiance is to the Legislature and not to her.

No Englishman in fact ever misunderstands the oath of allegiance which he takes; nor do we at all mean that we regret the constitutional fiction, which places the Monarch before the people as representative of Law. It is but an infinitesimal part of the population, which looks at things scientifically: and those who are not scientifically cultured, are far more impressed by the majesty and sacredness of Law when that law is embodied in their idea of a *person*, than they could be in any other way. In fact we agree on the whole with Mr. Bagehot's interesting Essay on the English Constitution; and we incline to think that any government, which does not abound in constitutional fictions, is shown by that very fact to be an unwise government. But all this is entirely external to the controversy between "W. P." and ourselves.

From what has been said it is easily seen, how profound is the difference between the Catholic doctrine on civil government, and that anti-Catholic theory which (for want of a better name) we will call "Stuartism."\* If there were an hereditary

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\* This is sometimes called the "divine right," or again the "legitivist" theory: but we indignantly refuse to give it an appellation, which would imply that we are one whit less earnest in upholding the "divine right" of "legitimate" civil sovereignty, than is the extremest Stuartist. What we here call "Stuartism," in our October number we called "hereditism." (See pp. 238-291.) We are not satisfied with either appellation, but cannot at the moment think of a better.

line of monarchs deriving sovereignty immediately from God, it would follow that no concession of the reigning king's could invalidate his successor's right of repudiating such concession. But according to Catholic doctrine (as we set forth last October, p. 275) if some Monarch, hitherto absolute, freely establishes constitutional government, by that very fact he abdicates the sovereignty, vesting it in the new organization which he establishes. From that moment,—to resist the new organization, whether in behalf of this Monarch or any of his successors, is to revolt against the existing sovereign and commit the sin of rebellion.

Now there is a passage in "W. P.'s" letter, which induces us to exhibit the same principle in a somewhat different form. Let it be supposed then that, by a slow, gradual, imperceptible process, the Constitution has been importantly changed; so that those relations which now exist between the various elements of the Legislature, are essentially different from those which existed a hundred years ago. In that case—since the process referred to has proceeded at each moment under the tacit sanction of the sovereign Legislature—we should maintain that it is the Legislature as *now* constituted, which is de jure sovereign; and that such a sovereign body as existed a hundred years ago, has ceased to have rights, as it has indeed ceased to be. This truth is evident also (we think) on another ground, besides that which we have mentioned; because it is the Legislature as *now* constituted which is in peaceful possession, and there is no rival claimant whosoever. Such is our own doctrine. As to our correspondent's, we have seldom seen a more perplexing passage than that which we proceed to cite:—

In the hypothetical case you put of a future king attempting to govern illegally by force, it appears to me that, however wrong he might be, he *could* be no rebel; the king can do no *legal* wrong, though the persons who act illegally by his orders are no doubt responsible. In practice it could not happen; for not only are the taxes, and the purposes to which they are to be employed, in great measure voted annually, so that the machinery of Government could not be carried on unless Parliament were sitting, but not even could military violence be used to enforce payment of illegal imposts, for the Mutiny Act (on which the existence of the army as an organized body is founded) is also voted annually, and renewed from year to year. In fact, the House of Commons have usurped *practically* the sovereignty which strictly speaking they delegate to a body, unknown to the old English Constitution, which is called the Cabinet; and the successive sovereigns have latterly acquiesced in the arrangement: but if ever there arose in England a vigorous king determined to assert his rights, and that from the moment he ascended the throne, he might work a great change without doing a single unlawful act (p. 533).

We must admit at starting, that these remarks oblige us to make one retractation. We hold firmly indeed that the Monarch, like any other individual, is a rebel, if he revolts against the Sovereign placed over him by God. But in October (p. 274) we said further, that the Monarch might justly be punished for his rebellion. "W. P." reminds us of the provision (a very wise one we think) made by the English Law,—that is in other words by the Sovereign Legislature,—that the Monarch is personally exempted from punishment, whatever his offences. It hardly ever happens (we suppose) that a person can be justly punished for an offence, which was not legally punishable when it was committed.

Now however for the rest of the paragraph; and we will begin with one or two minor comments. Surely the House of Commons does not now "practically" possess "the sovereignty"; for again and again the House of Lords throws out its measures. All which can be truly said is, that the House of Commons is by far the most powerful portion of the sovereign body. Still less can we admit that the sovereignty has been delegated to the Cabinet; indeed we do not understand the meaning of such a statement. Nor again can we understand our correspondent's drift, in pointing out that the Cabinet is "a body unknown to the old English Constitution." According to his view, the Constitution has no part in the sovereignty; which latter belongs to the Monarch exclusively. On the other hand according to *our* view, the sovereignty is vested in the Legislature,—not as acting in accordance with some antiquated Constitution,—but in accordance with the Constitution which now exists.

But on the whole passage we ask this broad question. Why is it undesirable that "a future king should attempt to govern illegally by force"? We suppose that the laws, against which the king is supposed to act, are not divine or ecclesiastical, but secular laws. But if he be Sovereign, these laws derive their entire authority from him, and he can repeal them at any moment on his own authority. Nor can we well imagine an occasion on which it would be more reasonable to repeal them, than one on which they impede him in the full exercise of that sovereignty which God has given him. Yet our correspondent's tone is as though secular "laws," which prevent the Sovereign from exercising his rights, had some kind of sacredness, nay were a blessing to the country. In fact the whole drift of the passage, as far as we can make out, is to prove the very thing which we maintain; viz. that the Monarch is not *de facto* sovereign of England. But if he were *de jure* sovereign and yet not *de facto* such, it would follow (as we have already

pointed out) that the existing English government has no de jure claim on the allegiance of Englishmen. And this conclusion certainly would be as monstrous in our correspondent's eyes, as it is in our own.

Here we leave English ground and cross the Channel. And as regards France, we will at once encounter that portion of our correspondent's argument, on which he lays his chief stress. These are his words :—

You seem to think that the fact of Pius VII. crowning Napoleon I. settles the doubt as to his ever having been legitimate sovereign, and that all good Catholics ought to bow to it as a Papal decision to that effect. I am simply amazed at such an opinion. I thought no theologian, however extreme his views, held that the Pope was infallible in matters of personal conduct and policy (p. 534).

Now we directly *disclaimed* the opinion, that Pius VII. was exercising his prerogative of infallibility in what he did about crowning Napoleon; for we said (p. 291), "we do not see how by any means *short of an ex cathedrâ definition*, the Pope could have more emphatically declared the Emperor's de jure sovereignty." We do not understand, however, how the fact that Pius VII.'s decision was not strictly infallible, tends to show that Louis XVIII.'s conduct (see p. 292, note) was worthy of a "truly loyal Catholic." Suppose there is some property in my possession, of which I know that it is not mine, but am not sure whether it belongs to A. or B. I ask my confessor, and he tells me that beyond doubt it belongs to A. I do not like the decision, and so I consult a whole series of learned and able priests; and they all confirm the opinion, that beyond doubt it belongs to A. Under these circumstances, I hand it over to B. The confessors I have consulted were certainly not infallible, separately or jointly; but (to speak very much below the mark) my conduct would certainly not be accounted that of a truly loyal Catholic. The parallel is obvious. My allegiance is due by God's Law either to M. or N. It is not merely a series of confessors, but "the teacher of all Christians," who deliberately implies a solemn judgment that it belongs to M. This question is one of "morals" pure and simple; and by no means, as "W. P." suggests, one of "policy." Nevertheless I pit my judgment against the Pope's, and pay my allegiance to N. Nay the case is even stronger than as we have stated it; for I am led to do this, precisely through holding that anti-Catholic theory which we have called "Stuartism," against the Church's doctrine. Louis XVIII. did all in his power, that the largest possible number of Catholics should act as we have described. The only change which reflection

enables us to make in our criticism of such conduct is, that we understated the ecclesiastical disloyalty of which he was guilty. At the same time it cannot be necessary (we hope) to add, that we confine our remarks entirely to the external course of action which he pursued. We know nothing whatever of the motives which animated him ; and are ready to accept whatever may be urged, as to the amount of invincible prejudice with which he had been imbued by the misfortune of a Gallican and Bourbonite education. For all we know, he may have been as devout as you please in his personal relations to God. But it is important in the interests of religion, that the true character of what he did (if our view be right as to its true character) should be distinctly set forth.

On the other hand, in regard to the response of the Holy See concerning Louis Philippe, we think there is much force in what our critic says ; and so far we withdraw our original statement. The Pope's rescript, we admit, did not necessarily imply more, than that there was solid probability in the opinion of those, who regarded Louis Philippe's Legislature as *de jure* sovereign ; and that those therefore who held that opinion, could lawfully take the oath of allegiance. At the same time we may add our own humble judgment, that the responsibility is so grievous of disturbing a *de facto* government, that no one is justified in resisting it, who is not *certain* that there is a legitimate adverse claimant.

"W. P." thinks (p. 533) it may fairly be urged, "that though Charles X. did wrong, he did not do such grave wrong as to deserve deposition." But we cannot see that he was deposed at all. Our correspondent himself admits it to be very doubtful, whether Charles X. was ever Sovereign ; whether the sovereignty had not been vested, throughout his reign, in the Legislature, of which he was only one portion : and this latter of course is the position, which for ourselves we confidently maintain. On this view, the sovereignty had been vested in three distinct parties, co-operating according to the relations expressed in the Charter. But if one of these three parties under such circumstances refuses to co-operate any longer (in such relations) with the other two, surely the sovereignty is *ipso facto* broken up ; and the community re-enters into its right and obligation, of choosing and submitting itself to a fresh sovereign. Charles X. had never been Sovereign ; and by his own rebellious act he voluntarily abdicated what share he had possessed in the sovereignty. "W. P." adds indeed, that "the people as a body were not consulted as to their new sovereign." No ; but they acquiesced in the peaceful possession of the incoming Government : and this is a no less valid

(while to our mind it is a far more healthy) indication of popular assent, than is a plebiscite.

We observe no other remarks of our correspondent which call for notice; and we will conclude therefore with thanking him for the assistance he has given in fathoming a question, which is of some speculative interest, and has certainly important practical aspects.

## II.—NECESSARY TRUTH.

The second letter which we named at the head of our article, is the following :

STR,—As the time fixed by you for the postponement of the discussion on this subject has now elapsed, and Dr. Ward's answer to Mr. Stephen has appeared in the "Contemporary Review," I hope you will allow me to make one or two remarks.

The whole subject is far too wide to be treated in newspaper correspondence, and I propose, therefore, to allude only to a single point of it, which to my mind, imperatively calls for comment.

At page 536 of the current "Contemporary" Dr. Ward says : "No important philosophical service whatever would be done by merely affirming that it is outside the sphere of Omnipotence to effect what is a contradiction in terms. The thesis which I desire to make good is that certain things are outside the sphere of Omnipotence, which are by no means contradictions in terms. In other words, that certain ampliative propositions are cognizable as necessary."

Such an opinion I must needs consider as most dangerous, and that in two different ways. 1st. It is well known to be a principal object with the infidel philosophers of the present day to limit the sphere of Omnipotence. Their intention is manifest, for they very quickly proceed to apply their philosophical theory to religion, arguing that revealed mysteries are impossible even to God. In this case I think it is incumbent on Catholic philosophers to use the greatest precaution in the use of terms, so as not to give even apparent countenance to the idea of there being any possible limitation of the Divine Power. Dr. Ward does not see the necessity of such caution, quite the reverse. It is very well to speak of the sphere of Omnipotence if by "sphere" you mean a universe, but most dangerous when you show that you mean only a limited sphere, by speaking of things "outside" it.

2. It is so universally laid down by Catholic philosophers that Omnipotence has no limits, except what is really not a limitation at all, the impossibility of effecting the agreement of contradictories, that when Dr. Ward says "certain things are outside the sphere of Omnipotence, which are by no means contradictions *in terms*" (the italics are mine) I suppose for certain that he holds that things may be contradictory *in themselves* without being so *in terms*. Now I submit that this is a most dangerous proposition, and for the following reason. Terms are the signs of ideas. Practically they may not in all cases give adequate expression to ideas, but in philosophy, at

all events, it is assumed that they are capable of expressing ideas, and to say that anything is no contradiction in terms is therefore equivalent to saying it is no contradiction in idea. Thus Dr. Ward evidently maintains that a proposition may be contradictory in fact whilst it is not contradictory in idea. *Per accidens*, owing to a defect of intelligence, no doubt this may be true, but Dr. Ward has excluded this exception in two ways: First, by the addition "by no means," i.e. however fully the idea may be expressed, still there will be no contradiction in terms though it exists actually; and, second, more explicitly, a few lines back, where he says (the italics are mine) "there are ampliative propositions; in which the predicate expresses what has *neither explicitly nor implicitly* been expressed by the subject."

Surely then it must follow from such a doctrine that we may entertain ideas in our mind which *are not* contradictory, whilst the objects which they represent *are* contradictory. But what could be conceived more subversive of all certainty? Every single syllogism resting, as all syllogisms do, on the principle of contradiction, would be thus rendered doubtful in its objective value, for whilst the terms are not contradictory their objects might be.

Dr. Ward might certainly reply—"There are many things which God cannot do, not because they are contradictions in terms, but because some other of His attributes forbids Him to do them"; but this is no real difficulty. The question is not what God can do, but what His *Omnipotence* can do. As far as *Omnipotence* goes, He has the power of doing a thing which would be unjust. The limitation which prevents Him from doing it is not the limitation of His power, but of His will. And as to things which depend upon His Immutability—for instance, that He cannot make void a prophecy—the impossibility is entirely *à posteriori*, and therefore does not enter into the present question, which is entirely *à priori*. The permanence of the natures which He has given to created things depends upon His creative decrees, and is therefore also *à posteriori*. There is nothing which it would be impossible for Him to make on the ground that there is no *ratio* corresponding to it in the Divine Essence, except things which are contradictory in themselves—that is, of course, nonentities. Otherwise His Essence would be limited. If a non-triangular trilateral be not a contradiction in itself, then *à priori* Omnipotence would make it. "*Omnia quaecumque voluit, fecit.*" These are inspired words, on which our language is modelled. If by the mercy of God we save our souls, at the end of the world we shall see that whatever God did not do was "*quia non voluit,*" not "*quia non potuit,*" and as we hope to see the matter then, so I maintain we ought to speak of it now.

There is just one other specious objection which might be taken to my argument. It might be urged, "To say, that 'a whale never existed' is not a contradiction in terms, and yet it is a falsehood which Omnipotence could not make to be truth." No doubt it is not *expressly* a contradiction in terms, but it is *implicitly*, for by "a whale" we mean an actual objective living animal of a certain kind which either is known to be, or at least to have been, in existence. Our idea in this case is a copy of the object, and implies the previous existence of the object. So too with the proposition "the Germans did not wage war with France in 1871," although there is no *express* contra-

diction between subject and predicate, there is a clear *implicit* contradiction for by "the Germans" we do not mean some imaginary abstract Germans, but certain individuals, the King, the Crown Prince, Moltke, &c., into the full idea of whom the fact of their having waged war with France in 1870 enters as a component part, just as "Wellington" and "the conqueror of Waterloo" are pure synonyms.

It is extremely painful to me to be thus obliged to write against one for whom I entertain so sincere a respect as for Dr. Ward, and to whom I most readily and gratefully acknowledge the obligations I have incurred through the medium of the DUBLIN REVIEW, but I think all your philosophical readers will admit that the words to which I have called attention ought not to be allowed to pass without comment. I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

A. P. B.

We \* replied in the "Tablet" as follows:—

SIR,—I have to acknowledge the courtesy with which your correspondent "A. P. B." expresses himself towards me, and of which I am truly sensible.

The question which he raises is undoubtedly one of very great moment, and I should have treated it expressly in a subsequent article of my series. As things are, I will reprint his article in the DUBLIN REVIEW, and make it the occasion of anticipating what I should otherwise have drawn out at a later period. My hands however are so full just now, that I fear I shall not be able to accomplish this before July.

I have already, in many paragraphs of the DUBLIN REVIEW, implied the answer I should give him; nor can I suppose that the difference between us is much more than one of words. In my view, just as in his, "Omnipotence has no limits, except what really is no limitation at all; viz., the impossibility of" creating a "non-ens," an intrinsically repugnant chimera. Moreover, I hold that any proposition, affirming the existence of such a chimera, must lead by necessary consequence to a contradiction in terms. But I think it of great importance for many reasons to insist on the truth, that the number of such propositions is extremely large; including as it does (among many others) the contradictories of all the mathematical theorems which have been or can be demonstrated.

I wish your correspondent had thought of quoting the last words of my article in the "Contemporary," as they bear closely on the question he has raised. "Necessary truths," I say, "are founded on the Nature of God; they are what they are, because He is what He is."—I remain, Sir, faithfully yours,

W. G. WARD.

At the same time there appeared a letter from another correspondent, signing himself "P. B. A.," which seems to us most able and entirely conclusive in favour of what we had said. It appeared however (as will be seen) from a later letter

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\* It will be more convenient in the following discussion, to use the editorial "we," as synonymous with "Dr. Ward."

of "A. P. B.," that "P. B. A." had not rightly apprehended the former writer's meaning. For our own part, we had been entirely unable to comprehend *what* "A. P. B." meant; while "P. B. A." understood him in that sense, which alone (to our mind) his words legitimately bear, but which (as it turns out) was not the sense in which he had used them.

The next week "A. P. B." published a brief and courteous reply to ourselves, with a short stricture on "P. B. A." In the same issue of the "Tablet" appeared a valuable letter from Canon Walker, objecting to one or two statements which "A. P. B." had made. We agree, we need hardly say, with every syllable of the philosophical doctrine contained in Canon Walker's letter; and so, on all points but one, does "A. P. B." himself. He wrote therefore a reply to Canon Walker in such a sense; and from that reply we extract one paragraph:—

There are two classes of things (using the word in a very wide sense so as to include chimeras) which cannot possibly come into existence: viz. (1) those which are absolutely or intrinsically impossible, on account of the incompatibility of the terms; and (2) those of which the production would involve a repugnance to one or more of the Divine Attributes, other than Omnipotence. The former are *à priori*, the latter *à posteriori* impossible.

For our own part, as the Canon had evidently not read our "Contemporary" article and misapprehended therefore the exact point at issue, we published the following short letter:—

SIR,—I have already explained that I cannot pursue in your columns the controversy concerning Necessary Truth, but must reserve for the DUBLIN REVIEW what further I have to say on the matter. Canon Walker's valuable letter, however—with the entire doctrine of which I need hardly say I am in full accordance—suggests to me, that he and "A. P. B." may come to be at cross purposes in their discussion, so far as I am concerned, unless I add a little further explanation of my meaning.

I do not call any proposition a "contradiction *in terms*," unless it contradicts something which its subject expresses. A contradiction in terms, I should say, may be "explicit"; as "this straight line is not straight," "this square is not square"; or it may be "implicit"; as "this straight line is curved," "this square is not quadrilateral."

I will now however instance a different class of propositions. Euclid has proved that the angle in a semicircle is a right angle. Let me take then the proposition, "this angle, which is in a semicircle, is not a right angle." I should not call this proposition "a contradiction *in terms*," nor do I think that it would commonly be so called. But I should say of it, that it leads *by necessary consequence* to a contradiction in terms; that as it stands its two terms are in reality mutually exclusive; that it involves a real contradiction; that it affirms the existence of an intrinsically repugnant chimera,

which (to use Canon Walker's admirable expression) is not "within the sphere of Power"; that consequently there is no disparagement of God's Omnipotence, in saying that He cannot create such a chimera.

I cannot fancy that there is any substantial difference among Catholics on this matter; or, that whatever apparent difference there may be, is other than mainly verbal. But, at all events, I trust I have made my own meaning sufficiently clear.—I remain, Sir, faithfully yours,

W. G. WARD.

To this "A. P. B." made the following reply, and the correspondence closed:—

SIR,—Some of your readers must, I think, have been not a little surprised to learn from Dr. Ward himself, that he considers a proposition, of which the "terms are, in reality, mutually exclusive," to be no contradiction in terms. And I should have been much disposed to wonder at his uttering such a paradox, were it not that he has already shown symptoms of an inclination to agree with Kant, who endeavoured ineffectually to make a similar distinction in discussing the principle of contradiction. Kant objected to the principle of contradiction as expressed in the formula "*Idem non potest simul esse et non-esse*," and proposed to substitute for it "*Predicatum quod rei repugnat illi non convenit*." He is thus refuted by Balmes ("Fundamental Philosophy," Brownson's Translation, book i., chap. xx.). "The first observation of Kant refers to the word *impossible*, which he considers unnecessarily added, since the apodictic certainty, which we wish to express, should be contained in the proposition itself. Kant's formula of the principle is this, 'a predicate which is opposed to a subject does not belong to it.' What is the meaning of the word *impossible*? 'Possible and impossible absolutely are said in relation to the terms. Possible, because the predicate is not opposed to the subject; impossible, because the predicate is opposed to the subject': says St. Thomas, and with him agree all the schools. Therefore impossibility is the opposition of the predicate to the subject; and to be repugnant is the same thing as to be impossible; and Kant uses the very language which he blames in others." Dr. Ward can surely not attempt to deny that "to be repugnant" is the same thing as "to be contradictory"; but at any rate I will prove it from Tongiorgi. In his explanation of the opposition of propositions (*Logica*, lib. ii., cap. 3, art. 2), he defines opposition as "the mutual repugnance of two propositions, which proceeds from the affirmation and negation *eiusdem de eodem*": and presently declares that there is true opposition between contradictories.

But even Kant uses the words "excluded from" and "opposed to," as synonymous. He says (Balmes, *ibid.*), "Whatever is *excluded* from the clear and distinct idea of anything, may be denied of it"; on which Balmes remarks, "A predicate which is *opposed* to a subject is the same thing as that which is *excluded* from the idea of anything; 'does not belong to it' is the same as 'may be denied of it.'"

It must, therefore, be abundantly clear that the three words "contradictory," "repugnant," and "mutually exclusive," are simply synonymous.

If in trying to prove a thing impossible I should say, "It is a contradiction in terms, *because* the terms are mutually exclusive," I should only be ridiculed for tautology. Nevertheless Dr. Ward's whole theory does really depend, as he implies in his last letter, upon his establishing a difference between "a contradiction in terms" and "terms mutually exclusive of one another"; and it may fairly be argued that the theory is *in extremis* when its existence has to be staked upon such a distinction without a difference.

Dr. Ward's difficulty, however, is capable of easy explanation. Implicit contradictions may be distinguished as those in which the contradiction is either *mediately* or *immediately* evident. Both are equally contradictions in terms; for this reason, that the question of mediateness depends entirely on the intellectual capacity of the observer. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas, in treating of propositions *per se nota*, which are the positive form, or the reverse of contradictions in terms. He says (1, 2, q. 94, art. 2) that such a proposition as "the whole is greater than its part" is *per se nota* to the mass of mankind; but this "*Angelus non est circumscriptivè in loco*" is not *manifestum rudibus*. In the same way he would say (supposing for the moment that Euclid is a true analytical science\*) that the proposition "The angle in a semicircle is a right angle" is *per se nota* to a mathematician, to whom it is immediately evident; but not to a schoolboy, to whom it is but mediately evident. Nevertheless, it is in itself *per se nota*, and its denial is a contradiction in terms; since it is only *per accidens* that the schoolboy cannot see the contradiction immediately, the fault being in him, and not in the proposition.

For my own part I was quite content to suspend the discussion of this

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\* This episodical parenthesis refers to a theory, which the writer had expressed in his brief reply to "B. P. A."; viz. that geometrical truths are not really cognized by mankind as necessary, because philosophers cannot prove "the permanent and the universal symmetry of extension." Of course our divergence from him on this head is not regarded by him as a reason for accounting our philosophy dangerous to religion; because notoriously the whole body of Catholic writers oppose him on the subject, and teach exactly what we hold. Thus S. Thomas ("*Summa*," c. i. q. 82, a. 1),—speaking of the proposition that "the three angles of a triangle taken together equal two right angles,"—says that the "necessity" of this proposition is "natural and absolute," and arises "from a principle intrinsic" to itself. Since however such is our critic's doctrine on geometrical truths, it will be better in what follows to take our chief illustrations from arithmetic; as his reasons for doubting the necessity of geometrical truths have no bearing on arithmetical.

In saying that his doctrine on geometrical truths differs from the unanimous teaching of Catholic philosophers, we are not for a moment intending any invidious appeal to authority. On ground so purely philosophical, he has of course every right to hold that opinion which to him may seem conformable with reason; and if at any time he may be led to put forth in detail the arguments which have led him to his conclusion, we will give them every attention. We must express regret however, that in his reply to "B. P. A.," he has thought fit to call the opposite doctrine "a schoolboy notion." Is not such a term objectionable, as applied to the avowed doctrine of S. Thomas?

subject until July, and I have expressly limited myself in this letter to answering that of Dr. Ward in your last issue. But if I am attacked in turn by a third person, Dr. Ward cannot expect me to remain silent.—I am, dear sir, yours sincerely,

A. P. B.

*April 13.*

Far from at all complaining, we are very glad that our critic published his last letter; for it was not till we read that letter, that we had any definite idea what was his controversial position. In all our experience we have met with none more singular. It may be summed up as follows.

I. The particular point, on which he thinks our position "most dangerous" to religion, is what we had said on the sphere of Omnipotence. On this matter we do not differ from him by so much as a hair's breadth.

II. The only question on which he has really argued against us is, whether a certain phrase, which occurred once incidentally in our "Contemporary" article, have or have not been used by us in its legitimate and proper sense.

III. Nevertheless this difference of terminology between him and ourselves suffices, in his opinion, to prove, that our "theory"—precisely identical though it be with his own—"is in extremis."

Let us take all this in detail. And first, what is his own doctrine, on the mode of harmonizing with Divine Omnipotence the existence of necessary truths? It may be expressed as follows; and, for the reason given in a preceding note, we take our illustration from arithmetic instead of geometry. It is a necessary truth, that  $356 \times 184 = 65,504$ ; or, in other words, it is outside the sphere of God's Omnipotence to effect, that  $356 \times 184$  shall be either more or less than 65,504. Is God's Omnipotence then compromised? God Himself forbid! Take such a proposition for instance as the following: "64,514 objects are here arranged in 184 rows, each row containing exactly 356." Such a proposition involves a contradiction; its terms are mutually incompatible; it affirms the existence of a "non-ens," of an intrinsically repugnant chimæra. Omnipotence is the power of doing whatever falls within the *sphere* of power.\* But to create a non-ens does *not* fall within the sphere of power; it would involve foolishness in God even to contemplate the idea of creating,† what is intrinsically incapable of existence.

Those who have read "A. P. B.'s" letters with any care,

\* This last admirable expression is Canon Walker's.

† This very true and forcible way of putting the matter occurs in "A. P. B.'s" reply to Canon Walker.

will see that we have stated his doctrine with perfect accuracy ; and we now proceed to observe, that we agree with it in every single particular. What then is the point at issue between him and ourselves? A question of pure terminology. Let us revert to the proposition already cited, that "64,514 objects are here arranged in 184 rows, each row containing exactly 356." For facility of reference, we will call this "Proposition Z." We say, as our critic says, that Proposition Z is intrinsically repugnant ; that it involves a contradiction ; that its terms are mutually exclusive and incompatible : but we do not call it—whereas he does call it—"a contradiction in terms." His whole criticism comes to this :—that our theory on necessary truth is "most dangerous," because we use the phrase "contradiction in terms" in a different sense, from that which he regards as the more appropriate. Never surely was so much good zeal thrown away on so trivial an offence. But when he proceeds to say that this terminology of ours proves our "theory" to be "in extremis"—that theory all the time being precisely identical with his own,—we can no more understand his meaning, than if he wrote in Sanscrit.

As regards this trivial verbal question, we have been in the habit of thinking that Catholic theologians and philosophers use the terminology we have adopted. We have been in the habit of thinking that, according to Catholic usage, the phrase "contradiction in terms" is not applied to *all* intrinsically repugnant propositions, but only to one particular *class* of them ; to those namely, which may be expressed in the form "A is not A," or (in other words) which directly contradict something expressed in the subject. We cannot better illustrate what we mean, than by the geometrical propositions mentioned in our second letter. (1.) The proposition that "this straight line is curved"—directly, though but implicitly, contradicts what is expressed in the subject ; because the word "curved" precisely means "not straight." (2.) The proposition that "this straight line is not straight"—directly and explicitly contradicts what is expressed in the subject. Either of these two propositions may be put into the form "A is not A" ; and we call either of them a "contradiction in terms" implicit or explicit. But (3.) of a different kind is the proposition, that "this angle which is in a semicircle is an acute angle." This latter proposition (according to the ordinary Catholic opinion that geometrical truths are necessary) is intrinsically repugnant ; its terms are mutually exclusive and incompatible : but it does not directly contradict (either explicitly or implicitly) anything expressed in the subject, and we do not therefore call it a "contradiction in terms." Yet on the other hand it

leads *by necessary consequence* to a contradiction in terms; because, since I know by reason that every angle in a semicircle is a right angle, the proposition before us would land me in the conclusion, that "this right angle is not a right angle." In regard then to the proposition that "this angle which is in a semicircle is an acute angle"—we have been in the habit of thinking, that it would not be called by Catholic writers a "contradiction in terms." They would say of such a proposition, that "it *involves* a contradiction," because it leads *by necessary consequence* to a contradiction in terms; but they would not say, we think, that it is itself a contradiction in terms.

Our critic however has evidently paid more attention than we have to this portion of terminology; and we are quite prepared for the possibility, that our view of Catholic verbal usage may be a mistaken one. He has the issue then entirely in his own hands. Let him adduce a sufficient catena of passages to make it pretty clear, that Catholics ordinarily call *all* intrinsically repugnant propositions by the name of "contradictions in terms." If he were to succeed in this, he would succeed in altering our future "*modus loquendi*." We should think it inexpedient to use the phrase, in a sense different from that of approved Catholic writers; and we should therefore set to work to invent some other phrase for our own purpose.

Still, as *at present* advised, we should *not* apply the phrase "contradiction in terms" to the proposition that "this angle in a semicircle is an acute angle"; or again to the arithmetical proposition, which we have called Proposition Z. It may be asked however, whether we should call these propositions "contradictions," even without adding "in terms." And again it may be asked, whether we should call the terms of such a proposition "mutually contradictory." As at present advised, we should *not* so express ourselves in either case. We should not call two terms "mutually contradictory," unless in one term were expressed the *contradictory* of something expressed in the other term. But on all these trivial matters of language, we speak entirely under correction of such Catholic authorities, as "A. P. B." may adduce against us.

Nothing now remains, except to comment on various statements, which our critic and ourselves have incidentally made.

I. At the beginning of our first letter we said, that the question raised by "A. P. B." would have had to be expressly encountered by us in a later part of our series. This circumstance would have occurred thus. In our present course of articles, we hope to establish on argumentative ground the

Existence of that Being, Who, as being infinitely Perfect, is inclusively Omnipotent. An objection might be at once raised against this conclusion, drawn from the very doctrine of necessary truth which had borne so important a part in establishing it. "How can a Being be called Omnipotent, who has no power of reversing whatever is included in this vast mass of necessary truth?" To this we should, as one answer, have made the reply which has now been set forth. An "Omnipotent Being" is "One Who can do whatever falls within the sphere of power": but the contradictory of a necessary truth is a non-ens; and to create a non-ens, does *not* fall within the sphere of power.

There is a second answer to the objection, which of the two we rather prefer, as exhibiting more fully the whole truth. We expressed the foundation of this answer in our "Contemporary" article. "Necessary truths," we said, "are founded on the Nature of God: they are what they are, because He is what He is." This is the ground taken by F. Kleutgen in so many words; and substantially also by F. Franzelin.\* In January, 1874 (p. 31), we thus set forth our reply to the objection supposed:—

On this, as on other occasions, we have often given, as a special explanation of the term "necessary," that the reversal of a necessary truth is external to the sphere of Omnipotence. It is possible that here and there some Catholic may have been startled by this expression, as though it implied some disparagement of God's Attributes. Now since a very few words will suffice to remove any such misapprehension, those few words had better be inserted.

On a former occasion we laid down the following proposition, as that for which in due time we shall contend. We consider, with FF. Kleutgen and Liberatore, that all necessary truths are founded on God's Essence; that they are what they are, because He is what He is. Let us suppose then any Catholic to make the objection we suggested above. We would ask him, whether there is any disparagement to God's Attributes, in saying that He cannot destroy Himself; that the destruction of God is external to the sphere of Omnipotence. On the contrary, he will answer, God's Attributes *would* be intolerably disparaged, if He were *not* accounted Indestructible: Existence is involved in His Essence. Secondly, we would ask, whether there is any disparagement of God's Attributes, in saying that He cannot change His Nature; that He cannot make Himself, e.g., mendacious, unjust, unfaithful to promises. On the contrary, the Immutability of His Nature is

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\* "*Totus ordo metaphysicus constituitur legibus necessariis essentialium, quæ leges ideo sunt necessariae quia Divina Essentia eas postulat. Unde ipsa Essentia Divina, non liberâ voluntate sed ex necessariâ Suâ Perfectione, est fons et mensura totius etiam veritatis ordinis metaphysici.*"—De Deo, p. 316.

perhaps what is in my mind more than anything else, when I speak of His Greatness. But if He cannot change His Nature, it follows that He cannot change what is *founded* on His Nature; that He cannot change necessary truths. In saying then that the reversal of a necessary truth is external to the sphere of Omnipotence,—so far from disparaging God's Attributes, we are extolling the Immutability of His Nature.

II. In regard to the theorem that "the angle in a semi-circle is a right angle"—and by parity of reason in regard to every other demonstrated mathematical theorem—our critic says (in his last letter) that such theorem is *in itself* per se notum; and that, if it is not per se notum to a schoolboy, such circumstance arises from the latter's intellectual deficiency. We cannot think (as he does) that S. Thomas holds this doctrine; and as regards the passage to which he refers, we are extremely surprised he has failed to observe, that S. Thomas is expressly treating therein, not demonstrated theorems, but exclusively "*principia prima demonstrationum*." On the other hand, let him refer to S. Thomas's Summa I., q. lxxxii., Art II. Again, Liberatore, e.g. ("Logic," c. 2, a. 7) expressly lays down, that "by means of reasoning *new truths* are discovered."\* At the same time here, as once before, we are as far as possible from implying, that, while he is on *purely philosophical* ground, "A. P. B." is bound even by the unanimous dictum of Catholic philosophers, if he thinks reason to be against them. But for our own part we certainly cannot concur with his remark. It seems to us, that I may understand most fully all which is meant by "an angle being placed in a semicircle," and all which is meant by "a right angle"; and yet be very far indeed from knowing, that "every angle placed in a semicircle is a right angle." Again it seems to us, that I may know the whole of what is meant by " $356 \times 184$ ," and the whole of what is meant by " $65,504$ "; and yet be very far indeed from knowing that " $356 \times 184 = 65,504$ ." Surely in either case I arrive at my knowledge of the theorem, not by pondering its terms, but by combining with each other certain axioms.

To prevent however any possibility of misconception, as to the sense in which we use the phrase "contradiction in terms"—we will make one further remark; though there is no need of here insisting on it. "A. P. B." says that "*propositiones per se notæ*" are "the positive form or the reverse of 'contradictions in terms.'" There are many "*propositiones per se notæ*" however, of which we should not ourselves dream of

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\* "*Mens aut comparatione principiorum inter se novas earundem relationes dispicit aut [ &c. ]*" "*Ratiocinatione novæ veritates deteguntur.*"

saying that their contradictories are "contradictions in terms." Such is the proposition: "Every trilateral figure is triangular"; or " $(a-1) + (b+1) = a+b$ "; or any other axiom, of the class which we call "ampliative."

III. In "A. P. B.'s" first letter is the following passage:—

Surely then it must follow from such a doctrine [as Dr. Ward's] that we may entertain ideas in our mind which *are not* contradictory, while the objects which they represent *are* contradictory. But what could be conceived more subversive of all certainty?

We wish we could more clearly apprehend the meaning of this passage. We do not know whether the following remarks meet in any way what our critic intends; but at all events we set them down, for what our readers may find them to be worth.

Take Proposition Z. How many are there of even the most highly educated men, who would even guess, on hearing it, that this proposition is intrinsically repugnant? Not one, unless perhaps some arithmetical prodigy. But this proposition is only one sample of other million millions. The number is literally inexhaustible of arithmetical propositions, which are intrinsically repugnant, but of which no one would even guess the repugnancy till he had worked out the sum. So much is indubitable, and will of course be admitted by our critic. But some higher creature may see various propositions to be intrinsically repugnant—and God may see a still further number of propositions to be intrinsically repugnant—of which the human faculties (however keenly exercised) would entirely fail to see the repugnancy, from unacquaintance with this or that necessary first truth.\* For instance, Catholics know by faith that a Divine Nature, not possessing the attribute of "Fecundity," is an intrinsically repugnant chimæra; but the human faculties of themselves could not ever so distantly have guessed this truth. Nor do we see how such a circumstance can have any tendency to engender scepticism. We do not see in fact how ignorance can ever foster scepticism, unless that ignorance be mistaken for knowledge.

IV. Our critic (first letter) thinks it "most dangerous" to say, as we have said, that chimæras are "outside the sphere of Omnipotence." Suarez however ("Metaphys.," Disp. xxx., sec. 17) says that they are "extra objectum Omnipotentiae."

V. We do not think that "A. P. B." expresses himself

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\* "*Est evidens non posse lumen nostrum naturale esse regulam eorum, quæ in re ipsâ veram repugnantiam includunt aut non includunt.*"—Suarez, "*Metaphys.*," Disp. xxx. sec. 17. See the whole passage.

correctly—though the question of course is substantially a verbal one—when he says (first letter) that “as far as *Omnipotence* goes, God has the power of doing a thing which would be unjust.” God is a Being unalterably just; and surely it is intrinsically repugnant that He should act unjustly. On this point therefore we follow Canon Walker, and dissent from “A. P. B.”

On the whole we thus sum up what we have urged. As to what we had said concerning the sphere of Omnipotence, there is not even the shadow of a difference between our critic and ourselves. The controversy he has raised turns almost exclusively on the purely verbal question, whether it is he or ourselves who use the phrase “contradiction in terms” according to the sense given it by Catholic writers. We believe it is we who have spoken in accordance with them, and that his comment is a mistaken one; but should the case prove otherwise,—there is on one philosophical conclusion we have ever maintained, which would be ever so distantly affected by the circumstance. No other result would ensue, except that (as it is inexpedient to use any phrase in a sense different from that unanimously adopted by Catholic writers) we should be obliged to devise some other phrase for expressing an idea, which peremptorily *needs* to be expressed.

In justice to ourselves we must make one final remark. We do not think it possible for any one to read with care that passage of ours from which “A. P. B.” made his extract, without seeing what it was which we intended to express, by the phrase a “contradiction in terms.” We think therefore we have ground of just complaint against our critic; because he has brought against us the very grave charge of advocating a “most dangerous” theory—that is, most dangerous to religion—without taking due care to ascertain what our theory *is*. On the other hand we have to thank him sincerely for the courtesy and even kindness towards us with which he has written. Moreover we entirely agree with what is evidently his opinion; viz. that in these days all the chief speculative dangers which threaten religion originate in an unsound philosophy. We heartily admire the zeal of any one, who, when he believes on good grounds such danger to impend, comes boldly and outspokenly to the rescue; and we hope that, after the explanations we have given, our critic has less dread of our own theory than he had before. We have the more reason for so hoping, because his own doctrine on the sphere of Omnipotence is identical with ours, except as regards the point—almost entirely a verbal one—which we have just mentioned under the number “V.”

### ART. III.—SECULARISM IN ELEMENTARY EDUCATION.

*Elementary Education Act, 1870.*

*Elementary Education Act, 1873.*

*Agricultural Children Act, 1873.*

*Instructions to Inspectors on the Administration of the New Code.*

*Verbatim Report of the Debate in Parliament during the progress of the Elementary Education Bill, 1870.* Published by the National Education Union.

*Report of the Committee of Council on Education, 1873-874.*

WE shall make no attempt to prove that the present attacks against the Catholic Church can only be successfully withstood by the spread of a precise, accurate, and reverential knowledge of Catholic doctrine. The very instinct of self-preservation dispenses with all proof. Even were this not aroused, the attacks of numerous various and experienced foes, all converging on the same point, would show beyond doubt where lies the vital stronghold of the faith. Accordingly, after the failure of approaches from points theological, scriptural, ethical, and political, the true key to the position has been found; and the cry is, "Let us throw aside our long-trusted weapons; they are blunted, broken, worthless against the keen defence. We cannot despoil those who have the faith; let us endeavour to prevent the young from acquiring it. Let the school, then, be the point of attack; and let each one mask his advance with as much cunning as he can command." The true secret being at last found by common instinct, a tacit alliance has been made against the Catholic school. We admit that this is true science; for it is easier to starve the acorn than to uproot the sturdy oak, to deprive the baptized child of Catholic instruction than to make him reject, when once it has taken root, the one faith which alone satisfies the questionings and cravings of the intellect and heart of man.

That the school is the common point of attack is evident to the most superficial observer. The materialist Huxleyite would pursue even with persecution the teachers of an exclusively Catholic school. The Bismarckian upholder of the Divinity of the State would banish Catholic teaching from the school, or

enforce upon it heretical instruction. The ordinary sound Protestant cannot understand why Catholics are not content to learn merely what he considers the common truths of Christianity in public State schools. The Anglican objects to the school which teaches the errors of Rome. The Dissenter—the most sectarian of men—cries out that to support a Catholic school is to promote sectarianism. And the philosophical social reformer hates the Catholic school, as the personification of that public nuisance “the religious difficulty.” These various forces are each represented by able men of great literary power, and some of them by “men of blood and iron.” They have gained over not a few kings and legislatures, and the noise of the conflict has descended from Parliament to the cottage. But far above the din and confusion, undaunted by force, uninfluenced by sophistry, the infallible voice of the Head proclaims the mind of the Church, and condemns every system of education, however speciously defended, which prohibits the teaching of religious knowledge in the public schools. Many had been half gained over to the pernicious idea, that religion ought to be taught apart from the school; and secularism saw victory almost within its grasp. The Syllabus, however, unmasked the enemy, and was accordingly received with a cry of rage. From the moment of its publication to the present day, the attacks of secularism in one shape or another have been unceasing; but the defences of Catholic principle have grown more vigorous, for men have become more clear-sighted under the guiding light of its teachings.

In England, as in other countries, attacks have been made, and a system has grown up, and has been adopted by the nation at large, which no Christian can defend as in itself a desirable one. This system is beginning to have a marked influence on the relation of Catholic elementary schools to the State; and therefore we are sure we shall have the patient attention of our readers to the remarks we are about to make on this subject, relating chiefly to the amount of freedom of religious teaching enjoyed by our schools, their relation to the State and school boards, and the amount of security they possess with regard to the future. If some of the details may appear to the general reader of little importance, it must be remembered that it is only by such indications, often petty in themselves, that the future course of events can be at all accurately foreseen or guessed. Indeed our chief object in writing is less to give information for its own sake than, from an exposition of the changes in our position which have arisen since 1870, to induce Catholics to watch more narrowly the signs of the times, and to labour to defend against all attack whether legal or administrative the strictly Catholic character of our schools.

When last we wrote on this vitally important subject (April and July, 1872) we advocated two conclusions. On one hand we maintained, that there was nothing in the Act of 1870 which rendered it *impossible* that thoroughly good Catholic education should be given in Catholic schools receiving aid from the State. On the other hand, we urged that this result was rendered far more *difficult* by the new Act; and that, moreover, there was most serious danger, lest the evil principles so unhappily sanctioned by the Legislature should receive an increased and most alarming development. We deeply regret to say that our worst fears at this moment tend to being realized.

The first indication of the changes, which have since then been so rapidly introduced, appeared even before 1870, in the Government requirement that those who applied for building grants should agree to accept the Conscience Clause. This apparently harmless measure, once introduced, produced consequences which ought to have been foreseen. The strictly denominational character of such schools was thus in principle destroyed. Those who objected to this condition were debarred from Government aid towards the building of new schools; but still the grievance was little felt by Catholics, who for the most part, distrusting such connection with the State, built their schools entirely from their own resources. The step, however, from the permissive to the compulsory is but a small one in England; and Catholics soon found that the large sums, which they had thus relinquished for the sake of preserving the thoroughly Catholic character of their schools, did not purchase for them that immunity from State interference in religious teaching which they had hoped to secure. Having lost the building grants to avoid the Conscience Clause, they found the latter imposed upon them by the new Act, without any compensation for the price they had paid to escape it. The clause at first affected building grants only; it was now extended to all schools which received any kind of assistance whatever from the State. Not only was it extended to all aided schools, but its force and application became more clearly defined; and by means of a strict time-table, introduced to secure its operation, it brought the interference of the State to bear upon the very arrangement of each hour of the school day. Religion must be treated as a thing apart from the ordinary teaching of the school, and strictly confined to what may be called non-official hours. This latter restriction has been found in practice to limit the opportunities for religious teaching by the clergy in large towns; surrounded as they are by other pressing duties, which often make it impossible for them to be free at the particular hour appointed in the time-table.

The State having thus banished religion from the Government hours, it followed as a consequence that there would be no danger to the religious feelings of Protestant parents if their children frequented a Catholic school, and therefore it was required by the law that no child should be refused admission to a Catholic school on religious grounds. A Catholic school must now receive as many Protestant children as like to present themselves, even at the risk of thus filling up places which ought to be occupied by the Catholic children for whom the school was built. Would it not be reasonable to demand some alteration of this part of the law, so that a child might be refused admission to a denominational school on the ground that sufficient accommodation existed in a school of his own denomination, or in a Board school? This is required by the justice of the case, apart from the expediency of keeping up the Catholic character of any particular school.

The Code provides, that no school shall receive a grant amounting to more than half the cost of each scholar's education for the year; and the Act declares, that no religious school shall obtain aid from the rates: it follows, therefore, that at least half the cost of the education of a Protestant child attending a Catholic school must be borne by the subscriptions of Catholics, even though he attend the school to the exclusion of a Catholic child. Moreover, if such a law were taken advantage of to any great extent, Catholic teaching would lose much of its power over the minds of the children; for it would frequently happen that what would entail on a Catholic child the reproach of a grievous sin—e.g., spending the Sunday morning in the fields instead of attending at Mass—would be passed over without blame in the case of the boy next him who might probably be a Protestant.

But, in fact, we have to look to the future for the further logical developments of the Conscience Clause. In England there is no more potent argument for the advance of legislation in a given direction than that the principle has already been admitted in previous Acts of Parliament. This gives us reason to fear that the further advance of secularism in education will seize the position thus afforded; and that its advocates will argue that, as a Catholic school must admit scholars of every religion, and as the master as well as priest is prohibited from teaching religion during the ordinary school hours, therefore there can be no necessity why Catholic schools, as such, should be aided or even permitted by the State. Indeed why should denominational training colleges be supported by public grants, when, under the Conscience Clause, the masters are to teach children of all religions during the ordinary school hours, and are to teach the children of their own denomination only at a period

unrecognized by the Government, and external to the ordinary school teaching? Again, if, under the Conscience Clause, Industrial Schools have been established by School Boards, why should those be supported which do not admit the Clause? We fear that a principle has been admitted, which will work injury from the University to the Workhouse.

We are aware that many rest satisfied on the ground of the general fairness of public opinion, and of the fidelity of governments to contracts with religious bodies; but we contend that the introduction of the new legislation brought with it a rude instance of the facility with which Governments and Parliaments shake off obligations formally contracted with religious bodies. For instance, the agreement with the Poor School Committee, that only Catholic Inspectors should be appointed to examine Catholic schools, was set aside without the smallest difficulty, upon an argument similar to that which we fear will work still greater mischief in the future. It was said that as the Inspectors were not allowed to examine in religious matters, and the Conscience Clause secured the admission of children of all religions and banished religion from the ordinary school teaching, there was clearly no need of maintaining the former arrangement. On this subject Lord Robert Montagu asked Mr. Forster whether under the Act "it was intended to obtain power to send any one of the Inspectors (of whatever religious denomination he may be) to inspect the schools of a different denomination." He also asked Mr. Forster "how he proposed to alter the present system of inspection without breaking the contracts with the religious bodies?"\* And again, "whether the religious bodies had consented to let their contracts with the State be broken?"† Mr. Forster said, "they did not consider themselves bound to ask the religious bodies, and that they had not done so." We do not know, what answer the Poor School Committee gave to this declaration; nor what efforts were made by Catholics during the progress of the Bill to claim that "separate treatment," which our peculiar position demands, and which we had hitherto enjoyed. It was fairly assumed that the different Protestant sects had much in common, and might be satisfied by some common system; but we should have thought that Catholics would have resisted every attempt to deprive us of our former position, or to merge us into a system which, however acceptable to others, must, in

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\* Verbatim Report of the Debate in Parliament during the progress of the Elementary Education Bill, 1870. Published by the National Educational Union, p. 34.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 32.

its developments, be found injurious to us. However unsuccessful such efforts on our part might have been, they would probably have produced at least this most profitable effect:—it would have been known that we felt ourselves injuriously affected by the breach of a formal engagement; and that what suited others well enough, might prove a grievance to us. A further favourable consequence would probably also have been gained; inasmuch as our complaints would lead fair-minded men, at least in the future, and before committing themselves publicly to any particular course, to make inquiry into, and give fair consideration to our wants and feelings.

During the debates on the education question in the House of Commons, not a single Catholic member spoke on the subject of the Bill. Lord R. Montagu was not then a Catholic. In the House of Lords only one Catholic peer spoke on the Bill; and he, referring to this very subject of the violation of the contract with the Poor School Committee, said, "Many years ago they came to a specific understanding with the Government on the subject of education; and received various privileges, such as that of having Inspectors of their own religion. These privileges they were now asked to give up, and he might remark that they relinquished them with a good grace, in order to show their desire to promote the education of the country at large."\* The nobleman who spoke these words possesses the esteem and respect of all Catholics, for the personal labour and the large sums he has bestowed on the education of the poor, and also for the leading part he has taken in the conduct of Catholic affairs. From his well-known character, we feel that he would be the last to deprecate fair criticism on the policy pursued by Catholics at the great crisis of 1870. Indeed the crisis is not yet over, and the final shape which the relation of our schools to the State will assume remains still a subject of anxious consideration; and therefore it may not be out of place to state objections against what has already been conceded with a view to our safe conduct in the future.

With regard then to the statement made in the House of Lords, we cannot see how the relinquishment of our former privileges has affected, either for good or evil, "the education of the country at large"; on the other hand, we fear there was much danger to ourselves in such a concession. We believe that the strictly denominational character of our schools has thereby been weakened, and proportionate progress has been made towards the complete absorption of our schools—formerly

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\* Verbatim Report, p. 531. Published by the National Education Union.

perfectly Catholic—into the public school system of a non-Catholic State. Moreover it affords an apparent sanction to arguments, which may eventually injure us deeply; and opens the door to such a provision, as one lately introduced into the Code of 1875.

It was argued that as Inspectors were to fulfil a simply secular office, without touching on religion, there could no longer be any need of requiring them to profess any particular religion whatever. It was true that hitherto Inspectors did examine in religious knowledge in Church of England schools; but even in them Mr. Forster said the practice had proved an inconvenience. In introducing the Bill he said, "I hear clergymen complain that the children they instruct are subjected to examination in religious doctrines by an Inspector whose sentiments are different from their own."\* The fact, that a Church of England Inspector was found a cause of inconvenience to a Church of England clergyman because his views affected his report on the examination in certain subjects, affords no argument for the removal of Catholic Inspectors from Catholic schools; for in these latter the Inspector did not examine in religious subjects. Why then should they have been retained? Because it might have been fairly anticipated, that questions would almost necessarily arise, between Catholic managers and schools on the one hand, and the educational authorities on the other, of which only a Catholic Inspector could judge fairly, as possessing a knowledge of Catholic matters and practices which a non-Catholic Inspector could hardly possess. However carefully religion may be put out of sight and removed from the view of the Inspector, it is evidently impossible to get rid altogether of deep moral questions in the education of the young. If a Church of England Inspector was found an inconvenience on certain subjects to a clergyman of the Establishment, what must be the relation of a similar, or, still worse, a secularist Inspector to a Catholic manager, when required, as is now the case, to make a portion of the grant depend on his inquiries into the teaching of matters, which all Christians as least must regard as essentially religious? The New Code for 1875, page 28, contains the following Instructions to Inspectors under the head of Discipline:—

To meet the requirements respecting discipline, the managers and teachers will be expected to satisfy the Inspectors that all reasonable care is taken in the ordinary management of the school . . . to impress upon the children the importance of cheerful *obedience to duty*, of consideration and respect for others, and of *honour and truthfulness in word and act*.

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\* Verbatim Report, p. 9.

Unless the Inspector is satisfied on these matters, he is required to make a reduction in the grant of one shilling per head on the average attendance of the year.

Surely duty, honour, and truthfulness are essential matters of religious teaching, and cannot successfully be taught without reference to God and religious duty towards Him. In this relation, "duty" has a much wider sense to a Catholic child than to any other, and embraces essentially religious observances which may not even be mentioned in a Protestant or Board school. How then is the manager, usually a priest, to *satisfy* the Inspector that these matters are properly taught? Moreover these matters must be taught in the "ordinary conduct of the school." If this embraces the "religious time," it can only be inquired into by a Catholic Inspector. If it excludes it, and refers only to the "secular time," then it is impossible for the manager to satisfy the Inspector on the subject: for 1st, he himself is forbidden by the Conscience Clause to teach during the secular hours the Catholic doctrines of duty, honour, and truthfulness; and 2ndly he certainly cannot allow the teacher, nor could a Catholic teacher make the attempt, to teach religious truths on a mere secular basis, without reference to any "religious catechism or religious formula, which is distinctive of any particular denomination" (sec. 14, Act 1870). And yet that these subjects must be taught on secular principles apart from religious teaching, in order to satisfy the Inspector, and obtain the grant for discipline,—is clear from section 7, which says, that "it shall be no part of the duties of such Inspector to inquire into any instruction in *religious subjects* given at such school, or to examine any scholar therein in religious knowledge, or in any religious subject or book." If religion nominally banished is to be thus re-introduced, Catholics have a just reason for demanding the re-establishment of the old agreement concerning Catholic Inspectors; or, at least, the exemption of Catholic schools from the requirement of satisfying the Inspector on these essentially religious subjects. Indeed we regard it as an indignity inflicted on the clergy throughout the country, of whatever denomination, to be thus subjected in such matters to the School Inspectors. The various denominations are submitting to an enormous fine, by refusing to accept rates for the support of their schools, in order to preserve the liberty of teaching religion to their own children; and now they are to be required to prove to Inspectors, either that they actually do what they pay so heavily for the license to do, or that they teach secularism which they profess to hate and repudiate.

And here justice to our subject requires that we should notice

an objection which will occur to many, in reference to the points on which we have so far touched. It may be said "are not your objections so far as now stated theoretical rather than practical? The Conscience Clause works well enough, and only in some cases do the Bishops complain that religious knowledge has fallen to a lower standard; the Inspectors behave as gentlemen, and show a fair appreciation of their position. We must leave it to time to prove, whether the Code of 1875 will result in practical inconvenience on these several subjects." Were we dealing with an ordinary subject of every-day life, with its varying unwritten conditions, influenced by the current of changing custom or the accidental breeze of popular favour, —we should agree that the broad practical view was sufficiently safe to take; and that it were worse than useless to look under the surface to seek for almost occult principles, or to anticipate in the future a steady development of the forces we thought we discovered in action. But we are dealing with the statute law of a great nation, which, in the multiplicity and pressing nature of its legislative activity, can hardly find time to remedy even the admitted grievances of a minority. We are noting the logical administrative and almost necessary development of principles, embodied in written laws and codes of regulations, which, once inserted in the Statute-book, have no longer to be interpreted by common sense, nor by the comments of newspapers, nor even by the intentions of those who framed them; but by lawyers and judges, whose trained acumen is solely directed to give to every line and word, to every principle which can by any logical process be discerned under every provision, their fullest, uttermost, and most practical application, without feeling, without remorse, without the slightest responsibility for any injustice or oppression their interpretation may entail. No reticence on our part can hide any evil the School Acts may contain, either actually or in germ. And we may feel full certainty, that, even without the persistent action of the vast interest which the School Board, as opposed to the religious system, is evoking, the principles of the Act, however latent, will receive in time their full logical development. We believe that to be true of the School Act, which the *Times* lately said of another, "that the Bill might do a great deal—much more indeed than its framers knew or intended—both by its direct operation, and by the further legislation it would entail."

Already, indeed, the principles of the Act of 1870 have been somewhat further developed in the Act of 1873. In answer to difficulties which it was anticipated might arise from the former Act, Catholics consoled themselves that at worst they might

forfeit the grant at any time they pleased, and thus if necessary regain their former liberty. And in this view they were strengthened by the assurances of nearly all parties, that the new system was only to supplement the old, not to destroy or supplant it. Existing schools, especially the denominational ones, were to be encouraged, first for their moral effects on the population, and, secondly, as evoking a large personal interest on the part of the clergy and subscribers to such schools. Moreover it was urged, that the very instincts of the British ratepayer would prevent any attempt on the part of school boards to induce children to leave the voluntary schools, and thereby cast so large an additional weight on shoulders already burdened to the groaning point. Gratitude had been spoken of towards those, who for so many years had borne the chief weight of cost and the whole weight of labour in the elementary education of the country. Let us see how this supposed liberty stands after the legislation of 1873.

Under the former Act the educational wants of a district were to be ascertained by the visit of an inspector to all the elementary schools existing within the district. If a school, however efficient, refused to admit the inspector, or if, upon examination, were found below a reasonable standard, such school was not to be regarded as affording school accommodation to the district, and, as a penalty, a Board school might be built near it. The school itself, however, might continue to exist, subject only to the competition of the new Board school. Recognition by the Government was not required for voluntary schools; and this itself was a safeguard of no mean worth, as efficiency was estimated not merely by the education given, but also by the condition of the school premises, and the willingness to accept the conscience clause—a condition most distasteful to those managers especially who felt that they could dispense with the Government grant towards the support of the school. The provision of section 74, that a school board cannot compel the attendance of a child at a Board school if he "is under efficient instruction in some other manner," seemed innocent enough, and apparently contained no menace of injury to voluntary schools, which refused or were unable to place themselves under Government inspection. In the Act, however, of 1873, this has been developed in a most startling manner. The attendance at a school which is not "a public elementary school" is no longer to be permitted, unless it be proved to a magistrate, not that the school is a good one, but that the child has really profited by his attendance at such a school. However good the school may really be, the parent may be fined for sending his child to it unless he can prove to the magistrate

that the child is capable of passing an examination in the standard required by his age, according to the code in force for the time at the public elementary schools (Act 1873, sec. 24). While there are thousands attending Board and public elementary schools who cannot and do not pass the examination required by their age, no penalty attaches to their frequenting such schools; whereas if the same child attend any other school, the parent may be fined for sending him there. Thus irregular attendance, or stupidity, or culpable inattention on the part of one child may cause a serious loss of reputation to a voluntary school, and may lead to the withdrawal of many or all of its scholars, through fear of a school board prosecution. The scope of this measure will be better understood when we remark that a "public elementary school" is one which, besides accepting *all* the provisions of the conscience clause, is also a "school which shall be conducted in accordance with the conditions required to be fulfilled by an elementary school in order to obtain an annual Parliamentary grant" (Act 1870, sec. 7). Among these "conditions" are those requiring that the teachers shall be certificated, and that there shall be the required number of apprenticed pupil teachers employed in the school, &c. We need not say that there are many excellent convent schools, of enclosed and other orders, where these conditions cannot be fulfilled, and whose existence is practically menaced by the law as it stands now.

It is evident from all we have said that the liberty of maintaining schools, which do not fulfil the Government condition for gaining a grant, is in principle undermined by recent legislation; and moreover the practical possibility of withdrawing our schools from the operation of any future injurious law or code is also already in principle removed. As the case now stands, the parent of each individual child attending any elementary school not under Government inspection, is exposed to the worry of a school board prosecution if residing in a school board district.

Mr. Forster's intention in 1870 was "to complete the present voluntary system, to fill up gaps";\* but the real principles embodied in the Act have since then been developed, independently it may be of his intentions, and have already given just cause for apprehension, that their ultimate effect will be the forcible absorption of all elementary schools into the Government system. We see this somewhat clearly in the School Act of 1873, and still more so in the "Agricultural Children Act" of the same year.

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\* Verbatim Report, page 8.

That Act provides that it shall be illegal to employ children under a certain age in agricultural labour, unless they have made a certain number of school attendances within the year. So far we entirely sympathize with the intentions of the Legislature; but in a most unexpected way the Act deals a great blow at a large number of Catholic schools in agricultural districts. The Act defines "school" to mean one *recognized by the Government as giving efficient elementary education*. Attendances at school, however numerous, may not be counted for the purposes of the Act, at any uninspected school which is within two miles' distance from a Government or Board school. Again, children who have reached the fourth standard are, no matter what be their age, exempted from the operation of the Act; but the certificate in proof that they have reached such a standard, can only be issued by a Government inspector, or by some one deputed by him for the purpose (sec. 11).

It is hardly to be expected that our small village Catholic schools can support the expense fairly required for the maintenance of trained certificated teachers, even if a sufficient supply of such teachers existed; and the whole spirit of the education authorities would shrink from recognizing as efficient any school, which does not comply with the conditions which would fit it to be considered a public elementary school.

Again, the Act of 1873, the passing of which created little excitement among Catholics, for the first time brought our schools in relation—and in subject relation—with school boards. It had been fondly hoped that the School Board system, founded as it was "to supplement all existing organizations," would stand in relation to the central authority on much the same footing as the religious schools. There was to be no favour or preference for either, at least in secular matters. Whatever Government required was to be conveyed to each by the central authorities, to whom was entrusted the carrying out of the laws affecting elementary education, leaving the managers of religious schools and school boards on a footing of equality. Section 22 of the Education Act of 1873 has overturned all such anticipations about these mutual relations. It was thought probable that school boards or their officers might want information concerning the attendance of children, &c., from the managers of voluntary schools. We need not pause to inquire what regulations might have been made on this subject, fully compatible with the independent position of the voluntary managers; but the provision preferred by the Act is one which shakes to its foundation the standing of these schools before the country. The managers are thereby placed in legal subjection to school boards and their officers, in a manner which cannot

fail to generate opportunities and arguments for further increasing the power thus given for the first time to school boards over voluntary schools. Section 22 empowers school boards "to supply forms to any public elementary school, for the purpose of obtaining reasonable information with respect to the attendance of children." The managers of the school must fill up and return these forms "in the manner required by the School Board," and must give information whether a child attending such school "attends the same in the manner required by the said by-law" of the School Board. If this is not done by the managers, then they are required to produce "to such member or officer of the School Board, or other person as may be duly authorized in that behalf by the School Board, at any reasonable time when required by him, the registers and other books and documents containing information with respect to the attendance of children at such school, and shall permit him to inspect and take copies of and extracts from the same." Formerly the voluntary schools were governed by the Committee of the Privy Council; now they are subject to by-laws of the boards. They must so keep their books and registers as to be able to fill up forms "in the manner required by the School Board"; and, if they fail in this, then a member or officer of a school board may demand to see the registers, books, and other documents, and may even take copies of the same.

It is evident, then, that there is now another power over the voluntary schools, besides the Privy Council, which can make by-laws, in the framing of which the managers have no voice, and which can enforce them by an inspection of documents which the managers must produce "at any reasonable time when required by him [the member, officer, or other person] to do so." It has been lately stated at the meeting of the National Society, that the voluntary schools now teach eleven-twelfths of the children attending school, whereas school boards provide but for one-twelfth; and yet the latter can make by-laws for the former, and enforce them in a rough-and-ready manner with regard to books and documents, which is almost—if not quite—unknown to the law of England. To put the case plainly, the position is now entirely reversed. The one-twelfth are the official legal schools of the nation; to which the eleven-twelfths must be regarded as supplementary, and only to be barely tolerated until starved or worried into giving up their religious character. This state of things has been produced gradually, noiselessly, and in a roundabout way. We trust that Catholics at least will awake with alarm, before their schools are utterly undermined.

School boards, it was thought, would find enough employment in providing apparatus, books, &c., for the children who might be induced to attend their schools; but they have found leisure to bring pressure to bear on Catholic schools; and the result is, that the school-books, published under the sanction of the Poor School Committee and hitherto in use in Catholic schools, had to be altered to the exclusion of religious lessons, even in schools entirely Catholic. That this is a loss to our children no one will deny; but how could we resist the logical results of the conscience clause? And what defence shall we be able to make, when other Catholic matters besides school-books are attacked?

What renders the more serious this change in our books is, that the time required by the Government extends beyond the four hours of secular teaching; and therefore diminishes, more than is generally supposed, the time for religious instruction. The teachers have to devote one hour each day to the instruction of pupil teachers; this, added to the ordinary five hours of school teaching, makes their work sufficiently onerous. It would be undesirable to prolong the duration of their work, even were it possible. It is generally assumed that of these five one can be given to religious study, but this is not the case. A circular of the Education Department requires that "adequate time for marking the registers should be provided for in the time-tables—from five to ten minutes or more according to the number of scholars." This must be done twice in each day, and thus twenty or even thirty minutes must be taken from the fifth hour. The department cannot be expected to demand less, but on the other hand the alteration in our books must be felt the more in proportion to the diminution of other opportunities for religious instruction. How soon may we expect drilling and sewing, both required by the Code, to be relegated to times which do not interfere with the secular four hours? Indeed the temptation to do so must be very great in Board schools, in which religious instruction is not given, and where the fifth hour is not sacred as with us.

It is clear that we Catholics stand in great measure alone on this subject of religious instruction. Other denominations look upon religious teaching in schools as something, which can be treated with far less effort and application than subjects of secular knowledge. They do not teach much, for they do not think much can be taught, or ought even to be attempted to be taught. The Nonconformists hold this so strongly, that in most numerous instances they have handed over their schools to boards; not so much, we believe, because they thereby escape the obligation of finding money for the payment of

teachers, &c., nor because, in many instances, in London at least, they receive from the School Board payment as rent for the use of school premises filled with the same teachers and children, who before the Act was framed frequented them: but really and honestly because they believe that they can convey sufficient religious instruction to their children in their Denominational Sunday schools. Large numbers even of Church of England schools have been handed over to school boards for much the same reasons. That this has not been done to a greater extent, is rather surprising than otherwise; for the Archbishop of Canterbury, when lately presiding over the annual meeting of the National Society, declared that it was a common belief throughout the country, that very little effort, and therefore, we may add, but little time, was required to teach children the amount of religious knowledge they were capable of receiving. He said—

It was commonly believed throughout the country at the present time that the sort of religious instruction which was suitable for children was of a very simple kind. Minute technical distinctions of theology were of course altogether unsuited to the minds of children. The simplest statements of the truths of Christianity were all that was desired or required. But this principle, *excellent as it was*, might be strained into a disapproval of the teaching of Christian doctrines to children.\*

Of course no Catholic could for a moment admit that "the simplest statements of the truths of Christianity were all that was desired or required." The Catechisms in use in the schools of all Catholic countries, and the success with which they are taught, though containing minute distinctions of theology, are a sufficient answer to Dr. Tait's theory, or to what he states as the common belief throughout the country. Catholics hold no such belief; and we should be glad to hear that our practical success in this matter should be tested, by Dr. Tait asking one of our teachers to catechise the children in his presence. The common belief of the country, however, cannot be altered by anything we may say or do; and therefore it is true to say that we Catholics stand almost alone on this great question. We have not merely to contend with the avowed advocates of secularism; but it is much to be feared that the managers of Church of England schools would be content to forego much that is vital to us, and to submit without much opposition to regulations which, differing but very slightly from those at present in force, might prove fatal to our religious liberty.

Danger is arising also from another and perhaps an unex-

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\* *Times* Report, June 10, 1875.

pected quarter. We, like all other classes of the community, are anxious that the teaching in the elementary schools shall be thoroughly efficient, so that the children of the poor may derive the greatest possible benefit from the opportunities secured for them. But our contention is, that a young man, who when at school had daily four hours of secular and one hour of religious instruction, is far more educated, and a far more valuable citizen, than one who, while at school, had five hours a day of secular study, with merely the casual religious instruction of a Sunday school. His intellectual as well as his moral faculties would be more highly developed, and he would be better fitted for success in life. We do not however suppose that the intellectual power gained by religious study will enable the Catholic child to pass an examination in a special subject, to which a school board pupil has devoted that fifth hour of each day, which has been employed on a different subject by the Catholic pupil. When therefore the standard of examination in public elementary schools is raised, due proportion should be maintained, between the amount of work demanded, and the four hours of secular study required by the Code. If the standard of examination is raised so as to equal the product of five hours' work, it is evident that the same amount cannot be produced in four hours. In such a case our schools would almost necessarily fall below the standard, or be subjected to an unhealthy strain and pressure on the faculties of both teachers and children. In case of failure in what I may in this respect call the extra subject of the fifth hour, there would be a loud cry that our schools were below the mark; and that for the sake of what the masses have been taught to call "sectarianism," the education of our children was being injured. Effort would be vain to try to convince the general public, that our system produced a better article, though by a somewhat different process. "If," they will say, "religious teaching is impeding the progress of secular knowledge, why should Catholics be allowed to devote school time to what is superfluous, or to what may be sufficiently taught at some other time and place?" We fear that some such outcry as this will make itself heard in a comparatively short time.

In the meanwhile Catholics should watch vigilantly the many questions connected with grants and examinations; not so much for the sake of the money itself, as for the sake of preventing unfavourable comparisons between the amount earned by Catholic schools and that obtained by other denominations or Board schools. As an instance of what we mean, let us compare passages from the general reports of two Government Inspectors on the subject of arithmetic; premising that

the practice is to give three sums, the correct working of two out of the three securing a "pass" and grant. Dr. Morell says:—

The scholars in our primary schools are not good at solving arithmetical problems, which require any more than an ordinary degree of thought and skill. The fact is that the foundations of arithmetical knowledge and practice are for the most part firmly laid . . . but these secured, few intellectual operations are superadded. Still the intuitional foundation is there, and the superadditions can be easily appended whenever the time and opportunity arises for extending the whole sphere of primary education.\*

Again,

The real power of arithmetical calculation is all involved in the readiness with which we deal with the more elementary processes, and it is just these which I feel perfectly convinced are worked into the minds of the scholars in our primary schools.

This Inspector is evidently content with the working of ordinary sums as distinct from the solution of problems. These latter are a test and a good one of the intellectual power of the boy in perceiving the real arithmetical questions underlying the statement of the problem; but it is no test of the ability of the boy to work the sum correctly if proposed as a "sum" and not as a problem. At page 31 of the same volume another Inspector says:—

My plan of testing the arithmetic of the four higher standards has been as follows:—to set three questions, two in the ordinary shape, in which rules are set forth in the test-books, and one in the shape of an easy problem. Now in the great majority of cases the "pass" has been secured by correctly working the two plain-sailing sums, and giving the go-by to the easy problem.

Apparently under the former Inspector a "pass" would be secured by two out of three "sums," under the latter but *two* "sums" are given, and a problem to which "in the great majority of cases" the "go-by" is given; thus requiring practically and in the majority of cases two out of two, not two out of three sums to be worked correctly. If this be so, it is evident that the schools in the district of the latter would earn a less grant than those in the district of the former; and, that schools, which in one case would obtain a good report, would, in the other, be blamed for failure in arithmetic. That such matters as these should be noted carefully, is of great importance to Catholics; as any failure, no matter from what cause, will probably soon be attributed to the amount of time given to religious instruction.

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\* Report of the Committee of Council on Education, p. 132.

On questions affecting the amount of Government support for our schools, we Catholics have a right to most favourable consideration, on account of the very great efforts we have made in the cause of the education of the poor, during the ten years from the year ending August 31st, 1864, to the same date, 1873. The Government statistics\* show clearly that Catholics have increased their voluntary contributions in a much greater ratio than the Church of England and the Dissenting bodies. We extract from the Report the following statistics :—

## AMOUNT OF VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS.

	1864.	1873.	Increase per Cent.
Church of England.....	£226,268	£416,465	84·0
Dissenters .....	40,199	83,629	108·0
Catholics .....	11,293	35,814	213·3

## AMOUNT OF SCHOOL PENCE.

	1864.	1873.	Increase per Cent.
Church of England.....	£231,385	£451,509	95·1
Dissenters .....	77,500	184,857	138·5
Catholics .....	9,501	29,773	213·3

It will be admitted at a glance that Catholics have made proportionally much greater efforts during these ten years for the education of the poor than either the Church of England or Dissenting bodies; and that whereas Catholic voluntary contributions have increased in the same proportion as the payments of the poor in School pence, Protestant and Dissenting contributions have not increased in the same ratio as the fees of their poor schools.

Indeed, all the questions relating to the strictness of the code, and the raising of the standard of education, bear with a very unequal pressure on the denominational schools as compared with the Board schools. With regard to the former, it was fairly estimated that a diminution of the grant consequent on failure to reach the prescribed standard would prove a sufficient stimulus to great exertion; for the loss of grant would have to be made good by the supporters themselves of religious schools, burthened as they now are with the cost of the secular schools. But what pressure equal to this is brought to bear on Board schools? What they lose by a diminution of the grant is, *ipso facto*, made up by the rates, and the inconvenience to

\* Report of the Committee of Council on Education, 1874, Tables, pages 19 and 20.

the managers is therefore almost nil. It is provided by law that the deficiency from one source shall be met by a proportionate increase from the other. In such a case it may be said that the ratepayers would raise so great an outcry as to force the School Board to succeed better at the next examination. But first the managers themselves are usually not members of the Board, and would remain quite undisturbed by the clamour, knowing that the bills must be paid whatever else might happen; and, secondly, the indignation of ratepayers has for many years been quite insufficient to control the conduct even of the guardians they themselves elect, and the country has again and again been deeply moved at the grievous scandals which have arisen in workhouses. So inefficient has been the controlling power of local opinion, that many laws have been lately made for the express purpose of effecting that which the ratepayers were unable or too negligent to do. How then can it be supposed that they will control school boards more efficiently than boards of guardians? Indeed, the school boards are much less under the power of the ratepayers; as they are elected for three years instead of for one, and are usually chosen from a more independent class than that which furnishes candidates for the office of guardian. We believe therefore that we are right in saying that any undue increase of strictness in the code would be a grievous loss to the managers of religious schools, and but a nominal inconvenience to school boards. Moreover if, as some eminent men think, the new code has raised the standard too high, the religious schools will suffer directly and at once from such a mistake, whereas the school boards will merely have to explain to the ratepayers that the children passed as good an examination as, under the circumstances, could have been expected.

We trust that the numerous difficulties we have pointed out will lead our readers to agree with us, that during the last few years very grave attacks have been made upon the religious character of denominational schools; upon the irreligious, and in some respects civil liberty; and upon their financial prosperity. It seems to us that inevitably, and by the almost spontaneous development of the principles embodied in recent legislation, these attacks will be multiplied in the future. Secularism in education, planted but a few years ago, has already waxed strong, and threatens to overshadow the whole of the country. Introduced to supply defects of accommodation, here and there, it already looks upon the great religious system, not merely as a rival, but as an intruder. Laws and codes must be framed in accordance with its aggressive spirit, and if they are injurious to the religious system so much the worse for the latter. Is it

not time that Catholics should take serious counsel as to their future conduct in so vital a matter? Can even a day be spared, when each day witnesses a further advance of that which we have so much reason to dread? The prudence of waiting until something is done positively incompatible with the continued existence of our schools may well be questioned, when we see a highly organized force steadily advancing against us. The facts we have mentioned appear to us a sufficient justification for crying out at once and persistently, so that our grievances may be known to many just-minded men who are at present ignorant of them. Will it not be a reproach to us if we wait until the last straw is placed on our backs—will not people ask why we did not cry out sooner? Indeed, the mere surprise of many will lead them, in the religious temper of the time, to look upon our declarations, if made too late, as the factious, unpatriotic result of Catholic principles.

We are anxious, then, that all educated Catholics should take a deep interest in the subject of the relations of our schools to the State—that they should be well acquainted with the Education Acts—the Codes, and their working—the Circulars of the Education Department—the by-laws made by school boards—the reports of Government and diocesan Inspectors, &c. &c., in order that they may be able to form a judgment on the great question of the day. We would wish all to remember, that resistance beforehand to any threatened advance of the State or of secularism is far easier and more likely to succeed, than the slow and uncertain effects of agitation for the after-repeal of laws and regulations, to which, in the first instance, we submitted apparently without a murmur. Catholics should vigilantly watch and eagerly scrutinize every Bill introduced into Parliament at all affecting education, and they should be careful to draw the attention of the authorities to all those administrative acts from which we may suffer in the slightest degree. Above all, their voices should be heard by all those whose duty or privilege it is to prepare Bills, and Codes, and Official Circulars, so that our objections may receive due consideration, before statesmen are publicly committed to any course affecting the interests of our schools. We do not feel that it is our place to point out what precise course ought to be adopted; but we do strongly protest against the want of special knowledge on these subjects which really prevails, and against the whole course of yielding without expostulation to almost every attack made on our religious freedom, which seems to have been our policy since the introduction of the Bill of 1870.

ART. IV.—THE PURPORT OF BISHOP FESSLER'S  
'TREATISE.

*The True and the False Infallibility of the Popes.* By JOSEPH FESSLER.  
Translated by Father AMBROSE ST. JOHN.\* London : Burns & Oates.

*A Letter to the Duke of Norfolk.* By J. H. NEWMAN, D.D. London :  
Pickering.

A NOTION has got abroad among some Catholics, that Mgr. Fessler's treatise was partially directed against a certain Catholic ultra party, which is supposed to exist, and to defend an exaggerated interpretation of the Vatican Definition. And from this supposition it is inferred, that the Pope, by complimenting the treatise, expressed his own special approbation of the more moderate line taken by the Bishop, as contrasted with that of the aforesaid contemporary ultras. We must maintain in reply that there is not so much as the vestige of a foundation, for any one part of this theory : and if the theory be such a simple delusion as we allege, every one will agree that the delusion should be dispelled at the earliest possible opportunity. In our last number however we were too much pressed both by time and by space, to set forth the necessary details. On the present occasion we hope to consider (1) those particular passages, which have probably led to the misconception ; and (2) the general bearing and position of the treatise as a whole. Nor can we better commence our remarks, than by citing a brief note, which F. Newman inserted in the popular edition of his celebrated letter.

Fessler seems to confine the exercise of infallibility to the nota " heretical " (p. 137).

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\* Since this article first went to press, the news reached us of F. St. John's most unexpected death. As we are in a certain antagonism with him in the whole course of our remarks, we hope it may not be accounted impertinent if we say a few words on the sincere respect and regard which we feel towards his memory. The present writer cannot boast of having had any intimate acquaintance with him ; but his character always appeared to us most touching, from its singular simplicity, peace-lovingness, and unobtrusive self-sacrifice. Our readers will not fail to remember F. Newman's earnest words of affection towards him in the " Apologia." F. St. John's theological stand-point differed in some important respects from our own ; but we trust there is nothing in this article, which would have given him a moment's pain had he still been upon earth.

This edition of F. Newman's letter did not reach our hands, until long after our article on Bishop Fessler had gone through the press, and while we were very busy with other parts of our April number; and on the other hand the statement just quoted, coming from an authority of such weight, is so extremely serious, that it did not admit of perfunctory and incidental treatment. On the whole therefore we resolved to ignore it for the moment, reserving it for future consideration.

I. It is not more certain—so we must maintain—that the Bishop wrote his treatise at all, than that he advocated therein no such tenet as F. Newman supposes; and it will in no way therefore be disrespectful to Mgr. Fessler's memory, if we point out how theologically discreditable to him would have been any such advocacy. We will quote a passage to this effect from Cardinal Manning's "*Petri Privilegium*."

All Catholic theologians, without exception, so far as I know, teach that the Church is infallible in all [minor doctrinal] censures. They differ only in this: that some declare this truth to be of faith, and therefore the denial of it to be heresy; others declare it to be of faith as to the condemnation of heretical propositions, but in all others to be only of theological certainty; so that the denial of it be not heresy, but error.

To deny the infallibility of the Church in the censures less than for heresy, is held to be heretical by De Panormo, Malderus, Coninck, Diana, Oviedo, Amici, Matteucci, Pozzobonelli, Viva, Nannetti. Murray calls it objective heresy. Griffini, Herinx, Ripalda, Ferraris, and Reinerding do not decide whether it be heretical, erroneous, or proximate to error. Cardenas and Turrianus hold it to be erroneous; Anfossi erroneous, or proximate to error. De Lugo in one place maintains that it is erroneous; in another, that to deny the infallibility of the Church in the condemnation of erroneous propositions is heresy. All, therefore, affirm the Church in passing such censures to be infallible (iii. 74, 5).

F. Newman himself, we may add, is in full concurrence with other theologians on this subject. In condemning any proposition, he says (p. 136 or 121\*), the Church "tells us . . . that the thesis condemned, when taken as a whole, or again when viewed in its context, is heretical or blasphemous or impious or *whatever like epithet she affixes to it*." It is "of faith . . . that there is, in that thesis itself which is noted, heresy, or error, or *other like peccant matter as the case may be*." "The act of faith *which cannot be superseded or trifled with* being the *unreserved acceptance*, that the thesis in question is heretical or the like, *as the Pope or Church has spoken of it*."† So much then on

\* When we cite F. Newman's letter in this article, our first reference shall be to the popular, and our second to the larger edition.

† There is a passage in F. Newman's Appendix (pp. 163, 4, or 147, 8)

the language of theologians; and it will be seen as we proceed, that the Church herself speaks in effect with even greater severity against the tenet ascribed to Mgr. Fessler, than do theologians. It is surely quite incredible, that the censors who examined the Bishop's treatise should have passed over so grave an error, even if the Bishop could possibly have fallen into it. And if our readers will give their attention to the extracts we shall at once cite from the volume, it will not be possible for them to doubt, that Mgr. Fessler's own words directly contradict the proposition ascribed to him by F. Newman.

The passage to which F. Newman refers as containing it, is at p. 11; and was quoted by us at length in April (p. 334, note). Like several other passages of the book, it is very far from clearly expressed; but we confess willingly, that among all the interpretations which can be given it, we believe that to be the true one which is most favourable to F. Newman's argument. As we explained the Bishop's words in April (p. 334), he seems to say, that if eighty *heretical* propositions had been sent round (designated as such) to the Bishops, under circumstances in every other respect similar to those of the Syllabus—there could have been no possible doubt that the issuing of such imaginary Syllabus was an *ex cathedrâ* Act; whereas on the contrary, as regards the Syllabus which was actually issued, he holds that there is a real opening for doubt on the point. Now even if we confine our attention exclusively to his opinion on the Syllabus,—that opinion not only does not prove, but effectually disproves, the suggested interpretation of his words. He says again and again, that the question of the Syllabus's *ex cathedrâ* character is not a certain but a doubtful one. But if he confined the exercise of infallibility to the nota "*heretical*," there could be *no possible* doubt in his mind, that the teaching of the Syllabus as such is not infallible. No tenet is "*heretical*," unless it directly contradicts what was (explicitly or implicitly) taught by the Apostles. How then could such propositions as the following be possibly condemned as *heretical*?

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which we do not quite see how to reconcile with his words quoted in the text. He seems therein on the surface to say, that no one can possibly accept the mere condemnation of a given thesis with *interior assent*, but only with that *external obedience* which is rendered by not publicly advocating such thesis. Of course he does not mean this; and we need therefore but briefly refer to his own statement as given in our text. Nothing surely can be more intelligible—as on some occasions nothing can be more important—than to accept with interior assent the proposition, that such or such a thesis deserves the censure with which it has been branded.

13. The method and principles, whereby the ancient scholastic doctors cultivated theology, are not suited to the necessities of our time and the progress of science.

38. The too arbitrary conduct of Roman Pontiffs contributed to the Church's division into East and West.

77. *In this our age* it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion should be treated as the only religion of the State, all other worships whatever being excluded.

78. *Hence* it has been laudably provided by law in some Catholic countries, that men thither immigrating should be permitted the public exercise of their own several worships.

If then the Bishop had really held that infallibility does not extend to minor doctrinal censures, it would have been to his mind *certain*, and no matter of doubt at all, that the issuing of the Syllabus was no infallible utterance. On the other hand the doctrine which he really did entertain about the Syllabus, is easily explained by another of his doctrines which he has expressed in so many words. "In theology," he says (p. 70), "it serves as a sure note of a dogmatic definition, when an opposite doctrine is branded by the Pope as heretical." What he means then is evidently this: "If the eighty errors had been expressly condemned as *heretical*, that circumstance would have sufficed to show the *ex cathedrâ* character of the Syllabus. But whereas such is not the case, *other* indications must be consulted, in order to decide the question whether it be *ex cathedrâ* or no; and those other indications do not suffice to make the matter clear."

We have fully confessed, that in the two pages on which we are commenting (as indeed is unfortunately the case with other parts of the treatise) the Bishop's language is somewhat difficult of interpretation; but the words to which we shall next refer in elucidation of his doctrine, are as clear as day. The doubt of theologians, he says, on the *ex cathedrâ* character of the Syllabus,

Is founded especially upon this, that the form of the Syllabus is quite different from that which the Pope usually adopts when he delivers a *solemn definition de fide*. In order to convince himself of this, Dr. Schulte need only peruse the Bull of Leo X. against Luther, the "*Exurge Domine*," . . . or the celebrated Bull of Pius VI. "*Auctorem Fidei*." . . . In these and in similar documents the intention of the Pope is expressed in the most decided manner, either at the beginning or at the end, that certain propositions must, by virtue of his Supreme Apostolical power, be regarded as incompatible with the Catholic doctrine on faith or morals. . . . It may be said perhaps, that the Pope, by requiring that the Syllabus should be made known to the whole Episcopate, desired to raise all his utterances on the errors contained in the Syllabus to the position of doctrinal defini-

tions, such as would be, according to the Definition of the Vatican Council, utterances *ex cathedrâ*. This many theologians think may be assumed to be doubtful, until a fresh declaration is made on the subject by the Holy See (pp. 91, 2).

We cannot at all follow the Bishop in thinking, that the form of the Syllabus is more unlike the other forms of *ex cathedrâ* definition, than those other forms are unlike each other. On this we shall speak presently; but our immediate point is this. He says expressly, that the "*Auctorem Fidei*" is "*a solemn definition de fide*"; and he adds, that the propositions condemned in it, "must, by virtue of the Pope's supreme Apostolic power, be regarded as *incompatible with the Catholic doctrine on faith or morals*." But he was of course fully aware, that more than half of these propositions are only branded with censures lower than that of "heretical." Propositions 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 are condemned only as "false, temerarious, &c. &c.;" prop. 17 "captious, temerarious, &c.": and so on to the end of the Bull. We do not therefore see how he could easily have devised words more emphatic than those he has used, for the purpose of *utterly disavowing* the opinion, that "infallibility is confined to the nota 'heretical.'"

And certainly, on reading the "*Auctorem Fidei*," we cannot be surprised at Mgr. Fessler's confident judgment on its true character. In the earlier part of the Bull Pius VI. expresses himself as follows. We italicise one clause:—

We can no longer delay fulfilling our Apostolical office. . . . On every side the judgment of the Supreme Apostolic See is not only waited for but demanded by assiduously repeated prayers. God forbid that the voice of Peter should ever be silent in that his See, wherein he, ever living and presiding, affords the truth of faith to those who seek it. . . . Such a wound therefore must be cut away, whereby not one member alone is injured, but the whole body of the Church afflicted; and by help of the Divine mercy provision must be made that (dissensions being cut off) the Catholic Faith may be preserved inviolate, and that (the advocates of evil being recalled from their error) those whose faith is approved may be fortified by our authority. Having therefore implored . . . the aid of the Divine Spirit . . . we have determined . . . that various propositions, doctrines, sentences . . . should be condemned *each with its appropriate note*, as by this our perpetually-to-stand (*perpetuò valiturâ*) Constitution we condemn and reprobate them.

At the end he adds the following command; and we italicise a word.

We command therefore all Christians of either sex, that they presume not to *think*, teach, preach, concerning these propositions, otherwise than as is declared in this our Constitution.

It is plain then, that the opinion ascribed to the Bishop would have placed him in an attitude of direct rebellion against the Holy See; and would not only have deprived him of all authority as a theologian, but would have exposed him to grave ecclesiastical censure.

Now (2) there is another passage in his work, very similar in character to the one with which we have been dealing, and which we treated (April, 1875, p. 334) in company therewith. In p. 11, while denying that the "*Multiplices inter*" is a dogmatic definition, he admits that he should have thought otherwise; if any one proposition had therein been condemned as heretical; but since "heresy" is only one of various censures pronounced "*in globo*" on the condemned work, he thinks there is no proof of the Brief's *ex cathedrâ* character. As F. Newman understood him to mean by the *former* passage that he does not regard the Pope as infallible in pronouncing *minor censures*,—so by *this* passage the Bishop might be understood to mean, that the Pope is not infallible when pronouncing *censures in globo*. Now it curiously happens, that the very same passage of his book, which acquits him of the former charge, acquits him also of the latter. For he speaks, not only of Pius VI.'s "*Auctorem Fidei*," but also of Leo X.'s "*Exurge Domine*," as most indubitably "*a solemn definition de fide*"; adding that "certain propositions" are therein condemned "*by virtue of*" the Pope's "*supreme Apostolical power*," "*as incompatible with the Catholic doctrine on faith or morals*." Now whereas the "*Auctorem Fidei*" pronounces various minor censures on various definite propositions,—the "*Exurge Domine*" on the other hand pronounces censures *in globo* on Luther's propositions, as respectively "*pestiferous, pernicious, scandalous, &c. &c.*" It is with this case then as with the former. What the Bishop intended to say in p. 11 was, that the fact of Popes officially pronouncing some *tenet heretical*, is sufficient proof that they are speaking *ex cathedrâ*; whereas the mere fact of their pronouncing censures *in globo*, does not *by itself* suffice to establish that conclusion.

In this second case again it may be worth while to point out, what grievous ecclesiastical censure he would have incurred, had he really meant in p. 11 what his words might be understood by some to signify. The Bull "*Unigenitus*" censured *in globo*, and not otherwise, F. Quesnel's well-known 101 theses. Yet the Council of Embrun, specially confirmed by Benedict XIII., called its Definition the Church's "*dogmatic, definitive, and irretractable judgment*"; and added, "*if any one does not assent to it in heart and mind, let him be accounted among those who have made shipwreck concerning the Faith.*"

We may add, that in pp. 64, 5 the Bishop expressly occupies himself with cataloguing the various Pontifical pronouncements, which he excludes from the character of *ex cathedrâ* Acts; and that he does not give the faintest hint of his supposed opinion, that minor censures or censures in *globo* are never to be accounted *ex cathedrâ*.

II. We will next consider a question cognate to the former, but on which Mgr. Fessler is far more open to *primâ facie* misconception. No *tenet*, as we have said, is heretical, unless it be directly opposed to what was explicitly or implicitly taught by the Apostles as divinely revealed. If therefore it were true that the Pope cannot condemn *ex cathedrâ* any theses except heretical ones, it would follow that he cannot define any doctrine *ex cathedrâ*, which is not an integral portion of revealed truth. And, as we mentioned in April (p. 333), here and there the Bishop has seemed to express this conclusion in so many words. Yet, as we then pointed out, there are two different reasons, which make it absolutely certain that he never intended anything of the kind. In the first place we have seen how indubitable he accounts it, that the "*Auctorem Fidei*" was "a solemn definition *de fide*"; and that all the "propositions" therein recited are infallibly ruled to be "incompatible with the Catholic doctrine on faith or morals." Now by condemning these propositions, Pius VI. defined, among other things, (1) that Clement IX. had not acted as the Synod of Pistoia alleged; (2) that certain most holy doctors in past time had cultivated scholastic theology to the great benefit of the Church; and (3) that S. Thomas and S. Bonaventure had not been on a certain theme so deficient in accuracy and balance of mind, as the Synod of Pistoia alleged.\* Assuredly no one of these infallibly defined verities is any part of revealed truth; they are three non-revealed, but infallibly defined, "*doctrinæ de fide vel moribus.*"

In like manner, as we have also pointed out, Mgr. Fessler considers it indubitably within the sphere of Papal infallibility, to condemn the propositions recited in the *Syllabus*. But to

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\* Prop. 13. "*Propositio . . . quæ innuit Clementem IX. pacem Ecclesiæ reddidisse per approbationem distinctionis juris et facti . . . falsa, temeraria, Clementi IX. injuriosa.*"

Prop. 76. "*Insectatio quâ Synodus scholasticam agitat . . . falsa, temeraria, in sanctissimos viros qui magno Catholicæ religionis bono scholasticam exercuere injuriosa . . . .*"

Prop. 81. "*In eo quod subjungit, sanctos Thomam et Bonaventuram sic in tuendis adversus summos homines mendicantium institutis versatos esse, ut in eorum defensionibus minor æstus accuratio major desideranda esset—scandalosa, in sanctissimos doctores injuriosa . . . .*"

condemn props. 13, 77, and 78 of the Syllabus, is to define three non-revealed truths: viz. (1) that the method and principles of the scholastic theologians are not unsuitable to these times; (2) that even in this nineteenth century, when a country is circumstanced as Spain was in 1855, it is not inexpedient to exclude all non-Catholic worships; and (3) that it is not laudable, in a country circumstanced as New Grenada was in 1852, to allow immigrants the public exercise of their respective worships.

We have seldom met with a more lucid and powerful theological argument, than that in which Cardinal Manning ("Petri Privilegium," iii. 67-79) draws out a sample of the various non-revealed truths, necessary for security of the Deposit, on which the Pope beyond all possible question claims to teach infallibly. In their number are (1) various truths of natural reason and natural science; as that substance exists, or that the soul is the form of the body: (2) various truths of human history; as that the Council of Trent issued certain canons, or that Pius IX. defined the Immaculate Conception: there are (3) what may be called *dogmatic* historical facts; as that the Council of Trent was Ecumenical, or that Pius IX. is true Pope, or that the Vulgate is authentic: (4) there are truths of interpretation; as that Jansenius's book, according to its legitimate objective sense, contained five certain theses. And to all this we may add (5) that the Church has infallibly defined the aptitude of such words as "Consubstantial," "Transubstantiation," &c., in the sense in which she uses them. We may be very sure that the Bishop never dreamed of denying, that the Pope is infallible on such matters as we have now recounted. And F. Newman for his part cites with approval F. Perrone's statement, that infallibility extends to those "physical matters," which have necessary connection with dogma" (p. 130 or 115).

In fact F. Newman ably shows (p. 134 or 118)—as others have done before him—that the Church could not so much as define revealed truths, unless her infallibility extended beyond the actual limits of Revelation. These are his words, and we italicise those to which we refer.

As to the Pope's condemnation of particular books, *which of course are foreign to the Depositum*, I would say that as to their false doctrine, there can be no difficulty in condemning that by means of the Apostolic Deposit; nor surely in his condemning the very wording in which they convey it, when the subject is carefully considered. For the Pope's condemning the language for instance of Jansenius is a parallel Act to the Church's sanctioning the word "Consubstantial." And if a Council and the Pope were

not infallible so far in their judgment of language, *neither Pope nor Council could draw up a dogmatic definition at all* ; for the right exercise of words is involved in the right exercise of thought.

When therefore Mgr. Fessler and the Swiss Bishops (see Fessler, pp. 53 and 63) speak as though the Pope's infallibility were confined to his exposition of the Deposit, it would be understood by all theologically trained Catholics, that such a statement could not possibly be understood literally ; and when the Holy Father approved the Swiss Bishops' " Pastoral Instruction," he of course understood their language as every theologian would understand it. He understood the word " Deposit," " revealed truth," in the sense in which, as F. Franzelin testifies,\* the phrase " the Deposit " is frequently used ; so as to include " truths even not *in themselves* revealed, so far as they are *in contact with* revealed truths, and are needed to the custody, proposition, development, and defence of the latter." And the Swiss Bishops themselves, in another passage also quoted by F. St. John, express their meaning with unmistakable accuracy. The Pope, they say, " is infallible solely and exclusively, when, as supreme doctor of the Church, he pronounces *in a matter of faith or morals* a definition, which has to be *accepted and held as obligatory* by all the faithful." We may add that F. Newman evidently interprets their doctrine just as we have done. For he quotes (p. 141 or 125) with warm sympathy the " Instruction " ; while nevertheless he holds (as we have seen) that the Pope is not in any such sense " tied up and limited to the Divine Revelation " in his *ex cathedrâ* Acts, but that he can also define various non-revealed "*doctrinæ de fide vel moribus*." And we may add—as we did in our last number—one further remark. When it is remembered that even so well-informed a Catholic as F. Gratry thought there were Catholics who desired the definition of a " scientific, governmental, and political infallibility,"—it will be at once seen how important it is for good Catholics to do, what Mgr. Fessler and the Swiss Bishops have done ; to insist on the truth, that the Pope is no otherwise infallible, than in his guardianship of what was once for all taught by the Apostles as revealed truth.

From what has been now said, we may draw an inference of some little moment. In the instances we have given, no Catholic can doubt that the Pope's infallibility extends to non-revealed truths which concern faith or morals. There are other such non-revealed truths, in regard to which there is some difference of opinion among Catholics. For instance, is

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\* See our translation of his " Scholion," July, 1871, p. 263.

the Pope infallible in canonizing Saints? or in approving religious orders? or in defining the moral necessity of his civil principedom? Of such questions—as we have often mentioned—the Vatican Council deferred its treatment to a later period; nor have we any desire to enter here on an inquiry, how far, even under existing circumstances, the Catholic's obligation concerning them may extend. What we wish here to point out is this. The proposition, that a certain book published in the sixteenth century has a certain specified legitimate objective sense, is to the full as external to Revelation, as is the proposition, that A. B. is a Saint; or that this or that religious order merits approval; or that the Pope's civil principedom is necessary to the Church's wellbeing. Of course it is abundantly possible, that various persons, who regard the Pope as infallible in his theological interpretation of books, may not account him infallible in such propositions as we have just recited; only their reasons for rejecting the latter infallibility cannot possibly be, that the said propositions are external to the Deposit. And if Mgr. Fessler and the Swiss Bishops held (as of course they did) the Pope's infallibility on the sense of Jansenius's book,—there is nothing whatever in their language to show, that they did not equally account him infallible in canonizing Saints; or in approving religious orders; or in defining a certain doctrine on his civil principedom.

III. There is a third question, which we briefly treated in April (pp. 335–8), but which deserves fuller exposition than our time and space permitted us then to give it. Some have understood Mgr. Fessler as maintaining, that no Pontifical utterance can be *ex cathedrâ*, which does not *express* its own *ex cathedrâ* character. We reply, that to credit the Bishop with this opinion, is simply to stultify what is the whole drift and bearing of his argument from beginning to end. And we will commence with a few preliminary remarks on this particular head.

Among the various notes of an *ex cathedrâ* Act given by the Vatican Council,—which is it that every Catholic will account the most important? Which is it that most approaches to being legitimately called the “*differentia*” of such an Act? Assuredly, that it be issued with the ascertainable purpose, of obliging Catholics to its acceptance; or, as Cardinal Manning expresses it (“*Petri Privilegium*,” ii. p. 61), that it be “published with the intention of requiring the assent of the Church.” Now though, in a passage quoted by Mgr. Fessler at p. 48, Dr. Schulte seems to admit this condition as necessary,—yet no one can possibly read the citations adduced from him by the Bishop from p. 64 to p. 102, without seeing that the Professor in fact

entirely repudiates it. There is hardly one instance, if indeed there be so much as one, in which he attempts to show, that some given Act, affirmed by him to be an *ex cathedrâ* definition, was issued with the purpose of obliging the assent of Catholics to some given doctrine. This is in every successive case shown by Mgr. Fessler; and it is difficult to imagine a more crushing refutation of an opponent, than the Bishop accomplishes. He states this indeed himself strongly, but not at all too strongly.

Dr. Schulte, in presenting for our consideration numerous Papal expressions and Papal doings which he himself regards as so many infallible utterances, has enabled us to see that, with one single exception,\* the conditions which the Vatican Council has declared to be requisite for an infallible definition, are not to be found in those documents which he parades before us; and therefore that all the Papal expressions and Papal Acts, therein spoken of, cannot, according to the Vatican Definition, come into the class of infallible Papal definitions.

Now we would draw emphatic attention to one simply patent and undeniable matter of fact. It is *not* "one of the conditions which the Vatican Council has declared to be requisite for an infallible definition," that the defining Act shall itself *express* the Pope's intention of obliging interior assent. What the Council requires is, that the Pope "define a doctrine concerning faith or morals, to be held by the whole Church"; or, as F. Newman excellently paraphrases the latter words (p. 129 or 115), that the Pope speak "with the *purpose*"—of course the ascertainable purpose—"of binding every member of the Church to accept and believe his decision."† In the passage

\* The exception to which the Bishop refers is the concluding clause of the "*Unam Sanctam*."

† To our mind, F. Newman has expressed not only the truth, but the one fundamental truth, on the conditions of an *ex cathedrâ* Act, in p. 122 or 108. "The question," he says, "is unlike the question about the Sacraments: external and positive acts, whether material actions or formal words, speak for themselves. Teaching on the other hand *has no sacramental visible sign*; it is an '*opus operantis*,' and *mainly a question of intention*." In any given case therefore we have simply to consider, whether the Pope have sufficiently indicated his *intention* of obliging interior assent. And he may of course most easily indicate what has been his intention in some given utterance, without inscribing such intention on the utterance itself: as he most evidently did (not to mention a large number of other instances) in the two cases of S. Leo's Letter and Gregory XVI.'s "*Mirari vos*," to which we referred in April, p. 337.

Accordingly we see no difficulty whatever in the supposition, that some subsequent fact may for the first time make clear a Pope's previous intention. Those e.g. who hold, as F. Newman does and as we once did, that all the documents on which the Syllabus is founded were issued *ex cathedrâ*, must consider, in the case of several among them, that their possession of this character was first made known by the Syllabus. Again as to the

therefore which we have quoted, the Bishop necessarily implies that, in order to an *ex cathedrâ* definition, there is no need whatever of the Act itself *expressing* its own defining intention, if such intention be otherwise cognisable.

This we take to be Mgr. Fessler's deliberate opinion. But (as we have more than once said) his language is by no means always consistent with itself. In another page he much more stringently *limits* the sphere of Vaticanly-defined infallibility; while in another again (according to the obvious meaning of his words) he enlarges that sphere beyond all intelligible bounds. The former of these pages is p. 51; where he represents it as required for "an *ex cathedrâ* utterance," that *in* that utterance "the Pope must *express* his intention, by virtue of his supreme teaching power, to declare the particular doctrine on faith and morals to be a component part, &c. . . . and *as such to be held by the whole Catholic Church*, &c. &c." On this sentence we at once make three remarks. Firstly the Bishop does not even allege, that *the Vatican Council* has expressed any such restriction, but only lays it down as "the view of Catholic theologians." Secondly, such is most assuredly *not* "the view of Catholic theologians"; considering the unanimous acclaim with which they hail S. Leo's Letter to S. Flavian, not only as an instance, but even as among the most prominent instances, of "an *ex cathedrâ* utterance."\* Thirdly, the Bishop elsewhere (p. 70) ascribes to Catholic theologians an opinion, entirely inconsistent with the former; viz. that "it serves as a sure mark of a dogmatic definition when an opposite doctrine is branded by the Pope as heretical," whether the Pope do or do not *express* his intention of obliging assent to his pronouncement. See our comment in April, p. 336. In the very instance which the Bishop alleges, Boniface VIII. in no kind of way *expressed* his intention of obliging interior assent.

In other respects also, the Bishop's affirmation of p. 51 is inconsistent with what he says elsewhere. For instance. If

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Syllabus itself. For our own part we maintained in April (p. 342) that its *ex cathedrâ* character was abundantly plain from the first. But those who do not admit this, may yet have been convinced as to what was the Pope's intention in 1864, by reading the words which he addressed to the assembled Bishops in 1867. See our April number, p. 342.

Father St. John, starting from the principle opposed to our own, arrives by legitimate consequence at an opposite conclusion. See his note at p. 52.

\* It may be as well to point out, that no one can be further removed than F. Newman, from holding the opinion which in this one passage the Bishop seems to express. For instance, F. Newman regards as *ex cathedrâ* all the Pontifical Acts on which the Syllabus was founded. We should like to know how many there are of them, which *express* their own *ex cathedrâ* character.

it were always necessary to an *ex cathedrâ* utterance that the Pope should *expressly declare* its character, there would be no possibility of doubt on the question, which Pontifical utterances are *ex cathedrâ* and which are not. But the Bishop says (p. 5) that in "*a hundred*" cases the question is one of real difficulty. "It is the business of theology," he adds, "to support the different views which may be taken of this question by such arguments as it has at its command, and probably in this way to bring it to pass, that the right view *should become* the generally received view."

But further, if the Bishop had intended deliberately to maintain what he had affirmed in p. 51, he could not have written a single word of his fourth chapter. The whole argument of that chapter is as follows. Dr. Schulte alleged, that the various conditions of an *ex cathedrâ* Act on which Catholic controversialists had insisted, were mere "*pleas devised*" by those controversialists "to quiet the conscience" of their readers. No, replies the Bishop; Catholics insist on no other conditions, than those laid down by the Council itself. This is the one argument of his whole fourth chapter. But most certainly (as we have said) it is not one of the conditions laid down by the Council, that an *ex cathedrâ* utterance must express its own *ex cathedrâ* character; and this therefore cannot possibly be one of the conditions, on which the Bishop intended to insist.

Lastly, there is another paragraph of the treatise bearing on this particular subject, which is so much out of harmony with the rest, that we were unwilling in April (p. 337, note) to argue from it, because we suspected some mistranslation. On referring however to the French translation, we find that there also it appears; and the Bishop's intention is further made manifest (which we had not observed) by the quotation from Bellarmine which presently follows. The passage runs thus:

As doctrinal definitions comprehend doctrines respecting the faith as well as doctrines respecting morals, it will often happen in the nature of things that definitions on the latter of these two subjects, viz. morals, will be issued to the universal Church in the form of a command or prohibition from the Pope. (*Præcepta morum*) (p. 44).

Now for our own part we are far from doubting, that the Pope is infallible on matters of universal discipline; or in other words that he is infallibly prevented by the Holy Ghost from issuing commands to the whole Church, which cannot be obeyed without transgression of God's Law. But what surprises us in the Bishop's statement is his opinion, that these "*commands or prohibitions*" will often be such "*doctrinal definitions*" as are contemplated by the Vatican Council.

According to this view—so far from the condition of p. 51 being necessary to an *ex cathedrâ* utterance—it is not even required for such an utterance, that the Pope shall *express any doctrine whatever*. A Pope's command, that this shall be done or that shall not be done, is often (according to Mgr. Fessler) by itself an *ex cathedrâ* definition of faith. We believe the Bishop stands quite alone in this opinion. Certainly no other theologians we know,—however firmly convinced of the Pope's infallibility in universal discipline—ever confused that infallibility with the infallibility of his *ex cathedrâ* teaching.\*

As we have said however, we apprehend that neither the extreme statement of p. 44, nor the equally extreme opposite statement of p. 51, can be fairly taken as expressing the Bishop's real mind. In pp. 4, 5 he lays down as having been "defined by the Vatican Council," "that the doctrinal decisions of the Pope upon faith and morals, provided with all those notes which were prescribed in the well-weighed Definition of the Council, are free from error." Now this "well-weighed Definition" does not so much as *hint* at any necessity, that an *ex cathedrâ* Act must express its own *ex cathedrâ* character. Those therefore who advocate such necessity, in the Bishop's judgment contradict the Vatican Definition: for they say that a Pontifical utterance, possessing all the notes mentioned in that Definition, is not nevertheless *ex cathedrâ*, unless it possess a further note on which the Definition is profoundly silent.

One further remark in concluding this particular part of our subject. Considering the absolute and unreserved assent due by every Catholic to all *ex cathedrâ* utterances cognisable by him as such, it may seem strange that they are not distinguishable from *other* pronouncements by more decisive and unmistakable marks; that (as Mgr. Fessler says) in "a hundred" cases a theologian has difficulty in deciding, whether some given pronouncement be *ex cathedrâ* or not.† But in the first place (as of course all Catholics admit) there are innumerable dispensations of Divine Providence, for which man is unable even to guess the reason. Then secondly, as we pointed out last January (p. 190), Catholics fully understand, that no

\* F. Newman (pp. 134, 5, or 119, 120) speaks of the Pope's infallibility in certain moral precepts; but he has appended a note to his popular edition, explaining that the Vatican Council does not define such infallibility. So Mgr. Fessler himself—notwithstanding his language of p. 44—explains in pp. 126, 7, that the question of the Pope's infallibility in universal discipline is not touched by the Vatican Council.

† We need hardly explain, that this difficulty mainly arises from the difficulty of deciding for certain, whether there are sufficient indications of the Pope's intention to oblige assent.

obligation is incumbent on any individual, whenever at the moment there is a solid and well-founded *doubt* of the obligation. Moreover thirdly (as we also pointed out in January) the difficulty does not at all affect those who are truly loyal and docile to the Church; for these submit their intellect, not to *ex cathedrâ* utterances alone, but to every intimation they can possibly discover of the Church's mind. But now we add fourthly, that the circumstance to which we refer is in fact a real blessing. Even under existing circumstances a very unfortunate habit is not unknown among even well-intentioned Catholics, of drawing "a hard-and-fast line," between the Pope's infallible utterances and those which are not strictly infallible; as though interior assent were due only to the former class. In April (pp. 229-232) we showed how extremely alien is Mgr. Fessler from this spirit; but in some quarters it is certainly to be found. Now as things are, a very powerful argument is adducible against these indocile Catholics; and this argument would fall to the ground, if an unmistakable distinction existed in every case between those Pontifical utterances which are and those which are not *ex cathedrâ*. Take any one of these Pontifical Acts—so we would say to such a person—which you so readily disregard: if you are not certain that it is *ex cathedrâ*, still less are you at all certain that it is *not ex cathedrâ*. What can be more evidently and on the surface disloyal, than to disregard a pronouncement, which, for all you know, may be one of those which the Holy Ghost has protected—not only with that special watchfulness which surrounds every official Act of a Pope,—but even with that choicest assistance, which infallibly preserves from error its substantial teaching? In one word then, the uncertainty which at times indubitably exists whether some given Pontifical pronouncement be or be not *ex cathedrâ*, is a very valuable probation of the Catholic's intellectual docility. We treated this question ten years ago, and here subjoin what we said on that occasion.

Meanwhile an objection has been urged against our whole view, which some thinkers regard as very serious. They consider that "the gulf is infinite which separates that which is of faith from what is not of faith"; and they allege very truly that our theory presents Catholic doctrine in a most different aspect. To us, their objection appears as unphilosophical as it is untheological. Is it the case in secular science, that a line can be broadly and sharply drawn, such that all on one side of that line is absolutely certain truth, while all on the other is quite open and undetermined? Is not the opposite fact notorious? Some conclusions are absolutely established; others nearly so; others, again, under present circumstances, are much more probable than their contradictories, yet by no means sure not to

be afterwards disproved ; and so, along a kind of graduated scale, we finally arrive at those, on which as yet one side is not more probable than the other. So in theology. One class of doctrines unquestionably demands the assent of divine faith. Of a second class, it is quite certain that they are infallibly true, and probable that they are an actual part of the Deposit. A third class are beyond all doubt infallibly true, yet with no pretensions to be strictly of faith.\* Of a fourth class, it is more or less probable that they are infallibly true. A fifth class are almost certainly true, though not infallibly determined. And so by degrees we arrive at those, on which every well-instructed Catholic has full liberty to take one side or the other. Thus the pursuit of theological science becomes one sustained discipline of intellectual docility ; thus the student is constantly reminded, that he thinks under the assiduous superintendence and direction of that Holy See, whose continuous infallibility is the abiding light of Catholic doctrine (January, 1865, pp. 52, 3).

IV. There was a fourth point, on which we examined in April Mgr. Fessler's statements: viz. the *frequency* of ex cathedrâ utterances. He holds on the one hand, against Dr. Schulte, that such utterances constitute but a small *portion* of the Pope's official pronouncements; and in this we of course heartily coincide. On the other hand, as we pointed out, the Address to the Pope, which he signed in common with his episcopal brethren, suffices to show that (in his judgment) *absolutely* such utterances are far from infrequent. We extracted in p. 339 the passage from this address, to which we refer; and it may be worth while to add a few words in illustration of our argument. Let some given Pontifical Act be supposed to exist, in regard to which certain Bishops declare, that in this utterance the Pope, exercising his "supreme office," has "proclaimed" some "eternal verity"; has "smitten with his Apostolic utterance" some "error of the time," which "threatens" (in company with others) "to overthrow the natural and supernatural order of things and the very foundations of ecclesiastical and civil power"; that in this Act the Pope has tended to "dispel the darkness which perverse and novel teachings have shed over men's souls"; that this Act has enabled Catholics, on one point at least, to know "what they are bound to hold, retain, and profess." Let these Bishops be further supposed to add, that in this utterance "Peter has spoken by the mouth of Pius," "for the safe custody of the Deposit"; and that they feel themselves bound to confirm the said utterance, because they are deeply convinced that the Pope is by divine right "teacher of all Christians." No one would dream of doubting, that they contemplate this given Act as having been issued ex cathedrâ. But in the

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\* That is, "de fide immediatâ."

Address, the Bishops say that Pius IX.'s voice in a figurative sense "never has been silent," so frequent has he been in promulgating utterances of this very kind. Such being the case—whatever might be true of other Bishops—no one can doubt, that *those who signed the Address* accounted Pius IX. to have spoken *ex cathedrâ* very frequently. But Mgr. Fessler was one of those who signed the Address, and the conclusion is obvious.

We now pass from particular questions to the treatise as a whole. Some few Catholics (as we said at starting) seem in some way to have imbibed a notion, that the treatise was partly intended as a kind of manifesto against certain "ultramontane"\* and exaggerated expositions of the Vatican Definition, and as a protest in favour of some more moderate interpretation. Moreover, we find in various ways, that such persons suppose the DUBLIN REVIEW to be included among these "ultramontane" ultras. In reply however to such suggestions, we affirm with fullest confidence, (1) that in no single respect does our view of the Vatican Definition differ from the Bishop's; and (2) that throughout his treatise his readers (if they will only be at the trouble to distinguish his own voice from that of his commentators) will not find the faintest appearance of his contemplating the existence of any Catholic ultra party, which he supposes to interpret the Definition more largely than he does. We begin with the first of these two propositions.

We believe that the mistaken impression to which we have just referred, has partly arisen from some words of F. Gratry, which Mgr. Fessler's French translator thrust into his Preface, and which, as it happens, have been more than once quoted in the Gladstone controversy. F. Gratry, as is well known, had been a strong opponent of the Definition; and when—like a loyally-intentioned Catholic as he always was—he submitted to its teaching, he put forth the following explanation of his previous attitude:—

I combated an inspired infallibility; the Council's Decree rejects inspired infallibility. I combated a personal infallibility; the Decree gives but an official infallibility. Writers of a school which I thought excessive, were undesirous of limitation to infallibility *ex cathedrâ*, as being too narrow; and the Decree gives but infallibility *ex cathedrâ*. I almost feared a scientific infallibility, a political and governmental infallibility; and the Decree gives but doctrinal infallibility in matters of faith and morals.

It is difficult to imagine how a writer, otherwise so well-informed as F. Gratry, can have fallen into what we must be

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\* This very word "ultramontane" is used by F. St. John in the note at p. 111, on which we shall presently comment.

allowed to call so supremely absurd a tissue of misapprehensions. We can only account for it by supposing, that he never read a line that had been written on the subject by the members of that "excessive school," which made him so uncomfortable. Let us take his statements point by point.

(1) There was an "excessive school" forsooth, which advocated "an inspired infallibility." Even F. Newman has in some way received an impression (p. 172 or 156), that certain "courtiers and sycophants" have "ascribed" to certain Popes "the inspiration of the Apostles."\* Now as it is not easy to see how such a thesis would be otherwise than actually heretical,—we would earnestly submit to F. Newman, whether he ought to have implied such a charge even against "courtiers and sycophants," without adducing some proof. However, let this pass. Now as to the word "inspiration" having been occasionally applied to the infallible determinations of Popes and Councils,—we showed in January 1870 (p. 223, note) that this has been at times done even by grave theologians. Thus Orsi calls S. Agatho's Letter "a divinely inspired Rule of the Catholic Faith"; and S. Leo himself said that the "Definition" of Chalcedon is "through *divine inspiration*" indubitably consonant in all things with true doctrine. The word "assistance" is no doubt the recognized word. And it is a far more appropriate one, because (by the confession of all) the divine interposition given on such occasions is (as F. Newman admirably explains in p. 132 or 117) "simply an external guardianship, keeping" Popes and Councils "off from error; as a man's good angel, without enabling him to walk, might on a night journey keep him from pitfalls in his way." True it is that, as F. Newman also points out, "there is a sense of the word 'inspiration,' in which it is common to all members of the Church; and therefore especially to its Bishops, and still more directly to those rulers" when assembled in Council. But such inspiration, we need not say, differs in kind from the "inspiration of the Apostles"; and we may fairly therefore ask F. Newman to name any single "courtier or sycophant," who ever ascribed such inspiration to any successor of S. Peter.

(2) F. Gratry further thinks, that those exaggerating writers whom he dislikes ascribe to the Pope a "personal," as distinct even from an "official," infallibility. According to them, we suppose, if the Pope, in chatting, says to some friend, "I like

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\* These are F. Newman's words: Mr. Gladstone asserts "that Popes . . . have claimed the inspiration of the Apostles, and that Germans, Italians, French have ascribed such a gift to him. Of course he means theologians, not mere courtiers or sycophants, for the Pope cannot help having such till human nature is changed."

Franzelin's explanation of the Galileo difficulty," such explanation is thereby known to be infallibly sound. What was the good Father dreaming of?

(3) The same singular thinkers, it appears, "were undesirous of a limitation to infallibility *ex cathedrâ*, as being too narrow." We are tempted to cry out, like members in the House of Commons, "Name, name!"

(4) Nay, so numerous and influential were these writers, that F. Gratry,—forgetting the Holy Ghost in his terror,—“almost feared” that the Council might infallibly define “a scientific, political and governmental infallibility.” We should think that no other temperament can ever have existed, so imaginative and at the same time so timid as F. Gratry's.

That Mgr. Fessler's treatise would be violently at variance with such views as those repudiated by F. Gratry, was certain beforehand, since the Bishop was a Catholic. We suppose that, if he had spoken of them at all, he would have ascribed to them (as we should) the note of heresy.

So far then at all events, we are at one with the Bishop. Again we heartily follow him in pronouncing as a matter of course, that “the Pope is not infallible as a man, or a theologian, or a priest, or a bishop, or a judge, or a legislator, or in his political views; or even in his government of the Church.”\* No Catholic ever dreamed of thinking otherwise.

Again the Bishop constantly inculcates that, even in the case of *ex cathedrâ* utterances, their infallibility does not extend to preambles, arguments, or obiter dicta. In our former controversy on the extent of infallibility, there was no truth which we more prominently enforced than this. We were always urging it.

Undoubtedly, if the Bishop had represented the Vatican Definition as confining infallibility to the strict Deposit—or to a pronouncement of the note “heresy,” with exclusion of minor doctrinal censures—or to cases in which the Pontifical utterance *expresses* its own *ex cathedrâ* character—we should have been earnestly at issue with him. But we trust we have conclusively shown, that he has made no such restriction whatever. And we consider therefore the first of our two propositions to be irrefragably established; we consider it to be irrefragably established, that we are heartily in accordance with his treatise, as regards his general exposition of the Vatican Decree. That we should agree with all his incidental statements,

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\* Except indeed—which is not a matter touched by the Vatican Definition—that we consider him in some sense infallible (as we have already mentioned) in regard to matters of universal discipline.

could not be expected of course in the case of any uninspired writer; least of all in that of Bishop Fessler, whose incidental statements by no means unfrequently contradict *each other*. But (we repeat) his general view of the Definition is precisely our own.

Our second proposition is, that there is no trace, throughout Mgr. Fessler's treatise, of his contemplating the existence of any Catholic ultra party; of any party, which he considers to interpret the Vatican Definition more largely than he does, and against which accordingly he is intending to protest. Our proof of such a proposition must of course be mainly negative; and we can only say, let any one produce if he can some passage which contradicts our assertion.

The English Translator has certainly answered our challenge by anticipation; and has adduced indeed in his support, not one passage, but an entire chapter. Dr. Schulte has a chapter headed, "Pleas devised to quiet the conscience, and their confutation"; and the Bishop replies to that chapter under the same title, pp. 111-131. At the beginning of this chapter (p. 111) the Translator appends a note, saying that "the 'pleas' here spoken of are the replies supposed to be made by *ultramontane defenders of infallibility*,—not by Fessler himself,—to the view maintained by Dr. Schulte." We cannot for a moment accept such an account of Mgr. Fessler's meaning. In the very next page the Bishop says, that "what Dr. Schulte really means by the term 'pleas devised to quiet the conscience,' is the true and essential meaning of the Definition of the Vatican Council." According to the *Translator's* version then of Mgr. Fessler, this last sentence may be thus truly paraphrased: "There are certain pleas, which have been devised by ultramontanes to quiet the conscience. They are no pleas of mine; but on the contrary they are ultramontane pleas, against which it is one especial purpose of mine to protest. Nevertheless they do but set forth the true and essential meaning of the Vatican Definition."

Surely the drift of this fourth chapter is very obvious. Catholic controversialists have, from 1870 downwards, urged against the Döllingerite heretics these two propositions: (1) that no Pontifical utterances have been defined to be infallible, except those possessing the conditions mentioned by the Council; and (2) that such utterances as those alleged by Dr. Schulte do *not* possess those conditions. To this the Professor replies, that such conditions are mere "pleas devised" by controversialists "to quiet the conscience"; to prevent Catholics from seeing, how much is included in the obligation newly imposed on them. The Bishop rejoins, that on the contrary the conditions on which he insists are neither more nor less, than what were laid down by the Council itself in the very act of *imposing* the said obligation.

The Bishop, we repeat, contemplates no *Catholic* opponent whatever; no opponent except Dr. Schulte and the Döllingerites. He contemplates no doubt Catholics who differ from him on the authority of the Syllabus; or on the Pope's infallibility in universal discipline; or perhaps on the sense of the "*Unam Sanctam*." But there is no trace from first to last of his contemplating any Catholics, who differ from him on the sense of the Vatican Definition. It must be admitted indeed, that some of his *commentators* have understood him differently. Thus, as we have just seen, the English Translator mentions (p. 111, note) certain "*ultramontane* defenders of infallibility," whom he supposes to be at issue with "*Fessler himself*." And at starting (p. vii.) he warns his readers against "*exaggerated statements, even when made with good intentions*"; "*for*," he adds, "*it is precisely to these statements that the now open adversaries of the Church appeal, in order to place the true doctrine before their dupes in an odious form*." Presently he says (p. viii.) that "*Bishop Fessler was really the exponent of the mind of most of the German Bishops*." We will venture to say that, as regards his general view of the Definition, "*he is 'the exponent of the mind of' all 'the German Bishops'*"; and we may also add, of all the Italian, French, Belgian, Spanish, American, and English Bishops. Indeed we do not see how any persons can possibly differ in substance from his exposition of the Definition, without ceasing to be Catholics at all. According to the Translator indeed (p. x. note), at a certain moment Bishop Hefele "*became satisfied, that Bishop Fessler's pamphlet expressed the true sentiments of the Holy See on the subject of infallibility*." We do not understand what sentiments, other than Bishop Fessler's, *could* have been those of the Holy See on the subject of infallibility.

But by far the most important statements of the Introduction, as to this imaginary ultra party, are supplied (pp. viii.-x.) by an anonymous Roman correspondent of a German Catholic newspaper; the "*Germania*." Now Father St. John, with characteristic candour, takes care to point out one serious inaccuracy, which this letter contains. According to the correspondent, Bishop Hefele at first doubted, whether Bishop Fessler's "*defence of the Vatican Definition*" "*would be accepted as sound at Rome*" (p. ix.): whereupon, the latter Bishop told the former, "*that he had received from the Pope himself a Letter avowing his satisfaction with it*." Now we may be very certain that Bishop Hefele would not have approvingly quoted Bishop Fessler, so long as he doubted whether the latter prelate's doctrine would be accepted as sound at Rome. Yet the "*Germania*" itself mentions, what

must have been a notorious fact; viz. that the Bishop's Pastoral, when it appeared, made frequent quotations from Bishop Fessler's work (p. x.). According to the correspondent then, the Pope's Letter to Mgr. Fessler must have preceded, by some considerable time, Mgr. Hefele's Pastoral. Father St. John however points out (p. x. note), that the latter was published on April 10, 1871; while the former is dated April 27 of the same year.

This is not the only inaccuracy, into which the correspondent has ascertainably fallen. "The Pope," he says, "made himself thoroughly acquainted with the contents of Bishop Fessler's work; and as his own judgment of it fully corresponded with the judgment of the [theological] commission [which he had named for its examination,] he wrote a letter to the Bishop with his own hand, praising him for the highly valuable work, &c." The obvious meaning of this sentence is, that the Holy Father, having carefully read the treatise, assured the Bishop that he found it highly valuable. Now F. St. John has done great service, in publishing what the Pope actually did write. We reprinted the Letter in April (p. 329): and as those who read it will see, Pius IX. neither expressed nor implied that he had read a single word of the treatise; but confined his commendation to the excellence of its design and scope.\* The Bishop had sent him a copy; and the Holy Father in reply said that he observed with much pleasure what the Bishop was doing. We are very far from intending to suggest, that had the Holy Father read it, he would have approved its execution less cordially than he approved its design. We merely wish to point out, how little pains this correspondent had taken to discover the exact truth, and how impossible therefore it is to place reliance on his other statements. Newspaper correspondents in general are not commonly thought the most trustworthy of mankind; and this particular unit of the number is proved to have made two not altogether trivial mistakes.

Indeed *three*. One of his flourishing statements is, that Pius IX. "wrote a letter *with his own hand* to the Bishop of St. Polten." F. St. John, on whose accuracy one may always rely, explains (p. iv.) that it was the *signature* which was written with the Pope's own hand: no very rare and out-of-the-way compliment.

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\* We think there is much ground of complaint against the French translator. He published Mgr. Fessler's treatise, as "a work which has been honoured by an approbative Brief from Pius IX.;" without giving his readers any clue for discovering, to *what particular features* of it the Pope's approbation had been directed.

In fact we are inclined to suspect, that this anonymous writer is the founder of that pseudo-Fesslerian tradition, which we set forth at the commencement of our article. There is nothing in Gulliver's Travels, we are firmly convinced, more simply fictitious than this tradition; but the correspondent of the "*Germania*" had taken up the notion, and all his characteristic touches tend to engender belief in it. Bishop Hefele forsooth had feared that the Vatican Definition meant something extreme and dreadful; and (though he had himself been present at the Vatican debates) still he was not reassured, until told by Bishop Fessler that the Pope had read every word of the "*True and False Infallibility*," and strongly approved the moderation of its tone. Unless there is some evidence in reserve of which we know nothing, we do not believe a single word of all this. That Bishop Fessler sent Bishop Hefele the treatise, and that the latter made large use of it in his Pastoral, is of course simple enough; it is doubtless true; and it is in all probability the whole truth.

We cannot more suitably close our article, than by once more expressing our sense of the invaluable service rendered in Germany by the treatise. The Bishop did not dream of any other antagonists, except Dr. Schulte and his Döllingerite confederates; and of them his refutation is crushing. Of course we think that the work would have been much more valuable even than it is, if it did not contain those incidental ambiguities and inconsistencies of expression, which are by no means few, and on which we have been obliged somewhat severely to comment. But the French translator, cited by F. St. John in p. xv., does not at all exaggerate its characteristic merit.

Important documents well known in France, the collective declaration of the German Bishops of May, 1871, the "*Pastoral Instruction*" of the Swiss Bishops, have already set the principles, drawn out in form by Mgr. Fessler before the eyes of such of my readers who are not theologians. People have seen in a general way how these principles have to be applied to Bulls and other Papal documents, of which the adversaries of Infallibility endeavour to avail themselves. But the great advantage of this work of Mgr. Fessler, and that which gives it a particular interest, is the application this author makes of these principles to such numerous examples. All that the adversaries of the doctrine have drawn from history in order to assail it, has furnished the illustrious prelate with the opportunity of placing these very facts in their true light. Thus has he been able to show to men of good will, but hitherto imperfectly instructed in the matter, that the doctrine against which their understanding rebelled is not the true Infallibility defined by the Council of the Vatican, but the creation of ignorance and of passion—in fact, "*a false Infallibility*."

## ART. V.—PRINCE BISMARCK'S SPEECHES.

*Les Discours de M. le Prince de Bismarck (1862-1874), avec sommaires, notes et table analytique.* Berlin, Paris et Londres (1867-1874). Five volumes.

IN 1859, when the names of Magenta and Solferino were in every man's mouth, when French bayonets and Piedmontese gold were changing the face of Italy, and the Revolution was celebrating throughout Europe its triumphs won beyond the Alps, there were men in Germany who saw in the Italian conflict the prelude to a fiercer struggle in their own fatherland, "The Italian War (wrote the German democrat Lasalle) is not only sanctified by every principle of democracy, but it is an enormous advantage to Germany, for to her it brings salvation. Napoleon III., when he invites the Italians to drive the Austrians out of the peninsula, performs a German mission; he overthrows Austria, the eternal obstacle to the union of our country. If the map of Europe is reconstructed on behalf of the nationalities of the South, let us apply the same principles to the North. Let Prussia act without hesitation. If she does not she will have given a proof that monarchy is incapable of national action." Such were the thoughts of the school of Lasalle. To them German unity was the necessary corollary of the establishment of the revolutionized kingdom of Italy. And farther away, on the shores of the Neva, the same thoughts were working in the mind of one who was ere long to realize them in action. The Prussian ambassador at the court of the Czar, Count Bismarck-Schönhausen, a name then almost unknown to Europe, was following with anxious eyes the policy of Cavour. In him the Piedmontese statesman was to find a ready imitator on a far wider scale; and it was the Nemesis of Napoleon III. that from his policy in Italy came the inspiration which made Bismarck the Cavour of Germany, and that in a certain sense Solferino was but the forerunner of Sedan.

Three years later Count Bismarck became prime minister of Prussia. On September 23rd, 1862, King William placed him at the head of the cabinet. He was engaged in a close conflict with his Parliament on the army question; the ministry of Hohenlohe had just fallen; and he called to his aid the clear head, iron will, and daring courage of Count Bismarck, well known to him, but known to few other men in the whole world.

The Count had received a practical training in European politics such as falls to the lot of few statesmen. Elected in 1847 to the Diet of his native Saxony, and in the following year to the German Parliament, he had acted the part of a thorough Conservative, expressing opinions many of which were directly belied by his subsequent policy, but gaining little or no reputation for political sagacity, though all Germany applauded and laughed at his trenchant sarcastic wit. But he succeeded in winning the friendship of the king's brother, Prince William of Prussia. There was a community of feeling between the two men; something of that instinct which tells men that they understand each other, and can work well together to a common end. And so, when after the collapse of the Liberal movement in Germany, Frederick William, a prey to disappointment, failing in health of body and mind, and overawed by the policy of Austria, began to yield up the direction of affairs to a great extent to his more strong-minded brother, Prince William in 1851 obtained the appointment of Count Bismarck as representative of Prussia at the diet of the German Confederation. For seven years he held that post at Frankfort, and all that time he was working with heart and soul to oppose at every turn the policy of Count Rechberg, the envoy of Austria. Close was the struggle between the two statesmen, but Bismarck was wily enough to show a bold front without ever giving his adversary the pretext for an open rupture. In 1858 his mission ended, and he was sent to St. Petersburg by Prince William, then Regent of Prussia. There he formed a cordial friendship with the Emperor Alexander, and laid the foundation of that intimate understanding between Russia and Prussia the practical working of which we are now witnessing. In 1861 the Prince Regent became king, and one of his earliest public utterances was a warlike speech in which he told his generals that Prussia's best hope was in her army—men knew not then what a terrible weapon it was. In the following year he transferred Bismarck from St. Petersburg to the Tuileries. There the Count had ample opportunities of studying the character and policy of Napoleon III. To the Imperial Court an *entente* almost amounting to friendship seemed to reign between the Emperor and the Prussian ambassador; and when, after a stay of only a few months, Count Bismarck suddenly left Paris in September, 1862, to be the head of the Prussian Government, he took with him the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour.

From that time to this Bismarck has pursued one consistent line of policy. Looking at isolated portions of it, separated by long intervals of time, it may not seem thus consistent with

itself. But, viewing it as a whole, we see how during those twelve years it has been gradually but steadily developed, each act preparing the way for that which was to follow, no point once won being ever lost, no step deliberately taken being subsequently withdrawn. Viewing it in the light of moral right and wrong—the only true criterion of the acts of every man whether prince or peasant—we must emphatically condemn his policy from first to last; but at the same time we cannot but appreciate the power, the daring, the infinite resource, the unbending resolution which was needed to carry it into effect; and we cannot wonder that in this half-pagan age of ours, when all things are judged by their success, the “man of blood and iron” is the idol of millions. If we wish to review the work of those twelve years in which he has made himself all but the dictator of Europe—if we wish to know the typical statesman of to-day, to study his policy, and appreciate his position as he views it himself—we have only to turn to the five volumes which contain the record of his speeches as minister of Prussia, chancellor of the North German Confederation, and Prince-chancellor of the new German Empire.

We cannot judge of Prince Bismarck's speeches by the ordinary rules of rhetorical art. With him it is impossible to separate the statesman from the orator. Their literary power is of no account beside their political significance. There is no attempt at eloquence, at oratorical ornament, at the ordinary graces of style and diction. What he has to say he says briefly, quickly, boldly; he appeals to his own knowledge of politics as the best of arguments; if he attacks an opponent he does so with a hurried impetuous onslaught, seeming to wish rather to trample down resistance than to carry conviction to the minds of his audience. There are few of the conventionalities of the Parliamentary speaker; there is still less of the art of the practised orator. But in this long series of discourses we find what is far more valuable,—a continuous and closely-connected exposition of his policy, a record of his achievements, and the visible stamp of his character as a statesman and a man, in which we can trace in bold but unmistakable outlines his views, the means by which he seeks to execute them, and the ultimate objects at which he aims.

But first a word as to the precise value of this record of Prince Bismarck's speeches. It is a republication of the official verbatim report made by the shorthand writers appointed by the State to record the proceedings of the Parliament. But these reports were invariably more or less corrected before publication by Prince Bismarck himself. In the Landtag of 1863 the Liberal leader, Dr. Virchow, drew attention

to some of these corrections, and called forth an explanation on the part of the Prime Minister.

I do not blame the reporters (he said) for not being always able to follow the exact words, especially when a man speaks quickly, as I often do ; and so I find that a reporter must be very well practised to be able to follow me, and that very few reporters are practised enough for that. There is a visible difference in the reports at each change of reporters, some things being omitted and others given in a way in which they were not put by the orator. A correction will, therefore, be always necessary. And it is very difficult to fix a rule or limit to these corrections, for each one can only have recourse to his own memory for what he believes he said. Besides I have not time for a minute correction and complete revision, for I have other and more important affairs to attend to. Indeed I feel the want of time to such an extent, that the necessity for a revision (from which I would gladly dispense myself) might often make me keep silence rather than have to correct what I would say.

We may expect, then, to find over harsh and violent expressions toned down, awkward admissions made in the heat of the moment minimized, and the argument polished and made more telling and concise. But we have still here the substance of the speeches, and the general form in which they were spoken, with the additional advantage that they have received a careful revision, and have thus become the deliberate and studied expression of his views and policy, published with his official sanction.

The first thing necessary for Bismarck's policy was the army. Germany was to be "made by blood and iron," and he well knew that in this warlike age of ours bold words are worth little unless backed by strong battalions. But the National Liberal party, headed by Virchow, had fastened their opposition upon the army budget, and, supported almost unanimously by the Chamber, obstinately refused to vote supplies, and demanded a reduction in the military forces of the kingdom. The conflict then begun did not really end until 1866. Supported by the King, Bismarck steadily refused to yield, and but for that stubborn resistance the course of European history would have been changed, and Prussia would still be to-day what she was twelve years ago, and nothing more. The Upper Chamber was with the Government, but neither by argument nor entreaty could the Chamber of Deputies be induced to vote the budget. At length Bismarck prorogued the Parliament, and continued to administer affairs just as if the budget had been passed. When, therefore, the Parliament reassembled in January, 1863, the war of words blazed out again with increased fury, and on the

27th an address to the King was introduced in the Chamber of Deputies charging the ministry with having violated the constitution. Prince Bismarck's speech in reply was one of the boldest he ever uttered. He defended the position of the ministry, and defined its responsibility, and pointed out the limits by which he asserted the power of the Chamber was circumscribed. His speech contained an exposition of his idea of the Prussian constitutional system, and showed how utterly different it was from that of England, the ministry being really and not nominally the servants of the Crown, and therefore not liable to be displaced by a vote of the Chambers, a fact which has been sometimes overlooked by the English press when commenting on the affairs of Germany. He mercilessly criticised the address.

This address of yours (he said) claims for the Chamber of Deputies rights which either it does not possess or only shares with others. If you have the right, gentlemen, the exclusive right of definitely fixing the whole budget and all its details ; if you have the right to demand of his Majesty the King the dismissal of ministers who do not possess your confidence ; the right of fixing by the budget-resolutions the numbers and organization of the army, the right also—which the constitution nowhere gives you, but which you claim in your address—of controlling the relations between the executive and its organs ; you would then be in possession of the entire power of the government in this country. Yet this is the basis of your address as far as it has any. To my mind your claims may be practically summed up in these words : " By this address the House of Hohenzollern is summoned to transfer its constitutional rights to the majority in the Chamber." . . . . . You take advantage of your right of voting the budget to pass a resolution which it is impossible to execute, unless we want to disarm Prussia, and count as lost the millions that have been spent on reorganizing the army, in order that we may recommence that reorganization again next year. If you required us to execute your resolution (and I cannot suppose that an assembly like this would pass a resolution which it did not mean to have executed), you would demand of his Majesty the King the disbandment of half the infantry and a third of the cavalry, in all 119 battalions, I cannot say how many regiments. But your resolution could not be executed, for it applied retrospectively to the past.

Later on in his speech he hinted that the Crown had at least might on its side, and so would be certain to conquer in the end. " Gentlemen," he concluded, " the mission of Prussian royalty is not yet ended : it has not yet become a mere ornamental decoration to your constitutional edifice, or a useless wheel in the machinery of Parliamentary government."

Day after day the debate went on, and almost every day Prince Bismarck spoke in reply to one or the other of his

adversaries. One of the most remarkable of these speeches was that of January 29th, in which he had the effrontery to tell the Chamber that though they were constitutionally elected they could not be said to represent the country. And moreover he attempted a proof of this bold statement by showing what a small proportion of the electors had voted at the last elections, and expressing his belief that a large proportion even of those who voted were unable to follow the course of politics in the Parliament. A strange speech certainly for a nominally constitutional minister! But words like these are an index to his mind. He is not the man to allow his plans to be trammelled by constitutional forms; and, supported by the King, he was able to set the votes of the Chamber on the army-budget at defiance, though the deputies had on their side the public opinion of all Germany and the powerful influence of the Crown Prince. It is from this period we may date the ill-will, almost amounting to enmity, which it is well known exists between the Chancellor and the Heir Apparent—a fact which at an early future will perhaps have a deep influence on the destinies of Germany. Four years after, as Chancellor of the North German Confederation, speaking in the Federal Parliament, he referred triumphantly to this conflict, for Sadowa had then justified his acts in the eyes of most of his hearers.

As (he said) the previous speaker has expressed a certain amount of astonishment at my having devoted perhaps the best years of my life to disputing the right of rejecting the budget, I will ask him to recall one fact, that he cannot be sure that the army which gained last year's battles would have possessed its present organization, if in the autumn of 1862 there had been no one ready to conduct affairs by order of his Majesty, without taking any notice of the vote of the Chamber of Deputies on September 23rd in that year.

Evidently Prince Bismarck held that success justified all the means by which it was accomplished. He certainly was never particular as to the selection of these. While he was thus securing the continuance of the reorganization of the army, by flagrantly violating the constitution, he proceeded to gain his second object, namely, to conciliate the friendship of Russia by a far more iniquitous course of proceeding. Early in 1863 the violent policy of the military government established at Warsaw drove the Poles into open revolt, and the flame of insurrection spread rapidly through all the Polish provinces of Russia. There was no agitation in the Polish provinces of either Prussia or Austria, and the latter power refused to concert any measures with Russia regarding the insurrection.

But, on February 8th, Bismarck concluded a convention with the Russian Government, by which its troops were allowed to pursue fugitive Poles into Prussian territory, and carry them back prisoners across the frontier, to be sent to the gallows or to Siberia. At the same time Posen was virtually placed in a state of siege. These acts of the Prussian Government added to the excitement in Western Europe on the Polish question. France was burning for war with Russia, but England held aloof, and the Emperor would not act alone. It was fortunate for Bismarck that England hesitated. Had the Western Powers declared war against Russia, his policy would have been nipped in the bud, for the struggle between him and the Parliament was then at its height, and he would have found it difficult to drag Prussia into war in the interest of Russia. On the Polish question he was violently assailed by the Polish and Liberal deputies, and he made several speeches in reply, boldly asserting that it was Prussia's interest that the insurrection should be crushed out by Russia; for if it succeeded, the new state would claim Posen, Dantzic, and Thorn. Prince Bismarck is still consistent in his fear and hatred of Polish nationality. And there is little doubt that his persecution of that noble champion of the faith Cardinal Ledochowski, though begun on religious grounds, has been embittered and intensified by Bismarck's seeing in him the representative man of Catholic Poland. How else can we account for the exceptional severity and cruelty which it has been the glory of the illustrious prelate to suffer in his prison of Ostrowo.

Of Bismarck's speeches on the Polish question the most remarkable is that of February 26th, 1863, for it led to one of the strangest scenes ever witnessed in the Parliament of Berlin. A motion had been brought forward by Herr von Carlowitz and the Baron von Hoverbeck calling on the Government to observe strict neutrality in the affairs of Poland. In reply, Bismarck ridiculed the interest shown by the German deputies in the Polish question. "This enthusiasm," he said, "for foreign nationalities and national aspirations, even when they can be satisfied only at the cost of our own fatherland, is a kind of political malady, of which, alas! Germany seems to have the monopoly." He charged the deputies with factious and unpatriotic conduct. They had applauded Herr Unruh when he said that if the Government involved the country in foreign complications by its Polish policy, the Chamber would refuse any exceptional supplies. "This," said Bismarck, "is saying to foreign nations, 'Invade us, it is a favourable opportunity.'" A storm of outcries interrupted him, and he coolly congratulated the Chamber on its expression of indignation,

and then there was another outburst, but order was restored by the President Behrend. Bismarck then, amidst new interruptions, launched out into a personal attack on his opponent Herr Unruh; evidently he had lost all command of his temper, as he so often did in more recent sittings of the Reichstag, when he had received a home thrust from some Catholic member of the Centre. At length Herr Behrend, as President of the Chamber, called him to order, but Bismarck turned sharply upon him:—

I take the liberty, Herr President (he said, amid frequent interruptions), to point out to you that I cannot recognize your right to exercise a disciplinary control over words pronounced by me. I have not the honour to be a member of this assembly; I have not adopted your regulations; I have had no share in the election of your President; I am not then subject to the rules of the House. The power of the President does not extend to the place which I hold here. The only superior authority which I recognize is that of his Majesty the King, and I know not what rule of law or article of the constitution subjects me to your President. (Interruptions.) I do not speak here in virtue of your rules, but in that of the authority which his Majesty has conferred upon me, and of the paragraph of the constitution which says that the ministers must be allowed to speak whenever they request it, and must have a hearing. (Interruptions.) You have no right to interrupt me!

The President then pointed out that he had no wish to silence the Prime Minister, but reasserted his right to call him to order. This Bismarck flatly contradicted, and was returning to his attack on Unruh, when the President threatened to close the sitting, and only then he returned to the question before the House. Let us try and imagine an English minister holding such language to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and we shall have some idea of the cool effrontery of which Bismarck is capable, and which, indeed, is one of the main features of his oratory. It was more by means of this than of anything else that he was able to hold his ground in the stormy years with which his ministerial career began. It was thus he was able to coolly assert that wrong was right and right was wrong; that the constitution had very little to do with the budget, and that ministers need not heed the votes of the House; that it was the interest of Prussia to violate international law in order that Russia might the more easily trample out the flame of Polish nationality. Thus, in defiance of the Parliament, he completed the reorganization of the army, drew closer the intimacy with Russia, and asserted the independence of the Crown, and its power to ignore the votes of Parliament.

But all this had aroused a dangerous spirit in Prussia. It was easy enough to stifle the voice of public opinion by pro-roguing Parliament, and suspending the more outspoken journals (for the press of Germany was not then the subsidized, spiritless engine of the State which, with few exceptions, it is to-day), but beneath the surface the storm was gathering, and had peace continued, had nothing occurred to divert the popular mind from internal conflicts to the sterner strife of war, and to rouse the spirit of national aggrandizement, 1864 might have witnessed an outbreak which would have forced King William either to abandon his favourite minister or to fall with him, and give place to his more popular son, the Crown Prince. But the death of Frederick VII. of Denmark on Nov. 15th, 1863, the accession of King Christian, the agitation in the Elbe duchies, the destruction of their local government by the new Danish constitution, the Duke of Augustenburg's claim to their sovereignty, and the support given to his pretensions by the German Diet, reopened the Schleswig-Holstein question, and gave Prince Bismarck the opportunity, of which he availed himself with such consummate skill, to obtain a respite from the struggle at home, and to open the first great act of his daring foreign policy.

Fourteen years before, when the first Schleswig-Holstein war was declared by Germany amid the tempest of 1848, Bismarck, then beginning his political career, and acting upon principles and advocating views which were diametrically opposed to his subsequent policy, had publicly denounced the war, "deploring that the Prussian troops had entered Sleswig to defend the revolution against the legitimate sovereign of that country, the King of Denmark." He said that a "*querelle d'Allemande*" had been forced upon the Danes, and he declared that "the war was a rash, unjust, and disastrous enterprise." This speech is not to be found in the present official series. His earlier oratorical efforts have never been collected. They are scattered through the German papers of 1848 and 1849; but if they were republished they would form a strange commentary on this series of ministerial discourses. He was now to adopt the policy he had then so vigorously assailed, but in circumstances ten times more difficult than those of the earlier crisis, and which taxed all his versatile and unscrupulous statesmanship, and called forth all his headlong courage.

In virtue of the Treaty of London, signed by Austria and Prussia on May 8th, 1852, under the mediation of Russia, the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein had been reunited to the Danish monarchy, and the two powers acknowledged Prince

Christian of Glucksburg as the future king. But the German Diet had always refused to recognize this treaty, and asserted that the law of 1650 was still in force, by which the Duchies were not united to the state of Denmark, but only to the direct line of the Danish kings, and were to revert on its extinction, not to the branch of Glucksburg, but to the German ducal family of Augustenburg. Accordingly when King Frederick died the Diet warmly adopted the cause of the Duke of Augustenburg, and on December 7th decreed the occupation of Holstein by Saxon and Hanoverian troops; thus showing at the outset its fear of Prussia. But before this crisis the question had been more than once discussed in the Prussian parliament. The treaty of London guaranteed the autonomy of the Duchies under Danish rule, and this was certainly violated by the new Danish constitution proposed a few months before the death of King Frederick. On the 17th of April Herr Twesten had asked if the Government considered itself bound by the treaty of London, at the same time urging that war with Denmark would be very unadvisable, and quoting Count Bismarck's former speeches to that effect. In his reply Bismarck adopted his favourite tone of haughty defiance. He refused to be judged by his personal opinions of fourteen years before. The previous speaker, he said, had sought to calm the fears of Denmark by alleging that Prussia was weak and divided by the conflict in the legislature, and therefore was not in a position to make war. "But," he went on, "I can assure you, gentlemen, that if we think it necessary to declare war, we shall do so, whether you give us your approval or not." As to the treaty of London, he said, the Prussian Government felt that Denmark had violated the autonomy of the Duchies, and Prussia and Austria, as signatories of the treaty, were prepared to support it.

This was plain speaking, but he knew that a bold course of action was the only safe one for him. He had already secured the support of Austria, and by inducing that power to declare a state of siege on the Polish frontier in Galicia, he obtained an assurance of the neutrality of Russia, interested as she was in the fate of the Duchies. The dynastic element was not introduced into the question until the accession of Christian IX. in November, and then the vigorous action of the Diet in support of the Duke of Augustenburg hurried on Bismarck into armed intervention. By his advice Prussia and Austria asked the Diet for authority to occupy the Duchies on the part of Germany with their armies, instead of the Saxon and Hanoverian troops. The authorization was refused, and then the two Governments resolved to occupy Schleswig and Holstein in their independent capacity as great European powers. As to

the ultimate fate of the Duchies nothing was agreed. Austria never asked Bismarck what it was to be, thinking perhaps that the matter was virtually decided, first by the joint guarantee of their local independence by the treaty of London, and then by the application to the Diet, which would naturally imply the decision of the question with a view to German and not merely Prussian interests. On his side Bismarck carefully concealed his real intention of annexing the Duchies to Prussia, as it would have unmasked his plan of eventually driving Austria out of the Confederation, and at the same time he studiously abstained from doing or saying anything to favour the claim of the Duke of Angustenburg, though he could not directly condemn it, or even show a marked antagonism to it, without endangering his relations with Austria. It will thus be seen how difficult was his position, and how daring his projects. He had induced Austria to ignore the decrees of the Diet, and thus establish a fatal precedent for her own expulsion from Germany in 1866. The Liberal party in the Prussian parliament saw their opportunity, and brought forward a resolution condemning the policy of Bismarck as to the proposed occupation of the Duchies by an Austro-Prussian army in defiance of the Diet, and threatening to refuse supplies in order to prevent its execution. Bismarck had already spoken on the subject before a committee of the house; he complained that in their *procès verbal* they had reported his words incorrrectly, expressing the idea truly enough, but more bluntly and frankly than he wished to formulate it.

The conclusion of my discourse before the committee (he said) has not been accurately reported. I have been made to say: "In a question like this the distrust between the Government and the Chamber of Deputies cannot be reciprocal. The Government would wish to be able to act with supplies constitutionally granted by the Chamber. But if it refuses these necessary supplies, the Government must take them wherever it can find them." I did not express the idea so bluntly; what I said was: "We confidently expect that on your part you will vote in a constitutional manner and to their fullest extent the supplies which we require, and require so urgently that we must take them wherever we can find them." The idea is the same, but it is expressed more moderately, and it has not the crude, blunt form under which it appears in the report.

Thus it will be seen that from the first he assumed a position of independence of the Parliament. If they approved of the war, he would be all the better pleased to have their support, but if not, he would ignore their displeasure. If they voted supplies, it would be very satisfactory to be able to act for once in a constitutional manner, but if not, money should be

found for the war, and he would take it. And this model minister of absolutism, ready to act like another Richelieu, is the man of all others who is the hero of the Liberal press of Europe—because he hates and persecutes the Church.

On this occasion, in order to avoid informing the House of the views of the ministry, he read a despatch which they had addressed to the German courts, and which purported to be a complete exposition of these views, but was carefully written so as to pledge the Government to no particular line of policy. It spoke of the impossibility of the existing state of things being allowed to continue in the Duchies, deprecated any hasty decision on the claims of the Duke of Angustenburg, and proposed that they should be referred to the consideration of the Diet at some future date (ignoring the fact that by a formal vote the Diet had already decided the question); finally it proposed, as a possible alternative, the constitution of Schleswig-Holstein into an independent state under the Danish crown, but guaranteed by Germany, and holding the same position with regard to Denmark as Norway does to Sweden. This was a wily proposal of Count Bismarck's, for it effectually masked his real object while placing no obstacle in the way of its realization, for even had it been adopted, the claims of the Angustenburg family would have been discredited, their supporters in the Diet defeated, and Prussia would be still free to find some opportunity for asserting that Denmark had violated the compact, in order to overrun the Duchies as she did in 1866. But he knew very well that the proposal would not be accepted; it was only a mask for his policy, and so successful was it that more than one writer on the events of 1864 has seriously asserted that Bismarck was friendly to Denmark, wished to preserve the Duchies to the Danish crown, and was only forced into aggression by the course of events.

The discussion was resumed next day, and evoked another speech from Count Bismarck. We dwell upon those earlier debates, because the utterances of Bismarck on these occasions throw a clear light upon his later career, and, viewed in connection with his subsequent conduct, show very plainly what are his real aims, what is the true character of his policy. We have seen already how small is his claim to the applause of the boasted guardians of constitutional freedom, the so-called Liberal party, who are to-day supporting in Germany the foulest of tyrannies. Let us now examine for a moment his claim to be considered the champion of German unity. It has been loudly asserted that Bismarck, beginning the work in Schleswig-Holstein in 1864, and completing it at Versailles

in 1871, has realized what was for centuries the hope and prayer of the German people, by founding a German nation. We reply, that he has no more given real unity to Germany, than his precursor Count Cavour gave true unity to Italy. Prussia is the Piedmont of Germany, as Bismarck is her Cavour. Cavour was above all and before all a Piedmontese; in the same way Bismarck is and always has been above all and before all a Prussian. It has been his boast for thirty years. He has subjected all the minor states to Prussia, and called this new state the German Empire. Again and again he has asserted that he is a Prussian, that his policy is Prussian, and again and again he has ridiculed and assailed the idea of German unity.

"We are Prussians," he had said, in the Parliament of 1849, "and Prussians we desire to remain. I know that in these words I utter the creed of the Prussian army, the creed of the majority of my fellow-countrymen, and I hope to God we shall continue Prussians when this bit of paper is forgotten like a withered leaf of autumn."\* The same spirit showed itself in his speeches in the Schleswig-Holstein debates of 1863-64.

We are reproached (he said) with having nothing in common with Germany. There must be some singular charm in that word "German." We see every one trying to appropriate it to himself. Each one calls whatever is useful to him, or advantageous to his party, "German," and the meaning of the word is changed according to need. And thence it comes that at certain epochs it is called "German" to oppose the Diet, while at other times it is "German" to take the part of the Diet, when it adopts a progressist policy. And so it comes to pass that we are accused of wishing to have nothing in common with Germany, in order that we may pursue our own interests. But I can with justice hurl back this reproach at you. You do not wish to have anything in common with Prussia, because from the standpoint of your party and in the interest of your party, you do not wish Prussia to exist, and because you wish that Prussia should cease to exist, or exist only as a province of the National Union.

This was his view always. He refused to subordinate the interests of Prussia to those of Germany. The exaltation of Prussia,—that was his one idea. As to the German national party, he ridiculed, as we have seen, their aspirations. They should clearly define, he said, "where 'Germany' is, what 'Germany' is, and what is to be understood by the 'interests of Germany.'" And to these questions one might give as

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\* Heseckiel, "Life of Bismarck."

confused a reply in the political sense as the song of Moritz Arndt gave in the geographical."\*

So the debate went on from day to day, Bismarck ever ready with a reply; now calmly arguing with his opponents, now assailing them with fierce invective, now using the weapons of banter and ridicule. Once, in replying to Dr. Virchow, he told him that he was too ignorant of politics to understand the question,—so ignorant indeed that he was not aware of his own lack of knowledge. And he did this not in so many words, but by a supposed case of some rash student opposing Virchow himself in his own lecture-hall.

I will not follow the previous speaker (said Bismarck) upon the historico-political ground which he has taken up. I will just ask him a question. Does not he think it possible that in that special branch of science which he himself professes, some one who had a taste for anatomy but did not make it his chief study, might, speaking before an audience personally well disposed to him, but not so profoundly versed in the science as the honourable member,—addressing himself, I say, to this audience, might not such an orator put forward most convincingly,—and perhaps even with all that eloquence with which the honourable member himself is gifted,—put forward, I say, in this specious manner anatomical principles which the honourable member, deeply skilled as he is in that science, would consider perfectly erroneous, and yet he would only be able to refute them before an audience as familiar as himself with all the details of the subject?

This was Bismarck speaking with a perfect command of his temper, and therefore able to coolly decline giving any reply to his formidable opponent, by telling him, in a kind of simile, that neither he nor the rest of the House could understand the reply he would be able to give to an audience more experienced in political affairs. Again he told the House that their opposition to his policy, their refusal to authorize a loan for the war against Denmark, only proved that they did not really represent the Prussian people.

If the people of Prussia (he said) had the same sentiments as you, I should simply say that the Prussian State had outlived its epoch, and that the time was come when it should give place to some other political organization. (Then, after quoting the words of Frederick William I., the father of Frederick the Great—"I am building up the sovereignty like a bulwark

\* An allusion to the famous song of Arndt, the watchword of the Unionist party :—

Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland ?—  
So weit die deutsche Zunge klingt.

What is the German Fatherland ?—  
As far as sounds the German tongue.

of bronze," he continued): That bulwark of bronze is standing still. It forms the foundation of Prussian history, of the glory of Prussia, of Prussia as a great power, of constitutional royalty; and you will be able to overthrow this bulwark of bronze neither by your National Union, nor your motion of to-day, nor your *Liberum Veto*.

But it was all in vain. The Parliament heard his angry speech, and then by an overwhelming majority voted an address to the king refusing to grant supplies "to a ministry which lived in a state of war with the constitution." But Bismarck was not to be stopped in his career by Parliamentary votes and addresses. He took no notice of the opposition. He had defied the German Diet, and he now ignored the Prussian Parliament. As he had threatened, he took the money for the war wherever he could find it, that is to say, he levied the taxes just as if the budget had been voted. On the 1st of February the Prussian and Austrian armies entered the Duchies. The Danes had been encouraged to resistance by the declarations of the English ministry; but Napoleon remembered well how England had refused to act with him on the Polish question, and he now declined to support England in opposing the dismemberment of Denmark, and so the Danes were left to struggle single-handed against tenfold odds. Right gallantly they fought behind the ramparts of Duppel, but their stronghold was captured, Jutland overrun, Alsen invaded; and then the treaty of Vienna separated Schleswig-Holstein from the Danish crown. It was Bismarck's object to keep the fate of the Duchies still undecided, and, strangely enough, the indolence or carelessness of the Austrian ministry allowed him to accomplish this. No word was inserted in the treaty precluding Prussia from annexing the Duchies. "Every morning," said Bismarck, later on, "I expected Count Rechberg to come and ask me to sign a declaration that neither power should derive any territorial advantage from the treaty." But, by a strange fatality, Rechberg never took this simple precaution, and the first act of the political drama closed, leaving Bismarck free to pursue his policy unhampered by treaty obligations.

When he met the Parliament again in 1865, the conflict on the budget was resumed, but he was able to appeal triumphantly to the success of his policy in the Duchies, and to assure the deputies that he had a great object before him, and that he was working towards it as persistently as ever, though he was unable to tell them what it was.

Had I been able (he said) a year and a half ago to openly tell you in this House what was the object at which we then aimed, I think, gentlemen,

that you would not have made such a determined opposition to us. You are of opinion that, driven by the current of events, we have from time to time modified our object and our aims. But one day, when you will have the opportunity of reading the records of other proceedings, having quite as official a character as those of this House, you will see, gentlemen, that since December, 1863, *our object has never changed*. And in the same way, if we could tell you to-day what prospects we have of bringing our policy in the Duchies to a successful issue, and by what steps we consider that this result should be obtained, if we could give you as clear an explanation of our affairs as I give to His Majesty the King, I think that your lively opposition to our policy would become a little quieter. At least, if you were better acquainted with the technical department of diplomacy, you would not press us in this way, so as to place the ministry in the dilemma of having either to keep silence, and so seem to acknowledge the truth of what you say, or to refute you, and in so doing express opinions which, for political reasons, it would be better to keep in the background. We have been reproached with saying too much and doing too little, with taking a long aim and firing too late. I have indeed been surprised at this complaint, for really I expected that we would be reproached with saying too little about what we wish to do, so as to give you the mortification of not being always able to know exactly what object we are aiming at, and what means we are adopting in order to attain it.

During all this period, from the treaty of 1864 to the war with Austria, Count Bismarck had to exercise considerable self-command, and often to listen thus to the attacks of the opposition without making any attempt to refute them. He spoke very seldom in the Parliament, he said very little about either his policy or his aims. These were indeed matters "which, for political reasons, it would be better to keep in the background." Thanks to General Della Marmora, we now know pretty well what those reasons were. It was the most active period of Bismarck's career. He was negotiating the alliance with Italy, out-manceuvring Napoleon III., and leading Austria step by step towards the fatal rupture of 1866, while at the same time he had to contend at home with the Liberal opposition in the Chamber on the one hand, and, on the other, with the unwillingness for war on the part of the King and of the Court party generally. There are few speeches of Count Bismarck which date from this period; certainly he could not be reproached with saying much and doing little; for he worked on steadily and in silence. He had too much to do, he said, "to waste his time and his lungs" in arguing with the opposition, and when he spoke on political affairs it was not in the Chamber but in his cabinet, battling with the reluctance of the King, or cementing the alliance with the Italian envoy Govone, a man almost as wily

as himself, or on his short summer holiday walking on the sands at Biarritz in friendly chat with the French Emperor, leading him more and more astray with every word he said. We may pass briefly over this eventful period for two reasons. First, our subject is Bismarck's speeches so far as they reflect his policy and his character, and this was for him a time fruitful in action but not in words; and again, we very fully discussed it in these pages not long ago, on the occasion of La Marmora's revelations.\* We pass on, then, to the next period of Bismarck's political career.

The Seven Weeks War of 1866 had placed Prussia, under the guidance of Bismarck, at the summit of power in Central Europe. While Von Falckenstein crushed the armies of Southern Germany, the mass of the Prussian forces, led by Von Moltke and the King, had poured into Bohemia, shattered the power of Austria by one deadly blow on the field of Sadowa, and dictated a treaty of peace with their vanguard in sight of Vienna. Of the states which had cast in their lot with Austria, some became the provinces of Prussia, others her allies, in a sense which made them more truly her tributaries, and the old Confederation disappeared to give place to the North German Bund, of which Prussia was rather the ruler than the leader, and this state of things continued until new and more startling triumphs on the battlefield enabled Bismarck to give a further development to his policy by proclaiming the German Empire of the Hohenzollerns, in the old palace of the French kings on New Year's day, 1871. His speeches, delivered in the interval between 1866 and 1871, divide themselves into two classes,—those addressed to the Prussian Parliament and those delivered in the Reichstag, or Federal Parliament of the North German Confederation. But though strict order would necessitate our following this arrangement, we prefer to take such of his speeches as illustrate our subject, rather in their chronological than in their local sequence.

The events of 1866 naturally modified Bismarck's relations with the Prussian Liberals. They saw him using the might of Prussia to draw Germany together into a forced unity under her supremacy; in his public utterances they could trace overtures made to them for their support; he spoke of the necessity of union between all parties; he ceased to assert, as he had previously done, the subjection of the Chamber of Deputies to the Crown and the Upper Chamber in the matter of the

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\* See the DUBLIN REVIEW, April, 1874, article: "Prussian and Italian Diplomacy in 1866."

budget; for the fact was he had fought and won the battle; the army was now securely organized, and moreover welded together by the stubborn strife of war. From this time, then, there was visible a gradual *rapprochement* between Bismarck and the Liberals, in whom he knew he would find the best allies for his future policy. The first mutual concession by which the Prussian premier and the Liberals began their alliance was the bill of indemnity of September, 1866, which secured the ministry from the consequences of their acts in ignoring the votes of the Chamber on the budgets of the four years from 1862 to 1866, when Bismarck had virtually made the King levy taxes on his own authority. On introducing the bill he told the deputies that he did not himself confess that he was in the wrong, he did not ask them to confess they were in the wrong, it was simply asking them to let bygones be bygones.

We desire peace with you (he said). We would have sought it sooner had we had any hope of obtaining it. We think we shall now obtain it, because you will perceive that the King's Government is not so remote from having the same objects in view as those at which most of you are aiming, as you have perhaps hitherto believed; is not so remote as you may have been led to believe by the silence of the Government on many points, on which silence was a necessity. This is why we believe we shall obtain peace. We seek it loyally. We have stretched out the hand to you, and the report of your committee is a guarantee to us that you will not reject it.

He was right in his surmise. The bill of indemnity was passed, and then for the first time in the ministry of Count Bismarck he was able to administer affairs with a budget legally voted by both the Chambers. And so began the connection between the Prussian chancellor and the Liberal party, which was destined to bear such fatal fruit for Germany. Strangely enough almost immediately after this the name of Hermann von Mallinckrodt (the great Catholic champion, whose death was deplored throughout the world only a few months ago) appears for the first time in those speeches. In the Reichstag of 1867 he began that course of opposition to Bismarck which he pursued with unflinching determination until his death. He was perhaps the most evenly-matched of all his opponents, and we cannot pass over unnoticed the first passage of arms between these formidable antagonists.

In the Reichstag Bismarck naturally said much less of Prussia than of Germany; and indeed during the discussions on the constitution of the Confederation he adopted in his speeches many of the well-worn commonplaces of the German Unionist party. On one occasion he had spoken somewhat vaguely of Germany having "passed through six centuries of

suffering." On the 12th of March, Herr von Mallinckrodt, in a speech on the war of the previous summer, asserted with perfect truth that Prussia had been the aggressor, and then added, in allusion to Bismarck's speech:—

Count Bismarck told us lately about Germany's six centuries of martyrdom. I think that this is not a correct method of reckoning, and that our national martyrdom should not be dated from the time when Rudolph of Hapsburg destroyed the castles of the robber-nobles in order to give internal peace to Germany.

There was a sting in the allusion to the house of Hapsburg as the foe of robbery and the friend of peace in Germany, and Bismarck felt the reference to Prussia as the aggressor of 1866. La Marmora's documents were not then before the world: with his usual astuteness Bismarck had forced the enemies of Prussia into declaring war, instead of making the declaration himself; so now, in defiance of truth, he flatly contradicted Von Mallinckrodt's assertion. Then he went on to say that he should protest against the views as to German history which had been attributed to him. The "six centuries" went back to a period anterior to that of Rudolph of Hapsburg.

I have reckoned (he said) from the fall of the Hohenstaufens, and I think I am right. The honourable member has allowed himself to make a little flank movement in favour of the robber-nobles. Whence arose the brigandage to which he refers? From the anarchy in the German empire during the interregnum? And whence came the interregnum? From the defection of the Guelphs and the victory of the Ultramontanes.

It was strange that in this first conflict between Von Mallinckrodt and Bismarck, the future leader of the Ultramontanes and the future chancellor of the Hohenzollern Empire, which was to renew the persecutions of the Hohenstaufen, the latter should allude to the downfall of that ill-fated race as the beginning of the woes of Germany, and speak of the Ultramontanes as the foes of the Empire, though, of course, only in a retrospective sense. Yet it truly shadowed out the mind of the man; his actual view of politics and his future policy were implicitly contained in that brief reference to the struggle between a German dynasty and the See of Peter, six centuries ago, which he himself was in a few years to imitate.

There were other speeches, too, in which the events of later years were dimly shadowed forth, or in which at least we can trace the tendencies which led to these events—speeches, for instance, in which the Polish nationality was violently assailed; in which the priesthood of Poland was condemned

for telling their people that they should vote as Poles and as Catholics ; speeches in which Bismarck plainly told the Polish deputies that they represented not Poland but Prussia, and referred to the gallant deeds of the Polish *corps d'armée* on the fields of Nachod and Skalitz only to assert that the Poles had in battle with the Austrians "sealed with their blood their conviction that they belonged to the Prussian people." In all this we can trace the same animus which is visible in the fierce persecution of the Catholics of Posen and their heroic bishop at the present moment.

Of the other speeches of this session perhaps the most remarkable is that of the 28th of March, in which he made another concession to the Liberals by giving his adhesion to universal suffrage. And next in importance to this were two speeches, in which he made a very poor attempt to defend the retention of the Danish districts of Northern Schleswig in violation of the treaty of Prague, a breach of good faith on the part of Prussia which has now lasted nine years, and in all probability will last as long as Schleswig remains Prussian. But, for the most part, the speeches of this period had only a temporary and a local interest. It was a time of internal organization for Prussia and the North German Confederation. Bismarck was gathering the fruits of his victories of preceding years, and laying the foundations of the future Empire. It was a lull between two stormy epochs. There were few disagreements between Count Bismarck and the majority in the Chambers ; and for the sake of this tranquillity he yielded many points for which he had violently contended in the period which ended with 1866—notably his theory on the incompetence of the Lower Chamber to reject the budget ; and the question of the immunity of members of Parliament. On this last point he had long contended that liberty of speech in the English sense could not be permitted in the Prussian Chambers ; but he now voted in favour of it, alleging that in doing so he was sacrificing his own private convictions for the sake of peace.

On this occasion (he said) I act upon an opinion which I have often expressed in this very place ; namely, that the constitutional life of a nation viewed as a whole consists of a series of compromises, and that the most important duty of a constitutional government is to favour mutual concessions amongst the great bodies of the State. A compromise can never be effected unless one is prepared, for the sake of a general agreement, to make a sacrifice of one's own convictions,—of sincere convictions, gentlemen, such as mine are, for I would speak of no other.

This is a principle on which Bismarck has acted on more

than one occasion, and it is a very convenient one, though somewhat difficult to reconcile with the possession of high principle in him who adopts it. Concession may be well enough on matters of minor importance, but Bismarck has applied his favourite theory of constitutionalism to affairs of serious import and with the most mischievous results. Thus it was that in direct contradiction to his utterances on the same subject in 1849, he last year gave his support to the civil marriage bill, and when taxed by the Catholic Centre with this apostasy from his former principles, he replied that his convictions were unchanged, but that he thought it right to sacrifice them to the exigencies of the time, acting as a minister of the Empire and not in his private capacity. This is the inevitable result of his theory:—in his opinion the political views of a minister need not necessarily regulate his policy, and the most cherished convictions are to be sacrificed for the sake of a compromise. This shows us how thoroughly the idea of the necessity of pursuing what is practically expedient at the moment, rather than what is theoretically good, has taken possession of his mind; to gain his predetermined end, that is his one object; success is his one criterion of good; arguments drawn from the first principles of right and wrong are but thrown away upon him. He never uses them himself, and apparently he does not understand them when used by others.

“How can I rule in Prussia, in Germany, in Europe?”—this is the question he has been asking himself, and answering in acts, since 1862. It is the key-note of his policy. We see it in his conduct in the crisis of 1862, in the affair of the Elbe Duchies, in the struggle with Austria, in the formation of the North German Confederation and of the Empire, and finally we see it to-day in his efforts to subject the Church in Germany to the all-powerful State which it has been the mission of his life to build up and to exalt. And that he is the virtual ruler of Germany there cannot be a moment's doubt. He does not hesitate to openly distinguish between the personal and the official acts of the Emperor, between those which he does in his individual capacity and those which are done in concert with the ministry, and to these last only does Prince Bismarck attach any importance. Thus, speaking in the Reichstag on the 18th of July, 1870, on the declaration of war by France, he denied that Count Benedetti had been in official relations with the Prussian Government, but, on the contrary, alleged that he was only in relation with King William at Ems, and his words lead to the necessary inference of the utter worthlessness of any pledges given to Benedetti by the king on that

occasion—pledges to which so much importance was attached at the time by those who wished to prove that Germany was assailed by France after making every possible concession.

All those personal declarations (he said) which they have endeavoured to obtain from his Majesty the King in private interviews, in which every appearance of good-will was manifested, and which perhaps they would have obtained if his Majesty did not maintain even in the intercourse of private life that firmness of character by which he is distinguished—all those declarations, I say, could not be acts of the State but only the expressions of an individual, so long as the monarch did not moreover formally confirm them in his capacity of Sovereign, and thus make known his wish to transform them into official acts.

This distinction so carefully drawn between the personal and the official acts of the Sovereign is an important one, and in this particular instance it shows how Bismarck held aloof from the conferences at Ems in July, 1870, determined to assert, as he afterwards did, the informal character of Benedetti's relations with the King; thus placing another obstacle in the way of the preservation of peace. He took no part in these negotiations, just as though he had been the sovereign and King William the minister, and it was only when the rupture with France was complete that he appeared upon the scene.

With the concluding volumes of this series of speeches we enter upon the latest and perhaps the most deeply interesting period of Prince Bismarck's career—that in which, after founding the German Empire, he revived the traditions of the Ghibelline Empire of former days by inaugurating the persecution of the Church in Germany. There have been many speculations as to what it was that prompted him to take this course. It has been said that the German persecution was begun because Prince Bismarck was intoxicated with the success of the German arms in France and of his own policy at home, and, like many another conqueror, in the pride of victory declared war against God's kingdom here on earth. But to us it seems that this is a very partial and superficial view of the origin of the Bismarckian persecution. It must be remembered that the mere glory of conquest, the flush of triumph, would not alone have been enough to induce the German chancellor to enter upon what even his own official press described at the very outset as a "doubtful and dangerous conflict with Rome." It was generally after a victory, too, that Bismarck was most conciliatory in his policy. His successes in 1866 were only secondary to those of 1870; Sadowa was eclipsed only by Sedan; the triumph of forming the North German Confederation was little less than that of

proclaiming the Empire. And yet it was in the period which immediately followed Sadowa that Bismarck made his most important concessions to the opposition, and showed indeed a marked anxiety to establish as far as possible a concord between all parties in the State. He knew that in thus welding together the various elements of German politics, lay the best hope of stability for the new federal system which he had just founded. One would have supposed, then, that after the still more startling triumphs of 1870 he would have pursued a similar policy; and certainly such a course of action would have been dictated by true statemanship, and, had he adopted it, the prospects of Germany would have been far brighter than they are at this moment. And it is very probable that such would have been his policy but for one circumstance,—the triumph of Germany over France coincided in point of time with the beginning of the wretched Old Catholic schism, the first seeds of which were sown before the war and while the Vatican Council was still sitting. It has been said that before the war, too, Bismarck had resolved on inaugurating a policy of persecution in Germany. We have not yet seen any real authority for the statement, and there is more than one circumstance which tends to discredit it. His words to the Polish deputies in the Reichstag, shortly after the opening of the session of 1871,—when he told them that they were not elected to defend the nationality of Poland, but to watch over the interests of the Catholic Church, and that it was by doing so that they would best discharge their duty to their constituents,—do not look like those of a minister who was at that time determined to assail the very interests in question. The revelations of Count Arnim have proved that while the Council was still sitting there were not wanting evil advisers to urge the Prussian Chancellor to abandon the course of toleration which he had hitherto pursued, and assume a position of hostility to the Church on the pretext of the new definitions; but we doubt very much if Bismarck accepted this advice as soon as it was given, and we are rather inclined to believe that he assumed an expectant attitude, watching events without for the moment resolving upon any change in the relations between the State and the Catholic Church in Germany.

But, as we said before, the guiding principle of Bismarck's policy is the insatiable longing for command. He had raised Prussia to the lofty height of Empire, and he was himself the ruler of her destinies, and now came the temptation to endeavour to extend his power into a hitherto untried realm. Could he reduce the Catholic Church in Germany to the position of a tributary of the State, the Emperor William, and, for every

practical purpose, he himself, would rule over all Germany almost as absolutely as the Czar over Russia. A church which would obey the orders of a central bureau at Berlin would be an engine of government which he might well long to possess. The beginning of the Old Catholic schism seemed to point out a way to the accomplishment of this end—an end which but for this he would perhaps never have set before him. Alas!—

“How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds  
Makes ill deeds done!”

The Evangelical Church of Prussia was already subject to the control of the State, as were all the minor Protestant communions to a greater or less extent. The inauguration of a movement among a few of the Catholics of Germany, which, based as it was on heresy and schism, endeavoured to obtain some support from the authorities by arrogating to itself a quasi-national character, doubtless seemed to Prince Bismarck to afford him some prospect of being able to reduce the Catholic priesthood to the same tributary position towards the State as the Lutheran clergy, and he probably thought that by judiciously encouraging and fostering the revolt from Rome, the wretched insignificance of which he exaggerated into an affair of great importance, he might eventually see a State Church take the place of the Catholic Church in Germany. As we have said, he at first maintained a merely expectant attitude, watching the progress of the movement, and aiding it by supporting the Old Catholic professors at Braunsberg, Breslau, and Bonn in their rebellion against their bishops. When this policy had been so far successful as to give the Old Catholics a rallying-point in two of the universities, he proceeded, but still slowly and cautiously, to other measures. Up to the end of 1871 he himself had not said a word against the Catholic episcopate, priesthood, or people of Germany either in the Reichstag or in the Prussian Chambers, but with the opening of 1872 the persecution began. Already the liberty of speech of the bishops and clergy had been seriously menaced, but the first step which really indicated the new direction assumed by the policy of the Government towards the Church was the abolition of the Catholic department of the ministry of Public Worship and Education, followed as it was by the resignation of M. Mühlner, the minister who held that portfolio, and the appointment to the post of Dr. Falk, the *fidus Achates* of Prince Bismarck in the persecution of the Church. Up to that time the relations of the State with the Catholic Church had been guided by the advice of the Catholic department, wholly composed of Catholics,

while a "Protestant department" regulated those with the Lutherans and Evangelicals; but, by the abolition of this system, the regulation of Church affairs and education in Germany, both Catholic and Protestant, was placed under the absolute control of a knot of Lutheran and Liberal officials presided over by Dr. Falk. Then followed the secularization of the schools, the expulsion of the Jesuits, the Lazarists, and the Redemptorists; the State regulation of ecclesiastical education, the establishment of the high ecclesiastical court; in a word, the long series of arbitrary and penal enactments, the sum of which was completed in this present year by the wholesale spoliation of the clergy and the law for the suppression of the convents.

But before the persecution had begun the Catholic leaders of Germany had marked, with keen insight into the politics of their country, the first signs of the coming storm, and had formed for the defence of the Church the party of the Centre, which has so nobly, but alas! unsuccessfully endeavoured to uphold the cause of trampled right and justice against the ruthless might of the persecutors of Germany. Its leaders were men of whom any country might well be proud, experienced statesmen and accomplished orators like Mallinckrodt, Reichensperger, and Windthorst. The latter had been the minister of King George of Hanover, and in 1866 had distinguished himself by the gallant struggle which he made to sustain the falling throne of his royal master. Prince Bismarck had the bad taste to attempt, by a reference to this, to attach the charge of disloyalty to the Empire to Herr Windthorst and those who followed him, and to speak slightly of him as a "great general who had long been without an army," "a man who had for some years formed a little political party consisting only of himself, but at last, *à la Wallenstein*, had found some followers." But Windthorst succeeded in forcing the Prince to withdraw all the imputations of disloyalty which he had levelled against him. It was in reply to this champion of the Church and his illustrious colleague, Von Mallinckrodt, that most of Bismarck's speeches on the Church question were delivered.

We have no intention of attempting a full analysis of these speeches, far less of recounting the story of the German persecution. It has been amply discussed by the whole Catholic press, and has called forth a unanimous and unmistakable condemnation of Prince Bismarck's policy, not from Catholics only, but from every non-Catholic sufficiently acquainted with the course of events in Germany to form a just judgment upon them, and unbiassed by party or by creed. But we must notice

one or two points in these utterances of the arch-persecutor, which it is well to bear in mind. In the first place, then, Bismarck's policy is condemned by his own words spoken in the earlier part of the conflict. We grant that they may have been the words of a hypocrite, uttered only to mask his real intentions, but none the less they condemn him. "I subscribe to the principle," he said, "*that every creed amongst us ought to have full liberty of action, and full liberty of belief.*"\* How would the May laws stand the test of this doctrine, adopted by Prince Bismarck almost as an axiom on this occasion? "I have pointed out," he said later on,† "the desire of the Government to attain to peace on the religious question, and its resolution to give every satisfaction to so numerous a body of our fellow-citizens as the Catholics of Prussia." How has this promise been fulfilled? At the same period, too, he spoke in very respectful terms of the dogma of Papal Infallibility. "Even if we do not believe it ourselves," he said, "*every dogma which is professed by so many millions of the inhabitants of this country ought, in any circumstances, to be held sacred by their fellow-citizens and by the Government.*"‡ And yet he has made that very dogma one of the pretexts of the persecution.

At this time Prince Bismarck used only moderate and guarded expressions in the Parliamentary tribune; it was not until later on that he began those violent harangues in which he recklessly levelled a hundred groundless accusations against the Church in Germany. He asserted the existence of a league between the French Government and the German Catholics; he charged the Centre party with revolutionary tendencies; he alleged that in Poland the priesthood used the confessional as the means of a political propaganda; and, finally, in defiance alike of facts and common sense, he attempted to show that the Catholic opposition had an international character, and to attribute to it a part in a great conspiracy against Germany, having its centre at Rome, to which the origin of the Franco-Prussian war was to be attributed.

This conflict (he said, on March 10th, 1873) is the same as that which under the name of the struggle between the Popes and the Emperors fills up the history of mediæval Germany down to the ruin of the German Empire, and which ended only when the last representative of the august imperial race of Suabia perished on the scaffold under the axe of a French conqueror in alliance with the Pope.§ We have been very near a similar solution

\* January 30th, 1872. † February 9th, 1872. ‡ January 30th, 1872.

§ Here again we see Bismarck's admiration for the persecuting Hohenstauffens; and his hatred of Austria shows itself in his dating "the ruin of the Empire" from their downfall and the rise of the Hapsburgs.

of the situation, modified to suit the manners of our time. Supposing that the French war of conquest, the declaration of which coincided with the proclamation of the resolutions adopted at the Vatican,—supposing that this war had been crowned with success, I do not know but they would have related here in Germany too the *gesta Dei per Francos*.

There were many other statements made by Prince Bismarck which would have been absurd but for their mischievous wickedness; but we doubt if any of them can be compared to this. He knew perfectly well that there was no strife between Rome and the German Government in 1870, and yet he makes this monstrous supposition of the Papal Court having inspired the war, arranged that its outbreak should coincide with the Definition of the Dogma of Infallibility (or, as he calls it, "the resolutions adopted at the Vatican"), and then sent Napoleon III., not as he himself proclaimed to vindicate the *principes immortels de 1789*, but to enact again the *gesta Dei per Francos*. Had we not the official report before us, we might almost hesitate to believe that such a mad theory was so much as alluded to even by Prince Bismarck in the Prussian Chambers.

His other charges against the Catholics of Germany do not need refutation. He has never even attempted a serious proof of them. We have given one specimen of his oratory on the Catholic question, and it is enough. The same daring and random assertion, the same unblushing disregard for even the appearance of truth, marks many others of his speeches in the period from 1872 to 1874, varied only by invectives against the Catholic party, in which we can trace his disappointment and discomfiture at the first great failure of his policy that he has ever known. Again and again he has been called upon both in the Prussian Chambers and in the Reichstag to give some proof of his charges. He has never done so yet. We have looked in vain through his speeches for even an appearance of proof; we have found none. To the demand for it, urged by the men whom he calumniates, he replies only by repeating his charges. On one occasion, indeed, he went so far as to refuse all proof. He had accused the priesthood of Germany of a want of patriotism. "Where is the proof?" cried Windthorst, interrupting him. "I do not see the offence of what I said," continued Bismarck, but he was interrupted again, this time by the loud outcry of the Centre and Right—"Give us proof! Give us proof!" "Well, gentlemen," he replied, "look for proof of it yourselves!" And this is the man at whose beck the so-called Liberals of Germany have voted away the liberties of their Catholic fellow-citizens.

Nor does Prince Bismarck spare in his attacks the Catholics of other countries. When a short time ago Count Münster so far forgot both diplomatic etiquette and ordinary good taste as to charge the Catholics of Ireland with disaffection and disloyalty, in his speech at the National Club, he did little more than condense the attack made by his master upon Catholic Ireland in a reply to Windthorst on May 16th, 1873, when Prince Bismarck had the effrontery to assert that the priesthood of Ireland and the Ultramontane press laboured to destroy the respect for the laws, to undermine authority, to foment discord, to keep open old wounds, and to excite hatred towards the government. From this alone we might judge how far Prince Bismarck can carry what has been euphemistically termed the "art of misrepresentation," when Catholic interests or the conduct of Catholics are in question.

Such is the character of Prince Bismarck's utterances upon the conflict between the Empire and the Church; and as we read them we ask ourselves, is this the same orator as the statesman who, in 1864 or 1866, could so brilliantly explain and defend his policy, even before hostile assemblies? There has been a fatal change since then. He has attempted the impossible, and he has not only suffered a crushing defeat, but he has imperilled the results obtained by all his former successes. He has trod in the steps of his favourite heroes, the persecuting emperors of the Hohenstaufen line, and he is thereby exposing the empire of the Hohenzollerns to the direst danger. Can he suppose for a moment that his policy is drawing together the Catholic and Protestant states of Germany, or that he is securing the devotion to the new empire of its Catholic subjects? Is he not rather by an intolerable tyranny, doing all he can to make the very name of the empire hateful to them, and to hopelessly alienate them from it; and yet they are among the most loyal of the population of that empire, as they proved by their acts in the crisis of 1870, and under a just and tolerant government they would be its most secure and most trusty support. And upon the other hand, what has Bismarck gained by the persecution? Nothing. It has been an utter failure. And still he pursues the same insensate policy,—still he says, as he said in the Reichstag three years ago, "You need not fear; we will not go to Canossa."\* Let him read once more the story of his hero, Frederick of Hohenstaufen. He did not "go to Canossa." He too fought on to the bitter end in the strife against the See of Peter, and for him and for his race it ended on the fatal

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\* May 14th, 1872.

field of Benevento and the scaffold of Salerno, and history has scathed his name with indelible infamy. The record of the German persecution will form as dark a page in the annals of our own days. Up to 1871 Prince Bismarck might have been called the most successful statesman of modern Europe, but since then, plunging into a conflict with a power which is invincible, because the might of God sustains it, he has encountered nothing but defeat. He has yet time to repair the evil he has done, to withdraw from the impious course upon which he has entered and which he has so long pursued; but if he perseveres in his present policy, he can expect nothing but disaster for himself and for the empire over whose destinies he presides.

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#### ART. VI.—FATHER DUMAS ON THE SYLLABUS.

*Études Religieuses*, May, 1875. Art. V.

ONE great incidental advantage has arisen from the recent Gladstone controversy; viz. that the mind of Catholics has again been directed to a careful consideration of the Syllabus. In proportion as this noble utterance is more attentively considered, two conclusions (we think) will come to be regarded as certain. The first is, that its promulgation was an ex cathedrâ Act; and the second is, that no Catholic can safely take part in his country's intellectual and political life, unless he bear the teachings of the Syllabus carefully in mind.

We observe then with very great pleasure, that F. Dumas is beginning a series of papers in the "*Études*" on this important subject; and that if we may take that already published as a specimen, the series will be distinguished by signal ability. This first article is occupied in defending the former of the two conclusions, which we mentioned at starting; viz. the ex cathedrâ character of the Syllabus. To this we shall confine our attention in the present article; reserving to a future number his account of what doctrines they are, which the Syllabus teaches. On our present subject our best course will be to translate F. Dumas's article almost entire; for it is very difficult to abridge it without seriously lessening its force. We

will therefore only make one or two preliminary remarks, and then offer F. Dumas himself to the study of our readers.

We would especially draw their attention to a fact, mentioned by F. Dumas and also by the late F. Schrader. Pius IX., it seems, after he had defined the Immaculate Conception, did not thereupon dissolve the Commission of theologians who had been engaged in preparing the Definition, but kept them still together, for the purpose of assisting him in his teaching office, by a careful theological examination of contemporary errors. And their labours—so it would appear—bore a very important part, not only in preparing the various Pontifical utterances on which the Syllabus was founded, but also in preparing the Syllabus itself.

It will be further seen, that F. Dumas agrees with the late F. Schrader, in regarding the Syllabus as an integral part of the "*Quantâ curâ*." There is one argument however adduced for this conclusion by F. Schrader, which has not occurred to F. Dumas, but which we ourselves mentioned in April, p. 345. The Syllabus is a recital of errors already condemned; while the "*Quantâ curâ*" is occupied in condemning *further* errors. Now Pius IX. expressly affirmed in the Encyclical, that the errors which he had already condemned are an evil "*fountain*"; and that those condemned in the Encyclical are such as "*spring forth from*" that "*fountain*." The result then of connecting the Syllabus with the "*Quantâ curâ*" was, that the Bishops had in their hands one *ex cathedrâ* Act, exhibiting the whole mass of anti-Catholic falsehood, which the Holy Father had condemned from the commencement of his Pontificate.

The only feature in F. Dumas's article with which we find ourselves out of sympathy, is the severity with which he refers to F. Newman's view of the Syllabus; without however mentioning F. Newman's name. For ourselves, as we said in April (p. 341), from the first moment when we read F. Newman's letter, we never could see in that view anything inconsistent with the humblest and most loyal submission to the Pope's magisterium. To accept as *ex cathedrâ* the whole body of Pontifical documents on which the Syllabus is based, indicates surely anything rather than a grudging view as to the extent of Papal infallibility. Nor (as we also said) can we see any great practical difference, between this doctrine, and the doctrine that the Syllabus itself was issued *ex cathedrâ*. Mgr. Fessler's view (to which apparently F. Dumas refers with less disapprobation than to F. Newman's) surely gives *less* scope to Papal authority, than does the eminent Oratorian's; and yet even this, so far as we see, does not very far differ from F. Dumas's in its practical results. See our summary of Mgr. Fessler's theory

in April, p. 346. So long as it is firmly held that every Catholic is bound to accept with interior assent the proposition, that the eighty theses were justly condemned in the sense in which the Pope originally condemned them,—we cannot ourselves see that any serious mischief is done to the integrity of Catholic doctrine.

We now proceed to translate the principal portion of F. Dumas's article.

We have to show then that the Syllabus is of itself, and independently of the Pontifical Acts which form its matter, a true teaching; that this teaching obliges the conscience of Catholics; and that it obliges their conscience, because it emanates from the infallible authority of the Head of the Church. We shall not have omitted (we think) any point adapted to throw light on this serious question, if, after having followed it through all its *détours* and having discussed all its difficulties, we succeed in showing this three-fold character of the Pontifical work: viz. (1) its doctrinal character; (2) its obligatory character; and (3) its character of infallibility.

To say that Pius IX., when he denounced with such force to the Christian world the errors of our day, wished to teach us nothing, that he had no intention to instruct us,—to allege this was, even at the time of the appearance of the Syllabus, a very bold paradox; but, to assert and maintain it now, when we are the happy witnesses of the effect produced by this immortal Act, is to speak against evident truth. The Syllabus is not indeed sufficiently known or sufficiently studied. Still though [comparatively] little known, no one can deny that it has already rectified many ideas, corrected and enlightened many minds. Thanks to it, not only the learned and those who are the most attentive to its voice, but all Catholics without exception have a better knowledge of the risks which their faith incurs from certain doctrines. They have been warned; they are on their guard; they have a more distinct view of the road they must follow, and the dangers they must avoid. Pius IX. has then lighted a torch, and guided them by its light.

What is the use then of playing with words, as if vain equivocations could destroy the striking evidence of this truth? Let men say as much as they please—"the Syllabus is a mere list, a catalogue, an index of contents, a recital of propositions formerly condemned"—will they have gained anything? . . .

Is not every series of propositions condemned by the Pope a "mere list"? Did not Martin V. and the Council of Constance, Leo X. and S. Pius V. draw up a "catalogue," when they anathematized the errors of Wickliffe, John Huss, Luther and Baius? Are not the Canons of our Councils "tables of contents," in which all the impious doctrines of heretics are set down, summed up, and condensed? Is not every solemn definition, every creed, a recital, intended to remind a Christian of what he is bound to believe? . . .

And now, if men fancy themselves to raise a great difficulty by asking us how the Syllabus, which, before its publication already existed in the Letters

of the Holy Father, could teach us something new, they are much deceived. Let us for a moment, as they will have the thing so, reduce it to the humble rôle of an *echo* ; if this expression may be pardoned. Let us suppose that its whole force consists in repeating what has already been said. We would ask whether an echo does not sometimes convey to the ear a sound, which without it would not have been heard ; whether it does not occasionally reproduce it more strongly, more sonorously, and even more distinctly. It is not a new voice that it utters. Be it so ; but it conveys to us the utterance of the original voice, more fully and more loudly.

Comparison, it is true, is not reason ; and we shall therefore leave figurative language on one side, and reply directly to the question put to us. We are asked what the Syllabus is of itself, independently of the Pontifical Letters which were its first origin : and we reply thus :

It is at least a new promulgation of anterior condemnations, more universal, more authentic, and therefore more efficacious. Every man knows the legal maxim, that a second publication powerfully confirms, and (if need be) even supersedes the first. The history of human legislation teems with examples proving this. When, owing to the neglect of men, or the difficulty of the times, or the fickleness or the unruliness of peoples, a law is not sufficiently known or exactly enough observed ;—those in whom the sovereign power resides, promulgate it afresh, in order to strengthen its tottering authority. It is thus born again, and (even were it dead) receives a second life. What could the majority of Christians have known concerning so many condemnations, scattered, and we may say buried, in the voluminous collection of Pontifical Encyclicals, if the Syllabus had not given them light ? How could they respect them ? How could they obey them ? It was necessary that they should again hear them from the great Pontiff, that they might submit themselves afresh to their authority, and again take upon themselves a yoke of whose existence many were ignorant. The well-being of the Church depended on this.

But further, the Syllabus is not only a new promulgation, it is often a luminous interpretation of the original documents to which it refers ; an interpretation sometimes so necessary, that from the moment it were to disappear, the meaning of those documents on several points would become obscure, or at least doubtful. This is worthy of attention. In order to deny the doctrinal value of the Syllabus, much stress has been laid on this fact : viz. its being unaccompanied by any explanation or reflection. "It is a dry nomenclature," men have said, "of which neither the character nor the object can be determined." The real truth is, that it is precisely its brevity which is the cause of its luminousness. The eighty propositions, isolated from their context, present themselves to us in a clearer, more precise, and more accurately defined shape. In the original Acts the forms of the condemned errors might be found to be somewhat indistinctly sketched ; whereas in the Syllabus, they stand forth definitely with singular vigour and force. This is certainly a very great advantage, and we would request our readers to verify it themselves. . . .

Let us confirm by example what we have just laid down. The second paragraph of the Syllabus has for its object the condemnation of "Moderate

Rationalism." Some of its seven propositions reproduce the teaching of a man, little known in France, though much cried up in Germany: a kind of independent Catholic, who, before breaking with the Church from which he is altogether separated, wrote some books, whose object was to sow among the students of the University of Munich the corrupt seed of "free science." We refer to Herr Fröschammer. Pius IX. censured his errors in a letter addressed to the Archbishop of Munich on 12th December, 1862. Leave the Syllabus on one side and go to the Letter,—you will see there the condemnation of Herr Fröschammer and his books, and you will see nothing else. But who in France has ever read his works? The French Catholic who had read Pius IX.'s Letter would say to himself, "This Munich professor has doubtless written after his own fashion; he is doubtless temerarious, as is every good German who has plunged into the dark depths of metaphysics: but after all there is nothing to show me that what he has written is exactly what I think. Why then trouble myself with this Letter of Pius IX.? It does not affect me." Another example. In paragraph X. we find the principle itself of modern Liberalism thus laid down:—"It is no longer expedient in this our age, that the Catholic religion should be treated as the only religion of the State to the exclusion of all others." We are referred to an Allocution promulgated on 26th July, 1855, and commencing with these words: "Nemo vestrūm." What is this Allocution? A solemn protest of the Sovereign Pontiff against the iniquity of the Spanish Government, which, against its sworn allegiance to the rights of the Church and the eternal laws of justice, had dared to break its promises, by abrogating of its own authority the first and second articles of the Concordat. Pius IX., filled with grief, thus spoke:—"You know, Venerable Brethren, how in this convention, among the various decisions relative to the interests of the Catholic religion, We had especially laid down that the said holy religion should be the sole religion of Spain, to the exclusion of every other worship." The proposition of the Syllabus is contained in these words of the Allocution, and nowhere else. A man of very great sound sense or a man of scientific thought, on looking at these facts and attentively weighing the words of the Pontiff, would perhaps find the proposition condemned in the Allocution. But how many others there are who would pass it over! How many there are who would not see it at all; or if they saw it, would be in doubt, not knowing against which it was directed, the application of the doctrine, or the doctrine itself! How many would simply see in the words the dolorous lamentation of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, outraged in his dearest rights!

Let us now return to the Syllabus. With it, that which was obscure is made plain. The two propositions above quoted do not then present themselves in a confused and uncertain sense. On the contrary, by being disengaged from the surrounding circumstances which might obscure their meaning, and by being clothed in a more emphasized, universal, and abstract form, they assume a pronounced sense. Hesitation is impossible. It is not the teaching of Herr Fröschammer or the sacrilegious encroachments of the Spanish Government which are condemned—it is the doctrine in itself and in its substance. And since the Roman Pontiff, after having isolated it,

imprints on it a mark of censure by qualifying it as an error, he denounces it to all as meriting the lasting censure of the Church.

Hence it is that, for our own part at least, we will never accept without restriction a phrase which we continually meet with, even among writers for whom we have the highest esteem : "the Syllabus," they say, "has but a relative value—a value subordinate to that of the Papal documents of which it is the recapitulation." No ; we cannot admit this appreciation, but account it full of peril. Let us not soften down the truth, if we would preserve its salutary empire over souls. Catholics speak of the value of the Syllabus. What do they mean ? Its authority ? It has this certainly of itself, and from the sovereign power of him who publishes it ; it is as fully an Act of that supreme authority, as are the Letters or Encyclicals to which it refers. The sense of its propositions ? Doubtless several of them, if compared with their sources, would receive thence some light ; but others, and these not the minority, would thereby either lose their precision, or would impart more light than they would receive. Of these two assertions, "the Pontifical Letters explain the Syllabus," "the Syllabus explains the Pontifical Letters,"—the latter is, with a few exceptions, the more rigorously true. This is easily proved. Let us suppose that by some unforeseen accident one or the other of these pronouncements destroyed [the Syllabus or the assemblage of its sources], and no trace of their existence left ? Which of these two would we especially desire to be preserved, in order that the mind of Pius IX. and the Church's judgment regarding the errors of our age should be more certainly transmitted to future generations ? We do not hesitate to reply,—and sound sense, the evidence of facts, and Christian conscience will reply with us,—the Syllabus.

Nothing is more fruitful in subtleties, than the mind of a man desirous to escape from a duty which hampers him. We must not then be astonished if several opponents of the Syllabus have discovered ingenious distinctions, which permit them theoretically to admit the truths we have laid down, and to elude their consequences in practice. What have they done for this purpose ? They have acknowledged the real value of this great Act in so far as it is a doctrinal declaration (or, if they prefer the phrase), "a manifestation of doctrine" ; adding nevertheless, that the Pope has imposed it on us, not as an obligation, but only as a direction. "Only as a direction" would be a happily invented notion, if it were easy to imagine, on so important a matter and in so solemn an Act, a truly efficacious direction,—such consequently as the Pope must have wished,—which was not an obligation. Let us not however reason on abstract grounds, but adduce a few positive proofs against this theory, which is more specious than solid.

First, we oppose the title of the Syllabus :—"A Syllabus of the principal Errors of our Age, censured in the Consistorial Allocutions," &c. To this we add the titles of the different paragraphs :—"Errors relating to the Church" ; "Errors relating to Civil Society" ; "Errors relating to Natural and Christian Morals." That the Pope, the guardian and protector of the truth, obliged by the duty of his office to preserve the Church from change or corruption of doctrine,—that the Pope (I say) should denounce to the Christian world some given tenet by branding it with the appellation of "error"

—this is evidently to forbid its acceptance ; and to order all the faithful to keep aloof from it. What communication is there between light and darkness ? between life and death ? There can be no question of mere direction or counsel, when the highest of interests is in peril. Our duty is imposed on us by the very nature of the case. When then Pius IX. wrote at the head of the Syllabus that word “ errors,”—and he intensified it by adding the yet more significant words “ principal errors of our age,”—he said equivalently, “ Here is death : avoid it.” And if, to escape the obvious inference, any one professes to distinguish the obligation created by the nature of the case from the obligation imposed by the legislator,—we should remember, that the same Pius IX. pronounced that memorable sentence, applying it to the Syllabus : “ When the Pope speaks by a solemn Act, he is to be understood literally ; what he has said he intended to say.” On our side we should say, What the Pope has done, he most certainly intended to do.

But what need of so much discussion ? The proof of our assertion is expressed in so many words in the letter of his Eminence Cardinal Antonelli, Secretary of State, which was sent round to acquaint the Bishops with the will of our Holy Father. . . . [The Pontiff, says the Cardinal, has ordered the Syllabus to be compiled and circulated “ in order that the Bishops may have before their eyes all the errors and pernicious doctrines which he has reprobated and condemned.”] What then, we ask, is this Syllabus, ordered by the Holy Father to be sent to all the Bishops, but the text of the law, brought before the notice of those judges who are commissioned to execute it ? What is it, but a rule which demands their submission, and which they are forbidden to transgress ? They must not lose sight of it. Why ? Because they are bound to introduce its doctrine into their own teaching ; because they are bound to repress every tamerarious opinion, which would venture to contravene it. In this sense all the Bishops understood the command given them. Their fidelity and the indomitable courage of their obedience show this fact. During the general excitement produced by the appearance of the Syllabus in France, the Government had the audacity to usurp the position of judge. The Minister of Justice and Public Worship forbade the publication of the Pontifical document in any pastoral instruction ; alleging that it contained propositions contrary to the principles on which the constitution of the Empire reposed. What was the unanimous reply of the Episcopate ? The letters of eighty-three Bishops testify. All, united in their resolve, opposed the ministerial letter with the words of the Apostle, “ Non possumus.” All declared that they must obey God in preference to man ; and two of them, from their cathedral pulpit, braved the menaces of the Government, by reading to their assembled people that which they had not been permitted to print. Would they have thus acted, had they not been convinced that they were performing their duty, and thus acting up to the axiom of the Christian knights, “ Do what you ought ; happen what may ” ?

We shall not insist further on this point. Let us come to the question which may stand for all the others. We ask if the Syllabus be an infallible definition of the Vicar of Christ.

It seems to us that we have already answered this question. Can a defi-

nition *ex cathedrâ* be anything else, than an instruction regarding faith and morals, addressed to and imposed on the whole Church by her visible head on earth? How could we recognize it, were it not by this sign? and is not this the account given us by the Vatican Council? Reperuse the grave and carefully chosen words of the Fathers of that august Assembly, and you will find nothing there which better explains the exact and precise idea of an *ex cathedrâ* definition, than the account we have just given. Therefore, all doubts ought to vanish. The Syllabus emanates from him who is the Sovereign Master and Teacher of Catholic truth; it appertains exclusively to faith and morals, by the nature of the matter it contains; it has received, from the circumstances which accompanied its promulgation, the manifest character of an universal law of the Church. What more does it require, to be an irreformable decision, an act without appeal of Peter's infallible authority?

We know the objection made to this. Peter may speak, and yet not wish to use the plenitude of his doctrinal power. Yes, but when he restrains within voluntarily imposed limits the exercise of his authority, he shows it clearly. He takes care to explain, in order not to overtask our feebleness, that notwithstanding the obligation with which he is binding our consciences, he is not purporting as yet to pronounce a definitive sentence on the doctrine in hand. Does the Syllabus present the faintest indication of such reserve? What can be more definitive, than a judgment formulated in these terms: "This is error, that is truth"? Can such a judgment as this be ever reconsidered or annulled? Is it not so promulgated, as to preclude all possibility of change or explanation? In a word, can it ever be permitted us to say "What is error in this century is truth in the next"? It may be added that according to the confession of friends and enemies alike,—a confession strengthened by the declaration of the Cardinal Secretary of State,—the Syllabus is an annex and as it were an appendix of the Bull "*Quantâ Curâ*"; to which none could legitimately deny the character of a definition and an irreformable sentence. Consider all this, and you will understand how unreasonable it would be to disregard the evidence of facts, and acquiesce in an objection which has no solid basis.

The Holy Father's intention is not concealed under an impenetrable veil, as is sometimes supposed. It shows itself as soon as it is looked for, and it is easily discovered in the preparation of the Syllabus. It should be known that the Syllabus was not the work of a day. Pius IX. has repeatedly attested this: he had long resolved to strike a severe blow, and to blast the whole monstrous edifice of revolutionary doctrine. With this object, immediately after the promulgation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception he transformed the Congregation of Cardinals and theologians who had aided him in the accomplishment of that work, into a congregation entrusted with the duty of setting forth in detail to the Apostolic See the new errors which had been ravaging the Church of God for the last century. Ten years passed by: Encyclicals were published; Allocutions pronounced; the theologians continued their labours: at last on 8th December, 1864, the moment for action having arrived, Pius IX. addressed that word to the world, which is still sounding in our ears; the "*Quantâ Curâ*" and the Syllabus were promulgated. It is clear that an Act, drawn up after such long preparation and

with such diligence, could not be compared to an everyday act. The Pope did not wish to lessen the evil, he wished to destroy it. So much exertion could not have had for its object to define nothing. Who then will dare to say, that the whole intention of a reign, and of a reign like that of Pius IX., has miserably terminated in a measure which has neither strength nor efficacy? To believe this would be an outrage, to assert it an insult, against the wisdom and prudence of the most glorious of Pontiffs.

But why such research for proofs? one reflection alone will cut short every difficulty. There are two ways in the Church to know if a Papal Act is, or is not, a sovereign definition, an infallible decision. The Pope who is its author must be interrogated, or else the people who submit to its teaching. Neither one nor the other can deceive us in their respective replies. The Divine Promise remains fulfilled to both; in the former when he teaches, in the latter when they hear and obey. This is what theologians call active and passive infallibility. Let us admit for argument's sake that Pius IX. has left us in ignorance. Let us suppose that he has published the Syllabus, but has not told us what kind of assent he requires from us. Well; as we all know, the great voice of the Christian people has proclaimed it for him. How often have the people repeated with an enthusiasm intensified by love, that this Syllabus,—despised, insulted by the enemies of the Church,—was accepted by them as the rule of their belief; received by them as the very word of Peter, as the very word of life come down from Heaven to save us! Is not this the way in which the Bishops and theologians, learned and ignorant, powerful and humble have in turn spoken? Who among us has not heard such language? A celebrated Doctor, Tanner, has said, that in order to distinguish among the doctrines of the Church those which belong to her infallible authority, we must listen to the judgment of the learned, and especially consult the universal sentiment of Christians. Let us keep to this decision: it reveals to us our duty towards the sovereign Act, by which Pius IX. has rescued the world from the darkness in which it was lost, and prepares a better destiny for it in the future.

We have the greater reason for so acting, because Hell, by its mad rage, gives us the very same warning, and proclaims the imperishable grandeur of the Syllabus. Neither Hell nor those who serve it have ever been deceived on this point. They have often explained their thought, both in their acts and in their words. What implacable anger, what torrents of insult, what relentless clamours! And when inopportune compromisers have told them that they are deceived, that the Syllabus was nothing or of little consequence, and ought not to excite their anger,—how have they replied to them, and crushed them under the weight of their contempt! At the end of 1864, at the time when the struggle excited by the promulgation of the Encyclical and the Syllabus was at its height,—an advertising agency in Paris, the agency of Bullier, published the following note: "The Encyclical is not a dogmatic Bull but only a doctrinal Letter. It should be observed that the Syllabus does not bear the signature of the Pope. This Syllabus again has been so published as to permit the belief, that the Holy Father attaches no great importance to it. We must then suppose that the propositions therein recited—assailing as they do neither the dogma nor the morals of Catholics,

may in no way affecting dogma at all—are not condemned but only blamed.” To these words, poor in sense, but insidious in expression, the “*Siècle*” replied—“And now there are some who tell us that the Encyclical is not a dogmatic Bull, but a doctrinal Letter; that the eighty propositions are not condemned, because they are not mentioned in the Encyclical, but only in the Syllabus; that the Syllabus has not the Papal signature; that it was only drawn up by a commission of theologians, &c. These persons would do better to be silent. Encyclical or Syllabus, the fact is that the theocracy has thrown down as ostentatious a gauntlet of challenge as possible against modern ideas. We shall see who will be conqueror.”

Let us then leave such writers to arrange their mutual disputes. As for ourselves, hearing the voice of Heaven and Hell, the Church and the world, who unite to proclaim the momentousness of the ever blessed work of Pius IX., we repeat with a conviction more profound than ever, Yes, the Syllabus is the infallible word of Peter; and if our modern societies can be cured at all, it is by it that they will be saved.

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## ART. VII.—AN EXAMINATION OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S PSYCHOLOGY. PART II.

(Continued from Vol. xxiii., No. xlv.)

(COMMUNICATED.)

### PART II.—THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.

#### CHAPTER II.—THE COMPOSITION OF MIND.

THE contents of the sections of this chapter may be shortly stated thus:—§ 64. The mind's proximate composition,—states which appear simple being accepted as such. § 65. The distinction between feelings and relations. § 66. Division of feelings into those peripherally and those centrally initiated. § 67. Relations are equivalent to changes, simultaneous or successive, like or unlike. § 68. Tracts of feelings are differentiated from one another, as regards distinctness, according as they possess a greater or less number of relational elements. § 69. They are similarly differentiated as regards their cohesiveness. § 70. And also as regards their cohesion in clusters. § 71. And in clusters of clusters. § 72. Feelings limit each other most when they are of the same order. § 73. Vivid feelings and relations cohere with their faint likes in an orderly manner—the ultimate segregations grouping themselves as ideas of space, time, and

contrast. § 74. Thus the composition of mind is the same throughout, from its lowest to its highest elements, always consisting, as it does, of segregations and cohesions of clusters of nervous shocks to form first sensations, and secondly thoughts. § 75. This process conforms to the law of evolution, viz., the progress from indefinite, incoherent homogeneousness to definite, coherent heterogeneity. § 76. It also harmonizes with the facts as to nervous structure.

In this chapter Mr. Spencer endeavours to show that the proximate elements\* of the mind are primary feelings and relations between such feelings, these relations being further given as themselves feelings of co-existence, sequence, and difference (qualitative and quantitative) between primary feelings. Here, however, he entirely omits all the highest components of mind, such e.g. as its perception of Truth and Goodness *as such*.

Nothing in this chapter really tells against the Peripatetic view that intellect and sensation are radically and essentially distinct, the latter being a concomitant of nervous action, and necessarily ending with it; the former (intellect) being only accidentally connected with such action, and, at the least, possibly surviving it, though making use of such action (and consequently of sensations) as the occasion of its activity. Mr. Spencer starts, however, with an *à priori* conclusion in favour of the essential identity of thought and sensation, and therefore in favour also of the essential identity between the rational mind of man and the sensitive faculty of brutes. He argues on, from what he conceives to be the feelings of the lower animals, till he comes to man. But of course if there *is* in man a new higher principle, then the "feelings" of the mere animal may be so taken up and transfigured by its action that the activities of brutes may be alike inadequate to serve *without it*, for the explanation of such higher activities as we know ourselves to possess. A cat perceives a mouse—a man both perceives it and perceives the perception. A man appreciates and knows the value of his knowledge. A brute possesses *first intentions*, but a man has *second intentions*. A brute perceives things related in place and time, and by difference—a man apprehends these relations *as relations*, i.e. he apprehends formal relativity. Nevertheless as a substratum (necessary as we now exist for so apprehending) he has "feelings" of the merely material relativity. A brute "feels" the things which are *de facto* related without cognizing the relation itself, i.e. he feels material relations without knowing them.†

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\* In the last chapter the *ultimate* elements having been represented as "nervous shocks," its *proximate* elements are here represented as various aggregations of such shocks.

† The mental shock felt in passing from one feeling to another which is dissimilar to it, is, very superficially, confounded by Mr. Spencer with the

Moreover Mr. Spencer makes a fundamental error in that he makes all knowledge to be *classification*; but knowledge must first be direct and immediate, otherwise we get a *regressus ad infinitum*. He begins his classification (p. 163) by dividing the proximate components of mind into "Feelings," and the "Relations between feelings" (§ 65). He defines a "Feeling"\* as (p. 164) "any portion of consciousness sufficiently large for perceivable individuality, and marked off from adjacent portions . . . by qualitative contrasts; and which when introspectively contemplated appears to be homogeneous." He defines a "Relation" (between Feelings), as "characterized by occupying no appreciable part of consciousness.† Take away the terms it unites, and it disappears along with them; having no individuality of its own." But after this he goes on to say: "It is true that under an ultimate analysis, what we call a relation proves to be itself a *kind of feeling*." . . . "And it is true that, notwithstanding its extreme brevity, its qualitative character is *appreciable*; for relations are (as we shall hereafter see) distinguishable from one another only by the unlikenesses of the feelings which accompany the momentary transitions." So that, after all, since a relation is admitted to be a feeling, and an appreciable feeling, the two kinds are thus admitted to differ only as *long* and *short*. On the next page indeed he says: "A feeling proper is an aggregate of related parts, while a relational feeling is undecomposable." It is all very well to say so, but if, as he admits, a relation has duration sufficient for appreciation of its quality, it must be as decomposable as a feeling of a flash of lightning.

In reality his two kinds are two species of the genus "states of consciousness," serving two kinds of *intellectual* activity. These material feelings are quite enough to explain mere brute reasoning. It is evidently quite a different thing to *feel* the shock of two feelings and to intellectually recognize the relation, to feel an enduring feeling and reflexly to recognize it.

dissimilarity itself. It is the dissimilarity which is the relation; the shock is not the dissimilarity but the result of it. It is only in virtue of this discreditable confusion of ideas that Mr. Spencer makes out the relation of dissimilarity (as also of similarity) to be a feeling.

\* This definition of feeling assumes the whole question that all mental phenomena are *feelings*. The definition is faulty moreover in using metaphorical terms.

† If so, a relation between feelings would not be an appreciable part of consciousness, i.e. we should be unconscious of it. But these relations are afterwards described as shocks, and so as occupying an appreciable part of consciousness, in contradiction to the definition. The word "appreciable" is a sadly vague term.

He divides (p. 166) feelings thus :—

FEELINGS	{	centrally initiated .....	Emotions.*
		peripherally initiated {	from surface-nerves...External sensations.
			from internal nerves...Internal sensations.

And all these are again divided into vivid and faint, which he calls *real* and *ideal* respectively.

He now (p. 167, § 67) goes on to consider simple "relations," for which he says the occurrence of change is a necessary condition.† He says (p. 168) : "The degree of the change or shock constituting in other words the consciousness of the degree of difference between the adjacent states, is the ultimate basis of the distinctions among relations," resulting in feelings of likeness or unlikeness, quantitative or qualitative, and grouped under the heads "co-existence" or "sequence." But granted that this is the sensitive basis, it in no way accounts for our intellectual recognition of these various relations. It is too bad to say that "the degree of shock" constitutes the "consciousness of the degree of difference," however much it may induce feelings which serve as the occasion of conscious perception. Next (p. 168, § 68) he goes on to maintain that definiteness of feelings‡ varies with the amount of the relational element, being greatest in the external

\* Mere nervous sensations, however, as well as emotions, may be centrally initiated.

† This may mean either that change is necessary to the recognition or that it is necessary to the existence of relations. The first of these statements is a mere truism, which it would be scarcely worth any one's while to state ; for if no change takes place there is nothing new to recognize, and for this reason change is needed, not simply for the recognition of relations, but for the recognition of anything which has not been recognized before. In its second and more natural meaning, a relation may exist without change as easily as anything else. If a black and a white ball existed from all eternity, the relation of dissimilitude would have existed from all eternity as well.

‡ By a definite feeling is meant one that is sharply contrasted with other feelings. The relational element is merely the same thing in other words. The case is not therefore that of two things varying together, but the truism that a thing varies with itself, i.e. when it is present to a large extent, and *vice versa*. That things contrasted must be in juxtaposition is also an old friend with a new face. If they were not in juxtaposition, they could not be contrasted. There is a certain ingenuity in the generalization that the more external the cause the more distinct the feeling, and yet this seems to be no more than a misleading half-truth. The cause of greater distinctness being (a) the presence of appliances (e.g. the lens) by which one nerve-extremity may be affected while its neighbour remains unaffected, (b) the conveyance of the distinct impressions thus produced by distinct channels to the brain, and (c) the importance of noting the distinct sensation thus produced. The distinctness and definiteness of certain sensations appear to be due to the combined influence of attention, and such physical antecedents as those above referred to. Mr. Spencer's explanation is *idem per idem*.

peripheral, and greatest of all in sight. As also, according to him (§ 69, p. 173), does coherence between feelings of the same kind; and again (§ 70, p. 175), the clustering coherently of feelings and (§ 71, p. 177) the clustering of clusters. Here, however, he introduces an error, he says (§ 70, p. 175): "There is little, if any, clustering of clusters among the simultaneous auditory feelings. But among the successive auditory feelings there are definite and coherent combinations of groups with groups. The fused set of sounds we call *a word*, unites with many others such into a sentence." Thus we have the intellect introduced without any notice, and then confounded with feelings of *musical sounds*. But the difference between intellect and sensibility is shown by the difference between our power of recollecting a sentence in a known language, and in an *unknown* one. He next proceeds to consider the agglomeration of clusters of feelings of different orders similarly conditioned. But he adds (p. 180): "The impressions which make up the visual consciousness of an object, hang together more firmly than the group of them does with the group of sounds making up the name of an object." This is true; but the illustration is ill-chosen, since a name is mostly the sign of a general conception—"A nightingale, and the notes of its song," would have been a better one. But the thesis of this section is not successfully maintained; indeed he himself admits that some complex groups cohere with very unrelational ones (p. 181), saying: "Between tastes and smells, and certain visceral sensations, such as hunger and nausea, there is, indeed, a considerable aptitude to cohere"; and indeed, as he elsewhere admits (p. 191): "Smells have exceptional powers of calling up remembrances of past scenes."

He now (§ 73, p. 181) turns to "faint feelings," and says: "The cardinal fact to be noted as of co-ordinate importance with the facts above noted, is that while each vivid feeling is joined to, but distinguished from, other vivid feelings, simultaneous or successive, it is joined to, and identified with, faint feelings that have resulted from foregoing similar vivid feelings. Each particular colour, each special sound, each sensation of touch, taste, or smell, is at once known as unlike other sensations that limit it in space or time, and known as like the faint forms of certain sensations that have preceded it in time—unites itself with foregoing sensations from which it does not differ in quality, but only in intensity." Here we come upon a surprising ambiguity. Does Mr. Spencer mean "*known*" directly and simply, as a sheep knows the bleat of its kind, or known consciously and reflexly, as when we say, "This A is like that B"? The former is *sensitive*, the latter *intellective*. But this singular confusion is further exemplified where he adds (p. 182): "An *idea*, or unit of knowledge, results when a vivid

feeling is assimilated to, or coheres with, one or more of the faint feelings left [we may well ask *where* left?] by such vivid feelings previously experienced." Then we are to term the unreflecting aggregation in a dog of a smell to a faint survival of a smell, an *idea*. What an idea!

But elsewhere (p. 228) he directly identifies ideas with faint sensations. His words are: "Vivid feelings or sensations directly presented, and *faint feelings* or *ideas* in which they are represented." But he is yet more deliberate in his confusion. He goes on: "From moment to moment the feelings that constitute consciousness segregate, each becoming fused with the whole series of others like itself that have gone before it; and what we call *knowing* each feeling *as such* or *such*, is our name for this *act of segregation*." A want of discrimination such as that here displayed, a confounding of an unconscious mechanical association and aggregation with a deliberate recognition of a feeling as possessing a certain character, is nothing less than amazing.

He continues (p. 183): "This union of present clustered feelings with past clustered feelings, is carried to a much greater degree of complexity. Groups of groups coalesce with kindred groups of groups that preceded them; and in the higher types of mind, tracts of consciousness of an excessively composite character are produced after the same manner." But no such complexity would account for a rudiment of self-conscious reflex mental action, although such repeated aggregations may well serve as an instrument of which the intellect can make use. He then goes on to the segregation of relations, and represents them as segregating according as they are strongly contrasted, or weakly contrasted, of ascending or of descending intensity, of homogeneity, or of heterogeneity; of co-existence, or of sequence, the two latter further segregating into space and time. But granted the fact of segregation, a new faculty becomes requisite to cognize them as strong, ascending, homogeneous, co-existing, &c., or as time and space. That the phantasma of a previously experienced sensation should become present in consciousness when a similar sensation is present is one thing; to recognize the sensation as strong, and note its strength, is quite another.

After this he proceeds to what he declares (p. 184) to be "the chief purpose of this chapter to bring into view"; namely, "the truth that the method of composition remains the same throughout the entire fabric of mind, from the formation of its simplest feelings up to the formation of those immense and complex aggregates of feelings which characterize its highest developments." Now here, *in limine*, it must be denied that "feelings" of any kind *characterize* the highest developments of mind, although of course it is true that feelings serve as the basis and material of such developments.

Making use of his previous assertion (disputed by me) that simple feelings, as sound, are made up of many nervous shocks on their subjective side, and other simple feelings, as *timbre*, of unions of simultaneous series of such shocks, he concludes that a *sensation* "is constituted by the linking of each vivid pulse as it occurs, with the series of past pulses that were severally vivid, but have severally become faint." But this I deny. I admit that such "sensation" is so "generated," as by the *material* element; but it is "*constituted*" by the *formal* element, namely, the sentient faculty. Carrying on the same scheme, he represents (p. 185) analogously the constitution of mind, &c., saying: "Mind is constituted only when each sensation is assimilated to the faint form of antecedent sensations. The consolidation of successive units of feeling to form a sensation, is paralleled in a larger way by the consolidation of successive sensations, to form what we call a *knowledge of the sensation as such or such*," as if the mechanical addition of sensation to its like was at all the same thing as a knowledge of the sensation *as such*, which involves the conception of being and substance, and various subordinate genera. It is easy enough to call "feeling" "knowledge," but introspection shows they are exceedingly different. Similarly, "relations" are represented as becoming known through the segregation of relations. All this is mere assertion, and were it valid and true, brutes would have knowledge and reason, for they segregate "feelings" and "relations" materially, though they have no self-conscious knowledge of their feelings *as* feelings, or of the relations between them *as* relations—i.e. they lack the *formal* element of knowledge. But Mr. Spencer grounds all this on the assertion that feelings which seem to us simple, as that of *timbre*, are really compound and built up of contemporaneous series of minute nervous shocks on their subjective side—i.e. minute feelings of nervous shock. He must mean this, for to say a feeling is made up of objective nervous shocks would transgress all he says as to the absolute distinctness of the subjective and objective. But then if a feeling is felt to be made up of minute feelings, it is not simple. He must mean, therefore, that an apparently simple feeling, as *timbre*, is made up of a number of minute feelings that *are not felt*. Yet elsewhere Mr. Spencer says that unconscious sensation is a contradiction in terms. Certainly we can only investigate the subjective side of our being by introspection, and what that declares to be simple must be taken to be so. For what is "simple" but that which is incapable of analysis or decomposition? To call that which introspection declares "simple," *compound*, on account of any *objective* consideration, is to confound the two orders, and give the supremacy to that which he has elsewhere (p. 159) declared to be secondary.

We should note that Mr. Spencer every now and then indulges

in unwarrantably dogmatic assertions, and in assumptions of the very things which have to be proved, such as were noticed in the examination of his first part. Thus we meet with "In the last chapter we saw" (p. 184), when in fact we saw nothing of the kind. Again he says (p. 186), "Thus it becomes manifest," when it is really clear that it is rather the very reverse. Again he remarks (p. 187), "We have lately seen," that which is really not only invisible but impossible; and "We have seen that" mind "consists largely, and in one sense entirely, of feelings" (p. 192). Again (p. 194) he affirms dogmatically, "there is no likeness," "either in kind or degree," between internal feelings and the external agents on which they habitually depend.

He proceeds (p. 186) now with his process of segregation in clusters of feelings and relations, saying: "Knowledge of the powers and habits of things, dead and living, is constituted by assimilating the more or less complex relations exhibited by their actions in space and time with other such complex relations." Thus again he makes no distinction between material and direct acts on the one hand and formal and reflex acts on the other.

He concludes the section as follows: "That the same law of composition continues without definite limit through tracts of higher consciousness, formed of clusters of clusters of feelings held together by relations of an extremely involved kind, *scarcely needs adding.*" This is a strangely confident remark! His argument is: As shocks are to tone, so are reiterated sensations to intellectual thought. But I deny the relation asserted by him as to the first, and as to the latter, many animals experience sensations and relations as varied and reiterated as a savage man, and yet we meet in them with no sign of self-consciousness, the possession of which by the savage shows him to be animated by a different and a higher principle. Thoughts are made actual and formally constituted by a new principle, just as potential sound which never becomes actual when reaching a cabbage or a honey-dew, becomes actual when reaching the auditory organ of an animal, being made formal by its (the animal's) sentient principle. Mr. Spencer then (p. 186, § 75) traces the correspondence between his evolution of mind and the laws of evolution of progressively more definite and heterogeneous integrates. Incidentally he says (p. 187), "Mental actions, ordinarily so called, are nearly all carried on in terms of those tactual, auditory, and visual feelings which exhibit cohesion, and consequent ability to integrate, in so conspicuous a manner. Our intellectual operations are indeed mostly confined to the *auditory feelings* (as integrated into *words*), and the visual feelings (as integrated into impressions and ideas of objects, their relations, and their motions)." Now as to the "terms," it is most true we

think by phantasmata, as all allow, yet such images are not all our thought. What is the image of a "relation"? We can understand "greater than" and "therefore" by the mathematical signs  $>$  and  $\therefore$ , mentally abstracting from any particular things compared. In the same way words are "auditory feelings," but they are vastly more, and our intellectual operations do not at all (except in philology and music) regard them as "feelings," but exclusively in their intellectual relations.

Mr. Spencer (pp. 187, 188) attaches an importance to sight which seems exaggerated. He says: "After closing the eyes, and observing how relatively immense is the part of intellectual consciousness that is suddenly shorn away, it will be manifest that the most developed portion of perceptive mind is formed of these visual feelings." But those born blind can attain to the highest and noblest intellectual exercises; and this fact alone shows how independent the intellect is of even the most relational of the senses. But, after all, Mr. Spencer's conception of the process of mental construction is plainly inadequate to account for the mind as we know it; for it is not merely a discriminative but also a *retentive* power, and he has not in the least shown how it can be constructed as a retentive power out of his mental units. Again, as to his picture (p. 189) of mind-evolution, we may well ask what increased feelings of sensation or relation enable a man to say "I," when an orang cannot? But indeed, the whole process, even as represented by him, would be better expressed thus: *The more things are obtruded on the sentient faculty, the more that faculty energizes; and the more things are obtruded on the intellectual faculty, the more that also energizes, and the more we know of that faculty as it has the power of presenting itself to us in consciousness through its activity.*

He next (p. 190, § 76) proceeds to indicate the correspondence of his views as to mind with the facts of nervous anatomy. In the preliminary part he says: "If we consider each such [nervous] transformation to be physically that which, psychically, we consider a unit of feeling, then, remembering its appreciable duration, we may understand how it happens that when the waves of molecular changes brought by an incoming nerve-fibre exceed a certain rate of recurrence, the transformation set up by each lasts till the next commences; and hence the corresponding units of feeling become forced into a continuous feeling or sensation." But recurring beats do not result in a like-feeling, but a musical *sound*, and complex series induce a *timbre* sound. Thus, a musical sound is not a transformed beat-feeling, but a different thing, and could never be generated from beat-feelings, or by an increase in the frequency of *that which produces* beat-feelings, unless that power was latent and potential, and made actual by means of such

complicated beatings. The sensation (the beating) ceases absolutely when the other (the musical sound) arises. Individual differences of power (the personal equation) make only a difference as to the point at which a change takes place.\*

The "anomaly" that "such unrelational feelings as *smells* have exceptional powers of calling up remembrances of past scenes" is, he says (p. 191), "probably due to the fact that the olfactory centres are outgrowths from the cerebral hemispheres." But musical sounds have a yet greater power of the same kind, and yet the auditory centres are always remote from the cerebrum, and, indeed, there is no special connexion even between the *optic centres* and the cerebrum.†

Altogether there is nothing in this second chapter which really tells at all against the view that intellect and sensation are radically and essentially distinct. There is really nothing in it against the view of sensation being but a result and concomitant of nervous action and ending with it. There is really nothing in it against intellect (although dependent on nervous action during life, because making use of feelings as the occasions of its exercise) not being necessarily or essentially connected with nerves at all, or against its being capable of surviving the destruction of the body. Feelings and emotions in a self-conscious being may be so modified by the presence of the intellect that takes them up and subserves them, that we can only argue imperfectly and with risk from what we are conscious of in ourselves down to the faculties of brutes. Our intellect transfigures these beggarly elements. A brute feels material relations without *knowing* them or knowing that he feels. *We* have an apprehension of a formal relativity.

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\* To say that e. g. a sound is a transformed beat-feeling, and, in general, to say that certain sensations are other sensations *transformed*, is to commit the absurdity of supposing that sensations are something different from what they are felt to be, which is justly regarded by Mr. Mill as a token of metaphysical incompetence. The truth is, that the one sensation is succeeded by the other as the vibrations increase in frequency. To say that it is transformed into the other is to say that the sensation is a substance which persists while its attributes change.

† The "anomaly" may perhaps be explained by there being many more distinct sensations of smell than of e.g. colour, the former not shading into each other as the latter do. A sensation of smell, therefore, recalls fewer previous sensations, i.e. recalls sensations which have been presented on fewer occasions, and consequently recalls those occasions more distinctly, and less confused by multiplicity. Thus the odours of a pine forest, of new hay, &c., have been felt only on similar occasions, and thus recall distinct pictures. So the odour of eau-de-Cologne in a sick-room. But there is nothing in this that is peculiar to sensations of smell. Sensations of sight (e.g. the peculiar appearance of the atmosphere in Italy) will, under similar circumstances (i.e. if they have been experienced only under similar circumstances), recall pictures as distinct.

Mr. Spencer accounts for the segregation of relations; but the reflex apprehension of relations as related must be done by a persisting (therefore *substantial*) self-conscious something—the mind—which can turn to and fro, look back and forwards, and so apprehend relations and the *relatedness* of them. The attribution to man's soul of the power to abstract ideas from sensible materials explains everything, whilst nothing is *really* explained by Mr. Spencer's plan of merely *calling names*—e.g. calling segregated material relations—*ideas*! How, upon Mr. Spencer's hypothesis only, can we ever understand that wonderful power the mind has of *searching* for that which it knows yet does not know, because it has temporarily forgotten it, while its immediate recognition of it when it flashes on the memory proves that it was really known all the time, though it was temporarily incapable of recall?

### CHAPTER III.—THE RELATIVITY OF FEELINGS.

The sections of this third chapter may be thus summarized:—  
 § 77. There are objects which are beyond consciousness. § 78. There is no equivalence between such objects and feelings.  
 § 79. The connexion between object and subject varies according to the structure of the species. § 80. and of the individual. § 81. It also varies according to the constitutional state of the individual.  
 § 82. and according to which part of the organism is acted upon.  
 § 83. It also varies according to the state of such part. § 84. and according to the relative motions of subject and object. § 85. The feeling produced in the organism from its action upon external things is modified by circumstances. § 86. The same is the case with internal (endoperipheral) feelings, and in fact all we are conscious of, as properties of matter are but subjective symbols.  
 § 87. This harmonizes with that absolute difference which exists between nervous structure and the feelings it occasions. § 88. But real objective existences are always necessarily implied and assumed.

Mr. Spencer here considers feelings in their relations to external objects, i.e. he considers objective causes and subjective effects.

At p. 193 we find mind stated to be "composed of feelings and the relations between feelings and the *aptitudes* of feelings for entering into relations," &c. Here then Mr. Spencer himself adopts a scholastic occult power.—"*Aptitudes*"; if this may be done once, why not many other times? Mr. Spencer asserts (p. 194, § 79) the truth that "the forms of sensation" may vary in creatures according to their organization, and compares a crab feeling by its claw with a man feeling by a stick (and here it may be remarked, by the way, how intellect enables us, as it were, to enter by imagination into the sensoria of inferior creatures) to

exemplify qualitative difference, and a nocturnal animal's appreciation of faint light, to exemplify quantitative difference. He also affirms (p. 196, § 80) that the same species may have similar differences, such e.g. as colour-blindness or other individual variations as to sense-perception, so that we may conclude that in no two individuals are such perceptions absolutely alike. But partial blindness, or deafness, or other similar infirmity, does not prove that men do not see and hear truly as far as they *do* see and hear. Vision that fails to distinguish between red and green is not *mendacious*, but *imperfect*; it sees colour, but inadequately. The colour-blind have no difficulty in understanding that distinctions exist which they fail to appreciate. And probably all eyes are altogether inadequate to apprehend the objective truth of colour as known to pure spirits. But again, colour-blindness is abnormal, and that abnormal physical conditions may produce imperfections of sensation in some cases is what all admit.

Mr. Spencer next shows (p. 197, § 81) "that quantitative and qualitative differences of sense-appreciation exist in the *individual* through illness and various different constitutional states," which nobody denies. He then (p. 198, § 82) refers to the familiar fact that the same external agent, e.g. "a whiff of ammonia," produces different sensations according as it is applied to different organs of the same individual. But this only shows that each order of sensations gives but a partial revelation of the external world, which nobody disputes, not that our senses are mendacious. If we saw with our nose and fingers in addition to our eyes, it would give no greater objective validity to the report of our senses.

Then (p. 200, § 83) the state of the part, heat, cold, &c., are shown by our author to modify sensations, and besides these also (p. 201, § 84) "the relative motions" of the perceived object and the perceiving sentient, as we find in the fall of tone in the whistle of an approaching steam-engine, and the modification produced in the spectra of receding stars. But surely these are but changes similar to that produced by the rapid rotation of a coloured disk or the changes in apparent size and position of lamp-posts, resulting from our change of position as we walk past them. No one ever disputed that our senses could be confused by complex motions.

Mr. Spencer then proceeds (p. 203, § 85) to consider the feelings which accompany the actions of the organism on external things, and shows that similar mechanical effects produce different quantities of feeling, as when we lift a weight with the finger instead of with the hand, and he also instances the effects of age and illness. Again (p. 204, § 86), he considers peripherally-initiated internal feelings and centrally-initiated feelings (emotions), and shows they may be modified quantitatively and qualitatively by (1) specific structure, (2) individual structure, (3) structure of different parts

of the body, (4) age, (5) constitutional state, (6) temperature, (7) circulation, (8) previous use, and (9) relative motion; and that these co-operate in ever-changing proportions, whence he concludes, "that subjective consciousness . . . is no measure of objective existence."

He continues to urge that certain oscillations produce an auditory feeling, but only in one organ, and that the same oscillations produce other feelings in other organs; whence he says we may become fully convinced that the form of objective action we call "sound" has not the slightest kinship in Nature with the sensation of sound which it arouses in us. He argues similarly with respect to the other senses, declaring that "the subjective state no more resembles" its objective cause "than the pressure which moves the trigger of a gun resembles the explosion which follows." So also, he says, we may conclude with respect to tension and other sensations of mechanical force; "thus we are brought to the conclusion that what we are conscious of as properties of matter, even down to its weight and resistance, are but subjective affections produced by objective agencies that are unknown and unknowable. All the sensations produced in us by environing things are but symbols of actions out of ourselves, the natures of which we cannot even conceive." But here he is *too hasty*. Though all *sensations* would, of course, vanish in an insentient universe, qualities these senses make known might, nevertheless, be known by pure intellect, and thus all the objectivity in sensations which the greatest "realist" would desire will have existed in the world for all time. It is the ego which *knows* that the violet is sweet, though it is the nose which smells it, and though of course we cannot conceive (because the elementary experience is lacking) *how* such sweetness could become known without a sense-organ, can we really understand how it is known to us *with one*? No one ever supposed a mechanical force to resemble a sensation, but to become manifested to us *through* sensations. The senses are inadequate to exhaustively reveal all objectivity, but they are not mendacious. Our sensations are, as Mr. Spencer says, "symbols," but they are symbols by and through which the intellect comes to know objectivity—being, substance, extension, number, form, &c., things not to be expressed except in *terms of sensation*, but nevertheless not apprehended *as* sensations.

He goes on to declare (p. 207, § 87) the harmony of nervous physiology with his view, saying that when the structures of nerve-threads and cells are considered, it becomes inconceivable that any resemblance exists between the subjective effect and that objective cause which arouses it through the intermediation of changes resembling neither. That it becomes inconceivable *how* such a resemblance can be produced, *concedo*; that it is inconceivable

that it is produced, *nego*. Moreover, by the term "*effect*" is here properly meant, not the sensation merely, but the intellectual conceptions made known through sensation. Comparatively few persons will be ready to concede that as regards the extension, number, and shape of objects, "there is no likeness either in kind or degree" (p. 194, § 78) between such qualities as they exist objectively, and as they are known to us subjectively by the agency of our bodily organs.

He next (p. 207, § 88) turns to what he calls "an all-important implication," namely, the existence of an external world—"that the active antecedent of each primary feeling exists independently of consciousness" (p. 209). But how then can Mr. Spencer dare to affirm dogmatically that there is no likeness between that antecedent as objectively existing and that antecedent as known by us? We, on the contrary, may quite logically *on other grounds* arrive at 'an independent conclusion that there is such a likeness. "Likeness" I assert; "identity" I, of course, deny. Probably the material universe is clothed in a splendour of multitudinous kinds, some few of which are partly and feebly revealed to us with varying degrees of incompleteness by our senses, though revealed with ample sufficiency for our needs. Probably it everywhere throbs with objective harmonies, appreciated fully by pure spirits, and made known to us in a rudimentary and fragmentary way through vibration in our ears. And so with sight, smell, touch, and taste. "Touch" is but a minute acquaintance with surface as extended and figured; and "taste," though to us known so poorly and so rarely as to seem unworthy for spiritual enjoyment, may be conceived, though not imagined, to be a perennial source of spiritual enjoyment, not of course as tasted by an organ, but as intellectually known and apprehended.

The absence of light subjectively is darkness, and most of Mr. Spencer's school would deem the objective universe to be dark and also silent. But these conceptions, "darkness" and "silence," are really as "subjective" as light and sound. The absence of light as "*sensed*" by us is not objectively "darkness," but something which we cannot conceive. To think of the unseen universe as dark is to express objectivity in terms of the subjective, and is just as much to attribute objectivity to mere subjective sentiency as would be to adopt the most vulgar notion of the reality in the external world of our own very feelings of different kinds. Mr. Spencer's denial of likeness between the subjective and objective is indeed most unreasonable. He may say that from his point of view he sees no evidence, actual or possible, of such likeness, but he cannot affirm, without stupendous and absurd arrogance, that our senses *cannot* have been organized so as, most mysteriously, to make us truly acquainted with objective existences, together with

a variety of the powers and properties which such existences possess.

#### CHAPTER IV.—THE RELATIVITY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN FEELINGS.

The following is the substance of the several sections of this chapter:—§ 89. Relations, as we know them, exist only in consciousness. § 90. Those of coexistence vary with the structure, size, physiological state, and position of the organism experiencing them. § 91. Those of sequence are quantitatively and qualitatively affected by structure, age, and state. § 92. Relations of difference also vary with structure, bulk, and state. § 93. And because relations cannot be imagined without imagining (however minutely and transitorily) the related feelings, therefore the relations of coexistence, sequence, and difference do not exist, objectively, as we know them. All three being ultimately reducible to shocks are necessarily unlike such. § 94. This doctrine harmonizes with the facts of nervous structure. § 95. In spite of all this, conditions of objective existence are really symbolized by relations as we conceive them. There is some order and nexus beyond consciousness, and its real existence is implied throughout, as also that there is really an absolute.

The object of this chapter is (p. 210) "to show that the forms and degrees of relations between feelings are determined by the nature of the subject—exist, as we know them, only in consciousness, and no more resemble the connexions between outer agents than the feelings they unite resemble these outer agents."

Mr. Spencer begins by (p. 211, § 90) considering cognition of space in three dimensions (constituted of trebly compounded relations of co-existence), and maintains that it must vary qualitatively according to the structure of the species. It must vary, he says, even in the same species, since two points contemplated from the side are conceived as a single relation, but as a double one when we stand between the points (p. 212). But surely this is simply a different *mode* of attaining the same result. Again, he says, a mouse traversing a space "cannot have the same conception of this space as a man," a proposition\* which may *indeed* be conceded, as also that opium-dreams, or juxtaposition of large and small objects may alter our appreciations. But the conception of *space* itself is one thing, the conception of *quantity* of space is

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\* There is here some confusion. In the first example Mr. Spencer is really considering, not the space relation of two points to each other, but their relation to the spectator. In the second example, the mouse's idea (supposing it for argument's sake to have one) and the man's idea are respectively relative to the size of their bodies, and there is no more discrepancy than in saying that a furlong is more than a foot and less than a mile.

another. Everybody admits that "largeness" and "smallness" are essentially relative. Mr. Spencer also urges upon us the differences in impressions produced by the same object when viewed in different positions. But we may reply to this that *sensible* perceptions of relation, change, but not the *intellectual conception* of the relations of objectivity to which such sensible perceptions minister. Nay, the *very changes* of sensible perceptions intensify and make clearer the unity of those intellectual perceptions which they occasion.

A passing remark of Mr. Spencer's may here be noticed. He says (p. 214), "differences of quality in general are resolvable into differences in the ratios of the co-operative factors." But *quality* can never be identified with *quantity*. That which makes the ratio different *is* the quality, but the expression tends to mislead the ignorant into thinking that, profoundly considered, quantity and quality are fundamentally the same. That the ideas of quantity and quality are incapable of analysis or reduction into each other may be shown thus: Conceive two objects absolutely similar in *quantity*, we may then conceive that they differ in *quality*. One may be green, the other red; one transparent, the other opaque; one sonorous, one not; one in motion, the other relatively at rest; one a natural formation, the other an artificial fabric; one my property, the other the property of another; and so on.

He goes on (pp. 214, 215): "When we see that what is, objectively considered, the same connexion between things, may, as a space-relation in consciousness, be single or double; when we remember that, according as we are near or far off, it may be too large to be simultaneously perceived, or too small to be perceived at all; it becomes impossible to suppose any identity between this objective connexion and some one of the multitudinous subjective relations answering to it." But surely this is the *very* poorest and shallowest sophistry. No one has supported the assertion of "IDENTITY" even between the intellectual concept gathered from changing phenomena, and the object of that concept itself; still less between it and "some one of the multitudinous subjective relations [feelings] answering to it." But this absence of identity does not even go one step towards invalidating the correspondence between certain of the objective characters of objects and intellectual cognitions of such objects in and by the sensations they occasion, which sensations *present* them (in the sense of "*make them present*") to the intellect.

Next (p. 215, § 91) he examines compound relations of sequence, and he considers that herein qualitative differences of apprehension may be produced by the different structures of different animals, adding, "there is most likely a marked qualitative difference between that undeveloped sense of duration derived solely from the

experiences of inner changes, and that developed conception of time derived mainly from outer changes, but conceived to be a form of both outer and inner changes.

Now as to qualitative differences in animal sensations, all Mr. Spencer requires may be conceded, as such differences are but the materials of intellect. But if an intellectual animal could think by means of such materials of merely internal sensations as those Mr. Spencer supposes, such an animal would perceive time itself to be such as (like in nature to) the time we perceive—though its mode of arriving at such perception would be different. It need hardly be added that there is indeed a difference of quality between our perception of time and any feelings of a polyp.

As to quantitative differences of perception of sequence he remarks (p. 216): "Months to the old man appear no longer than weeks to the young man." Just so, the old man remarks a changed condition of sensibility, and he perceives a similarity of *feeling* between months now and weeks formerly as a result of that change; but he does not *intellectually* perceive months to *be* weeks, though they *feel* like them to him.

As to the effect of opium, &c., I readily concede all Mr. Spencer advances, but it is trivial and beside the question.

With respect to changes produced by "change of position among our experiences," he remarks (p. 217), as to the recollection of an evening passed somewhere a year ago: "There is a *conviction* that it was several hours long; but when contemplated it cannot be made of equal apparent length with the several hours just passed."\* I reply to this—to the *feelings*, no! to the *intellect*, yes! It would be inconvenient as well as useless if our feelings did not change with distance in time as well as in place. Mr. Spencer admits a "CONVICTION," what more can we possibly require? He adds (p. 218), "life seems no longer at forty than it did at twenty." This is not my experience. I can recollect the leading events back year after year for thirty years, which I certainly could not have done at twenty. He also says: "To a lowly-endowed creature, conscious only of internally-initiated changes, it [time] cannot appear what it does to a creature chiefly occupied with changes that are externally initiated; since, in the last, it is partially dissociated from both orders of changes. Whence it seems inferable that, only partially dissociated as it is, it cannot have in consciousness that qualitative character which absolute dissociation would give it, and which we must suppose it to have objectively." This he maintains on

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\* This remark of Mr. Spencer's is singularly trivial, frivolous, and not at all to the point. It would seem as if he was here writing rather for children than for men.

account of the reason just before given, that "time, considered as an abstract from relations of sequence, must present a different aspect according to the degree of its dissociation from particular sequences." But to this may be replied: The idea of time is one thing, the possibility of recalling a greater or lesser number of more or less vivid phantasmata of things which happened in a given quantity of time, say a month or year, is a very different one; nor, probably, would even Mr. Spencer have ever confounded them together had not his theory obliged him to do so.

Mr. Spencer concludes this section by saying that "compound relations of sequences as we conceive them cannot be quantitatively like the connexions beyond consciousness to which they refer, is proved by the facts that they vary in their apparent lengths with the structure of the organism, with its size, with its age, with its constitutional state, with the number and vividness of the impressions it receives, and with their relative positions in consciousness. Manifestly, as no one of these variously-estimated lengths can be taken as valid rather than the others, it becomes impossible to suppose equality between an interval of time as present to consciousness, and any nexus of things which it symbolizes." But these difficulties as to time may be answered in a way parallel to that in which those of space were replied to. "Feelings" change, but do not necessarily carry with them changes in the intellectual perceptions they occasion, nay the very fact of the phenomenal changes brings out yet more clearly the objectivity they reveal, and which is known by and to the *intellect* correctly, in spite of sensational variations when the organism is not so deranged that the intellectual faculties are thereby paralyzed.

He then (p. 219, § 92) proceeds to consider the compound relation of difference, and he infers that (since it "has to be conceived in terms of impressions that differ; and since the conception of difference cannot be dissociated from the order of impressions in which it is presented, if there is but one such order"), the "conception of difference becomes more independent of particular differences," "in proportion as the impressions become more multitudinous in their kinds," "and that, *therefore, in higher creatures it is not qualitatively the same as in lower creatures.*" This should in fact be thus amplified, and such amplification would do away with that confusion between intellect and sense which Mr. Spencer makes. He should say: *Therefore in higher creatures the material (the direct sensitive cognition of things which differ) is gradually more and more elaborated, so that when taken up by an intellectual principle it is far indeed from being the same as in lower creatures.*

He concludes (p. 221) "that the compound relation of difference, as we know it, is dependent on structure," size, and state. I reply:

As we "know it," meaning, as it is presented to us *sensibly*, yes ! as we "know it," meaning, as it is presented to us *intellectually*, no !

Next (p. 222, § 93) he considers the pure relations of co-existence, sequence and difference, and concludes that their relations "*as we know them*" do not obtain beyond consciousness, because they cannot be thought of without a "tacit recognition" of concrete existence ultimately derived from our feelings. But as to this it may be replied that "difference" (like genus and species) exists *formally* only in mind, though *materially* in things. The abstract is not, of course, the concrete. As to the "tacit recognition" of the concrete, that is merely the phantasmata necessary to all knowledge in our present condition. They are merely counters made use of by the mind. We understand five purely ; through five counters, or five anythings. What proves that Mr. Spencer can think of pure abstract difference is, that he can write about it. Then as to this expression above quoted, "*as we know them*," we may reply : "As," in the sense of the means whereby we have them, no ! "As," in the sense of agreeing with our intellectual apprehension so obtained, yes !

He next goes on (for the sake of clearness !) to attempt to simplify the expressions coexistence and sequence by means of terms expressing existences which in the first have, in the second have not, differences "in their order." Phenomena which can be experienced in different orders of succession (as the phenomena presented by an orange) being phenomena of coexistence, while those which can be experienced only in a single order (as those of a musical air) are phenomena of sequence. But what is the meaning of *order* if we have not yet got sequence, i.e. time ? It may be contended that order as an intellectual act is primary, but anyhow it cannot be *really* understood without the addition in thought of either space or time.

Mr. Spencer sums up (p. 224) by reducing all perception to shocks accompanying transitions from one feeling to another. "That is, the relation of difference as present in consciousness is nothing more than a change in consciousness. How, then, can it resemble, or be in any way akin to, its sources beyond consciousness" ? But what can be the meaning of saying that it is not *akin*, and *differs* from its source, if the category of difference is not applicable beyond feeling ? If it is not so applicable, then it no more *differs* than it *agrees*, there being simply *no relation*. In fact, however, the perception of difference is *elicited* by shocks of sensitive change, but it itself is very much more, and the *intellectual* unit is a perception of being and non-being.

He goes on to say there is nothing between two colours, as they objectively exist, "answering to the change which results in us

from contemplating first one and then the other." I reply : Nothing between them like to the *feeling* of the change in the sensible perception—no ! Like to what the intellect apprehends concomitantly with that feeling—yes ! " Their relation [the two colours] as we think it, *being nothing else than a change of our state*, cannot possibly be parallel to anything between them, when they have both remained unchanged." This is equivalent to saying that no one thing differs from any other objectively ; because no objective difference whatever is the same as a nervous shock. But this extreme position may be turned round and made use of to prove the objectivity of extension, since the objectivity of " difference " is certain, and yet it is the very same arguments (thus shown to be futile) which are brought against the objectivity of extension which are brought against the objectivity of " difference." Moreover, if a subjective relation of difference cannot exist without the momentary coexistence of its terms, the objectivity of difference is most *true* on this very account, because an objective relation cannot exist without this momentary existence of *its terms*.\*

He then (p. 224, § 94) tries to show that physiology harmonizes with his doctrine, saying that all relations are composed of nervous elements, not " intrinsically different," and therefore cannot resemble intrinsically-different objective connexions." But what, then, is meant by using the term " intrinsically different " ? Moreover, a set of apparently similar nerves may be as truly organized for revealing a variety of objective conditions as any one set.

He concludes that " *it needs* but to think of a brain as a seat of nervous discharges, intermediate between actions in the outer world and actions in the world of thought, to be impressed with the *absurdity* of supposing that the connexions among outer actions, after being transferred through the medium of nervous discharges, can reappear in the world of thought in the forms they originally had." But where is the " absurdity " ? It is indeed true that it

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\* Mr. Spencer, in saying that the nervous shock constitutes by its occurrence the consciousness of a relation of difference, and by its degree the consciousness of the amount of difference, contradicts what he previously said, that in relations of difference we have, (1) a feeling of some kind ; (2) a feeling of another kind, which being distinguishable as another feeling, proves itself to be not homogeneous with it ; and (3) a feeling of shock. For from this it follows that the consciousness of the relation of difference arises from the feelings being distinguishable and distinguished, which, he says, proves that they are not homogeneous, i.e. that they are different. The nervous shock is a subsequent affair ; it does not make the difference, nor does it make the perception of difference. I could perceive that John, who was alive, is dead, and then I receive a nervous shock ; I am not shocked by the difference between his past and present state until I have perceived it. The difference between two things which we consider, is not the same as, but is the cause of, a change in our state when we consider them.

is most mysterious *how* the nervous system gives us even any one symbolical message from objectivity such as Mr. Spencer allows that it does give. It is not *really* a bit more mysterious how it can reveal to us the objective relations which the realist believes it does reveal than how it reveals what Mr. Spencer allows it does reveal. Even he must admit that it can never be *disproved* that the universe has been so ordered that real objective relations become known to us *through* these "sensible symbols," provided we are adult, healthy, and use *all* our organs and faculties, sensible and intelligent. For what can be more absurd, when God has given us five senses to make use of, to complain that the use of one by itself leads into error? The truthfulness of the intellect's report as to the qualities of the objective world has the same basis as has its report as to the objective existence of that objective world, and the latter reposes on reason, as Mr. Spencer truly represents. He concludes the chapter (p. 225, § 95) by referring to the assumption universally made that "there exist beyond consciousness, conditions of objective manifestation which are symbolized by relations as we conceive them." "The very proposition that what we know as a relation . . . does not resemble any order or nexus beyond consciousness, implies that there exists *some such* order or nexus beyond consciousness." But how can it be "*some such*" order or nexus if there is *no* resemblance between them—"no likeness between them either in kind or degree"? (p. 194, § 78). The only meaning Mr. Spencer can really have is that which all philosophers would, of course, concede, namely, that objective conditions are not identical with subjective sensibilities, though made known to us through the latter by a complex and indirect process.

He then concludes by asserting the reality of an absolute and unknowable ontological order, giving rise to the phenomenal order, and an ontological nexus giving rise to phenomenal differences. "Though the relation of difference constituted, as we have seen, by a change in consciousness, cannot be IDENTIFIED with anything beyond consciousness; yet that there is something beyond consciousness to which it is due, is an inevitable conclusion; since to think otherwise is to think of change taking place without an antecedent" (pp. 226, 227). In the last words we see Mr. Spencer admits the fundamental nature of the law of causality. But the word "*identified*" should be carefully noted. Certainly what he speaks of cannot be *identified*, but whoever said it could? Whoever thought of *identifying* the mechanism of perception with the thing perceived? If he had only contended against "*identity*" instead of against "*likeness*" "*either in kind or degree*," there would have been no word to dispute, and no ill effects would have been involved in his system. The ontological order—dark to brutes—is revealed to man by his sensible experiences (feelings), and cor-

responding faint feelings (phantasmata) are, in this life, the *conditions* of its reproduction or presence in thought. But because we cannot think without phantasmata, it does not follow that those *phantasmata* THEMSELVES are all our thoughts in each case.

Mr. Spencer always treats the mere means and occasions of intellectual action as *intellectual action itself*, owing to his fundamental confusion of thought with feeling, which leads him to such nonsense as speculating as to an oyster's conception of time and space! He indeed approaches the truth, but then stops short of it. It is certainly most true that it requires but a little change to transform his system (in spite of its generally very different spirit) into scholasticism. His fundamental error is not seeing that imagination and sensible phantasmata suggest to our intellect truths beyond images, not therefore adequately expressible by words though *conveyed* by words with practical efficacy to other minds. Meanings beyond the words themselves, and still more beyond their more ancient meanings, are continually suggested by language. Who, when he hears of the "spirit of Shakespeare," thinks of the pulmonary exhalation from his lungs! So such words as "substance," "cause," are symbols, and suggest images through which the intellect understands what is hypersensible, and by such language conveys it to other minds. Men who do not *really* so understand them have either a mind which is undeveloped or they are somehow abnormally constituted.

#### CHAPTER V.—THE REVIVABILITY OF FEELINGS.

The sections of this chapter may be thus expressed:—§ 96. The conditions of the revival of faint feelings by the occurrence of vivid ones, are § 97, the relational character of such faint feelings, § 98; and the faintness of present competing feelings, § 99. Feelings are also revivable according as they were originally strong or oft repeated, § 100, and according to the state of nutrition of the nervous tissue, § 101; and to the general physiological conditions present when the revival is attempted, § 102. Revivability also depends on the quality of the blood, § 103; and all these *à posteriori* facts, as to feelings, accord with the data furnished us by the nervous system, and demonstrate the correspondence of the two sets of phenomena.

In this chapter and the three following, Mr. Spencer considers the revivability and associability of feelings and relations, in connexion with the nervous mechanism of such revivability and associability. But such questions, though most interesting to the *Physiologist*, are to the *Psychologist* (such as recent controversies have made him) matters little more germane than are to the machinist questions as to the botanical relations of the woods of which his tools are made.

It may be noted, however, that Mr. Spencer, at starting, speaks (p. 228) of "faint feelings, or ideas" as equivalents, though antecedently (p. 182) he had represented ideas as resulting "when a vivid feeling is assimilated to, or coheres with, one or more of the faint feelings left by such vivid feelings previously experienced."

#### CHAPTER VI.—THE REVIVABILITY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN FEELINGS.

The contents of the sections composing this and the following chapters, need not be separately given, as the notice of each will be very short. This is a very interesting chapter, and a very good one, showing, as it does, the material part of intellectual action—the conditions that direct that unconscious revivability of which our power of recollection makes use. Nothing in it, however, even tends to bridge over the difference between this material revival and the intellectual recognition of relations as relations, e.g., between the revival in a cat on its return home of associated sensible memories—or in one listening to the gnawing of a mouse—and our appreciation of time, space, and difference.

He begins by saying (§ 104) that from the changed order in which relations are continually experienced, "it results that relations of coexistence, of sequence, and of difference, come to be separable from particular pairs of impressions, and acquire a *quasi-independence*." But this does not and cannot result from the mere incidence of relations, it can only come from the presence of a mental power to abstract such conceptions from such incidental experiences—i.e., Mr. Spencer here quietly introduces the intellect without saying anything about it.

He then proceeds (p. 241, § 105) to the position that "relations in general are more revivable than feelings in general," and he illustrates it by the greater readiness with which we recall the relative position than the colours of a room inhabited in childhood. But indeed this illustration is a good one of a nearly pure sensible revival; and we may see the difference of kind constituted by the introduction of intellect when we begin to arrange the parts of the mental picture by general conceptions of "right and left," and by other reflex attention to it.

He continues and shows (p. 243, § 106) that "the most relational relations are those of coexistence," then those of sequence, and finally those of difference. Again, he shows (p. 245, § 107) that "present relations hinder the representation of other relations, and (§ 108) most so those of the same order. He next makes plain (§ 109) that all the same physical conditions (use, state, blood, &c.) apply here, as were enumerated as being influential in the revivability of

feelings. Finally (§ 110), he shows a similar parity with the conditions of the nervous system to exist here, as in the last chapter was shown to exist with respect to the revivability of feelings.

#### CHAPTER VII.—THE ASSOCIABILITY OF FEELINGS.

In this chapter Mr. Spencer declares (§ 111) that the associability of feelings goes with their revivability, since (§ 112) the first can only become known through the second. He asks (§ 113), what is the ultimate law of the association of feelings? and replies (§ 114) that feelings of the three great groups associate themselves primarily with members of their own group; and the (§ 115) law is that each feeling associates itself with (p. 256) "the class, order, genus, species, and variety, of preceding feelings like itself." This he also shows (§ 116) to be congruous with nervous structure, and with the physical localization and proximity of different groups of cells and fibres.

#### CHAPTER VIII.—THE ASSOCIABILITY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN FEELINGS.

This is an admirable explanation of the sensible perceptions of brutes, but in it there is not the commencement even of an explanation of one intellectual act.

He tells us (§ 117) that associability of relations varies with their revivability. The most relational (§ 118) are the most associable, and (§ 119) relations "aggregate (p. 262) with their respective classes and sub-classes."

Here he remarks (pp. 262-263) that the terms of a relation "can be known at all, as standing in relation, only by distinguishing between them in consciousness; and *the act of distinguishing between them* is the act of classing their relation along with relations of difference."

But the act of distinguishing automatically and indeliberately, though it is materially such an act of classing, is not formally such; it is formally such only by the action of *intellect*.

Again (p. 264) he says: "On looking, say, at a flower by the roadside, the relations among the feelings of colour which we receive from its petals *instantly* associate themselves with relations of coexistence in general, with the sub-class of visually-perceived relations of coexistence, with the sub-sub-class," &c. &c.

But in fact these *instantly* made automatic segregations are taken up by the intellect as perceptions of being, substance, &c. &c.—a fundamentally different thing.

He proceeds (p. 267, § 120): "Every relation then, like every feeling, on being presented to consciousness, associates itself with like predecessors. *Knowing* a relation, as well as *knowing* a feeling, is

the assimilation of it to its past kindred; and knowing it completely is the assimilation of it to past kindred exactly like it." Here is the old confusion between the material sensitive basis and the formal intellectual recognition.

He goes on to say that as in each great class the relations blend insensibly, each has a doubtful border—"a certain cluster of relations nearly like the one perceived, which became nascent in consciousness in the act of assimilation. . . . hence results the so-called law of association by contiguity."

He continues (p. 269) saying that the same law holds equally "in a plexus of relations among many feelings"—i.e. ordinary perceptions of objects. And he instances the perception of a pale face that was formerly seen red, and the redness "having served as a common term to many different but combined relations, it happens that when these are again presented, the assimilation of them to the like relations before seen, entails a consciousness of the missing term of these like relations before seen." But he entirely ignores the *mind*, which is absolutely required to *look back*, compare past with present, and formally recognize the relation indicated by the diverse sensations which have been automatically associated.

He goes on (p. 270): "The act of recognition and the act of segregation are two aspects of the same act." I reply, No! the first is the formal act of the intellect, which makes use of the previous automatic sensitive act as a material. Finally (§ 121) he shows how the facts stated respecting the conditions of associability of relations between feelings harmonize with the data afforded us by the study of the nervous system.

#### CHAPTER IX.—PLEASURES AND PAINS.

In beginning this chapter (§ 122) he remarks (p. 272) that besides feelings, central or peripheral, real or ideal, there is a cross-division into "agreeable and disagreeable," and these arise from defective as well as excessive action, while many actions, he says, are neutral and indifferent. He objects to Aristotle's doctrine that "pleasure accompanies the action of a healthy faculty on its appropriate object," saying some tastes and odours are disagreeable in all degrees of intensity. But in fact the word "appropriate" saves Aristotle's definition, and makes it applicable to evolution—since this process makes manifest *what* objects are appropriate and what not, to each kind of creature. Mr. Spencer tells us (§ 123) that pleasures and pains are the concomitants of certain acts—pain attending excess, a great defect, or disuse of action; and he remarks (p. 274): "Solitude, necessitating quiescence of the faculties exercised in holding converse with our fellow-beings,

leads by-and-by to great misery." But the Cistercians, Camaldolese, and Carthusians certainly contradict this as regards Christianity, and show the exceptional nature of Christian influences.

He next observes (p. 278, § 124) that all excessive actions that tend to be fatal are painful, and (§ 125) that any species so organized as not to feel such actions painful would soon become extinct. Incidentally he remarks (p. 280): "If we except the human race and some of the highest *allied races*, in which foresight of distant consequences introduces a complicating element, it is undeniable that every animal habitually persists in each act which gives pleasure so long as it does so, and desists from each act which gives pain. It is manifest that, for creatures of low intelligence, unable to *trace involved sequences of effects*, there can be no other guidance." But it is just some of those creatures which are *far* lower than man, e.g. ants, which have this faculty most apparent, nor need any brutes be credited with higher faculties than ants have, in order to account for any of their actions. Yet Mr. Spencer ventures to say that there "*can be no other guidance*"! Can Mr. Spencer explain on his principles as here expressed the actions of the wasp *Sphæx*?

He traces (p. 281) the failure of instinct, to individuals becoming exposed to conditions to which the race has not been accustomed by natural selection. He then proceeds (p. 281, § 126) to show how man, by the constant occurrence of new conditions, is continually having the adjustments of natural selection interfered with, resulting in the half sound belief that painful actions are beneficial, and *vice versa*, and in a God propitiated by self-torture. But Mr. Spencer ought to guard against the application of this to Christianity and Christian asceticism, since such asceticism is fundamentally different and furnishes a good example, when compared with Buddhism and Hindooism, of superficial resemblance arising from deeper differences, and of the *independent origin* of apparently similar social structures. The principle of Christian asceticism is love. Far from believing that God is propitiated by self-torture, the Christian rejoices in the wonderful contrivance by which the love of an Omnipotent Being has provided a way for such creatures as we are to serve Him. God approves not the self-denial itself, but the love which produces the self-denial. What antecedent conditions, Mr. Spencer may well be asked, can have occasioned the happiness of the "religious life"?

In the next section (p. 285, § 127) comes a qualification to the effect that actions naturally selected will be those good for the *race*, and not necessarily for the *individual* after the reproductive period of life.

Finally (p. 286, § 128) as to the intrinsic natures of pleasures and pains, psychologically considered, he says this question may eventually prove unanswerable, and concludes (p. 288): "they are

largely, if not mainly, composed of secondary elements of feeling aroused indirectly by diffused stimulation of the nervous system." But first it should be noted that he admits (p. 286, § 128) that "pleasures to a large extent, and pains to some extent, are separate from, and additional to, the feelings with which we habitually identify them." Therefore he admits they are distinct feelings themselves, and that therefore they are subjectively unanalyzable accompaniments of other feelings, and perhaps of all, for the apparently neutral and indifferent partake of the general pleasureableness of mere existence.

His reply explaining the intrinsic nature of them by nervous stimulation is quite inadequate. Granted that stimulation and depression are the physical sides, the occasions and physical causes of pleasures and pains, it is plain that subjectively they are unanalyzable.

The orthodox history of man is quite reconcilable with evolution, and with these feelings as explained in this chapter. Adam's sin made man (by depriving him of supernatural guidance) fall into the condition of mere nature, and having once so fallen, then the non-adjustment of habits to successively new social conditions would explain the *physical* side of *material* sin and suffering. This is made formal suffering by our intellectual nature, and our intellectual nature also makes the spiritual side of material sin, while sin is *formally* constituted by the deliberate act of our free will.

Mr. Spencer's representations, forming the contents of the second part of his "Psychology," may be summarized as follows:—

Mind is only known in its states, which, though apparently simple, are really compound, and, as sensations are made up of reiterated minute shocks of feeling, so thoughts are composed of reiterated sensations segregated with their faint likes.

Mind is composed of feelings and relations between feelings, simultaneous, successive, like and unlike, segregated in similar clusters of clusters, with like faint predecessors.

Neither feelings nor relations down even to "difference" are equivalent to their objective causes, though an objective nexus is necessarily assumed and implied. Feelings and relations are revivable and associable according to their relational character, and according to conditions of vigour, repetition, state, &c., each becoming associated with its kind and sub-sub-kind.

Pleasures and pains correspond largely with general nervous stimulation, but otherwise are due to the action of natural selection, which has destroyed individuals who felt pleasure in what was self-destructive or destructive to their race, while it has preserved those who feel pleasure in acts of individual or racial utility.

The whole teaching of this part may be more shortly stated

thus: "Nothing is knowable but complexly segregated feelings (including relations, pleasures, and pains) transformed by repetition. These we are compelled to take as symbols of an unknowable objective order and nexus. The segregation of plexuses of vivid feelings and relations to antecedent faint ones is mind. In other words: Nothing is knowable but feelings, symbols of the unknowable, presented in the unanalyzable forms, Mind, Matter, and Motion. These arise and go forth, without any break, from physical actions, through merely vital actions, to the highest mental acts.

On the other hand, it is here affirmed that *external things*, as well as feelings, *are* knowable, and that objective truth is revealed to us through the self-conscious Ego, which also shows us that there *is* an essential difference between mind and matter. Also that these two entities are known to us intellectually, as also that the first cause must be of the nature of that one of these to which It has given the power to *know*:

Further, that this power "to know" is a power of the body, such body being subject to the laws of matter, and motion, and animality, and in this way, *hic et nunc*, our intellect is accidentally bound to follow the laws of the imagination, though it can indefinitely transcend the latter in its range:

Further, that the nature of the action of the human mind is fundamentally different from brute neurosis:

Finally, that it is utterly gratuitous to assume one underlying base of which matter and mind are diverging forms. Reason declares that the divergence between the two is fundamental, and that if both, as known to us by experience, are derivative, then that both such experienced mind and such experienced matter are the creatures of a Being who, as having Intellect and Will, may be spoken of as a Mind which can be conceived but not imagined.

Casting a retrospective glance over the two parts of the "Psychology" which have now been examined, the line of argument and rejoinder may perhaps not unprofitably be represented in the following manner.

Mr. Spencer's "Psychology," so excellent in many respects, has, so far at least, one glaring defect. "Reason," in our sense of the word, is nowhere considered, and yet to omit its consideration from a Psychology is strange indeed.

The two first parts of the work together show us vivid and faint feelings of different kinds, formed of aggregations of shock-like units of feeling, and which apparently answer to varied transmutations of units of nervous action, but which are in no way equivalent to, though symbolical of, objective being.

To this representation it may be replied that such condition may indeed be the material basis of thought, as vegetable irrita-

bility is of animal feeling; but that "thought" and "feeling" are radically and fundamentally different.

Mr. Spencer would probably admit the truth of such reply, but would parry it by saying that "thought" is certainly not a feeling, but is the aggregation of segregated feelings (substantial or relational) to their faint-like predecessors.

Once more then we may reply—such again is indeed the material part of thinking, but our intellect shows us that in "thought" there is something made known to us beyond the material correlatives of sensible terms.

To this reply Mr. Spencer might object, saying that no relation can be thought of, without our making use of sensible terms, even if these are almost infinitesimal.

As a rejoinder to such objection we should say that all indeed know and concede that the mind (as we experience it) cannot act without the use of phantasmata, but nevertheless introspection shows us that by means of these phantasmata we come to know something more than themselves. Thus, e.g., through the feeling of difference and the imagination of that feeling we come to know difference *as* difference, and *as a relation*, the aggregation of vivid to faint feelings and relations is one thing, the recollection of relation *as* relation is (as has been before urged) quite another thing.

Mr. Spencer would probably respond by calling our attention to musical tones and *timbre* as apparently simple feelings, different in kind from feelings of "shock," although really composed of minute shocks aggregated together.

But, as has been said earlier, such response may be answered by affirming, as is most true, that there is no ratio, parity, or common measure between the difference between any two feelings and the difference between a feeling and a thought. But also it may be urged that, even waiving this denial of parity, the facts alleged as explanations are not true, and tone and timbre though occasioned by are *not* composed of nervous shocks.

With respect to Mr. Spencer's denial of objective truth there may be ambiguity. When he asserts that our conceptions and perceptions are symbols of, but not equivalent to, objective being, all depends on the precise meaning given to "symbols" and "equivalence." Mr. Spencer asserts that subjective states have no equivalence with objective being because feelings of all kinds depend on varying conditions, and because even a relation of difference cannot be thought without its terms being momentarily considered, and therefore such relation of difference as it exists objectively, cannot be like our conception of it. Moreover feelings and nervous shocks cannot be like their objective causes.

Now all this has been already here denied, and equivalence of

subjective perceptions to objects has been asserted, because a normal medium of conditions is supposed, and because a relation of difference cannot exist without its terms existing, at least momentarily, so that herein there is complete equivalence between thought and objectivity. Again, to deny the objectivity of difference is to deny the objectivity of the contrast between "subject" and "object" (which Mr. Spencer makes the one *fundamental* truth), as also of the law of contradiction, and so all reasoning is annihilated. It follows that the objectivity of the "relation of difference" and of that of "identity" must be maintained if we would be rational at all. Yet as Mr. Spencer most truly says (p. 225): "How can such thoughts resemble nervous shocks?" But if by means of "shocks," objectivities so radically different from such "shocks," as are the relations of "difference," "coexistence," &c., become revealed to us, why may not other objectivities be so revealed also; and why should the difference existing between the acting mechanism and its product lessen the value of that marvellous product?

In this way the objectivity of all that which reason declares to be necessarily objective, is affirmed and justified; and even as to secondary qualities, their objectivity is shown to be by no means "impossible" as *partial* revelations, especially if, on other grounds, there should be any evidence for thinking them probably true however imperfect. Reason certainly erects no bar against their being so received.

Thus we must admit a sentient faculty with special sense-aptitudes, and a *sensus communis* for the synthesis of the various sense-perceptions of different orders, and also feelings of pleasure and pain, the whole being distributable into epiperipheral, endoperipheral, and central feelings. But besides this sentient faculty we also require (to explain the fact of psychology) the admission of a distinct intellectual principle endowed with the three faculties (1) knowledge, (2) memory, and (3) will. It is this intellectual principle which replacing in us a merely sentient nature, takes up and transfigures into intellectual phenomena those nervous actions which in brute animals result but in sensation, imagination, and emotion.

The admission of a "rational principle" in man suffices to explain all the facts without confusion. If the existence of such a principle be *not* admitted, then the facts of psychology cannot be explained without confusion and an inevitable miscalling of low things by high names, as when "motion" is spoken of as "sensation," and "feeling" as "thought."

Having taken this preliminary survey of pure subjective psychology, Mr. Spencer again returns to anatomy and physiology, and the adjustments, in different animals, of nervous structure to the changes in environing conditions.

M.

## ART. VIII.—FATHER COLERIDGE ON THE GOSPELS.

*The Public Life of our Lord Jesus Christ.* Vol. I. By H. J. COLERIDGE, S.J.  
London : Burns & Oates.

IN January last we expressed our conviction, that the appearance of this first instalment of F. Coleridge's great work will be the beginning of a new era in the Catholic study of the Gospels. It was with great regret that we found ourselves prevented, by pressure both of time and space, from giving in April such a general exposition of its contents as we had hoped to accomplish; but we must no longer defer paying the debt we owe in this matter, not to F. Coleridge, but to the interests of Catholic truth and piety. Our brief comments indeed will at best be very poor and unworthy of the theme; and we will begin them with what must seem, as coming from a Catholic, a very common-place remark, but of which the bearing (we hope) will soon become apparent.

The fundamental dogma of Christianity may be thus briefly stated. When mankind had fallen, God did not content Himself with doing what would have fully sufficed for their restoration; with conferring on them pardon for the past under due conditions, and renewed strength for the future. He decreed that He would most unmistakably manifest to them the ineffable tenderness of His love, by personally suffering for their salvation. But since the Divine Nature cannot suffer, God the Son assumed a human nature, created for the very purpose of suffering; and then, clothed in that nature, He proceeded to close a life of bitter sorrow by a death of unparalleled anguish. In the case of those who apprehend this mystery at all worthily, language which on other subjects would appear rhapsodical and wildly extravagant, if applied to this theme will appear tame and inadequate.

But God has added to this a second entirely distinct mercy; a mercy, which by no means unfrequently escapes the explicit notice of Christians, by being, as it were, lost in the effulgence of the former. All which we said above might have been verified *in secret*. Its general truth might have been sufficiently revealed, but its details might have been entirely unknown. The Incarnate God, though suffering in His human nature no less than He has now suffered, might have lived an entirely hidden life, and died an entirely hidden death. Far different has been His choice. To this day all the localities are easily accessible, which

were trodden by His sacred steps. He spent three years in habits of most public communication, not only with the disciples whom he was training, but with the multitudes who were afterwards to turn against Him and procure His murder. His death was so public, that nothing could possibly have been more so; raised aloft as He was on the Cross, to be gazed at by His bitterest enemies, in such sense that every gesture, every movement, every word was exposed to their malignant comments. Lastly, as the obvious complement of this Divine appointment, the memory of His human words and acts was not left to the accidents and uncertainties of human tradition; but a selection from them was made by the Holy Ghost Himself.\* And this selection again was by Him committed to an inspired record, the truth and trustworthiness of which was to be authenticated by an infallible Church in every subsequent age down to the end of the world.

It is perhaps hardly too much to say, that this second mercy, though inferior to the first, yet may bear comparison with it. It might be thought a first principle, that the ways and thoughts of God are infinitely above human cognisance; and yet—though this must always of course be in some sense true—yet it is also true, that what may be rightly called, in the simplest and most literal sense, the words and acts of Almighty God, His movements to and fro, the various events which successively occurred to Him, are placed before the humblest of His disciples for study and meditation. This is a mercy, we say, entirely distinct from the former. One of its purposes undoubtedly is, that God's ethical character (if we may so express ourselves) may be rightly apprehended by mankind. This character is very far indeed from being sufficiently set forth by the visible course of events; because what men experience is but an infinitesimal portion of His Providence. But by studying the life of Jesus Christ, a Christian learns e.g. how tender is God's love towards mankind; how singular His predilection towards the poor, the sick, the despised, the reviled; how immeasurably greater is His desire for men's sanctification, than for any other end which they can pursue. This undoubtedly is one great purpose He proposes, by the knowledge He has given of His human words and acts. Another is, that Christians may grow more and more in habits of tender intimacy and familiarity with Him, who is their Creator and

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\* "The first object of the Gospels considered as literary works, was not so much history as doctrine; the collection of the facts about our Blessed Lord, on which Christian instruction and doctrine had been founded. No doubt there were other divine purposes which guided the hands of the sacred writers, but this was the first and the chief."—F. Coleridge, p. 141.

Redeemer. For such familiarity, we need hardly add, gives them a power, otherwise (as far as we can see) unattainable, both for personally loving Him, and for making Him their model and example.

Such being the Four Gospels, it might have been anticipated with some confidence, that large portions of them would present serious difficulties of apprehension. Their contents are selected (as we have said) by the Holy Ghost from innumerable human utterances and actions of Almighty God; and it was of course certain, that a very large proportion of those utterances and actions would be more or less mysterious. Why should we suppose that this latter class would be passed over in the selection? It appertained doubtless to God's love for the little ones of Christ, that many things should be recorded, which may be sufficiently and profitably understood by pious souls, however deficient in learning and ability. But very great benefit is derivable from the further fact, that a large portion of the Gospels is of a different character. It is surely in the highest degree a spiritually elevating and profitable occupation, to study the words and context of any given portion of these holy records; to compare Scripture with Scripture, fact with fact, and passage with passage; to compare facts and words alike with Catholic dogma; and so successively, in each particular case, to arrive at the true intent of something which the Incarnate God has said or done. A nobler intellectual occupation can hardly be imagined.

Dr. Trench, the Protestant Archbishop of Dublin,—who is certainly among the most reverential, orthodox, and satisfying of non-Catholic commentators,—has very well set forth the difficulty which is to be found in various parts of the Gospels; and his words, we think, are well worthy of attention:—

I have never been able to consent with that which so often is asserted — namely, that the Gospels are in the main plain and easy; and that all the chief difficulties of the New Testament are to be found in the Epistles. There are, indeed, by the gracious provision of God, abundance of plain things—so plain, that no wayfarer, who seeks his waymarks, need err for lack of such—alike in these and in those. But when we begin to set the hard things of one portion of Scripture against the hard things of another, I cannot admit that they have right who assume it as lifted above all doubt that those of the Epistles infinitely surpass those of the Gospels. How often the difficulties of the Epistles are merely difficulties of form; not of the thought, but of the setting forth of the thought; of the logical sequence, which only requires a patient disentangling, and all is comparatively clear. But in the Gospels it is not the form of the thought, for that for the most part presents little or nothing perplexing; but the thought itself,

the divine fact or statement, which itself constitutes the difficulty. Nor, if I am right in affirming it to be so, is this in any way strange. For while there must be deep things everywhere in Scripture, things past man's finding out—else it were no revelation—surely it is nothing surprising that the Son of God, *Who moved in all worlds as in regions familiar to Him*, who was not the illuminated, but the Illuminator of all others; not inspired, but the Inspirer, should utter the words of widest range and mightiest reach, those which should most task even the enlightened spirit of man to understand. . . .

The limpid clearness of St. John's style conceals from us often the profundity of the thought, as the perfect clearness of waters may altogether deceive us about their depth; and we may thus be too lightly tempted to conclude that, while St. Paul may be hard, St. John, at all events is easy. I believe this to be very far from the case.—(*"Studies in the Gospels,"* p. v.)

It is this noble work then, the exposition of the Gospels, in which F. Coleridge has engaged, to the signal benefit both of Catholic devotion and Catholic theology. He has made a start in the present volume, and its successor (as he mentions) will probably appear in July. When complete, it will be, as he says, a work "of considerable length and compass"; falling short indeed in these respects of no life of our Lord, which has hitherto appeared in ancient or modern times. One who comes to it mainly as a learner, cannot of course do it any kind of justice; but he may briefly set down one or two impressions which it has suggested to his mind.

Our first remark is this. Take the analogy of a human philosopher: those who have been carefully trained in his school, and still more those who have been frequently in his company, will catch far more forcibly than others the force and drift of his successive words and acts: they will see real and deep meaning, where others see no meaning at all; and they will see the true meaning of what others misapprehend and pervert. Thus it is those who have been trained in our Lord's own school;—who have been deeply imbued with true doctrine, whether on His Divine Personality or the endowments of His sacred humanity;—above all who have made Him their constant contemplation;—it is these who will most truly sympathize with His words and acts, and see their genuine significance. F. Coleridge then has laid the true foundation. His memory is richly stored with the thoughts and imaginings of such holy men; while (if it be not impertinent to make such a remark) every page displays his thorough mastery of all Catholic dogma which concerns the Incarnation. We should farther add, that in his hands the devotional and practical contemplation of our Blessed Lord entirely preponderates over every other aspect of whatever scene may be in hand.

As to this last-named feature of the book, there is hardly one page which will illustrate it better than any other page. But we may exemplify the admirable use he makes of the meditations of Christian contemplative writers, by the quotation from Ludolph in p. 86, on the scene which must have ensued in the wilderness, when Satan was for the time finally conquered and angels thereupon ministered to the Victor. Or we may adduce a longer passage (pp. 168-172), where the author introduces with great force the comments which have been made by devout Catholics on our Lord's first miracle. Under this head we may also commemorate two or three beautiful extracts from the visions of Sister Emmerich; which he has in no instance however introduced, except where they serve to fill up the details of some scene, which urgently needed the being set forth in full detail. As to all this, it will happen no doubt again and again, that some particular significance, given by devout Catholics to this or that passage, will be scouted by Protestant critics as far-fetched and puerile. But if Catholics were to drop whatever non-Catholics account puerile, they would simply have to change their religion for a different one. And at last "Wisdom is justified by her children." Those who have been nurtured in the love of God and in habits of piety, "have their senses exercised to the discernment of good and evil"; and they can see many a thought to be heavenly and divine in character, on which children of this world look down as the merest foolishness.

Closely connected with what we have been saying, though distinct from it, is the author's introduction of such pious and ascetical remarks, as are naturally suggested by the circumstances on which he is commenting. Some may perhaps think there is a little too much of this; but we must say that to our mind he has as nearly as possible hit the happy mean. His business of course is exposition, not admonition; and in our opinion, he has introduced no other practical applications, except those which emphatically serve to set forth the full significance of what the Evangelists have recorded. We may instance what we mean, and at the same time exemplify the characteristically Catholic spirit which pervades the author's reflections, by citing his comment of the passage, in which our Lord promises to Simon the name of Cephas or Peter.

Thus we see that the Church, the dearest thought of our Lord's Heart after His Eternal Father, was in His mind at this time; and that it was the presence of Simon Peter that, if we may so say, called it up; the two being inseparable in the love of our Lord, as in the Providence of God, Peter and the Church that is built upon him; as in the Incarnation itself there are two

persons never to be separated, Jesus Christ and His Mother, through whom He became Man (p. 126).

In truth however we find it difficult to enter into any one's state of mind, who can complain of any Gospel commentary on the precise ground of its being too lengthy. Grecian and Roman histories are published of a most voluminous character, and no one grumbles. Sir A. Alison has given fourteen thick octavo volumes to a history of Europe during the first French Revolution, and is not rebuked for his prolixity; in fact, we believe, he is exceeded in length by Thiers. Where the matter is thoroughly solid and good, no one complains of length: or rather no one does so, unless the highest of all possible themes be the one treated. Such a complaint, we repeat, is to us unintelligible. If it is among the noblest, so surely it is also among the most arduous works which can be undertaken, to set forth in their entire bearing, in their deep significance, in their full suggestiveness, the human acts and words of Almighty God. Indeed the very highest endowments and the fullest detail will only enable a writer to accomplish this with *approximate* success. Doubtless in this, as in every other study, there must be manuals and abridgments, for the young and for those who are prevented by adverse circumstances from lengthened investigation. But to us it is perplexing, how leisured and pious Catholics—believing what they do on the Personality of Jesus Christ—can endure to go through life, without attaining the fullest knowledge and apprehension they can, of every act which He performed and every word which He uttered.

And this leads us to another consideration of much importance. It may be almost said, that to write such a comment as F. Coleridge proposes, is to write a "*summa theologiæ*" for ordinary Christians. The exordium of S. John contains the whole dogma of the Incarnation; his sixth chapter the whole dogma of the Blessed Eucharist; the parables recorded by the Synoptists contain a mass of miscellaneous doctrine. "The Holy Ghost shall remind you of all things which I have spoken to you." He "shall not speak of Himself, but shall speak what things He has heard." "He shall glorify Me, for He shall take of what is Mine and declare it to you" (John xiv. 26; xvi. 13, 14). It would seem that there is hardly one, if indeed there is one, of the Catholic dogmata, which did not receive its first rudimental promulgation, in some evangelically recorded utterance of our Lord's. Of course the discussions of scientific theology are absolutely requisite, in order that due light be thrown on these pregnant and rudimental utterances:

but these last in their turn react on many a patristic exposition or scholastic argumentation, imparting a freshness and power which it would not otherwise possess. "In these Scriptural words God Incarnate first uttered this dogma"—here surely is an announcement of a most touching and practical character. It is this side of theology, which such a writer as F. Coleridge will build up with extraordinary laboriousness and power. And those Catholics, who have no vocation to technical theological study, must derive from such exposition a far deeper, wider, and more vivid knowledge of their religion, than they would otherwise possess.

We next turn to a somewhat different kind of excellence. In late years the science of criticism has put forth quite a new start and development; and it would be most strange, if the new ways of thought (since they contain much truth) were not capable of throwing important light on the Gospel narrative. We have already said indeed, what profound and accurate apprehension of our Lord's words and acts has been exhibited by those great contemplatives, who understood Him better than others, because they loved Him better and enjoyed more of His intimate familiarity. On the whole however, they have usually fixed their gaze on individual passages, we had almost said on individual verses. Take by way of contrast, such intellectual exercises, as an investigation,—in the case of some given discourse—of the thread of meaning which connects its various parts; the drift of the discourse *as a whole*; its suitableness to the particular circumstances under which our Lord was speaking, to the auditory by which He was surrounded, to the stage of His ministry at which He had arrived; &c. &c. Or take again,—in the case of some given dialogue say with Nicodemus or the Samaritan woman—a careful examination of what was passing in the interlocutor's mind; of how our Lord addressed Himself to that state of mind; of what is the connection between each successive utterance of His and that which preceded and that which followed. Such investigations as these, it would appear, have been more familiar to moderns than to ancients, and perhaps more to Protestants than to Catholics. This fact leads us to mention one characteristic feature of the commentary before us.

F. Newman has more than once set forth, with his usual force of language, the Church's power and duty of what he calls "assimilation." In every age, she has diligently surveyed habits of thought and practice existing outside her own bosom—not merely for the purpose of denouncing what is false,—but also of assimilating and turning to good service what they might contain of truth. We have ourselves more than once ventured to urge

the importance of this being done at present, within the sphere of *philosophy*. It is of great moment—so we have submitted—that non-Catholic philosophy should be diligently studied by children of the Church,—not merely (though this of course chiefly) for the purpose of guarding the Catholic against those deplorable aberrations which are its predominant characteristics,—but also of appropriating and assimilating such truths as it may contain, to which Catholics may not hitherto have given sufficient recognition. F. Coleridge has acted on this principle within his own special line of thought, and has evidently made much study of Protestant writers. We need hardly say indeed, that whatever benefits could be obtained from modern criticism, would be most dearly purchased, if for their sake less store were set on that most precious possession, the Church's traditional interpretation of Scripture. But in the present author's hands,—not only this is preserved in its full and exclusive supremacy,—but in fact it is placed throughout in fuller and clearer light, by the very circumstance that the results of modern criticism have been duly incorporated and assimilated.

We have already mentioned one great advantage obtained from modern criticism: viz. in tracing the thread of our Lord's discourses or dialogues; discerning the appropriateness of each to its attendant circumstances; and the light again obtainable from those circumstances, towards its true interpretation. F. Coleridge achieves this task in a very masterly way; nor in fact do we happen to know any other commentator, Catholic or Protestant, who at all equals him in its performance. We may refer, as an instance, to his treatment of our Lord's dialogue with the Samaritan woman, and His following address to the Apostles (pp. 300–326). On the surface it is very far from easy to apprehend the drift and current of this scene; but the author works it up with complete success, into a consistent and intelligible whole. In particular we may mention the well-known difficulty (John iv. 35–38) about “sowers and reapers.” F. Coleridge unites the two sentences, quoted by our Lord as proverbial (vv. 35, 37), into one single proverb, which he supposes to have been current: “Four months and the harvest cometh; one soweth and another reapeth.” And taking this as his foundation, he brings out with singular force (pp. 323–327) the full bearing of our Lord's address to the Apostles. Nor is this all; for this suggestion as to the meaning of the proverb, does him service for another purpose entirely different. As we shall presently point out at more length, if there is one feature more characteristic of the volume than another, it is the author's appreciation of the Gospels in their *chronological* aspect. Now in this particular

instance, he is able to use his interpretation of our Lord's words as a complete reply to a certain exposition of v. 35, which would oppose great difficulty in the way of a satisfactory arrangement of Gospel chronology.

We must admit frankly, that we do not think the author equally successful in every part of our Lord's colloquy with Nicodemus (pp. 253-275); but this is perhaps among the very most difficult passages in all the Gospels. Certainly we are not ourselves acquainted with any commentator, who impresses us as more successful in treating it than F. Coleridge. But we expected greater increase of light from him on the subject, than we have in fact attained.

There is another mode of illuminating the Gospel text, over and above that just mentioned, which is a specialty of modern times, and has been perhaps more cultivated by non-Catholics than by children of the Church. We mean a study of the religious opinions, the domestic habits, the political condition, the physical circumstances, of contemporary Palestine,—as often solving some difficulty which would not otherwise be solved, or giving far greater liveliness and freshness to some word or act of our Lord than would be otherwise discerned. F. Coleridge mentions in particular (p. xiii.) the great advantage of being acquainted with "local knowledge and acquaintance with Biblical scenery and antiquities"; and quotes some French infidel as saying, that "a visit to the Holy Land is like a fifth Gospel in the intelligence which it conveys concerning our Lord's life." We are not aware whether F. Coleridge has visited the Holy Land; but in other respects we do not believe that any modern writer exceeds him, in his mastery of such knowledge as we are here mentioning. At the same time he is very careful to keep it in due subordination, and prevent it from overriding the higher purposes of exposition.

There is a further feature of Protestant commentaries, on which a word may be said in passing: it is sometimes called—especially as practised by one well-known Anglican dignitary—"picturesque theology." It would be an utter mistake to suppose, that it is a specially modern habit, to form this or that individual scene of our Lord's life into a group, which may be placed distinctly before the imagination, and which may be exhibited indeed by painting or sculpture. Against any such supposition, we need only appeal to the great stress laid by S. Ignatius on "composition of place"; to such visions as those of Sister Emmerich, or again Mary of Agreda; and also to the great Catholic painters. What Protestants have added to this, has been enlivening and enriching

these pictures, by introducing such matters as the scenery of Palestine and the contemporary habits of secular life. F. Coleridge has not failed to derive due instruction from such writers; but on the whole they are, we think, more antipathetic to the instincts of Catholic piety, than any other class of Protestant commentators. It would seem their constant effort to minimize the distinction between things sacred and things secular; to assimilate, as nearly as they can, the Gospel narratives to a record of merely human events. In them moreover is exhibited in its extreme degree a peculiarity, which is shared however with them by all Protestant commentators, and which is a source of unremitting distress to the Catholic student: we mean, that their deplorable ignorance of dogma is constantly issuing in some unintentional irreverence to Him, Whose Divine Personality they so grievously fail to apprehend.

The following passage may here be advantageously placed before our readers, as illustrating what we have said:—

The use of the Gospels for prayer and contemplation suggests that Christian exercise of the imagination of which mention has already been made, and thus far, at all events, we may safely, if sparingly, avail ourselves of the beautiful pictures which have been drawn for us in contemplations like those to which reference has been made, just as we should of an actual picture drawn for us by Fra Angelico, or any other painter whose inspirations might be as pure, as holy, and as theological as his. Nor should we shrink, even in a narrative which aims at being historical, from helping ourselves now and then by the consideration of what we know must either have been, or be like what actually was, although there may be no distinct assertion to that effect from the pen of an evangelist. For there are facts in our Lord's life which are generally assumed as certain in the Church; as, for instance, that He ordained some at least of the Apostles priests or bishops at the Last Supper, or that he showed Himself after the Resurrection first of all to our Blessed Lady: assumptions as to which the Saints not only use words of sanction and toleration, but language which implies some censure on those who do not see that it could not have been otherwise (p. 141).

And here we may make an episodical remark. There is a very large number of sincere Christians in England, who (whether or no by their own fault) are external to the true fold. These persons profess to derive their creed from Scripture, and at all events are regular readers of the sacred volume. It may be under various circumstances a great advantage, if such men are brought to admit, how far deeper and more satisfying an interpretation of our Lord's words and acts is provided by Catholic theology, than is otherwise attainable. Let any fair-minded and competent Protestant be induced to compare such a commentary as F. Coleridge's with the best he can obtain in his

own communion: say, e.g., with Mr. Isaac Williams's which is in many respects written on a similar plan. He will be obliged to admit how far superior is the former in completeness, in depth, and above all in confronting the sacred text as a whole. With many Protestants, a first-rate Catholic commentary is (we may say) *the one* appropriate and hopeful method for their conversion.

Again, many a Protestant labours still under the notion, that Catholics put our Blessed Lord in the background, in order to find room for our Blessed Lady and the Saints. Such a work as that before us must (one would think) give a death-blow to this long-lived delusion.

We return however to the general course of our remarks; which is concerned with the religious interest of Catholics, rather than of Protestants. And in what we have already said we have in fact included one special excellence of this commentary, which it will be better however to name separately. Every scene which the author describes, he places with singular vividness before his reader in every detail; and constantly succeeds, by the very course of his narrative, in solving difficulties without even mentioning them. In this again we know of no other commentator who is at all his equal.

But the particular which, more than any other, distinguishes the present commentary from those hitherto written, is its way of dealing with the question of what are called "harmonies." As far as we know, F. Coleridge is the very first writer who has acted on what seems to us the true view of this question. The ancient Catholic writers,—whose attention (as we have already said) was fixed rather on individual verses and passages one by one, than on a larger field of view,—attached little importance to the *order* of Gospel events. Even had they otherwise been disposed to lay more stress on this particular topic, they would have been prevented from doing so to any great purpose, by a circumstance mentioned by F. Coleridge in p. x. S. Augustine's harmony is based throughout on the principle, that S. Matthew's order of events is the standard to which the other Gospels should be conformed. S. Augustine's authority was so deservedly great in the Church, that this principle was for centuries assumed as a matter of course; whereas F. Coleridge mentions it as "now generally admitted by students on the subject, that the order of S. Matthew's Gospel is not chronological" at all (p. xi.). Protestant writers then of the more orthodox school, as was not altogether unnatural, have seen keenly the difficulties besetting those schemes of harmony which had been perfunctorily accepted; and failing to find others entirely satisfactory, have more and more

tended of late to the opinion, not only that there is no discoverable order of connection in the synoptical Gospels, but that a large number of actual *mistakes* must be admitted to exist in their recital of subordinate details. F. Coleridge maintains on the contrary, that "to trace the onward march of the manifestations of our Lord, the gradual training of His Apostles, the development of His moral or doctrinal or mystical teaching" (p. xii.), is on the one hand a task which can be performed with continually increasing success, while on the other hand its performance must throw a flood of new light on the inspired record. We cannot do better, than place before our readers his own statement of the case.

No perfect life of our Lord can ever be written by human hand, because very large portions of it are entirely hidden from us; and even as to those parts which we know most about, there is much more that we do not know. What Christian criticism can do is to attempt, as far as may be, to restore, if the expression may be used, out of the materials which are furnished by the Evangelists, the Life of our Lord as it was known, in its external facts, to the Apostles and those who were familiar with Him, before the Gospels were written; to shed upon it the light which is furnished by Christian theology, from St. Paul and St. John to the Catholic writers of modern times;—and then, to go on to point out the purpose and method, in accordance with which each several Gospel was composed. This may be a difficult task, a task which is impossible, perhaps, to accomplish completely; but it does not follow that it should not be attempted, or that nothing short of perfect success can be valuable and profitable in advancing our knowledge of our Lord. Anything of the kind, that is true and sound as far as it goes, must be very precious; and it would almost seem as if Christian students were intended to exercise their minds and powers in industry of this kind, by the very fact that it has pleased God that the records of our Lord's life should be divided, as they are, between four several witnesses (pp. xii. xiii.).

We may supplement these remarks, by some others which appeared in the "Month" for last May.

The criticism of the Gospels, in so far as it applies to the arrangement of the events which are related by the four several Evangelists, not always in the same order, and to the careful discrimination of the method and purpose of each one of the four, is to some extent a creation of later times, and has perhaps still to pass through more than one phase before it can be said to be completed. No one will certainly be inclined to assert that the exact chronological order and sequence can be assigned with perfect certainty to every single act and saying of our Divine Lord as recorded by the Evangelists. But this is only one of the extremes into which Gospel critics may be misled. There is another, and perhaps more fatal mistake—that of supposing that the Evangelists follow no method, and that they are constantly inaccurate; for inaccurate they must be if they contradict one another. This error is perhaps more important at the present day than the other which we have

mentioned—more important on account of the sceptical direction in which the public mind in England is at present turned, in consequence of the many flaws in the logical armour of the High Church and “orthodox” party, who are so constantly abandoning the only positions from which the faith can be successfully defended, because they fear that what those positions really cover is the Catholic faith, and the Catholic faith alone. . . .

The present volume has been written under the sincere belief, confirmed by many years of thought and study, that the Life of our Lord, as far as it is at present the will of God that we should be acquainted with it, was really before the mind’s eye of the Evangelists as they wrote, and that it is not impossible to re-construct it, if the word may be used, at least in its main and determining outlines, out of the materials which they have collected, and which they have in their own Gospels dealt with after methods of their own, for which they had plain and grave reasons. This belief implies that there was a certain order and progress in our Lord’s life from the first to the last, according to which He was manifested by the providence of His Father, first in this light, and then in that, according to the anticipations of type and prophecy, and as the occasions for the several kinds of evidence concerning Him succeeded one to another. . . .

The writer’s object is to furnish Catholic readers with suggestions which may help them in the intelligent meditation and contemplation of all that belongs to our Lord’s history and character, and to the manner in which it was gradually manifested, whether to the people at large, or to thoughtful and devout minds, such as those of St. Peter and the other Apostles (pp. 105–107).

It is with intense interest that we wait for the gradual unfolding of this view in the successive volumes, which are now to be expected, and which will go over ground even more interesting than that covered by the one before us.

In these days of unbelief, there is an invaluable benefit—entirely distinct from those already mentioned—which this commentary cannot fail to confer. It will be impossible for any one to study with simplicity its series of volumes, without receiving the most deeply-seated conviction that the narrative is substantially true. The profound harmony and orderly progressiveness of its various parts, the inimitable touches of nature, the divine depth and beauty of our Lord’s words and acts,—to all these F. Coleridge will do fullest justice; and taken in combination, they cannot but engender in the reader’s mind the conviction we have named.

It remains to consider the particular form, in which F. Coleridge has placed before the world the result of his long studies and mature deliberation. On this subject again, it will be better that he speak for himself:—

It has not been my object to make the present work either a record of all the opinions which have been maintained on the various points treated in it,

or a book of reference for authorities. I have given the name of the author whom I have followed in cases where a reference to the work will be of advantage to the student, but otherwise I have been content with the result of researches, which I trust have been sufficiently wide and industrious to render it safe to say, that no important opinion or authority has been altogether neglected. The readers of many modern books on the Gospel history may well be frightened at the immense number of names of authors and books which meet their eyes at the bottom of the page, and they will sometimes be wearied at the long discussions in which all conceivable opinions and conjectures are dealt with and discussed. The truth is, that the field has been overgrown with critical writings without, as I venture to think, any proportionate benefit to true criticism; and it would be a real loss to the cause of truth if it were to be considered an established rule, that no one should deal with the critical questions connected with the Gospel history unless he has read all that has been written before him. Many authors merely repeat, either at second-hand or as the result of their own speculations, opinions which have been put forward over and over again, and perhaps as often answered; and the same may be, in its degree, said of the interpretations of the words of our Lord or of others which are recorded in the Gospels. I have endeavoured to keep down, as far as possible, anything that may interfere with the direct onward flow of the narrative or the commentary, by such discussions as rather exhibit the process by which a conclusion has been arrived at than add anything to the clearness of the doctrine or the history. Moreover any one who has studied the Gospels continually and critically will be aware that he is often unable to trace to its right author a view of facts or an interpretation of words, which has fixed itself on his mind after much reading and thought; and I trust that this will be an excuse for the paucity of acknowledgments and of references to authorities in the present volume. It has been written in the midst of occupations and distractions, such as would certainly have prevented me from undertaking it, if I had not thought it better to do what I could rather than wait for greater leisure which might never come (pp. xvi.-xviii.).

An objection may be imaginably entertained against the plan thus sketched, on the ground that it unduly commits the readers to F. Coleridge's own view, and leaves them no sufficient scope for individual judgment. But such an objection would proceed on a complete misapprehension of the main requisite for acquisition of knowledge, whether in sacred literature or profane. It is only by allowing others to judge for him in the first instance, that a man can acquire any power of reasonably judging for himself at last. Those who shall in the first instance have surrendered themselves unhesitatingly to F. Coleridge's guidance, will have acquired a knowledge of the sacred text, which will give them real right—such a right as they could not possess without some similar course of study—to a judgment of their own, between any given interpretation

adopted by F. Coleridge and some other which may be suggested as preferable.

But what is chiefly to be remembered is this. The one main ultimate object, at which every Catholic must aim in a Gospel commentary, is to help the student in acquiring such knowledge of our Blessed Lord's life in the flesh, as may generate familiarity with the thought of Him, and so issue in fuller and keener apprehension of God's Attributes, and generally in increased piety and devotion. But though all Catholics who write on the Gospel narrative must regard this as their *ultimate* end, there are several who do not make it their *immediate* one. Those e.g. who write on such a plan as Maldonatus's, lay down an invaluable foundation for a devotional superstructure; but then the persons who are to supplement such works by erecting such superstructures, are not so readily found. Maldonatus is so powerful an expositor, that a Protestant Archbishop (Dr. Trench) goes out of his way to eulogize the Jesuit Professor, as among the most successful commentators who have ever written. Yet no one would call Maldonatus's a *devotional* book; nor indeed would ecclesiastical students, as a general rule, include their Scriptural studies in the *ascetical* portion of their training. For our own part, we greatly prefer the method of those who, like F. Coleridge, pursue *immediately*, what all admit should be the *ultimate* end of their labours.

We would emphatically recommend however those who have this volume in their hands, to make it a matter of study and not of mere reading. It is not a work to be perused throughout and then laid aside. On the contrary, there should be frequent intervals, during which what has been read is made a matter of painstaking meditation and reflection. It is our belief, that those who so use it will in general find, that its use has marked a memorable era both in their devotional and their intellectual life.

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Since this article went to press, we have received proof sheets of F. Coleridge's second volume, on "The Preaching of the Beatitudes"; a volume which at first glance seems even to exceed in interest the one we have been noticing. We insert part of the Preface, as illustrating some remarks we have made.

It may, perhaps, be as well to add a few words as to the general character of the work of which this volume forms a part. Any writer on the Life of our Lord must necessarily have to decide for himself how far he is to attempt to make his work a commentary or exposition. The words of our Lord form, after all, the largest part of what has come down to us concerning Him. The

Gospels, as has already been said more than once, were apparently intended as manuals of doctrine quite as much as historical memoirs, if not much more so. But the words of our Lord are living and pregnant, no commentary can hope to exhaust their meaning, while to record them altogether without commentary is often to leave the reader in much difficulty, and to deprive him of the light which Christian interpreters have been able to shed upon them. One of the main objects of this book, moreover, is to assist meditation, especially by drawing out the theological and practical meaning of our Lord's teaching. It is therefore, I hope, not unnatural that a comparatively considerable space should be given to exposition, especially in certain parts, the subject-matter of which forms what may be called the foundations of our Lord's practical doctrine, as in the Beatitudes and the Evangelical Counsels, or of His teaching with regard to God's government of the world, as in the Parables. It appears that during the first year of His Public Ministry, our Lord's activity in preaching throughout Galilee was immense and almost uninterrupted, while what remains to us as to that period, in the way of history, is comparatively little. But we should form a false estimate of the position in which He stood before the people in general, and particularly before the authorities at Jerusalem at the end of that year, if we were not at least to endeavour to take into consideration the wonderful stirring of hearts and minds which must have been the result of several months of continuous preaching of doctrines such as those which are summed up in the Beatitudes and the rest of the Sermon on the Mount, especially when it is remembered that His preaching was accompanied and enforced by a constant series of His most marvellous miracles. For this reason, to pass over such teaching without at least attempting to draw out the Christian commentary upon it, would be, in truth, to glide over without due attention one of the most important periods of His Public Life. There are many parts of that Life as to which we shall be able to pass onwards with comparative rapidity, but the teaching of the first year was the foundation of the whole, both as to the training of the Apostles and the formation of the large number of disciples who afterwards became the first members of the infant Church. Few people would think, without examining the subject, how deep are the traces of the Beatitudes and the Sermon on the Mount on the first Christian communities, as far as we know them, and how naturally the teaching of the Apostles in their Epistles connects itself by direct descent with this first great publication of the Christian law.

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## ART. IX.—THE EUROPEAN SITUATION.

The *Fortnightly Review*, July 1, 1875. Art. I. The European Situation.  
By EMILE DE LAVELEYE. Art. VIII. The Military Position of England.  
London: Chapman & Hall.

PERHAPS there was no clause of the Syllabus which so roused the scorn of the Liberals of the universe, as that in which the Pope condemned this proposition, "The principle of non-intervention (as it is called) should be proclaimed and observed." That a principle, regarded as so beneficent, so enlightened, and so universally accepted ten years ago, should be thus gibbeted, as in a gallery of scarecrows, wounded the susceptibilities of many. In England, particularly, it was felt by the more advanced and philanthropic Liberals, those to whom politics are never wholly without poetry, and who hope ultimately to see the affairs of nations transacted on a system purely æsthetic, that the principle of non-intervention was a sublime discovery, the one fitting formula of the foreign policy of the future. But the future is a very big word. It is only a few months more than ten years since the Syllabus was issued. The world has never since grown weary of misreading and misconstruing that document; it is quite as much a topic of the day and of every day in 1875 as it was in 1865. But it is somewhat curious to consider that while the Syllabus stands in perpetual memory, as we are wont to say, demanding and compelling the attention of all men, especially of those who deny, and flatter themselves they despise, its authority—it is curious, we repeat, to consider how some of the most peculiarly popular doctrines which it condemns, and above all the doctrine of non-intervention, have been roughly exploded in some countries; and have quietly evaporated in others under the silently-exercised influence of the common sense of mankind. The latter case has been its fate in England. It has gone clean out of the memory of men, so that it is difficult nowadays to conceive when one last heard the phrase mentioned in a speech, or even in a leading article. Of course, a great many things have happened since the Syllabus was issued—Sadowa, Sedan, Russia's repudiation of the Treaty of Paris,—the general persecution of Christianity, for the present specially directed against the Catholic Church, in Germany; the general acceptance of the Infallibility of the Pope as a settled clause of the common law of Christendom—and, so far

as England is more particularly concerned, the two not utterly inglorious small wars of Abyssinia and Ashantee; the sudden and portentous development of Fenianism among the masses of the Irish population, and the still more sudden and not less portentous development of Toryism among the masses of the English population under the extraordinary thaumaturgic energies of Mr. Stephens and Mr. Disraeli. At the end of it all, we do not seem to know precisely where we stand. Every day brings its alarm—one day about Belgium, the next about Central Asia. The politician who should declare that nevertheless he relied with unabated confidence on the sublime and sacred principle of non-intervention to guide and to tide England in unshaken safety through all the perilous vicissitudes of the next ten years, would be no doubt regarded as fit to hold the seals of Foreign Affairs whenever Mr. Whalley is sent for to form a Cabinet and Dr. Kenealy becomes Lord Chancellor. If Prince Bismarck and Prince Gortschakoff could only feel quite sure that England's foreign policy would be guided under all conceivable circumstances by that anodyne doctrine, we should soon need to order new maps of Europe and of Asia. But as these questions, and other questions such as these, will hardly, at the present pace of events, stay *in statu quo* for ten years more, then England had better be ready for wars to which Abyssinia will seem but as a flash in the pan, and Ashantee as a dress parade.

Already there is some discussion as to what England could really do if she were fairly launched in a great foreign war, such as those projected by the Pitts, involving an active campaign on the Continent, and pretty nearly world-wide operations, both naval and military, on a considerable scale besides. Well, to begin at the beginning of England's power, she never was more mistress of the seas than she is to-day. When France and Spain combined declared war upon her in 1796, England at once surrendered possession of the Mediterranean, and retired to defend the home seas. The valour of Jervis and Nelson within two years restored her supremacy, but at the beginning of the war she confessed herself in danger of being overpowered. Nowadays the power of the navy of England has been estimated by the statesman who best knows its capacity, and who has done most to give it its living form, in words which faction has not ventured to challenge, and which, we apprehend, may well await a terrible test from history. Mr. Childers, in a debate on the state of the navy last year, uttered these memorable sentences:—

I am about to state a proposition which, no doubt, will be very carefully

criticized, and which I state in order that it may be criticized. I will state it in moderate language, and yet with the firm belief that I am not in the least exaggerating, or going beyond what is justified by the facts which I have given to the House, I fear in too great detail. My proposition is this : If, which may God avert, we should be, at twenty-four hours' notice, entangled, without an ally, in a war with the three principal maritime Powers, even allowing an ally to them, our strength is such that we should be able to hold our own in the Channel, in our Home seas, in the Mediterranean, and in the Chinese and Colonial waters. Within six months, such is the power of developing a force afloat which this nation possesses, we should have complete command of the seas, and have ruined our opponents' commerce ; and within twelve or fifteen months, at the outside, we should have added so many powerful ships to the Navy as would prevent any enemy's ship from putting to sea, without the almost certainty of meeting a superior British force.\*

This being the state of the case as regards ships—to which may be added, moreover, the weighty facts that the art of building the modern iron-clad man-of-war becomes more and more an English specialty, and that the mercantile marine was never so effectually linked to the Fleet as it now is through the Naval Reserve—it remains to be added that the artillery power of England is more than equal to any conceivable emergency. The battery which Mr. Hardy lately inspected at Shoeburyness is, it may be said without exaggeration, the most powerful for its number that ever was composed, and would penetrate, long before it could get within range, the sides of the strongest war-ship now afloat under a foreign flag as easily as a swan-shot pierces a pane of glass. Money may perhaps have ceased to be considered the sinews of war. No country that is merely rich nowadays will find much of a bulwark in its money-bags. But the strength of a strong country in the next general war will be, more even than it has hitherto been for England, in her equally absolute command of gold and of iron. After all, moreover money has not grown scarce in England. The revenue on which Mr. Pitt went to war was hardly half of that which the United Kingdom now yields for the ordinary works of peace, under a system of almost open ports and without a single oppressive tax. It would be almost as easy for Sir Stafford Northcote to raise a thousand millions to-morrow as it was for Mr. Pitt to borrow a hundred last century. There remains the question of men.

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\* "The Naval Power of England." A Speech delivered in the House of Commons on the 30th April, 1874, by the Right Hon. Hugh C. E. Childers, M.P. London : Longmans, Green, & Co.

Certainly a somewhat recklessly stimulated emigration has drained the great recruiting reserves of the kingdom. It will not be so easy to improvise big battalions in Tipperary or the Highlands in the next great war as it was in the last. Nor perhaps is it quite so clear, as some mettlesome critics imagine, that an English army is still of that temper that, with whatever foreign troops it might have to bivouac, its relation to them would be that of the spear-head to the shaft. Pit even Her Majesty's Guards, not to say an average Alder-shot brigade, against the Prussian Guards, or the Brandenburg or even the Pomeranian infantry, and the impact of the one force upon the other might not be so merely like that of the harpoon upon blubber, as some of the idolaters of British infantry are pleased to suppose. Nevertheless it is, when the dash of the Irish, the steadiness of the Scotch, and the staying power of the English are perfectly blended, the best infantry that ever marched; and its bayonets will yet no doubt add a few illustrious lines to the long scroll of victories on its colours. Suppose again for a moment, as all recent speculation on the subject assumes, that Prussia were England's adversary in her next war, there is a very important factor to be added to England's power, which has not hitherto been at all estimated. During England's wars with France, it has always been necessary to garrison Ireland heavily, and it has been also necessary on occasion both to guard against invasion and to repress rebellion in that kingdom. But let a British army take the field side by side with the French against the Prussians, and we do not think we can possibly exaggerate when we say that Ireland would yield 100,000 fighting men within three months; that its militia would volunteer for active service; that its very police might be withdrawn. Within a year, the War Office might have besides the control of Indian, American, and Colonial divisions. In the first moment of such a war, England, meeting directly the systematic menaces which Prince Bismarck has been addressing to the Belgian Government, would of course at once occupy Antwerp,—as M. de Laveleye says, "Antwerp is the necessary point of debarkation for the English, and its gigantic fortifications have been constructed solely to preserve it to her" (p. 19),—she would thence organize the forces of Belgium and of Holland (200,000 men on a war-footing), help Denmark to strike for Schleswig, and on the soil where Ramillies, Oudenarde, Malplaquet, and Waterloo were fought, mass her forces for a greater effort than Marlborough or Wellington ever made. It is not at all so certain that because Prussia holds Metz she would at once

enter upon a new war with France with an overwhelming superiority of force. Her next war with France will, because of her possession of Metz, differ from the last in this cardinal consideration that instead of closing the campaign with a siege of Paris after capturing one half, and masking the other half of the army against which she took the field, she will be in the first instance challenged to a new siege of Paris with lines of defence doubled in circuit and trebled in strength, while France will have at least two and probably three great army corps in the field independent of the garrison of the capital. It will be well for Prussia to be sure of the neutrality of Austria in such an hour; otherwise it would not be difficult to drive a wedge through the huge ill-welded bulk of the German Empire. That Empire is Catholic where it touches Austria with its Silesian and Bavarian border; it is Catholic where it touches France and Belgium with its Rhine provinces; and it may be admitted that it spares no conceivable pains to make its Catholic subjects regard themselves as alien to its political system. Prussia's base of operations against France will lie in the two immolated provinces, wherein every man, woman, and child looks to France with hope, and at Prussia with hate. Should any disaster befall a German army in France, its retreat under such circumstances may be a very ugly operation. Of course, the active alliance of Russia might render to Prussia in her next war all and more than all the aid which the Czar's benevolent neutrality afforded her in the last. But Prince Bismarck has lately learned that it is not too easy to count upon the policy of Russia. He has had hints that the Czar thinks he has gone quite far enough, and is determined he shall not go any farther at present. The Chancellor had apparently made up his mind to annihilate the Carlists some months since; but there appeared in the *Cuartel Real* an affectionate and timely letter from the Emperor Alexander to the Duke of Madrid, and all the inspired bluster about Spain in the Prussian official press forthwith promptly subsided. Again, it is fresh in the memory of all Europe what preparations were on foot for a treacherous and truculent war against France on the eve of the Czar's visit to Berlin in May; and how the Chancellor of the Russian Empire inflicted upon the German Government the humiliation of announcing to the Diplomatic Corps accredited to Emperor William the fact that his august master had determined the peace of Europe should not be broken just then. There was complete accord between the policy of England and Russia in that noble and prudent act of intervention, as our Ministers were able to announce in Parliament; and there is some reason to

hope that the relations between Austria and Russia have since become cordial again. Every such guarantee for the peace of Europe is good, even though it be only temporary in effect, and resting on no formal engagement. But the one only true and solid guarantee in dealing with a power like Prussia is that an adequate number of her neighbours should be prepared to overpower and inflict condign punishment upon her in the event of her breaking the peace wantonly. It may fairly be regarded as an axiom of English foreign policy for some time to come, that France must not be further plundered or dismembered. There is no power in Europe nowadays with which England has so many interests in common and so few interests in opposition. The ancient animosity of the two nations has so completely vanished that a war with France would now be generally regarded in England with little less horror than a civil war. Accordingly Prince Bismarck's most insidious apologists seem to suppose that they can best serve his interests by warning this country against the danger of being drawn unawares into an Ultramontane coalition. M. Emile de Laveleye, who curiously combines the affable omniscience of Mr. Grant Duff in discussing foreign affairs with the added theological notions of Mr. Whalley, declares that in such a war as we have been imagining, "the defeat of Germany would have for its consequence the hegemony of Austria in the centre of Europe, and the triumph of Ultramontanism on the Continent, which the English, I suppose, can hardly desire." M. de Laveleye must have long fondly caressed the idea that the English were a very ignorant people before he thought of uttering such a sentence. Does he imagine that the English people are so unconscious of their true political interests—especially their interest in the independence of Turkey,—as to suppose that those interests were always in great danger while the centre of gravity of Germany was at Vienna, and that their foreign policy is comparatively free from trouble because it has been transferred to Berlin? Does he believe that the English people know so little of history and of politics as to believe that the policy of the Austrian Empire is now, or has ever been, to the knowledge of serious statesmen, guided by what he calls Ultramontanism? Is the policy of England, of France, of Italy, of Russia, of Austria—the Powers most closely related to Germany—of Belgium, of Holland, of Denmark, of Spain, of Turkey—Powers which might also be involved in a general war—so completely directed by the Vatican that M. de Laveleye can speak of a coming war in which the Government of Berlin may find "against her the sentiment and perhaps the arms of

the whole of Europe," as at the same time "a coalition under the auspices of Ultramontanism," and as a "struggle between the Papacy and the Empire"? Even Mr. Whalley would be incapable of setting the House of Commons in hysterics by such a flight as that. We will, however, quote the whole passage, that it may be seen we have not exaggerated its absurdity, and because it is such an exquisite example of what both Mr. Disraeli and Prince Bismarck would agree in describing as "Professors' Politics":—

To sum up in a few words. A great change in the equilibrium of Europe cannot come about without provoking a series of wars, because the loser is always bent on recovering his ancient position. Every state which aspires to supremacy or which obtains it, ends sooner or later by finding a coalition in face of it. All history shows this. Germany sees that a coalition will form against her under the auspices of ultramontanism, and she is naturally disposed to anticipate it by being first in the field. Hence the danger of war which has just alarmed Europe, and which cannot be dispersed because it arises from the very situation. The position of Germany, dominant as she may be at this moment, is one of the most critical. If she acts without provocation, she will have against her the sentiment and perhaps the arms of the whole of Europe. If she waits, the danger will perhaps be just as great, and she will by that time have lost her present superiority. To extricate the new Empire from these shoals, those who have its destinies in their hands will need a great deal of prudence, moderation, and clear-sightedness, along with energy and decision in an emergency. In front of them the peace coalition has just risen up. Sooner or later will form against the war coalition. The struggle between the Papacy and the Empire will begin afresh, and who can predict the issue?

It is said that when Count Bismarck in the year 1862 was recalled from Paris to become Prime Minister of Prussia, he took leave of the then French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in these words—" *Le Libéralisme n'est qu'une niaiserie qu'il est facile de mettre à la raison; mais la Révolution est une force, et il faut savoir s'en servir.*" When we find a very philosophic Belgian patriot like M. de Laveleye pleading the cause of Prince Bismarck after such a fashion in the sentences we have just quoted—of Prince Bismarck, who notoriously offered to sacrifice the independence of Belgium to France, and who would undoubtedly abolish it to-morrow if it suited his purpose with infinitely less consideration than he gave to the sentiments and interests of the smallest German duchy which he absorbed—when we find this Belgian professor pleading Prince Bismarck's cause with such ludicrous bigotry and such base servility before

England, that is to say before the one only ally in whose honour and disinterestedness Belgium can trust—we get an inkling of the full extent to which Prince Bismarck has known how to avail himself of the best services both of Liberalism and of the Revolution. In order to bring them both to his side but one thing was necessary, and that was to persecute the Church. It was a very great risk that Prince Bismarck faced when he undertook to do that wicked and wanton thing. The richest and most populous of the Prussian provinces are Catholic; Alsace and Lorraine are Catholic; Posen is Catholic; Bavaria is Catholic, and has just elected a Catholic, or, as the Liberal Press prefer to call it, an “Ultramontane” majority to Parliament. All the instincts of a great statesman’s policy should, we might suppose, have determined him to avoid any considerable difficulty in the region of sentiment even, not to say conscience, while dealing with provinces whose allegiance must be regarded as in some degree reluctant, and whose territories lay at the frontiers where the new Empire was most exposed to war. There was no difficulty in avoiding a contest with the Church. Prince Bismarck has never been able to allege a reason, of the class which statesmen recognize and understand as motives of policy, for subverting with such animosity and thoroughness the good relations which had grown up in the course of time between the Catholic Church and the Prussian and other German Governments. There is but one adequate method of explaining his new policy. It became, after the war with France was over, or at least it seemed to him, necessary that he should have the utmost support of all the force of the Revolution throughout Europe, and of course what little help the spirit, *niais* though it be, of continental Liberalism could render to him. To declare war on the Catholic Church was the one simple sufficient method of rallying all these elements on his side. He risked his master’s Crown, the peace and integrity of the Empire, perhaps. He deliberately chose that risk. On the other hand, he gained the good-will of the Revolutionary party in France, which is already far more resigned in consequence to the loss of Alsace and Lorraine than any other class of its public men, and which would willingly sacrifice half a dozen more provinces to Prussia to-morrow, if it could thus get a majority in the Assembly with which to commence at a respectful distance an imitation of the Falk laws in the form of a few additions to the *Cultes* section of the Civil Code. He gained the revolutionary party in Austria, who may at this moment be described to their deep dishonour as more Prussian than the Prussians themselves. A writer in the *Fortnightly Review*, whose information has evidently been carefully col-

lected, and whose authority on this point at least we shall not dispute, gives the following succinct statement of the *état des esprits* at Vienna :—

Geographically viewed, Austria is more dangerous to Germany, and her alliance with another great power would seem more threatening ; but this contingency is felt and met at Berlin by the dexterity with which the German element in Austria and Hungary is played off against the unity of the Hapsburg dominions. A steady stream of professors and journalists coming from the north permeates Viennese society, fills the lecture-rooms of Prague, and occupies the most important posts in the press everywhere. The lessons they teach are two, pressed with ceaseless iteration. All that Austria can hope of good in the future must come from her eight millions of German blood ; and the loyalty of these eight millions is to depend on the subservency shown at Vienna to the dictates of Berlin. \* \* \* \* Those eight millions of German-speaking Austrians serve Prince Bismarck's purpose better where they are than if added prematurely to the Empire.

It may be so. As yet peace is, if not essential, very useful to Austria ; and the piping of the myriad professors fills the air as on an idle day the cawing of the crow is louder than the bursting of a crop of corn through the soil. Nor, we may be sure, will Austria wantonly break the peace. But it may well be in the providential scheme of history that a day of triumphant compensation is reserved for the misfortunes which her Kaiser has borne with such patient dignity ; and should that day ever come, the eight millions of German-speaking Austrians will be, where they have ever been, in the van of her army of many nations.

In Belgium, it is quite plain that Prince Bismarck's policy has also borne fruit. M. de Laveleye witnesses for the ideologues. The blood-stained pavements of Ghent witness for the mob. There are thousands of Belgians, no doubt, who hate the God of their fathers and the Church of their baptism with a hatred so possessing their most miserable souls and bodies that they would gladly see their free Constitution trodden under the Uhlan's heel forthwith and for ever, if only they could at the same time see the majority of their fellow-countrymen deprived of the simple boon of religious liberty, of the right to worship at their ancient shrines, and of being buried in Christian graves. In England, there is, thank Heaven ! no revolutionary party worth counting as a political force, but there is a sufficiency of that species of silly and semi-simious, or as it is pleased to call itself "advanced" Liberalism, which sees in the tyrannies and villanies of the Revolution all over the world the sort of measures it would enact if it could, and which regards Prince Bismarck as far and away the greatest Liberal of the age, though he has,

when it suited his purpose, treated the whole system of parliamentary government with worse than the scorn of Strafford, and with "thorough" success; and though he has done and is doing his best to abolish both civil and religious liberty (which indeed are inseparable) throughout Germany. What had he to offer to all these men—professors of black arts and dismal science—statesmen in the sulks—journalists, who daily pickle public opinion in the seven deadly sins—Red Republican clubs, whose natural instinct it would otherwise be to flay him alive, and make a big drum of his skin—the fatuous lights of Jewry, and the much bedizened hierophants of Masonry—for their distinguished consideration and benevolent neutrality at all times, their active sympathy and support on occasion? To have all the force, be it more or less, of the Revolution on his side in this age one thing alone was necessary,—to blaspheme the Church of God, to harass the ministers of Christ, to insult His vicar! Then the Prince of the powers of the air, the world and the children thereof, the enlightened public opinion of Liberalism, the volcanic energies of the Revolution, the very gates of Hell, were at once rallied to his side. Yet the bark of Peter will ride out the storm. One such compact we have witnessed in these latter days, when the Emperor Napoleon, in complicity with the secret societies, commenced the revolutionary war of Italy in 1859. We have seen to what end the policy then begun brought the French Empire. We shall hardly have to wait so long a time to see the result of a similar policy on the newer and less homogeneous German.

The state of France still remains the subject of our gravest anxieties and withal of our bravest hopes. The evidences of a widespread revival of religion abound; and the National Assembly has by two formal Acts—the sanction of the Church of the Sacred Heart at Montmartre, and the law enabling Catholic Universities to be founded—borne testimony to the faith of the nation in a way sure to bring down many blessings and graces from God. It is, nevertheless, impossible to watch for long the unwisdom and wrong-headedness of the various parties in that marvellous legislature without a sense of dizziness—without a fear that any day the fortunes of France may be again jeopardized by some sudden movement of frantic faction. It is with reluctance and grief we are obliged to confess, that, in the transactions of the last two years, the Republican party have excelled, in all the talents and qualities proper and necessary to success in public affairs, that party with which our natural sympathies are most identified. It has been, on the other hand, we cannot deny, the perverse policy of the Right, and especially the Extreme Right, which

has established the Republic as the definitive form of Government in France. Such a result was certainly not within the scope of their wishes or intentions. Consequently we can only conclude that they must have been blinded by personal and party animosity to a strange degree, when they allowed themselves to be so excited, cozened, and manipulated that the result was, as it obviously was, brought about by their means. They have so spoken and acted that the cause of the Count de Chambord, which in the year 1872 was almost triumphant, is now at such a pass that a miracle would be necessary to give it even a chance of success. It was evident to all Europe, no doubt, from the moment when the Count wrote his last, most ill-inspired, and luckless letter, in which he stipulated the adoption of the white flag as the national standard, that an immediate and unconditional restoration was impossible. But his restoration then and there became impossible, not, we believe, so much from any innate and universal feeling of Frenchmen about the symbolical value of one or the other flag. It was still more so because of an unexpressed but general conviction that in the condition in which France and her people then were, the writing of such a letter, however agreeable to the feelings of a refined and chivalrous party, was so utterly inopportune as to make it in the highest degree doubtful whether the Prince could possibly own those graces of state proper to a statesman and a sovereign which the French nation had a right to ascertain, if possible, that he possessed, before restoring him to the throne of his ancestors, in possession especially of such an unconditioned authority as was then claimed for him. A nation of a mocking spirit, and which mocked under the old monarchy just as readily as since the Empire, was neither edified nor suffused with loyalty when it found at such a crisis a question of heraldry and upholstery invested with a sort of pseudo-sacramental character. Yet the cause of the monarchy was not utterly ruined by that letter. The Government was still in the hands of the Royalist party. Its chief was the gallant and loyal soldier, whom the Count de Chambord had himself lately called the "modern Bayard." The Prime Minister, the Duc de Broglie, possessed in his rank and connections, in the courage and energy of his character, in the wide range of his studies, in that clear mastery of all the affairs of France which he at once displayed on obtaining the opportunity of power, possessed, it cannot now be denied, the precise qualities which in those days the Royalist party ought to have been most proud to have discerned in their chief. It was no secret that he was most dreaded by M. Thiers and M. Gambetta of all the public men who sat on the Right. But the dislike of the Extreme Left

for the Duc de Broglie was a limp feeling in comparison with that with which he was regarded on the Extreme Right. They would have had him sacrifice the policy, the safety, the peace of France to a point of honour—to the colour of a yard of bunting. It was, after the Count de Chambord's letter, simply impossible then and there to restore the monarchy. There was no majority to vote for its restoration in the Assembly. There was no movement among the masses of the population clamouring for its return. There was not a brigade in the army would strike a *coup d'état* for the whiteflag. Indeed, Marshal MacMahon said the Chassepots would go off of their own accord in quite another sense if it were unfurled before them. The course of common sense under these circumstances was to give the country the best institutions of government possible; cordially and loyally to sustain the Septennial Marshalate; so to postpone the definitive establishment of the republic, and, as the late Duc de Broglie said, "give time" to revive the principle and tradition of monarchical government in the common sense and goodwill of the nation. On the contrary, the Extreme Right and the organs of their peculiar predilection assailed all the statesmen capable of conducting the government of the country on their own side of the House, but more especially the Duc de Broglie, with an untiring and unscrupulous animosity. The hatred with which M. Gambetta, M. Thiers, and M. Dufaure were regarded was a weak sentiment in comparison. When a minister's deadliest enemies are among his supposed majority, ruin is not far off—not the ruin of the minister, who in this case has lost not honour nor real power, but the ruin of a party, of a policy, of a crown. The Duc de Broglie's ministry fell, and with his ministry fell the last hope of the French monarchy in the existing state of France. The Republic has now been regularly and lawfully established. It owes its acceptance by the Assembly and the country at large to the practice by the Republican party of the very qualities in which the Royalist party showed itself deficient—discipline, obedience to the authority of its leaders, readiness to take advantage of opportunity, skill in profiting by the dissensions of its opponents. But even still the Republican party, had they been all statesmen and sages, could not have converted the rickety institution which resulted from the Pact of Bordeaux into that organized framework of policy and administration now being consolidated. History will testify that the last French Republic was no chance product of a rush of the Paris mob, garotting the executive and paralyzing military discipline, but was the net result of, and was the deliberate verdict of the French people upon, the unreasonableness and the uncharitableness of the Legitimist party.

It is with great reluctance and regret that we speak in such terms of men who are, whatever be their errors, the flower of the ancient Catholic gentry of France. But this is a very serious, even a very awful age, in which we live. For the present moment there is a lull and a breathing space. But we have no reason to assume that it will last for long; or that at its end France may not have terrible trials to undergo, perhaps more grievous calamities to endure than she has yet sustained. Meantime symbols, ceremonies, points of honour, however interesting and curious to chivalrous hearts, seem to mock the stern gravity of the times. In France religion needs to be protected, order to be maintained, property to be secured, peace to be preserved. There is a new Constitution to be established, and much will depend on the character of the Government by which that Constitution is launched. We do not believe it admits of a doubt that the Government of Marshal MacMahon is the best Government possible in France under existing circumstances, and is therefore entitled to the loyal and steadfast support of all good Frenchmen and all good Catholics. It is the part of honourable men, if they seriously think otherwise, to have the courage of their convictions—to cross the floor of the House, and sit in opposition with M. Thiers and M. Gambetta. But it is not the part of wise or of good politicians, while their country is in the gravest difficulties, to form what we in England call a “Cave” in the midst of their party, to have a good understanding with the enemies of Government, to hamper its action, and on critical occasions to leave it in the lurch. The party which pursues such a policy is, as the old proverb says, “good for neither king nor country.” France is fast recovering from the mere financial embarrassments of the war. A new army has sprung from her soil, an army, according to every testimony, well-disciplined, well-principled, and well-conducted. No armed Commune is, in these days, likely to challenge its Chassepots. But in order that France may again assume and retain the great place to which she is entitled in the councils of Europe, more is needed than the assured conviction that she is free from the danger of civil war in the streets of Paris. Other states, especially those states which are her natural allies, have a right to expect that her Government be not liable to be upset by every whirlwind of temper in the Assembly; have a right to be well-assured that her institutions rest on the solid support of men of common sense and of goodwill. If, as we hope and trust, the coming dissolution results in the election of a strong and sensible legislature, France will, long before the Septennate comes to its close, have revindicated her rightful rank as the first nation of Christendom.

## CATHOLIC LIBERALISM.

Translated from an article by F. RAMIÈRE, S.J., in the *Etudes*  
of July, 1875.

**A**MONG the myriad forms which are assumed by that Proteus, Liberalism, there is one under which it contrives to approach to truth so closely that it is frequently confounded with truth. We allude to Catholic Liberalism, whose seductive exterior renders it especially dangerous.

Let us consider the gravity of this danger, and justify the zeal with which we believe ourselves to be called upon to combat Catholic Liberalism. Let us suppose that at the moment of the great religious reaction which marked the early years of the Restoration of the French Monarchy in the person of Louis XVIII., the heads of the Anti-Christian sect had assembled for the purpose of concerting means for repairing their defeat; and that the cleverest and wickedest of their number had addressed the others in these words:—"We have deceived ourselves. The open war which we have been waging against the Church has purified instead of destroying her. She is re-erecting her altars, mustering her forces, re-establishing her ancient institutions, and recovering her prestige in the mind of the people. We must change our tactics, and, in order to get the better of our enemies, look for auxiliaries in their own ranks. Let us seek out an error sufficiently specious to delude even the most fervent Christians, and sufficiently contrary to tradition to bring them into inevitable conflict with the authority which is the depository of that tradition—a system whose apparent object shall be to restore the popularity of Catholicism, and whose real effect will be to divide the fasces of its unity; a system which, when priests and laymen full of zeal for the conversion of externs shall embrace it, will push its most ardent champions into schism, and leave in the hearts of others a bitter leaven of distrust and discontent; in short, a doctrine which, while favouring all our principles, shall leave us no further trouble than the deducing of its inevitable consequences in theory and in practice."

If such a programme had been proposed in the councils of the enemies of the Church, would it not have been hailed with enthusiasm as the most powerful engine of warfare ever directed against the holy city for its overthrow?

Liberal Catholicism is nothing else than the realization of this programme.

The calculation which we have reduced to a formula has not been made by any man, but it has assuredly been conceived by the immortal enemy of Jesus Christ, the father of lies, the infernal inventor of every heresy.

As for Liberal Catholics, we can only regard them as unfortunate victims of delusion. Not only do we entertain no doubt of the original

rectitude of their intentions, but in that very rectitude we find the chief motive which leads us to detest their error. Yes, it is because it estranges from us our bravest and most devoted defenders, because it deludes the brightest intellects and the most generous hearts, because its venom penetrates into the veins of Christian society,—therefore it is that, with Pius IX., we regard this error as the most deadly of pestilences : *Pestem perniciosissimam*. By fighting against Catholic Liberalism to the death, far from failing in love and respect for Liberal Catholics, we offer them the most solid and effectual proof of our devotion. In addition, we are but complying with the request of several of their number, in thus undertaking the exhaustive treatment of the question which divides us. Our former articles were received, on the one hand with almost exaggerated goodwill ; while, on the other, they were subjected to criticism none the less useful that it was not pleasant ; and on both a desire was expressed for the elucidation of a too much prolonged dispute. It will not be our fault if the present article does not give satisfaction to both classes of readers.

#### I.—AN EXPOSITION AND HISTORY OF THE QUESTION.

The preliminary statements of our first article (January, 1874) ought to have convinced our readers that Liberalism opposes to Catholic doctrine a very old error under a new name. Ever since its entrance into the world, Christianity, which is the rendering of humanity divine through the God-Man, has had to measure itself against an enemy which it has conquered without being able to destroy—paganism, or the adoration which humanity renders to itself, with more or less deliberate consciousness of its crime. That idolatry, which had at length embodied itself in the Roman emperors, far from laying down its arms when Constantine upset its throne immediately set about the work of reprisals. Since then, not an age has elapsed in which it has not endeavoured with more or less success to gain the victory over Christian faith and morals by means of heresies and sensualism. But it is especially in the political order that reviving paganism, has striven to regain power which would enable it to extend its dominion into every other sphere. It has succeeded only too well. Byzantium first and Germany afterwards have yielded to its prowess ; but it was France who, in the person of the unworthy grandson of St. Louis, Philippe le Bel, gave revived paganism its first durable triumph, and commenced the great apostasy of Christian peoples. The movement has taken four centuries to develop itself, and it ended at the termination of the last century by a solemn proclamation of the deposition of Jesus Christ and of the emancipation of modern society. Since then triumphant paganism has changed its form ; from being monarchical, it has become demagogic ; Liberalism has taken the place of Caesarism. At bottom it is the same error,—the substitution of human pride for divine authority. So long as the childhood of peoples

lasted, they consented to bend their necks to the yoke of a monarch, and to adore humanity in his person ; but, when they reached adult age, they would no longer submit to this yoke, and every man pretended to a right to adore himself. This is the latest development of Anti-Christianity.

Such is the genesis of Liberalism. But how has this error, which is the opposite of Christian doctrine, contrived to combine with that doctrine so as to form Catholic Liberalism ? Alas ! just as in ancient days the sons of God wedded the daughters of men, by whose beauty they had been tempted, this combination is the result of the fascination which the false independence of error exercises even upon those who dare not entirely shake off the yoke of truth. Man rarely flings himself unreservedly into either good or evil ; in his reason and in his will there are intermediate steps between full submission and utter revolt. Thus all the great heresies have their diminutives : by the side of Arianism we have semi-Arianism ; by the side of Eutychianism, Monothelism ; by the side of Lutheranism, Jansenism. Already the resurrection of monarchical Cæsarism had given us Gallicanism, which is Catholic Cæsarism. Catholic Liberalism, on its side, is only the mitigated form of anti-Christian Liberalism.

This doctrine, which at first found enunciation only by some isolated writers, acquired a public existence in France in 1830. At this date the school of Catholic Liberalism was born : its father was the Abbé de La Mennais, and its cradle was the journal called *L'Avenir*. For fifteen years all the sections of the revolutionary party, united under the standard of Liberalism, endeavoured to render religion odious by identifying its cause with that of monarchical absolutism. This perfidious tactic had been unconsciously helped by certain royalists ; whose famous formula, "The throne and the altar," appeared to subordinate the altar to the throne, and exposed the former to succumb to the catastrophe which ended in the destruction of the latter. The Church could not accept any such solidarity ; and it was her duty to render her eternal interests completely independent of every political régime. If the school of the *Avenir* had not proposed to itself any other object, it would have deserved well of religion. Unhappily, with impetuosity which was less excusable in the head of that school than in his young disciples, it pushed things to extremes, and adopted for its programme the mutual independence of religious and civil society. Without consulting the Church, the new apologists proposed to the Liberal party a treaty of peace in the name of the Church, in virtue of which she should recognize and sanction the social order which had been established in opposition to her, on condition that she should be left complete liberty in the individual order.

We know what came of this. The Church held that she could not accept the bargain which these unauthorized negotiators had concluded in her name, and refused to purchase the toleration which was offered to her at the price of her traditional teaching. The doctrines of the *Avenir* were condemned ;

and, with the exception of their leader, who speedily justified that condemnation by his revolt, all the defenders of the proscribed system proved their good faith by the frankness and generosity of their submission. Happy would it have been if, at a later day, they had not allowed themselves to be seduced by the illusions which they appeared to have completely abjured ! Little by little, all that had been so clearly understood, was forgotten. Notwithstanding the perfect distinctness of its language, they persuaded themselves that the Encyclical "*Mirari vos*" condemned only the exaggeration of Liberal doctrine ; and they believed themselves authorized to remain Catholic, while they reproduced the theories of the *Avenir* under modified forms.

On one side, however, the Liberal Catholic school,—though on every other faithful to its origin,—has deviated from it remarkably : it was at first the sworn enemy of Gallicanism ; it has now become its close ally.

Under the Restoration the Gallicans were firmly attached to the monarchy, whose rights they exaggerated ; and the *Avenir*, by the law of reaction, flung itself into an exaggerated ultramontaniam, which did not take sufficient count of the rights of either the Episcopate or of the civil Power. Both parties were far from suspecting that in reality they were supporting themselves upon one and the same principle, that is to say, upon the negation of the rights of the Church with regard to civil society. This affinity between the two rival schools did not reveal itself, until the epoch of the Council arrived, and there was reason to believe that that august assembly was about to define the social sovereignty of Jesus Christ in His Church. Then a curious "right-about-face" movement took place. The Liberals, who had formerly been remarkable for the ardour of their ultramontaniam, suddenly revealed themselves as Gallicans ; this old error, which had been regarded as dead, acquired an unsuspected strength of resistance by its union with the great modern heresy. It was on the field of Gallicanism that the great doctrinal battle of 1869 was fought, but Liberalism bore almost all the brunt of it.

Everything leads us to believe that, if the Council had finished its work, the second of these errors would have been included in the anathema with which the first was struck ; but, arrested in its labours by the fresh eruption of the revolutionary volcano, it could do no more than condemn Liberalism indirectly, by the sanction which it gave to all the doctrinal Acts of the Holy See.

Hence arise the difficulties of the actual situation. Catholics imbued with Liberal principles are almost in the same position as that in which the Gallicans stood previously to the definition of July 18th, 1870. They know well that they have with them neither the Holy See nor the immense majority of the Catholic Episcopate. But they support themselves upon the credit of certain illustrious leaders, with whom they believe they cannot go astray. If they have numbers against them, they imagine that they have quality for them ; to the weight of authority they oppose the light of their own reason,

If we reproach them with dividing the Church, they reproach us with ruining it, and reducing it to utter powerlessness ever again to regain the moral rule over society,

Let us, nevertheless, gladly acknowledge that the hour draws near when this fatal illusion shall be dispersed. We already see a division taking place among the ranks of the Catholic Liberals analogous to that which parted the semi-Arians and the semi-Pelagians in the fifth century. There were among them two classes of minds, united by a common delusion, but animated by very different dispositions; the first, by far the greater number, were devoted above all to truth, and only adhered to error because they identified it with truth: the second, on the contrary, obstinately attached themselves to error, and would have nothing to do with truth, except in so far as it was allied with error. The *Old Catholic* schism has rid us of these false brethren, who concealed a purely schismatic spirit under the mask of Catholicism. By a fortunate re-action, those among Liberal Catholics, who were more Catholic than Liberal, have come to understand more and more clearly day by day the necessity of abjuring their Liberalism, and of becoming purely and simply *Roman Catholics*.

What have we to do in order to accelerate this desirable result? The question is not one of refuting the principles of Catholic Liberalism, which has no principles. It is plain to our mind that the distinction between the Liberal Catholic and the pure Catholic or pure Liberal consists in this,—that the former does not dare to profess the Catholic doctrine opposed to Liberalism, or the Liberal doctrine opposed to Catholicism. His system is less a doctrinal error, than a practical delusion, which beguiles the clearest intellects and the most generous hearts, by equivocal affirmations and deceitful promises. We shall deprive it of its power of seduction, if we prove that its most specious maxims are but sophisms, and that its brightest promises can only result, and in fact have only resulted, in a disastrous failure. By this double demonstration we shall terminate our inquiry into the bankruptcy of Liberalism.

The latter portion of our task will impose upon us the painful necessity of calling men, who have excited our utmost gratitude by their eminent services to the Church, as witnesses to and organs of the Liberal delusion. But, thanks to a providential concurrence of circumstances, certain of these illustrious adversaries have spared us the pain of strife with them, by refuting their own errors. In the life of Père Lacordaire, M. Foisset has given a deeply instructive history of the origin of the Liberal Catholic school. On reading it we perceive that this school has been subject to the common law which constrains error to turn upon itself. At the end of forty years we find it has returned to its point of departure. The sophistries upon which it rests in our time are no other than those which La Mennais employed in 1833, and which Lacordaire refuted with vigorous logic in a series of admirable letters addressed to the Count de Montalembert.

Nothing shows more clearly the seductive power inherent in this doctrine,

than its persistence in Catholic society so long after its earliest defenders appeared to have entirely relinquished it. And yet how many new lights have since been added to that which chased away their errors!

To this obstinacy let us never weary of opposing enlightenment; and let us so speak, that, if men will still persist in repelling true doctrine, it will at least be impossible for them to travesty it.

## II. THE AMBIGUITIES OF CATHOLIC LIBERALISM.

1. I find a leading equivocation, and that not the least perfidious, in the character attributed by Liberalism to the strife which it has stirred up in the bosom of the Church, and in its definition of the two camps.

This equivocation is frequently expressed in the following formula: Liberalism is a free opinion from the moment that it has not been formally condemned by the Church. In fact, in the eyes of Liberal Catholics, the thunders and lightnings of the anathema are the only means by which the Church can enlighten her children. So long as she does not command them, on pain of damnation, to believe a truth or to reject an error, her words have no value in their eyes; and as, up to the present time, no sentence of this kind has proscribed liberalism, they maintain that the controversy between them and their adversaries is an agitation outside the traditional teaching of the Church, and in the open field of free opinion. They hold themselves perfectly authorized to sustain their error, and have only against them, as they believe, a coterie of extravagant and intolerant men, who, understanding nothing of the exigencies of modern society and the true interests of the Church, compromise the cause which they serve by the blind obstinacy with which they pursue unrealizable Utopias. "I must acknowledge it," said M. de Montalembert, at the Congress of Malines, "the enthusiastic devotion to religious liberty which animates me is not general among Catholics. They desire it for themselves, but there is no great merit in that. Generally speaking, every man desires every kind of liberty for himself. But religious liberty in itself, liberty of conscience for others, freedom for the worship which one denies and rejects,—this is a thing which disquiets and frightens many among us. If we examine the motives of this dread, we can trace them back to three principal causes, and I really do not know which is the most chimerical and the least well-founded." He adds, a few pages later, "I have neither the right nor the wish to condemn those who think otherwise. I do not dispute their orthodoxy, God forbid! I will voluntarily admit them to be my superiors in virtue and in knowledge. Only, so long as I shall be mixed up with the affairs of this world, I shall be careful to keep clear of them, as of people with whom one can do nothing at the present day." (Laughter.)

The excellent Catholics who laughed at this jest, evidently did not know that

at the head of those who "thought otherwise" than M. de Montalembert was Pope Pius IX., who had already set forth his thoughts very plainly in several Briefs and Allocutions, before he formulated them in the Encyclical "*Quantâ curâ.*" They did not remember that Pius IX., in repelling Liberal doctrine, had merely trodden in the footsteps of Gregory XVI., Pius VI., and all the preceding popes. However strange such oblivion may seem among Catholics, it is perfectly intelligible in an audience carried away by the charm of an eloquent speech. But how came M. de Montalembert to write those phrases, and send them to be printed? Did he forget the solemn acts of the Holy See, which had condemned his theory of liberty for error? Did he not remember that, in order to escape from that condemnation, his former master La Mennais applied the accusation of non-comprehension of the needs of modern society, which is a favourite weapon of Liberalism, to the Pope himself? "The Pope," said he, "is a good religious who knows nothing at all about the affairs of the world, and has no idea of the state of the Church." Such language in the mouth of a priest who has not broken away from the Catholic unity is indeed culpable, but it does not lack a certain frankness. In defence of Liberalism the chief of its adversaries must be attacked. But can there be good faith in pursuing with invective those whose crime consists in following the guidance of the Pope, while lavishing on the Pope himself testimonies of the most profound respect? Certainly, if ever man was loyal by nature and in his resolves, it was the chivalrous "Son of the Crusaders"; and the sympathy with which his noble character inspires us does but render more odious the error, which obliged him to hide the secret gist of his thought until within a short time of his death, when he revealed it in words which must ever be regretted. And, on this point, all liberal Catholics are subjected to the same necessity, and conceal the truth under the same reserves. They vary in the designation of their adversaries: the enemies of some are the Jesuits; those of others are certain journalists; others again are content with accusations against "a certain school." These same subterfuges were employed at the epoch of the Council to render the defenders of the Pontifical infallibility odious and contemptible. This proceeding was not more loyal in the first of these two questions than in the second; it is even more unjustifiable historically, because Pontifical infallibility, although defended as a truth of Faith by the body of Catholic doctors of all ages, had been contended against in France during a certain period, whilst Liberalism has never had either a school or a doctor of any authority in its favour. Gallicanism pretended to free the temporal power of kings from the direct or indirect authority of the Papacy; but it never maintained freedom to propagate error, and it never dreamed of separating civil from religious society.

The adversaries of the Liberals are, then, not a party, not a school, but the whole of Catholic tradition. The Liberal doctrine is a thing of yesterday; it has never been the subject of other than the most unequivocal reprobation on

the part of the Church. It is true that, up to the present time, that reprobation has not taken the form of anathema; but by what right can the doctrinal power of the Church be limited to the fulfilment of anathemas? When Jesus Christ said to His Apostles: "Go, teach all nations; he who believeth in your word shall be saved, and he who believeth not shall be lost"—He did not set the limit to the power of His Apostles within which the Liberal Catholics would fain confine it. Whence do they derive the faculty for restricting the sovereign and immutable word of God which they arrogate to themselves? Such a pretension is the more untenable on their part, inasmuch as, if the Church would listen to them, she should never pronounce an anathema. Did they not, at the time of the Council, denounce this too imperious manner of imposing belief, as contrary to the tolerant usage of our times? Thus, on the one hand, they desire that the Church should never pronounce an anathema, and on the other they refuse to obey her, except when constrained by anathemas to do so. What course then remains for the Church to adopt, so as to content them, except to strip herself of her doctrinal power? Evidently all those among them who are really Catholics can no longer preserve this delusion, for they have heard the Pope condemn it in the Syllabus, with the assent of the whole Catholic Episcopate. After the Church has clearly manifested her mind in anything appertaining to the great interests under her charge, it is not permitted to any Catholic to attribute to himself the right to disobey her. Now, on the subject of Liberalism, the Church has manifested her mind a hundred times, and she has never varied from it. Only ignorance and want of reflection excuse those who class Liberalism among free opinions.

2. What is to be said of those who, not content with demanding toleration for their system, would pretend to impose it upon us as a tradition if not a dogma of the Church? The delusion of Catholic liberals has extended even to that point; and to support this strange pretension they have employed a second equivocation, which would appear incredible, if we did not see it maintained by the most illustrious masters of this school and formulated in the best authorized programmes. Let us hear M. de Montalembert. "This liberty of conscience has not an anti-Christian origin; it has, on the contrary, the same origin as Christianity and the Church. It was created and born on the day when the first of the Popes, S. Peter, replied to the first of the persecutors, *Non possumus*. We cannot leave unsaid that which we have heard and seen. Ought we not to obey God rather than men?"

It requires no great perspicacity to perceive that in this instance the eloquent advocate confounds two things which resemble each other as much as day resembles night: Christian liberty and liberal liberty, the freedom of truth and the freedom of error. Who doubts that the Church has always insisted on her right to preach her doctrines? Can we suppose that a single Catholic exists who is so stupid as to attribute to liberty of conscience thus understood "an anti-Christian origin?" Is it not precisely because we

wish to maintain inviolable that liberty of the truth, that we refuse to admit in principle the right of error to a liberty which has never failed to become oppressive? M. de Montalembert's argument proves only one thing; that having undertaken the defence of a bad cause, he was constrained to have recourse to the most unfortunate of expedients: to travesty at once his own doctrine, and the meaning of his adversaries. Unhappily, the travesty does not stop there. It extends to the holy Scriptures. The *Non possumus* of S. Peter is interpreted in a sense which the Apostle would have repudiated as a sort of apostasy.

We should like to know what reply he would have made to any one who had asked him whether, in uttering these words, he intended to claim equal liberty for every error and for the doctrine of Jesus Christ; whether he meant to declare himself satisfied if the Sanhedrim would place the Son of God in the same rank with Jupiter and Adonis. Saint Peter a Liberal! Why, it was he, on the contrary, who pronounced the first solemn condemnation of Liberalism, by declaring to societies as well as to individuals that they could find salvation only in submission to the one Saviour, Jesus Christ.—*Nec enim aliud nomen est sub celo datum hominibus in quo oporteat nos salvos fieri?* If the equality of rights between error and truth had been in the mind of the Apostles, they would not have lacked opportunities for proclaiming that doctrine. Rome, which so freely opened its temples to all the divinities of the conquered peoples, would not have refused a place to Jesus Christ if He would have consented to be admitted on the same footing as the gods of Persia and Egypt. That which brought such cruel persecution upon the Apostles and their successors was the immovable firmness with which they confessed Jesus Christ, not only as the true but as the "one Lord." It is a pity that Liberalism was not invented earlier; it would have spared Christianity much persecution and Paganism many crimes. We cannot hinder Liberal Catholics from attributing to themselves a wisdom beyond that of the Apostles; but when they attribute to the Apostles their own manner of interpreting the rights of truth and liberty of conscience, they are contradicted by every line of the Gospel, and all the facts of history. The Christian doctors quoted by M. de Montalembert are no more favourable to him than the Apostles. Tertullian does indeed blame the employment of constraint in leading souls to the truth, but we must not conclude from thence that he attributes to truth and to error equal rights, which is the only point in dispute between us and the Liberals, as we shall soon see. Again, the advocate of Liberalism quotes S. Augustine, who carried his aversion to that doctrine to the point of rebuking the maxim proclaimed by Tertullian. After having blamed the use of constraint, he acknowledged that it had the happiest effect in the case of the Donatists, and he expressly retracted his former sentiment. That the Liberals should refuse to follow S. Augustine so far we understand, but at least let them cease to boast of him as a patron of their doctrine.

3. Before we go further it is necessary to explain an important conse-

quence which is deducible from the prejudicial point we have just established. We have defined the character of the strife, let us now define the relative position of the combatants. If the doctrine opposed to Liberalism be the traditional doctrine of the Church, no one has a right to charge the defenders of that doctrine with responsibility for the grievous results of this most lamentable controversy. It is also an equivocation, but this time aggravated by an injustice, to accuse them of disturbing the peace because they are fighting in defence of the traditions of the Church; and this injustice is increased when all sorts of motives, unworthy alike of men of honour and of Christians, are imputed to them. Supposing the question were regarded merely in its practical light, how can a Catholic take it ill that other Catholics should regulate their thoughts and their conduct by the decision of those to whom Jesus Christ has promised His assistance? How can he dare to impute to them as a crime that they brave public opinion? If they did so out of pure bravado, one might indeed call theirs insensate acts, but which nevertheless did not lack courage; for public opinion is the idol of modern societies, and the idolatry of which it is the object is more seductive than ever was the worship of Diana of the Ephesians or of Astarte in Phœnicia. M. de Montalembert may say what he pleases; this is the true rising sun before which the men of our time, and especially the publicists, are more ready to prostrate themselves, than before the inferior powers. It is incomparably easier to break a lance with a Cæsar than to disdain that great goddess before whom the Cæsars themselves bent low. If, then, the adversaries of Liberalism were acting out of pure caprice, we ought not to refuse to regard them with the esteem which all men who resist a yoke to which the proudest have submitted are entitled. But if, in accomplishing this perilous task, they believe themselves to be fulfilling a sacred duty; if, beholding the unjust discredit which has been successfully cast upon the traditions and the great deeds of the Church their mother, they consequently face this unpopularity; if, instead of pleading "extenuating circumstances" for her, as some of her children have done, they defend her rights, and glorify her past, how can any Catholic refuse them his esteem and his gratitude, even though he does not share their convictions? Above all, how can he dare to accuse them of *outraging reason, justice, and honour!*

We shall say no more in refutation of a production so lamentable that its editors themselves have had the merit of rebuking it, but which they have unfortunately not been able to withhold from the public. The writers in the *Civiltà Cattolica* need no defence. The praise and encouragement which they have received from the Vicar of Jesus Christ suffice to avenge them for the accusations and reproaches of any adversary, were he gifted with the eloquence of a Pascal. It is better to say no more of these delusions, which the light of death has dispersed. But we are bound to wish that they may be also driven away from the living. In the interest of our dignity, as well as in that of truth and justice, it is to be desired that once for all every per-

sonal question should be put aside in a controversy which is completely independent. In every war both sides may be wrong, but the errors of either do not make the other right. Even in defending the holiest cause one may give a needless blow, or fail in correct aim. I do not think any soldier has ever found in that fact an excuse for forsaking his flag, or for outraging such of his comrades as have given more brilliant proofs than he of devotion and of courage in their common cause. At any rate, the faults of the combatants have nothing to do with the justice of the cause, and there is no justification for fighting against Catholic tradition in saying it is ill defended. When two powers go to war, each accuses the other of having broken the peace. Prussia has recently taught us what advantage may be got out of such an accusation, and how the foe whom one wants to push into strife may be tricked into assuming the odium of aggression. So in struggles between Catholics, each party has tried to throw the responsibility of the hostilities upon the other. But in this case the stratagem deceives none but those who choose to be deceived. Jesus Christ has unmasked it beforehand by establishing a centre of unity in His Church. From it we can always learn with absolute certainty who they are who disturb union, and who they are who fight for its maintenance. Union is adhesion to unity; division is, on the contrary, opposition to unity. Do not then accuse the champions of unity of disturbing union; for it is its cause which they defend, even when they use only persuasion as a means for the spread of their doctrines. That man must, indeed, have lost the Catholic sense who should prefer him who undermines the foundations of unity, to him who, fighting in the open day for the defence of the sacred citadel, does not always direct his batteries with absolute precision.

4. Whatever may be the influence over their minds which the Liberal delusion has gained, Liberal Catholics feel how difficult their position is from the point of view of tradition, and how crushing is the weight of authorities contrary to their doctrine. In order to escape it, they have recourse to another equivocation. The matter in dispute is not a dogmatic question, they say, in respect of which authority has the right of sovereign decision. M. de Montalembert reiterates this declaration several times in his speech at the Malines congress. "I am not dealing with theory, and above all not with theology, here," he said; "I am not replying by dogmatic arguments to the dogmatizers who condemn me, and whom I reject. I invoke facts, and I draw from them the purely practical teaching which I propose to you."

Hereafter we shall examine into the question whether the Liberals would have a right to repudiate the direction of the Church, even supposing the truth of these allegations had been established. We shall concern ourselves at present only with the misunderstanding in which this discussion has been intentionally enveloped. He whom we are now dealing with is of the number of those which Liberalism keeps most carefully alive in the mind of its adepts. But, however desirous he may be to lull their conscience to sleep by this delusion, he cannot open his mouth without contradicting himself

and rushing into that domain of theory which he seemed to interdict. In the same discourse, in which the most sincere and eloquent of the defenders of Liberalism made the protestations which we have just quoted, —twenty lines after those in which he mocks at the *proud and laughable pretension* of those who dream of the reign of the absolute,—we find him making the following declaration :—"This being said, I feel more at my ease in declaring that of all the liberties of which I have hitherto undertaken the defence, liberty of conscience is, in my eyes, the most sacred, the most precious, the most legitimate, the most necessary. . . . Yes, we must love and serve all liberties ; but among them all, religious liberty merits the tenderest respect, exacts the most absolute devotion ; it is she which hovers over the highest, purest, and vastest regions. She alone illumines two lives and two worlds, the life of the soul like that of the body, and heaven like earth."

"To believe in the truth," he adds, a little later, "to the point of consecrating to it one's honour, one's repose, and one's life, and, nevertheless, to respect liberty of soul in him who ignores or abandons the truth ;—*that it is which has hitherto appeared difficult*, and which now seems to be nothing but a *simple and natural act of justice, or at least of Christian charity*."

In all good faith, is this simple practice ? Is this the language of a soldier who is examining his ground, and not rather that of a teacher who is expounding a theory ? He who, a few minutes ago, declared that he desired to remain in the relative, has he not, at a bound, sprung into the sphere of the absolute ? Have justice and Christian charity changed their nature during the course of years ?

Is it not to reverse theology, and to set one's own judgment above the dogmatic infallibility of the Church, to canonize as the most precious, sacred, legitimate, and necessary of its rights, that which she has declared to be iniquitous and pernicious ? If the Holy Spirit, whose assistance is always with the Church, is *par excellence* the Spirit of Charity, the pretension to excel that Spirit in the practice of this virtue is the most audacious of all the encroachments of which human pride can be guilty in the domain of theology.

Thus it is that, in spite of their firm resolution and their sincere piety, the most skilful defenders of Catholic Liberalism are constrained to heterodox affirmations, so soon as they need to prove their system in the right. It could not be otherwise. Take all the other questions of politics and morals, that great question of the relations of Church and State belongs to the realm of dogmatic principles, concerning which no one can remain in an indifferent attitude. To wish to treat this question from a purely practical point of view, without in any way touching those principles, whether to affirm or to deny them, is as chimerical an attempt as that of the architect would be who should endeavour to construct an edifice without the smallest reference to the laws of equilibrium.

Here we touch with our finger the radical delusion of Liberal Catholics,

and the essential absurdity of their system. Here is their exact situation : as Catholics, they profess the dogmas taught by the Church in the religious order ; but, as Liberals, they reject the necessary consequences of those dogmas in the social order. As Liberals, they admit the antichristian constitution of modern society ; but, as Catholics, they reject the antichristian principles on which that constitution is founded. If the chief function of reason consists in deducing the consequences of principles, and in tracing consequences to principles, it must be acknowledged that no system was ever more irrational than Catholic Liberalism.

But logic has its exigencies from which one cannot entirely free oneself, as Liberal Catholics have just proved to us. At the very moment when they proclaim that they do not wish to deal with theory, they are doing so, in spite of themselves ; and the theory upon which they build up all their sophisms is in itself the most glaring of equivocations.

5. Let us beg them 'to make known to us this *simple duty of justice and charity* which the Church had ignored up to the day on which Liberalism discovered it. "It is," they reply, "the duty of according to others that liberty which we claim for ourselves." "Yes, Catholics, understand it well," cries M. de Montalembert, borrowing the words of Père Lacordaire, "if you desire liberty for yourselves, you must desire it for all men and under every sky. If you demand it for yourselves only, it will never be granted to you ; give it, where you are masters, that it may be given to you, where you are slaves." All the philosophy of Catholic Liberalism is contained in these lines ; so that we find the same thought reproduced under a thousand forms in all the manifestoes and publications of this school.

Now, there is really nothing but an equivocation in this pretended system of equity. It would certainly be unjust to demand for *ourselves* liberty which we should refuse to our fellows. But is it for ourselves that we demand anything whatever ? Is it not solely for Jesus Christ, the Son of God and the only Saviour of men, that we demand the submission which is due to Him, and without which it is impossible to accomplish His mission of salvation towards societies ? Unbelievers may be mistaken concerning our thought, but Liberal Catholics cannot be so mistaken. They know perfectly well that if we demand a special protection for the Catholic truth, it is because God has made it the indispensable foundation of social order. But then what becomes of the pretended principle of justice ? Let us substitute exact for cynical expressions in the phrases which we have just quoted, and that which appears to be equity will come out in its true light as iniquity. Here is the translation of these sentences :—

"The Catholic Church desires liberty for herself, and in that she has no great merit. In general, every man desires every kind of liberty for himself. But religious liberty in itself, liberty for creeds which she denies and repels, that is what the Church of Jesus Christ ought henceforth to accept and to demand, as the most sacred, legitimate, and necessary of all liberties. Catholics, understand this ; if you desire liberty for Jesus Christ, and for

the doctrine which He has revealed to men as the only way of salvation, you must desire the same liberty for all errors, and for every seduction. Give it to all the enemies of this Divine Saviour in those places where He is still Master, in order that it may be given to His servants in those places where they are slaves." Thus expressed, the Liberal theory brings to the light of day the fundamental error which is in it, and which its defenders endeavour to hide under ambiguous forms; that error is the parity of rights between truth and falsehood, between Jesus Christ and Belial. Admit that the doctrine which Jesus Christ committed to the keeping of His Church is an opinion, like those which are described in the religious, political, and philosophical world, and the conclusions of the Liberals become undeniable law. But if you suppose that this doctrine of Jesus Christ bears upon it incontestable marks of truth, and that it is as obligatory for the salvation of men and of societies as the laws of common justice and of individual morality, how can you demand, in the name of equity, the same protection as that due to the men who are charged with the propagation and the defence of that doctrine by God Himself for those who attack it with every disloyal weapon? Would you venture to apply your theory to any other social interest, to the public health, for example? Would you say that one cannot claim liberty to sell wholesome aliments, and refuse to poisoners freedom to drive their accursed trade? If you are a Catholic, you are bound to believe that the anti-Christian propaganda does more harm to the soul than poisons can do to the body. How then can you maintain in principle that the liberty of this propaganda is a simple duty of charity and justice?

6. Again, there is, in this very word "liberty" an equivocation against which we ought to protest untiringly. When Liberals argue against the Catholic doctrine, they always assume that the question at issue between themselves and their adversaries is one of *constraint*, whereas it is in reality a question of *defence*. Why does the Church repel, in principle, the liberty of the press, and freedom of conscience, as understood in the Liberal sense? Because they are the instruments of oppression; yes, instruments of the most iniquitous and most fatal of all oppressions, the oppression of feeble souls under the doubly ignominious yoke of falsehood and of immorality. We know how, before the abolition of the slave trade, the traffickers in human flesh procured the objects of their infamous trade. They offered to the degraded African races those intoxicating drinks which they eagerly covet, and in exchange the poor wretches gave them their fellow-men, and even their own children. The freedom of the press brings with it a more inhuman traffic, since, instead of dealing in bodies, it drugs souls, and makes them slaves of falsehood. Lacordaire understood this when the liberty of the press, condemned by the encyclical *Mirari vos*, was supported by the *Avenir*, and he strove to make Montalembert, who was always in favour of this false freedom, understand it too. "Are you well persuaded," he wrote to him, "that liberty of the press is not the oppression of honest intellects by perverse intellects, and that God, in bending all minds

under the authority of the Church, has not done more for the real liberty of humanity than all the writings of Luther, Calvin, Hobbes, and Voltaire ? Is it quite clear to you that the freedom of the press will not be the ruin of European liberty and of literature ?”

If he to whom those lines were addressed had had them more constantly before his mind's eye, he would have spared himself the injustice of which he was guilty in representing the traditional doctrine of the Church as inimical to liberty. The only liberty reproved by that doctrine is the liberty of tyranny. It does not demand that the civil power shall employ force to impose the faith on unbelievers. That which it does demand is, that in a society which has the happiness of possessing the unity of faith, falsehood should not be permitted to overthrow that society, and to wrest their faith from feeble souls by the seduction of its sophisms. It does not give the civil power a right to define the truth, or to meddle in questions of doctrine ; but since the mission of that power is to defend social rights, since in societies constituted on Christian principles, the Catholic doctrine possesses a social existence, the civil power ought to defend it as the common property of all the members of society. This obligation is so rational that Liberalism is constrained to acknowledge it at least in words. “That which we ought to demand from the State,” says M. de Montalembert, “is that it shall not hinder, *nor allow to be hindered*, the observance of the laws of God and the Church, and that it shall *protect religious rights* like other rights.” Let Liberalism frankly accept this principle, let it admit all the practical consequences, and we shall cease to attack it. But then, let it abandon the demand for political rights equal to those of religious. The two pretensions are absolutely incompatible. In order that Catholics may be completely free in the exercise of their religious rights, and that the observance of the laws of God and the Church be preserved and delivered from all trammels by the protection of the State, it is evident that the State must come forth from the neutrality to which Liberalism condemns it. It cannot, at one and the same time, protect the religious rights of the Christian workman who wishes to observe the Sunday abstinence from labour ; and the irreligious employer, who makes the violation of this duty a condition of his workmen's wages ; it ceases to guarantee the sacred right of a baptized child to a Christian education, if it gives free scope to the promoters of Atheist education. Let not Liberalism tell us, therefore, that it only repudiates constraint ; no, its principles necessarily lead to the oppression of souls ; and for that reason they can never be accepted by the Church, which is the mother of souls, and charged by Jesus Christ with the defence of their liberty.

7. There is another and equally odious equivocation with which it would also be well to have done, once for all ; it is that by which the Liberals represent their adversaries in the light of blind defenders of arbitrary power and national enslavement. Forty years ago Lacordaire refuted the sophistical declamations of Liberal polemics on this point. He wrote to his

friend, in the letter which we have already quoted :—"The encyclical of the Holy Father does not contain the doctrine which you repel with so much fright. There is no question of becoming either a partisan of the Emperor Nicholas, or an enemy of the liberty of the world and of the Church" A little later (Feb., 1834) he writes again :—"What do we differ upon? Upon nothing, if it be not the purely gratuitous imagination that Rome has condemned liberty, in itself, and desires nothing better than to see the kings put religion, with hands and feet tied, into a guard-room in their palaces." The eloquence of Père Lacordaire did not suffice to disabuse the Liberal Catholics of this *imagination*, which was to their minds so evident a reality that they make it the basis of the classification of the system which they put forward to regulate the relations of the Church with the State. In a carefully elaborated note, by which M. de Montalembert wished to explain and justify his unfortunate formula, "a free Church in a free State," he expresses himself thus :—"Let us ask whether, in the actual state of the world, any other situation can be imagined besides these four—The Church free in a free country, the Church enslaved in an enslaved country (Russia, &c.), the Church enslaved in a free country (Sweden, Portugal, Piedmont), the Church free in an enslaved country." If these four solutions are really the only ones which could be found for the problem, we could not reject the first, which is the Liberal solution, without accepting the fourth, "The Church free in an enslaved country," as the formula of the traditional doctrine of the Catholic Church.

Assuredly the spouse of Jesus Christ never consented to be a slave either in a free or in an enslaved country. Since M. de Montalembert himself recognizes that his solution, "the Church free in a free state," had not been hitherto admitted; since he makes it the *modus vivendi* of the Church with modern societies, it follows that the anterior state of things, that which Catholics had previously regarded as their normal condition, can only be expressed by the other formula, the Church free in an enslaved country! But who is there who would venture to sustain this formula? Who, without giving the lie to history, could call the France of S. Louis an enslaved country? Has not M. de Montalembert told us that, a hundred years ago, after Christian order had been systematically disturbed during four centuries by the encroachments of the royal despotism, "there was in France an entire order of individual, local, and municipal liberties which no longer exist?" When we pray for the re-establishment of Christian order, it is not, assuredly, slavery that we invoke. Besides, this very writer, who places before us the alternative between the Church free in a free country, and the Church free in an enslaved country, hastens to add that the second solution has never been, and never can be realized. What becomes then of all argument? What is the place of Catholic doctrine in these four systems, among which it is pretended that we must necessarily choose? Has it not been juggled away, to constrain us to accept the liberal solution?

Let us not be mistaken. In selecting the discourse of M. de Montalembert

at the Malines Congress for special consideration in this, the first portion, of our discussion, we had no intention of attacking the man. We have chosen his speech because we do not know of any other such skilful, complete, and authoritative exposition of Catholic Liberalism. On examining it closely, we have just seen to what it reduces itself ;—to a series of equivocations, which are specious only because they conceal the thought which they appear to express, and which turn into repulsive errors when that thought is brought to the light of day.

8. We cannot be reproached with having gone too far back for an opponent, in our endeavour to combat the doctrine of Catholic Liberalism, for we should have sought in vain for a more recent exposition of that doctrine in the writings of the heads of the school who have survived M. de Montalembert. Since the Sovereign Pontiff's reprobation of their ideas has become more explicit, they have given up the defence of them, and many of the number repudiate the name of Liberal Catholics, a title in which they formerly gloried. No, they say, in religion we are purely Catholic ; it is only in politics that we are Liberal. Under this formula, which expresses the latest evolution of the school, we feel there is still an equivocation. What is this political Liberalism under whose shade its professors hope to hide themselves from the anathemas of the Church ? Does it relate to the preference accorded to representative institutions over absolute monarchy ? But this is positively beside the question. When have the adversaries of Catholic Liberalism ever reproached its adherents with this preference ? To credit us with such a design is evidently to put public opinion on a false scent. Everything leads us to believe that the political Liberalism under which shelter is sought is nothing else than the Liberal theory of the relations between civil and religious society. This Liberalism is political, in fact, but it equally touches the rights of the Church. To pretend that the Church has nothing to do with it would be to grant the truth of the fundamental principle of the Liberal heresy. If the men who formerly showed themselves favourable to this error desire it should no longer be imputed to them, it is indispensable that they should disclaim it, and they must not rest satisfied with opposing us by a formula which is at least as ambiguous as that under which the semi-Arians endeavoured to shield themselves.

The following is, then, our first conclusion :—Instead of serious arguments Catholic Liberalism is supported only by equivocations ; and, consequently, it is absolutely untenable as a practical system from the double point of view of the end which it proposes to itself, the course which it takes, and the results which it obtains. Nothing will be wanting to our demonstration, if we can prove that, in this triple aspect, the reality completely gives the lie to the brilliant promises with which Catholic Liberalism has been beguiling us for forty years.

H. RAMIÈRE.

*(To be continued.)*

## Notices of Books.



*The True and the False Infallibility of the Popes.* By DR. JOSEPH FESSLER.  
London : Burns & Oates.

SINCE our article on this volume was printed off, a fact has come to our knowledge which we ought to mention. A certain correspondent of the *Germania* stated in 1872 that the Pope had "directed a translation" of the treatise "to be made into Italian, and instructed a commission of the different nationalities to examine it and report on it." We have shown in our article how entirely untrustworthy is this correspondent ; but we now understand from what seems to us excellent authority, that inquiries have been made in Rome on the subject, and that the above statement is entirely unfounded. We do not know whether a translation of the work was published at Rome, though (if it were) no doubt it was submitted to the usual censorship ; but the correspondent himself implies that the copy sent to the *Pope* by Mgr. Fessler was in *German*.

For our own part, we shall continue entirely to disbelieve the statement we have above mentioned, until some evidence is adduced for it worthy of being called evidence.

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*The Spirit of Faith.* Five Lectures by Right Rev. Bishop HEDLEY.  
London : Burns & Oates.

THESE most suggestive lectures inspire us with an earnest hope, that Bishop Hedley may have the opportunity of writing a complete and systematic treatise on the great question which they treat. Everything connected with the acquisition of Catholic faith is just now a matter of exceptional moment. Even sincere Protestants are beginning to admit, that Protestantism is effete as a widely influential principle. The flood of boundless infidelity, now so rapidly rising, can be resisted by no other agency than that of the Catholic Church. The vital inquiry is, how faith can be implanted in the mind of those who now reject it.

The Bishop's opinion—and it is our own—is, that the alternative whether this or that given person becomes a Catholic, depends (under God) much less on the question how cogently the argumentative evidences of Christianity

are brought before him, than on the question what *disposition* he may bring with him to their examination. The Bishop (see p. 43) by no means disparages the value possessed in their place by the irrefragable argumentative proofs, adducible for the truth of Christianity. Still at last, as the Vatican Council has declared, "The Church of herself, because of her admirable propagation, her eminent holiness, her inexhaustible fecundity in every good, her Catholic unity and unconquered stability, is a great and perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefragable proof of her own divine mission. And thus, like a standard set up to the nations, she both invites to her those who do not yet believe, and also gives her children full ground for knowing that the Faith which they profess rests on a most firm foundation. To which testimony of hers a powerful assistance is added by power from above."

But then, in order that he may be duly drawn by this "power from above," the inquirer must bring with him certain dispositions positive and negative, acquired by his free co-operation with those aids of grace which have been given him from the dawn of his reason. And it is the Bishop's main business, to inquire what these dispositions are. In this respect these lectures remind one of F. Newman's magnificent sermon (the fifth of "Occasional Sermons") on "Dispositions to faith." At the same time the Bishop's course of thought is essentially different from F. Newman's.

His first lecture is on the absolute necessity which exists, that men should be guided on a thousand matters of fact by testimony, unless the whole social world is to fall into ruin. Nay (as the Bishop puts it with admirable aptness) men are actually *compelled* to believe on testimony.

"Let us suppose, for example, that a trustworthy friend walks into your house, and mentions that he left his home at such an hour, or that he met and spoke with such and such a person; you are obliged to believe him, You cannot help having that much additional knowledge. It is true that by an extraordinarily violent mental effort, proceeding from some strong prejudice or prepossession, you may so confuse yourself as to doubt at last. But with your mind in a state of quietness and candour, on the first reception of the information you assent; the very make and texture of the human mind compels you. It is no more possible for you, with your senses in their healthy state, to help seeing trees and houses when they stand before you and you look towards them in the daylight, than it is for your minds to doubt upon due and sufficient testimony" (pp. 5, 6).

There is one incidental statement however in this lecture, which gives us some little difficulty. The Bishop seems to imply in p. 9, that without faith the mass of ordinary men will not arrive at firm and well-grounded conviction on the Existence of an Infinitely Perfect God. We would submit to his Lordship's better judgment, whether F. Kleutgen's doctrine on this head is not rather to be followed, as we set forth that doctrine last October from p. 447 to p. 453. F. Kleutgen considers that, apart from faith altogether, God infuses into all adults a reasonable knowledge of His Existence, by means of their implicit reason. This point of controversy however, whatever its value, has no bearing on the general scope of the Bishop's argument.

Faith then in some religious informant being so absolutely necessary, the next question is how men are to find their trustworthy informant. This will practically depend on the question, in what spirit they look out for him, and by what notes they seek to discern him. Here the Bishop's argument implies the doctrine, on which F. Newman so powerfully enlarges in the sermon to which we have already referred. God has given all men a clue to the true religion, by the moral faculty which He has implanted in them. In proportion as, on the one hand, they cultivate that moral faculty by conscientiously obeying its dictates,—and in proportion as on the other hand the Catholic Church is presented to them according to her true aspect—in that combined proportion they will recognize the plain notes of her divine commission.

“A man who has accustomed himself to call things by the name which the *undisciplined and sinful human heart* is in the habit of calling them, will easily pass by God, even at the moment when God is very near him. When Elias stood on the top of Carmel the Lord passed by him. There was a great and strong wind before the Lord, overthrowing the mountains and breaking the rocks in pieces; the Lord was not in the wind. And after the wind, an earthquake; and the Lord was not in the earthquake. And after the earthquake, a fire; the Lord was not in the fire. And after the fire, the whistling of a gentle air. And Elias heard the gentle wind, and he knew it was the Lord. . . . He is the type of the heart that knows where to see God. But most men act otherwise. They take the flash and the noise and the rush of some earth storm for the manifestation of God” (pp. 24, 25).

And they do this, because they have not trained themselves to obeying God's voice within them, and thus learning its true accents.

“The truth of this is never more clearly seen than in the case of multitudes in this country who are looking for, or perhaps think that they have found, what they call the Gospel. They take certain big and sounding names from the world's vocabulary, and measuring by them the revelation of God, they accept as much as they can cover with these names. Wealth and material power are names which earthly wisdom bows before; and is it not true they go a long way in helping men to choose their form of Christianity? But if you say these are vulgar notions, and educated and refined minds are far above measuring truth by power to strike and power to pay, I say that there are other words as dangerous and as false. Liberty, Independence, Progress, Free Inquiry—these are some of the notions which numbers of people bring to test the Gospel by. If they find any form of religion, like the Catholic Church, in which these names are not held in high esteem (at least as understood by them), then, like the Jews of old, they are straightway ‘scandalized.’ It cannot be true. It cannot be meant for them. Freedom is a glorious privilege. Progress is the inalienable birthright of the human race. Independence is the prerogative of man's noble nature. And being full of views like these, they settle down with such scraps of God's word as seem to suit” (pp. 26, 27).

On the other hand

“Revelation cannot be approached, except in an attitude of what may

be called the lowliness of worship. We come to it, not to criticise it, not to improve it, but to learn and to act. We cannot afford to lose one jot or one tittle of the precious light. The temper of the believer is the temper of Moses with unshod feet prostrate before the mysterious Voice in the wilderness" (p. 28).

In profound harmony with this principle, our Blessed Lord and the Church after Him is always "absolute, peremptory, and magisterial." This is the very characteristic note of truth.

"A man need not be a shrewd reasoner, need not be a great philosopher, reader, thinker, or scholar, to be able to make out God's revelation. He need only be guileless, unprejudiced, earnest. You will say, Then how is it so many in this world miss God's light? Because they are sinful, prejudiced (though not always by their own fault), or indifferent. Because they come, not to submit, but criticise; to discuss and to pass sentence" (p. 33).

Here then is one way, in which a person is prevented by his own moral defect from discovering the authority of Catholic Christianity. He has not entered on his inquiry as a learner, but as a critic. A second obstacle, also arising from moral defect, is commemorated in the Bishop's third lecture: *viz. prejudice*.

"The ignorant, the ill-educated, and the average-minded—in fact, the bulk of humanity—are exposed to the danger of allowing their reason to be blindfolded by the influence of their wants, inclinations, and passions. And even the most intellectual and the most cultivated are sure to have their convictions tinged with a large infusion of their likings" (p. 45).

There is one obvious and one only way of avoiding this: *viz.* that men shall cultivate the habit of directing their action, not in accordance with their own tastes and likings, but in accordance with duty. The world in general derives an incredibly large portion of its judgments from education and example. Why? Because it has not cultivated that faculty, which has the power of *neutralising*, in continually increasing degree, the prejudices which arise from education and example.

But there is even a more powerful antagonist to faith than any yet mentioned, and which is treated by the Bishop in his fourth lecture: *viz.* that "wilfulness" which arises from the corruption of human nature. When true religion is offered to men—whether Christianity to heathens or Catholicity to Protestants—on the one hand (as has been said), they are strongly impelled against it by the disgust with which those around them receive it; but on the other hand they are even more strongly impelled against it by the pride and passion which characterize the natural man (p. 70), and by the antipathy to heavenly truths which such pride and passion engender. So the world without, and the worldly spirit within, play into each other's hands in resisting the design of God.

What then is His weapon, if we may so express ourselves? Those in general (we have said) most readily arrive at religious truth, who have been most diligent in moral action; but no one can be diligent in moral action without habits of constant prayer.

"If I were asked for one royal road to the happiness of Faith, I should answer, with all the Saints, that it is prayer. No one who prays can be lost. God wishes all men to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth. But He has not promised to save those who are so immersed in the pleasantness or the business of this life as to give Him no share in their thoughts and none of the worship which is His right. We must bow to His majesty and beg for His precious gift. We must make ourselves feel, with all the fervour of our heart, that we are helpless if He do not help us, and blind if He do not enlighten us. And He will hear the prayer of the humble heart. Be sure that He will hear. Whether it be that He gives us new reasons or helps us the better to penetrate old ones; whether He send us a man, or a book, or an inspiration; whether He cast us down as with a lightning stroke, or lay His hand gently upon our eyes and ears; let us be assured that He will hear us. If He must send His angel from the heavens to teach us, then His angel will be sent. But it is He alone, and not ourselves, who can open our eyes and let us see the light" (pp. 103, 104).

It is a great and rarely tasted pleasure, when a course of remarks, at once so theoretically profound and so practically momentous, is placed before the Catholic public and thus brought before our notice. Every thought of Bishop Hedley's has been carefully elaborated, and every word accurately weighed.

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*S. Thomas of Aquin and Ideology.* By Mgr. FERRÉ, Bishop of Casa Monferrato. Translated by a Father of Charity. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1875.

WE are extremely glad of every fresh fact, which shows that Catholics are more and more recognizing the vital importance of Catholic philosophical unity. So far we heartily rejoice at the appearance of this translation: and we are glad of it also for a totally different reason; viz. that is well for English Catholic students, trained in a truer philosophy, to have means of compendiously knowing what has been advocated by so powerful, thoughtful, and religious a writer as Rosmini. But we fear that our sympathy with the volume before us hardly extends further than this. It raises three questions, and they ought to be kept apart: one is about the facts, viz. how far philosophical disunion among Catholics extends; the second is about the true interpretation of S. Thomas; the third about the merits of Rosmini's own philosophical theory. We hope to publish an article in our next number, dealing successively with these three questions; but we will not shrink from expressing at once the conclusions for which we shall argue in that article.

(1) On the first question—we think there has of late risen to the surface a far greater appearance of growing philosophical unity, than was visible when Mgr. Ferré delivered his address five years ago to the *Accademia Romana*, or when we expressed our own opinion on the subject in July,

1869. The Catholic presses of Germany, France, and Italy are busy with the publication of manuals, treatises, and elucidations of S. Thomas; at Naples and Rome the leading authors are purely Scholastic, and their books have sold with unexampled rapidity; in Germany there is the widest acceptance of Aristotle, and the best known writers (such as Kleutgen and Stöckl) have confuted Hermes and Günther by means of the Scholastic teaching. On the other hand, the perilous systems which had gained ground in France and Belgium have fallen under the displeasure of the Holy See, and have been given up by such as held them. Moreover, even six years ago—and this we would insist on—it was observable that the theologians of highest repute, were strenuous in their support of S. Thomas and Suarez; though, of course, they claim the liberty to improve, to perfect, to accommodate the phraseology to recent experiments, nay, to modify the doctrine itself in minor particulars.\* We may mention F. Franzelin, the lamented F. Schrader, the Jesuits in the Tyrol, and some distinguished professors at Louvain. There are no names that stand higher.

(2) S. Thomas has long been kept in the background; but now, at his coming forward, he brings in his train philosophers and commentators, nourished upon his teaching, and full of a living tradition as to its sense. The office of interpreter is, doubtless, one of great risk and delicacy; though the Scholastic keenness, not to say justice, of thought, has made their explanation of Aristotle (even from a Latin text) the wonder of succeeding writers. And the works of S. Thomas have been open to all, and have given rise to a vast exegesis, stretching over nearly six centuries. This is the old and received commentary, more or less discrepant in detail, but in general principle exact, consistent, fruitful in deduction. What of the new? One cannot but think of our Protestants, whose private judgment is a match for Fathers and Councils together. All the commentators on S. Thomas, it seems, before Rosmini, have erred from the right way, and have missed the meaning of, perhaps, the clearest author that ever lived. Here is a modern philosopher, who starts up from the quiet contemplation in which he has been long occupied, and tells us, not merely that he has found out an original and satisfactory theory—we might believe that—but that he alone can trace out for us the meaning of a world-renowned book, upon which folios of comment already exist. For ourselves, we had rather trust Suarez and Cajetan than the most plausible of modern prophets. But what if your new critic is furnished with a preconceived doctrine, not really unheard of before, but flourishing on the other side of the Alps? Now, if we may make bold to say it, Rosmini is nothing more in our eyes than Emmanuel Kant done into Italian. He himself tells us that Kant was in the right path, but that his theory wanted simplifying; and the *Nuovo Saggio* undertook to simplify it. We should have gathered no less from a comparison of the systems. Now Kant, as a matter of fact, seems to have borrowed a great deal from S.

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\* See our remarks in July, 1869, pp. 222–225, and pp. 40–42.

Thomas, and to have skilfully distorted it all, so as to round off his own philosophy. Rosmini's adaptation is, perhaps, more subtle, and is quite as bewildering: but the Ideal Being is not a talisman to unlock the treasures of the Angelic Doctor. Any one, whose duty leads him frequently to the Scholastics, will be amazed at the notion which Rosmini would instil into us.

We have no wish to assert without proving: so we will set down a few remarks, by way of justification. Mgr. Ferré assures us that S. Thomas does not treat professedly of the origin of ideas, which of course is the main point in dispute. We think the opposite can be made out. The Saint defines, analyzes, and describes at length the *Intellectus Agens*, the *Intellectus Possibilis*, the faculty which he calls the *Estimative*; he assigns their office to the *phantasmata*, discriminates most acutely between sense and intellect, and goes fully into the various modes by which we know matter and mind, singular and universal, necessary and contingent, finite and infinite. Few can have written more copiously on the subject. Moreover, he treats it polemically, and that very often; for his great antagonist is Averrhoes, whose doctrine of the Impersonal Reason could not be confuted, unless by a full exposition of the opinion prevailing in the schools. The sources, too, from which we gain S. Thomas's view, are numerous and varied. We will add to Mgr. Ferré's "*De Veritate*" and "*De Magistro*," the Commentary on Aristotle's "*De Anima*," the "*De Unitate Intellectus*," the "*De Ente et Essentia*" (of which more at another time), and, of course, the two great achievements, the "*Summa Theologica*," and the "*Summa Contra Gentiles*."

But long before a student has read all the parallel passages, he will be convinced that S. Thomas held no doctrine of innate forms or innate conceptions. As against Rosmini, however, we have two strings to our bow; and even though one might be broken, the other would still hold good. Either, in fact, the Angelic believed in no innate ideas, or he held a great many; nay, he went beyond Gioberti, and allowed of con-natural, unacquired *principles*, both in the speculative and in the practical order. Let any one go through the question "*De Veritate*," among the Qq. Disp. (16, art. 1), and he will find a clear statement that there is a knowledge of the truth, "*sine inquisitione*," in the practical, no less than in the speculative intellect; that this is "*quoddam seminarium totius cognitionis sequentis*"; and, finally, that such knowledge is a "*habitus naturalis principiorum*." Either, then, S. Thomas held more, or, (as we maintain) he held less than Rosmini: in no case are the theories identical. But really he would lay down, that the "*quædam scientiarum semina*"\* are principles derived from the comparison of ideas; and that all our ideas, including the first and largest, that of Being, are gained, by abstraction, from the sensible and material world. "*Aliqua sunt*," he declares, "*quæ statim, sine discursu* (that is, without demonstration),

\* We must remark, en passant, that Rosmini and the ontologists perpetually confuse knowledge and science, though the terms and conceptions are very distinct, and S. Thomas is careful to indicate his meaning.

obtinentur ; sicut principia prima, quæ quisque statim probat audita." What are not understood till they are *heard* evidently do not belong to the intellect from the beginning. As, moreover, the mind is endowed with no innate judgments, so neither has it innate ideas or species. S. Thomas is explicit on this head : "Intellectus, quo anima intelligit, non habet aliquas species naturaliter inditas, sed est, in principio, in potentia ad hujusmodi species omnes (Summa, P. I., q. 84, art. 3). And in another place : "Intellectum possibilem, qui, quantum est de se, est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, sed determinatur ad hoc vel aliud per species a phantasmatibus abstractas" (Qq. Disp. De Anima, art. 5). What is the usual answer to these quotations? No other than this, that the idea of being is not a "species abstracta," and that all S. Thomas lays down is about species, not about the primal idea. But this is not borne out in any way.

On the contrary, we have many phrases like the following :—"Prima conceptiones intellectûs . . . quæ statim, lumine intellectûs agentis, cognoscuntur, per species a sensibilibus abstractas . . . sicut *ratio entis*,\* et unius, et hujusmodi." In fact, all the transcendental concepts are formed by abstraction, and the concept of Being is no more than the first of these. "Quamvis illa, quæ sunt in genere *prima* eorum quæ intellectus abstrahit a phantasmatibus, sint prima cognita a nobis, ut ens et unum," (Super Boeth. de Trin.) We must be allowed to add, that S. Thomas starts from a position, the very opposite to Rosmini's. Take these words, as the summing up of the Scholastic theory ; "Operatio proportionatur virtuti et essentiae ; intellectivum autem hominis est in sensitivo ; et ideo propria operatio ejus, est intelligere intelligibilia in phantasmatibus" (De Mem. et Rem., lect. 1.). Whence he concludes, "Naturaliter (anima) non potest cognoscere aliqua, nisi quæ habent *formam in materia*, vel quæ per hujusmodi cognosci possunt." All knowledge, in this life, depends upon the senses ; intellectual knowledge, though of so high a perfection, is not due to the immaterial soul by itself ; and that soul is, first, a "tabula rasa," but living and self-moving, and possessed of the faculty of abstraction.

Just at this point, we are met by a strange fancy of Rosmini's, upon which, as in duty bound, Mgr. Ferré dilates with satisfaction. We have, says S. Thomas, certain faculties natural to us, and of these the principal are, the Intellectus agens, the faculty of abstraction, and the Intellectus possibilis, or understanding properly so called. The one is the motive-power, the root and seed, of the act of intellectual knowledge : the other elicits that act from out of itself, when it has been rightly prepared and furnished. "Intellectus possibilis est qui speciem recipit, et actum intelligendi elicit" : "Intellectus agens nihil recipit, sed est *potentia animæ*, quæ facit omnia intelligibilia actu" (De Potentiis animæ, art. 6). An-

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\* If the very idea (*ratio*) of being comes by abstraction from the senses, then, not simply all *determinate* knowledge, but all knowledge whatever is gained by this process. Mgr. Ferré mistakes on this head (p. 27).

other lucid statement occurs in the polemical tract, "De Unitate Intellectus," written against Averrhoes. The Intellectus Agens then, is a faculty of the soul. "No," says Rosmini, "it is not a faculty, but an idea, the idea of Being as I have described it." This, we confess, passes our comprehension. Worse still, should it be alleged that the Intellectus Agens is *both* an idea and a faculty. If things are like their definitions, then ideas and faculties are no more the same, than the power of seeing is identical with the impression on the retina. No wonder S. Thomas is dark, nay, involved in contradiction and altogether past cure, if he mixes terms after this fashion. But is not the Intellectus Agens the light of the soul? If any one will turn to Franzelin's "De Deo Uno," page 142, he can see for himself that this much-debated phrase admits of a dozen orthodox meanings; that, in one of these meanings, the Intellectus Agens may be called a Light, but that, as lights are many, the Ideal Being need not be confounded with a power of the soul, nor, indeed, be reckoned among the primal lights at all. But we cannot delay over all this just now. To our mind, the controversy about S. Thomas is already settled; it was natural, to be sure, that those who first stumbled upon him, should read him in the light of modern notions, but for some years past, the old books have been diligently studied, and the result seems, in a high degree, satisfactory. His theory of knowledge lies in a nutshell. Rosmini admits innate faculties, and one innate idea. S. Thomas thinks, that if innate faculties be granted, and if of these one be a faculty of abstraction, the rise, development, and perfection of knowledge, in a human being, may be clearly traced out, and accurately explained.

We are obliged by lack of space to omit in this notice any direct discussion of the Rosminian view. Perhaps, indeed, the positive method of exposition, which we hope to pursue in our proposed article, will throw more light on these difficult questions, and leave our readers in that calm state of mind which is essential to a philosopher. Philosophy is contemplation, and contemplation, as we know, is peace. When we have learned the truth, we shall be able to detect some shadows of it, even in the subtle aberrations of the theory of Ideal Being, and we shall have avoided the risk of needless controversy. Meantime, we are anxious to see one point cleared up, as to which Rosmini is obscure and unsteady. The Ideal Being is an *object*, contemplated by the mind, yet not to be confounded with the realities of the sensible world. What then is this object? It has the properties of infinitude, immensity, and necessity, and that in the modern sense of those terms. Is it then God Himself? Or is it, as we are inclined to think, the Absolute of Hegel and the Germans? These are questions that call for definite and intelligible replies, which have not as yet been given.

*Peace through the Truth : or Essays on Subjects connected with Dr. Pusey's Eirenicon.* By Rev. F. HARPER, S.J. Second Series, Part I. London : Burns, Oates & Co. 1874.

THE famous "catapult" discharged by Dr. Pusey is the occasion, at this distance of time, of another volume from F. Harper, marked with the seals of his solid learning and patient searching into the questions he discusses. The first volume appeared in 1866, dealing with Dr. Pusey's strange statements concerning the doctrines of the Eucharist, of the Immaculate Conception of our Blessed Lady, and of the unity of the Church. Now, we have a most careful and elaborate discussion of the statements made concerning the Papal power of dispensation with the impediments of matrimony ; and the matter is so abundant, that the second volume is very nearly twice the size of the first.

F. Harper, in his Preface, reminds his readers that Dr. Pusey has not yet redeemed the promise he made of answering the first volume. The promise was made so long ago, that we may now fairly presume it never will be redeemed. Against this we have the advantage of Dr. Pusey's silence upon subjects, with which he is certainly not competent to deal, and in dealing with which he has made many mistakes. F. Harper says (Pref., x.), that he "was forced to point out, over and over again, the absence in Dr. Pusey of those qualifications which are absolutely indispensable for any one who takes upon himself to discuss grave questions of theology." That being so, and we cannot for a moment doubt it, it is quite conceivable that silence is a gain for all men. F. Harper further enumerates seventeen points—these, of course, are not all—upon which Dr. Pusey (who began the controversy) was bound to say whether he held his own opinion or yielded to his adversary. But there is no answer.

F. Harper begins his present Essay by stating the question raised by Dr. Pusey, and does so in that Doctor's words. He then simplifies and makes somewhat plainer the meaning of his opponent, so that every one may have a clear apprehension of the matter in dispute. Dr. Pusey has, it seems, asserted that Popes have contradicted each other in serious questions ; and from that premiss, which is his own, comes to the conclusion that the sovereign Pontiff is not infallible when he speaks *ex cathedra* in deciding disputes in matters of conduct and belief.

F. Harper, in the present volume, deals with the first alleged contradiction : the declaration of one Pope that certain persons cannot marry certain persons without breaking the Divine Law, and a dispensation given to such persons by another Pope. Dr. Pusey considers the dispensation, on the part of the Pope who gave it, to be a direct contradiction of the Pope who said the marriage was unlawful. F. Harper has stated the question fairly and clearly ; and then, having done so, proceeds to discuss the principles on which the question turns.

But as Dr. Pusey and he have no common principle, or, if they have, it is not held in the same sense by both, F. Harper is compelled to dig down to the very roots of the question, and explain what is meant by law, human and Divine, natural and positive, civil and ecclesiastical. The non-perception by Dr. Pusey of the distinctions made in the schools, has led him into many errors, and into the making of some assertions which, with better knowledge, one may reasonably hope he never would have made. Then, again, Dr. Pusey had to explain, or thought he had to explain, a system of law, with which he is not familiar, and which he cannot possibly understand, because it is not respected in the community to which he unhappily belongs. He knows what confusion an un-instructed layman falls into, when he speaks or writes on the subject with which he himself is familiar; and he, in the same way, not being acquainted with the meaning of terms in a system of law which is not his own, has fallen into trouble. F. Harper has the advantage both of learning and experience, and the gain of training; all of which have been withheld from his adversary who, in entering on the controversy, had to study it and to learn it by his own unaided genius.

We pass over the earlier part of the work before us; but not without respect for the patience of the writer who, following Dr. Pusey into his favourite recesses of Patristic learning, overtakes him, and discovers the nothingness of the claims which his friends and admirers put forward on his behalf and on their own. The Fathers were Catholics, and their words can be understood only by those who know their language. Dr. Pusey knows Greek and he also knows Latin, but the Greek and the Latin are the Greek and the Latin of the heathens; whereas the Fathers, who used those languages, used them to convey to others that which was not known upon earth, when men spoke Greek and Latin in what is now called their purity, and when the words faith, hope, and charity, would have been unintelligible.

We, therefore, shall speak here only of that part of F. Harper's book, where he pursues Dr. Pusey into his fortified camp, built up out of canon law, but canon law strangely understood. F. Harper himself seems to admit that this is the more important portion of his work; though we should not like to forget that people will be very much instructed, especially in these days when we take our notions of law out of the first magazine or newspaper we may meet with, by the very clear and even profuse dissertations on law in general, and on the traditions of the Church. But as these portions may be regarded as prolegomena, and as the question is in fact about the acts or decisions of determinate Popes, it seems on the whole more useful, and more to the purpose, to turn to that part of the book in which he discusses the administration of the law.

Dr. Pusey has maintained that certain commandments concerning the marriage of Hebrews, recorded in the book Leviticus, are commandments of the Natural Law and, therefore, unchangeable. He says further, it seems, that one Pope, at least (Innocent III.), held the same opinion;

and that another Pope dispensed with the observance of those commandments, and consequently set aside, in that case, the obligations of the Natural Law. That is the question which F. Harper meets; and for the solution of which he had to write dissertations upon law in general, and on the Mosaic law in particular. The very way in which heretics speak of the law of God and the law of men does but perpetuate certain delusions current among the better sort among them. F. Harper's book will, on this point, be of great service; for he has shown so clearly the obligations of law, and determined so accurately what law is binding. No doubt Dr. Pusey will be very much astonished at some of the statements; but they are statements made by every Catholic, and are the common teaching propagated throughout the Church. The question raised by Dr. Pusey, in days of selfwill and lawlessness, cannot but find a solution very different from that which he must himself desire. He, no doubt, sincerely believing that certain marriages are forbidden by the Divine Law and therefore not allowable among Christians, said so; but, unhappily, his zeal lacked the virtue of discernment. He did not understand the question, and he has made a most grievous mistake. Having made the mistake, he seems to have fallen in love with it. Probably he cherished it the more, because he thinks he can use it as a weapon against the Church. Be that as it may, that is the principal service which it renders to him. His principle seems to be this: certain marriages are forbidden by the Divine Law, which is indispensable, but Catholics are allowed to contract certain marriages so forbidden; and, that being so, Dr. Pusey proclaims to the world, either that the Pope treats the Divine Law with contempt, or that one Pope contradicts another, and that, therefore, the Pope is not infallible.

A question like this demands, in the first place, great learning on the part of the person who raises it, to say nothing of sobriety of mind and reverence for authority. That, in substance, is the question which F. Harper has been forced to discuss.

In the first place, the learned Father has to show what the Divine Law is; and, in doing so, has been forced to throw down the elaborate building raised by Dr. Pusey on the sands. The Oxford Doctor has confounded human with Divine law; now the Divine law, the obligation of which he seeks to enforce, is certainly a Divine law, but a Divine law not in force. The whole law of Moses was a Divine law, Divinely given, but it was not binding on heathens, nor is it binding on Christians now. Dr. Pusey seems to have treated the Divine law of marriage, given to the Jews, as a law of perpetual obligation, binding, in virtue of its first promulgation, on the consciences of men baptized.

F. Harper has taken great pains, and has been very patient in this. He has shown that the law given by Moses came to an end in the Passion of our Most Blessed Lord, and that it is not binding now; for Christians are under the new law of grace, not under the law given by Moses. Dr. Pusey, on the other hand, seems to have spoken as if certain portions of the old law were still in force, because it is a portion of the old law: forgetting that the obligation of any part of the old law, as such, was done

away with ; or, that what is in force now, is in force, not because it was made known by Moses, but because it is a part of the law of nature, or re-enacted under the new dispensation. In clearing up the obscurities introduced by Dr. Pusey, F. Harper has been very elaborate, speaking very clearly, and enforcing very strongly the true doctrine, of which his adversary does not seem to have had any notion.

Persons outside the Church are hardly ever surprised at any assertion made concerning her discipline ; possibly some may regard the strangeness of the assertion as no inconsiderable element in the proof of its truth. This is, in a few words, what Dr. Pusey maintains. F. Harper says, p. 351—

“Let us recall to mind, once more, what those assertions were. The Oxford Professor undertook to show by the constant voice of the Church for fifteen centuries, that the Levitical prohibitions, forbidding marriage within certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity, formed part of the Natural Law ; were, consequently, eternal and unchanging ; not subject, therefore, to dispensation by human authority : and that they continued to bind the consciences of Christians by virtue of their original Divine promulgation.”

Now, a grave charge of this nature, brought against Saints and Doctors, against whole nations, among whom, surely, there must have been some men with conscience and adequate knowledge, has not startled Dr. Pusey in the least degree. In fact, it is he himself who says that the sovereign Pontiffs have been setting aside the Eternal Law whenever they had a mind to do so.

We shall not follow F. Harper into his discussion of the Eternal Law, in which he shows how Dr. Pusey does not understand the question. It is a long and laborious discussion ; and some, probably, will be surprised to learn how few are the Divine prohibitions in the matter of marriage.

F. Harper is a theologian, and writes as it becomes the school to which he belongs ; but the canonists will probably not be overpleased, at the way in which he treats them and their science. They are, however, accustomed to it for many generations ; they have received what they think scanty justice from theologians ; and they comfort themselves, occasionally, by retaliating on their foes who, they say, discuss questions they do not understand, and apply principles which they have not mastered.

They will, undoubtedly, object to one canon of interpretation laid down by F. Harper as follows—

“It is of great importance to the understanding of a decretal, that we should inspect it as it stands in the letter or record from which it is taken, if that be possible.”

There can be no objection to an historical account of any decretal ; but, if that historical account is to modify the strict decision, objections will be raised against the theory. The decretal stands by itself, and is law ; it may now subserve, as it stands in the *Corpus Juris*, a purpose quite distinct from that for which the Bull containing it was issued. The Bull stands as it always stood ; but a portion of it may be placed among the decretals, for the decision of a question not raised when the Bull was

published. The second volume of the *Corpus Juris* is law, as it stands, by the Act of the Pope Gregory IX. The decretals therein contained are the decretals of Gregory IX., who made them law in the form in which they are published, though he wrote but few of them himself. In the same way, the Clementines, canons decreed in the Council of Vienne, but subsequently changed and corrected by Clement V., are laws; yet, not because they were made in a general Council, or corrected by Pope Clement afterwards, but because John XXII. published them and gave them the force of law. F. Harper would have spared himself much labour, if he had forgotten for a moment that he was a theologian in his examination of *Litteras tuas* of Innocent III., p. 321. The Pope is not discussing doctrine, nor explaining the degrees of consanguinity; but he is deciding a question of law, or, to speak more intelligibly, a question of procedure; namely, whether a decree to be pronounced in a certain suit should be pronounced in one form rather than in another. The canonists have had their revenge upon the theologian here.

It is impossible to read F. Harper's work without a sense of the great pains and labour which he has inflicted upon himself. The patient study and the varied reading, and the industrious ordering of all the details of a most ungrateful task, are evident on the face of the book. Were it not for the end which the learned author has before him, we should certainly regret that he should be employed in the refutation of a forgotten pamphlet. But perhaps we should not look on his work in that light, but rather as a substantial treatise on certain subjects which it fully discusses; establishing principles and clearing away objections that might be lawfully raised; though, in this case, they are raised by one outside the Church, and are not always pertinent to the matter in dispute.

"Peter Auriol and Durand of S. Pourçain agree in considering all the degrees of consanguinity in the direct line—ascending or descending—to be included in the prohibition of the natural law; so that, as the former tells us, if Adam were to be alive now, that law would interdict him from marriage, since all the women on earth have sprung from his loins. One would have anticipated that the patent absurdity of the conclusion would have suggested a doubt as to the truth of the premises; yet, on the contrary, this strange proposition has found admirers among some few even of the post-Tridentine writers on moral theology" (p. 415-416).

That opinion about the second marriage of Adam is a very old and a very common one. F. Harper thinks it a patent absurdity; but we should not like to say that the great men who held it were not sufficiently acute to detect an absurdity, not to speak of a patent absurdity. The question can never be raised in a practical form, and so it may never be settled. F. Harper relies on the use he makes of the authority of S. Thomas for his ridicule of this opinion. It is true that S. Thomas is believed to confine the prohibitions of marriage, by the natural law, to that of father and daughter, mother and son. If so, then, by the law of nature alone, Adam might have married one of his grand-daughters,—much more,

if he were alive to-day, could he marry any one he pleased, so far as the law of nature is concerned.

As we have touched upon this question, we may as well say one word more. F. Harper says—

“Thus we find that Scotus agrees with S. Thomas and the seraphic Doctor in limiting the prohibition of the natural law to the first degree in the right line; and also, as it would seem, though his expressions are more vague, and the idea less consciously present to his mind, in the main reason assigned for such prohibition” (p. 409).

We once heard an inveterate Thomist declare that Scotus founded his theology upon the principle of contradiction of the theology of S. Thomas. If that be true, F. Harper must have made a mistake when he said that Scotus agrees with S. Thomas. But, as an Archbishop of Canterbury has also declared that the Dominicans and Franciscans were divided upon all questions that admitted of dispute—in *omnibus dubitabilibus*—we are not sorry, in defence of the Bishop, that we can find something to say against F. Harper’s accuracy. S. Bonaventure held perhaps, with S. Thomas, that the prohibitions of the Natural Law went no further than the first degree; we will not dispute that, because it is probably the meaning of his words, though we find it difficult to think so ourselves. But as for Scotus, he certainly held even the opinion which F. Harper calls a patent absurdity; namely, that Adam could never have a second wife. The prohibition, he says, touches not only father and child, but the whole straight line: *non intelligitur tantum de patre proximo, sed de quocumque in linea recta, ita quod si Adam hodie viveret non posset ducere aliquam uxorem* (4 *Sext. dist.* 40, *qu. unica*). Cardinal Cajetan in his commentary on S. Thomas (2<sup>a</sup> 2<sup>dæ</sup> *qu.* 156, art. 9), agrees with F. Harper and says that this doctrine of Scotus is unreasonable. *Hoc enim absque ulla ratione dicit.* And the Cardinal was a Thomist.

F. Harper is entitled to his opinion, and we do not dispute it. But, while we thank him for his book, the value of which people will appreciate the more they read it—and it is not to be read in haste—we must blame him, and we do so most seriously; He ought to have given an Index to his book and has failed to do so.

*The Troubles of Our Catholic Forefathers, related by Themselves.* Second Series. Edited by JOHN MORRIS, Priest of the Society of Jesus. Burns & Oates, 1875.

**A**MONG our other and far more weighty obligations to F. Morris, we are delighted to acknowledge, in his Preface to this second series of a great work, an excellent retort courteous to the “Pall Mall Gazette.” In reviewing his former volume, that very able authority carped at his want of a sense of humour in publishing a certain wonderful story relative to Mrs. Tregian, to which F. Morris thus replies:—

"I am fain to confess that the same deficiency has accompanied me while compiling the present volume. The old writers, whose words I print, have told various stories which seem to me extremely droll; but I plead guilty to the accusation that I have not seen the fun of omitting them. . . . I have not felt myself obliged to suppress anecdotes, which though gravely told long ago, now raise a smile in the perusal. To strike out such stories as those of the devils swimming like fishes beneath a man's skin, or Mrs. Bellamy's wonderful plant, or the Glastonbury Mouth of Purgatory . . . may be a method of showing a 'sense of humour,' but it would be a poor way of bringing back the records of a bygone time. Our gratitude to our Catholic forefathers for the precious inheritance they have bequeathed to us is not the less serious and deep because we are now and then amused by their quaint tales, and certainly we do not regard them as less trustworthy witnesses to the historical events they relate, because they reflect with accuracy the feelings of their own time."

And we must confess also that if anything could add to our confidence in F. Morris's conscientious exactness as a chronicler, these words would go far to increase our trust. The present volume is of greater interest, in our eyes, from its containing only the sum of two, and not many lives; that of the saintly Jesuit, F. Weston (d. 1615); the other the well-contrasted narrative of Anthony Tyrrell's fall. Both were missionaries during the hottest contests for religion in Elizabeth's reign, and, as F. Morris justly observes, our knowledge of what our forefathers suffered would be most incomplete if we did not set before us the vivid pictures of the influences brought to bear by the Government upon such Catholics as were weak both in faith and character. F. Weston was a friend of F. Campion, both at Oxford and Douay, and he tried to induce F. Weston to accompany him to Rome, when he went to offer himself to the Society of Jesus in 1572. F. Weston did not join the Society till later, but while on the English mission he took the name of Edmonds, out of reverence for his martyred friend. At Seville F. Weston was known as "Holy Father William." One of the many instructive chapters of his career is that headed "Life in the Clink," in which public prison, among many priests and gentlemen, he found a poor Catholic, who had a wife and two children, shut up as a priest. Even in the Clink, however, the priests were able to secure vestments, chalices, and everything needful for celebrating mass, which they kept concealed under loose bricks, hearthstones, &c.; and on the Christmas Eve (1587) F. Weston was visited by all the Catholic prisoners, heard their confessions, celebrated three masses, and gave communion to the whole band. To achieve this a way was found of drawing back the locks and replacing them afterwards. According to the method pursued in our own time by Mr. Gladstone and others, F. Weston was incessantly examined upon what he should do and what he should teach in certain cases which had never happened. Which side he should take as to the Spanish fleet, what he should uphold as the duty of others; with, he says, "various forms of speech and inventions of possible contingencies, which, though of course they sometimes happen, may very possibly not happen at all; and upon the ground of an hypothesis . . . they would have turned my words into a crime, just as if the facts themselves had existed."

After his imprisonment in the Clink, and an interlude, F. Weston was shut up in Wisbech Castle, and during the last five years there, organized, with his companions, a kind of College life, of which the account is very interesting. From Wisbech Castle F. Weston was sent to the Tower, but after seventeen years' imprisonment he was at last denied the martyr's palm. Elizabeth went to her own place, and James I. being proclaimed king, set the imprisoned Catholics free (1603), though even then, those who refused to "conform" were driven into exile. A crowd of persons assembled on the Tower quay to see F. Weston embark; for, of course, he instantly prepared to leave the country which he had so lovingly and faithfully served.

"The Catholics made no secret of their veneration. They fell on their knees about him, kissed his hands and begged his blessing, feeling sure, like those of Ephesus when St. Paul left them, that they should see his face no more. God, who often shows his acceptance of a generous will by the sacrifice of the very proffered service itself, and the substitution of a cross to be borne in union with the Prince of Pastors, had allowed F. Weston to be actively engaged in behalf of the souls for whom he risked his life, for two years only at liberty of the nineteen that he had spent in England. The coveted palm of martyrdom was not bestowed, and Father Weston must now go into exile, after a missionary career that the world would regard as a failure, but which was as acceptable to God as if the goodwill had been crowned by the most brilliant success" (p. 278).

The royal pursuivants did not relax their hold upon the formidable company of four feeble priests until they had seen them safely stowed at Calais; whence F. Weston, "almost blind, half broken down, prematurely old," and not able to keep his attention fixed upon more than three or four lines of a letter at a time, went on to St. Omer's and Rome, and there actually so far recovered his health as to be set to work again in Spain. He laboured successfully for nine years at Seville, when he was appointed rector of the English College at Valladolid, where he died soon afterwards. When he was told that his hour was come, the saintly confessor replied, "*Lætatus sum in his quæ dicta sunt mihi, in domum Domini ibimus.*" F. Weston's skull is kept as a pious relic at the Jesuit Noviciate at Roehampton, and certainly no better memorial could be set before the novices of the way to live and die. The portrait given of F. Weston is copied from that at Sant' Andrea at Rome, by Mr. Charles Weld.

In the second not less valuable part of the book, F. Morris has this excellent passage. He quotes from Froude's "History":—

"'It was towards the close of the Pontificate of Gregory XIII. . . . that two young English Jesuits, Anthony Tyrrell, who tells the story, and Foscue or Fortescue, better known as Ballard, and concerned afterwards in the Babington conspiracy, set out upon a journey to Rome upon a noticeable errand.' . . . To readers who are accustomed to Mr. Froude's habitual inaccuracy in the statement of facts, it is hardly needful to say that they must not think, because Mr. Froude thinks well to say so, either that Tyrrell was ever in the Tower, or that he or Ballard were Jesuits. The one is as false as the other, and it is not less false that Gregory XIII. approved of a proposal for the assassination of Queen Elizabeth."

The unfortunate Anthony, whose lapses are here commemorated with much instruction for our use, claimed to be a descendant of Sir Walter Tyrrell, who "unaware hit King William Rufus in the breast, that he fell down dead and never spake word." He was made priest about 1579-80, and was a student of theology at the English college in Rome, and for some time suffered imprisonment bravely, and laboured as a true missionary for the faith. But, in the end, his courage altogether failed him, and he yielded to the stress of punishment and the representations of the Queen's officials, and bore false witness against many Catholics, among them the Pope, then Gregory XIII. In his various recantations Tyrrell gives a list of all the people he had aspersed, the Pope being at the head of the list of foreign Catholics. His extraordinary sermon or address, which he began at St. Paul's Cross, and was not allowed to finish, because, like Balaam, having come to curse the Church, he uttered upon it a fervent blessing, is given entire, just as he threw the copies of it among the crowd. After acknowledging himself four times a Catholic and three times a Protestant, this most unfortunate man was induced to retire to the Low Countries, where his name in a list of apostates is endorsed, *Mortuus est pœnitens*.

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*A Catechism of Christian Doctrine arranged according to the Order of Ideas.*

By ANTONIO ROSMINI SERBATI, D.D. Translated from the Italian.  
London: Burns & Oates.

WE cannot be expected, on occasion of a small volume like this, to enter on the question—a most important and many-sided one—which is the best order and method whereby to imbue the youthful mind with Christian doctrine. We suppose all will agree however, that some very short catechism—such as that now in use among English Catholics—should be at starting firmly imprinted on the memory, even though at first it be but very partially understood; in order that it may serve as a nucleus, round which religious knowledge shall be gathered in proportion as it is acquired. Yet we wish Rosmini had explained in what precise relation he intended his own catechism to stand, as regards such elementary manuals; and certainly his translator's preface (p. xiv.) speaks, according to the more obvious sense of his words, as though no such elementary manual were desirable. The question we have raised must surely in practice be a very important one, and we regret that it is here ignored.

The general *matter* of Rosmini's Catechism, (as distinct from this question of order and arrangement) seems to us admirable; and likely to confer great benefit on large numbers, even of those who are not exactly "in statu pupillari." We hardly know, where so much is excellent, how to choose one passage for eulogy in preference to another. It will be more

practically serviceable perhaps, though much less gracious, if we mention the few particulars, to which we think, under correction, that exception may be justly taken.

At p. 11 (q. 70) the wording is as though God did not impose on Adam and Eve at their creation the Natural Law—so far as that Law was applicable to their situation,—but only the positive command about the forbidden fruit. Doubtless at p. 8 (q. 47) the true doctrine had been partially implied : but it is only at p. 11 that God is spoken of as their “Lawgiver” ; and here it is that we specially regret the omission which we have named.

In pp. 12, 13 we think that Rosmini has said either too much or too little, on the circumstances of the Fall. This fact seems to have originated in Rosmini’s plan, mentioned in the Translator’s Preface (p. xv.), of introducing various “Biblical narratives.” Whether this be generally a desirable feature, we will not here inquire ; but in the passage to which we refer, a Biblical narrative is put forth at length, of which we should say, that without commentary the said narrative will be but very partially intelligible to the young, while at the same time no commentary is supplied.

In p. 21 Rosmini says virtually, that the Jewish moral law as such remained in force, after the judicial and ceremonial laws were abolished. Of course the *Natural Law* is immutable in its general principles ; and would bind, whether it had or had not been specially promulgated to the Jews. But we strongly agree with an opinion expressed by F. Harper in his recent work ; viz. that much evil may result on occasion, if it be supposed that any part whatever of the Jewish law *as such* remains of obligation.\*

It may be said indeed, that the authorized “Catechism of Christian Doctrine” fails to draw the distinction which we are urging. But neither does it state the opposite doctrine ; nor, consistently with the brevity which is its principle, could it enter upon the subject. Rosmini, on the contrary (p. 21, q. 122), in answer to the question, “*How many commandments of the Law of God are there?*” answers “There are ten.” And he says (q. 121) that “the moral law, which was given by God to the Hebrews, has still to be obeyed by all mankind.” Surely the obvious sense of these words is, that God’s moral law demands obedience *because* it was promulgated to the Hebrews and has not been repeated. And these passages, we think, give additional importance to our former remark, that when God is spoken of as Adam’s “Lawgiver,” the words used by Rosmini sound as though God did not, as Lawgiver, impose on Adam the Natural Law.

In p. 49 (q. 271) words are used which may be understood as meaning, that a *rapid* recitation of the Lord’s Prayer, accompanied with only

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\* “Probabilius censeo Christianos non obligari, ex vi legis Moysei, ad præcepta Decalogi et moralia ejusdem legis.”—Suarez, “De Legibus,” l. 9, cap. xi., n. 22.

a *general* sense of its meaning, would never obtain graces from God. This seems to us at variance with the recognized practice of the Church, but we are not clear whether Rosmini intended to say it.

In p. 94 (q. 100) it is said that the contrition required for absolution must in such sense be "greater than any other sorrow," that "the sinner grieves more for having violated the Law of God than he would for losing the whole world." It seems to us, that to leave such a statement without further explanation, must engender innumerable and most calamitous scruples in those who study the Catechism. There is no question in all Christian doctrine, we would submit, which needs more careful, detailed, and well-balanced explanation, with the view of avoiding either extreme,—than that which concerns the duty of detesting mortal sin "*super omnia*"; and Rosmini was no doubt capable of throwing much light on it, had he made the attempt.

We trust that the very fact of our putting forth these individual criticisms will show how much we admire the volume as a whole.

*Remarks on a Late Assailant of the Society of Jesus.*

London: Burns & Oates.

THIS truly admirable work belongs to a class, of which it is difficult at first sight to see the utility. Catholics do not need them, and it is found by calamitous experience that Protestants will not read them. Yet in fact they have a most important place of their own. When the Protestant inquirer has come to see the utter insufficiency of his own religion, and at the same time the immense *primâ facie* cogency of the Church's notes,—he is often still haunted by individual objections. These objections, even if unsolved, very probably would not prevent him from fulfilling his vocation in due time; still their solution at all events greatly promotes his peace of mind. Under these circumstances, he would eagerly devour such a volume as the present.

In fact almost two-thirds of it (pp. 31–80) are occupied with accusations, which have no more force against Jesuits than against other Catholic theologians. These accusations—the accusations namely which are brought against Catholic teaching on "mental reservation," or which allege that Catholics regard "the end" as "justifying the means," or a thousand other such—rouse up in the ordinary Protestant an excitement of feeling, which almost precludes the possibility of calm examination; and they require to be dealt with, not only with knowledge and accuracy, but with great delicacy of touch. We have nowhere seen them (to our mind) more successfully encountered than in this volume.

We are greatly amused by the recital (p. 50) of Dean Howson's statement, that he felt obliged at Bonn, for practical purposes, to "the temporary use of language *admitting of various shades of meaning*." In plain

English, the Dean equivocated, for the sake of what he considered a pious end.

We may add, that for our own part we agree with the present writer (p. 51) in his preference for that solution of the "mental reservation" difficulty which was given by Scotus, over that given by S. Augustine and S. Thomas.

*De Romani Pontificis, in ferendâ infra hæresim censurâ, infallibili judicio.*

Dissertatio Inauguralis quam conscripsit JOHANNES VERMEULEN.

Trajecti ad Rhenum: Weller.

WE have often mentioned, on the authority of Cardinal Manning and others, that the Vatican Definition on the "subject" of infallibility, was to have been supplemented in the following year by one on the "object," sphere, extension, of that prerogative. It was by no means the least of the calamities inflicted by the Gallo-Prussian war, that this intention was for the moment frustrated. We are delighted therefore with everything which indicates, that theologians are giving their mind to the matter.

The question is a large one; and the present Essay deals with what is by far its easiest point. We can warmly commend it however; and we are rejoiced to find from it, that F. Knox's now classical volume on infallibility—so often praised in our pages—has been translated into German as well as Italian.

We must return to the Essay in our next number; as the author expresses some difference from Dr. Ward, mentioning the latter writer by name, on the deference due to those doctrinal decisions of a Pontifical Congregation, which are not issued in the Pope's name. We shall be able to show that the author importantly misunderstands what Dr. Ward has said.

*The Story of a Soul.* By MRS. AUGUSTUS CRAVEN. Translated by MISS EMILY BOWLES.

THAT large section of the reading public which is familiar with Mrs. Craven's works, whether in their original tongue or in the beautiful English dress with which Miss Bowles has invested them, will hail with pleasure the appearance of a new story by the same hands.

In many respects "The Story of a Soul" is inferior to none of its predecessors; indeed, in the delicacy and subtlety of the introspection, the artistic treatment, the perfection of finish, it may possibly surpass them. The interest of the story is centred, as its name indicates, on the workings of the inner life of the heroine under unaccustomed and stormy existence; it is easy to see how congenial is such a subject to the curiously subtle and

introspective mind of the authoress, and with how loving a pen she traces every light and shadow, every spiritual and moral progression and retrogression, every variation in short in the soul's barometer. The analytical bent of Mrs. Craven's genius suggests a comparison between her writings and those of an English poet, with whom in other respects she has but little in common. We refer to Mr. Coventry Patmore; and those who are familiar with the "*Angel in the House*" will find no difficulty in tracing the resemblance we notice between that psychological analysis of wedded love, from the dawn of betrothal to the mysterious night of parting and of death, and the more spiritual and religious, but not less microscopic observation which Mrs. Craven bestows on the innermost feelings and motives of her heroines. We are sometimes inclined to shrink from such complete setting open of the secret chambers of the soul; but with Mrs. Craven this feeling is much allayed by the womanly delicacy of the manipulation and the lightness of touch which can probe thus deeply, and yet not wound even our insular reserve and timidity in matters of feeling.

The plot of "*The Story of a Soul*" is not a very original or complicated one, although the book keeps its hold upon our interest from the first page to the last. The story is thrown into an autobiographical shape, and though we object to this form of narrative where the interest depends on the plot or on the minute working out of various incidents and characters, it is well adapted to so personal and individual a claim as is urged on us by Ginevra, the "lovely, golden-haired Sicilian." It would indeed be difficult to imagine a heroine more calculated to rivet the attention and secure the sympathy of the reader. She comes before us in her early girlhood—her last day of childhood, in fact—for the death of her dearly-loved mother that very evening, hastened as she feels it to have been by her girlish imprudence and impulsive disregard of the conventional rules of propriety, more stringently binding, perhaps, upon maidens of the higher classes in Southern Italy than in any other part of the civilized world, brings out in her all the latent but terrible capacities of suffering which her happy childhood had hitherto left dormant. We can trace the process of the upbreking of her soul through its thin crust of vanity and love of admiration through the dreary months of her father's suspicious watchfulness and her penitential seclusion; a process quickened and intensified by her brother Mario's stern revelations, for the poor little carnation thrown in innocent folly from a balcony has produced a crop of strife and bloodshed such as we, in our calm and unimpassioned North, should deem not alone sinful, but immoderate and unwarranted.

The days of Ginevra's solitude and mourning close with her brilliant marriage to Lorenzo, Duke of Valenzano—wealthy noble, enthusiastic artist, travelled man of letters, devoted lover, but lacking those principles of faith and of practical religion without which "a man's stainless honour is a feeble warrant of faithfulness." A brief period of sunshine falls to her lot, undimmed save for that cloud which sooner or later must fall upon the life of every believing wife linked to a husband who does not share her belief, of seeing that the happiness which makes her aspire to their closer

union in praise and thanksgiving to God finds in him no higher expression than a more and more earthly love for herself; that misreading of the "Beatrice in suso, ed io in lei guardava," which, to a sensitive and highly-wrought nature like Ginevra's would be so exquisitely painful, not alone from the sense of religious separation, but from the failure it denotes of comprehending or sympathizing with the finest and most precious parts of her individuality.

It is with Ginevra's married life that the greater part of the book is occupied, and we will leave it to tell its own story of anxiety, disappointment, and suffering; of a faithless husband and of a young wife neglected and insulted, sighting a precipice from which she is reserved in time to make the moment of danger one of the most complete and lasting victory; and of the mingled happiness and sorrow which steep the close of "The Story of a Soul" in a soft twilight glow—half the grace of the departed day, half the harbinger of that which is to arise.

Though the chief thought and labour of the authoress has necessarily been given to the portrayal of Ginevra, yet the book abounds in subordinate characters, all filled in with great delicacy and finish. Ginevra's half-sister, Livia, is one of those types of high spiritual perfection which Mrs. Craven is so fond of placing near her more earthbound heroines, as though to point the contrast between the eager, passionate life, dependent (even when striving most to serve God and be united with Him) on human affections and cares for its happiness and well-being, and the calm, hidden lives of those who have given up all the hopes and joys—and with them many of the sorrows—of earth, and who appear to be already raised above them. In many respects Livia recalls to us the Mother Magdalen of "Fleurange"; but a deeper interest attaches to her than to that beautiful and noble nun from the terrible and peculiar trial which is laid upon her, and of which we are allowed a glimpse. She is not lovely or particularly winning, and, owing to the superstition of her countrymen, who credit her with that fatal gift of Southern Italy, the "Evil Eye," she is condemned, though overflowing with love and sympathy which she yearns to give and to receive from those around her, to live as it were apart and alienated from all. We cannot sufficiently praise the manner in which this part of the story is treated, and the few slight but sympathetic touches which reveal the blighting of the poor girl's life when even her devoted and self-sacrificing love for her young sister is supposed by those about her to turn to Ginevra's harm and injury. Later on, when the wrench is over, the sacrifice consummated, Livia is permitted—thanks to that glorious and divine compensation which sometimes forestalls Heaven to those who are most heavily laden amongst the bearers of earth's burdens—to be all and to do all that she has ever dreamt of being to and doing for Ginevra; and the scenes between the two sisters in the Neapolitan convent, when the nun's fierce yet tender touch tears away the veil which trouble and wounded feeling have begun to spread before the eyes of the sorely-tried wife, are amongst the finest in the book.

Mario, the half-brother, with his high sense of justice and honour, and his real goodness of heart, obscured by sternness and jealous bitterness, is an

interesting character; and the affected, impertinent, frivolous, but really devoted and unselfish friend, Lando Lundi, no less than Ginevra's aunt, Donna Clelia, with her social aspirations, her uncouth worldliness, and her good-natured "tall girls," whom Lundi so amusingly takes in hand, and ends by selecting a wife from, very pleasantly relieve what might be, perhaps, otherwise, considered the over-seriousness of the story.

The sketches of the de Kergy family, though but lightly touched, are quite delightful, and make us long to have more of them. We have no doubt that the relations between Diana and her mother are the true and natural ones between mothers and daughters in the best and most cultivated class of French society; and we turn to them in their easy, fresh confidence and affection, their community of feeling in all matters of interest, whether great or small, with a feeling of keen pleasure from the ordinary types of school-bred girls, either insipidly ignorant and frivolous or demurely precocious and self-conscious, who with mothers to correspond, of repressive sternness or of worldly neglect of their daughters' interest and happiness, form so large a proportion of the characters in French stories. Gladly too do we turn to Gilbert de Kergy as a relief from the usual run of profligate or, at best, sentimental heroes, and, in spite of his hours of weakness and of dallying with temptation, read his true greatness of soul and his honour—not "rooted in dishonour," or founded like Lorenzo's on the mere caprice or the good impulse of the moment, but on the eternal, unchanging basis of faithfulness to God, to conscience, and to fellow men. We feel very glad that Gilbert is made happy at last by the sweet and lovely Countess Stella, whose devotion to Ginevra and gentle patience under her own sorrows are very charming and endearing.

We wish we could stop here, for it is an ungracious and ungrateful ask to criticise what has given us, and will we are sure give to others, such pleasure as the "Story of a Soul" has afforded us; but we feel constrained to express the strong opinion we hold that Mrs. Craven has been mistaken in her choice of a subject. Why should the delineator of "Fleurange"—that fragrant "angel-flower," so pure and spiritual, and yet so thorough a woman, and conveying so deep and much-needed a lesson—have here trenched upon ground which we would so gladly see abandoned to quite another class of writers? It must not be imagined for a moment that there is to be found throughout the book a single idea or expression that is not delicately pure and refined; but Mrs. Craven's readers, whether Catholic or Protestant, are certainly not of a class to require the morbid excitement of the French novel, nor do they require to have the same kind of subject treated in a religious spirit: the mere attempt to do so must, we think, end more or less in failure, even from a literary point of view, and we feel too great a reverence for the lofty talent and noble character of the authoress not to wish her to remain always in the high and pure atmosphere which is native to her, and to which she is so entirely congenial, leaving to more earthly minds and pens the duty (if it be one) of depicting and analyzing such trials and conflicts as Ginevra's married life imposes upon her.

It would be difficult to speak too highly of the merits of the "Story of a Soul" as a translation. As in her previous renderings of Mrs. Craven's French works Miss Bowles has succeeded in overcoming the difficulties of a peculiarly idiomatic style and choice of words, and (the highest praise which a translator can aspire to) in making her work thoroughly readable and pleasant to many who are masters of the French language, and who will not usually read a translation. She has done more than this, for with rare skill she has succeeded in transferring to her pages the real Italian spirit and atmosphere of the story, without departing from the translator's accuracy, and those who know how uncommon a gift is that power of rendering atmospheric effect, even when unhampered by the necessity of adhering to the words of another, will fully appreciate Miss Bowles's success, and the freshness and individuality which are the result of it. May we venture to express a hope that when next Miss Bowles's name appears on the title-page of a work of fiction, it will not be merely as an interpreter, but as giving us, as she has done in "In the Comarque," all the fullness and richness of her own thoughts clothed in her own original and poetic words.

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*English Men of Science: their Nature and Nurture.* By THEODORE GALTON, F.R.S., Author of "Hereditary Genius," &c. London Macmillan & Co. 1874.

THIS very curious book professes to be a natural history of men of science. It is founded on the results of answers made to a long string of queries which the author circulated among about a hundred individuals of that class who have attained a position before the public,—such as Fellows of the Royal Society, presidents of sections of the British Association, professors in some college or university of importance. These queries were of a most exhaustive and searching description, including their parentage, kinsfolk, religion, politics, originality or eccentricity of character, hereditary peculiarities, special talents, measurement inside the rims of their hats, energy of body and mind, if remarkable, early education—its merits and demerits, year of marriage, wife's maiden name, and any facts of peculiar interest in wife's family. We merely select a very few of the questions, which fill four octavo pages. Mr. Galton's correspondents seem generally to have answered his queries with great simplicity and good-nature, and he has largely quoted from their replies, carefully omitting names and clue to the individuality of the writers. We do not propose an analysis of the work, but shall principally call attention to two points: (1) the conclusions the author arrives at with regard to the religious bias of men of science, and (2) the views on education which he states in his summary at the end. It appears that out of ten scientific men seven call themselves members of the established Church of England, Scotland, or of the disestablished Church of Ireland, and three to one or more of the following "sects," named in order of their representation.

1. None whatever [if that can be called a sect]; 2. Established Church, with qualification; 3. Unitarian; 4. Nonconformist; 5. Wesleyan; 6. Catholic; 7. Bible-Christian. But their religious feeling requires explanations. Mr. Galton, as a man of logical mind, perceives it necessary to state exactly what he means by "religious bias." He says it comprises three things:—

"1. Great prevalence of the intuitive sentiments . . . the intuitive sense of a supreme God, who communes with our hearts and directs us. 2. A sense of extreme sin and weakness . . . 3. Revelation of a future life and other matters, variously interpreted by different sects."

He is led by his inquiries to conclude that religion, in the third aspect thus set forth, is not actively accepted by many of his correspondents who describe themselves as religiously inclined; nor again, that the second element he mentions represents the views of many of them. If religious bias be taken in the first acceptation, there may be two or more out of every ten scientific men who have it; but of this minority he cannot certainly say how many are religious in the sense of all three paragraphs. We are not surprised at these results, which a very moderate acquaintance with scientific literature would have led outsiders to anticipate. But the case is even worse, viewing it as Catholics, than Mr. Galton puts it. In his mind evidently the predominant idea as to religion is, that it is *sentiment*. If the predominant idea be a *creed*,—that is, if his third element be greatly intensified and placed first instead of last,—the proportion of religious men among the devotees of science which he fixes will probably be considerably reduced. This surely proves a frightful state of things, when we reflect that this evil can only go on with accelerated rapidity, since religion is more and more lessening its hold upon education, even such hold as it had in the years when the men of science now conspicuous received their early training.

Mr. Galton registers his results with such calmness, that for the greater part of the book his own feelings hardly appear; but at the end he congratulates the world on the manner in which the gigantic monopoly which, in education, as managed by the [Protestant] clergy, curbed the inquiring spirit and the pursuit of inductive studies, and gave all reward to mere classics and mathematics, is yielding to the efforts of educational reformers; and his ideal future presents a "scientific priesthood" to the nation,—a sort of new profession of men of science, provided for by sanitary and statistical business, and devoting themselves to "the health and well-being of the nation in its broadest sense." In other words, the body is to take the place of the mind, understanding the latter word in its loftiest sense. It was a curious feature of the decline, or rather the feculent corruption, of the Roman empire, that at no period did the study of bodily health assume a more prominent place, as a glance at its literature, and even its material remains, shows. And, on the other hand, science itself, by a slow but sure process, went to ruin in the same period. So it will be with modern Europe, if the infidelity now in progress be not arrested. The undue growth of a part of the human mind is no healthy development,

and what seem to be its gains,—the stupendous discoveries of the present day,—may fall out of the grasp of generations whose decay is being prepared by the very men who have been the agents in achieving these wonders.

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*Horæ Hellenicæ: Essays and Discussions on some important points of Greek Philology and Antiquity.* By JOHN STUART BLACKIE, F.R.S.E., &c., Professor of Greek in the University of Edinburgh. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

THIS is a collection of essays that have already appeared in various learned periodicals, on questions of Greek philology interesting to all who have scholarly tastes. The readers of Grote, Max Müller, Gladstone, and others of that class, will probably welcome in a permanent form these kindred investigations. It is always somewhat difficult to write a notice of a volume of scattered treatises on subjects each of which well deserves an article; yet we shall endeavour to give at least a short table of contents, and an estimate of their general drift and value. The essays seem to fall under about three classes:—(1.) The religious and mythological aspects of the early literature of Greece—viz., the Homeric "theology"; the Prometheus Bound of Æschylus; the interpretation of the old Greek myths. (2.) The history of philosophy and history proper; the pre-Socratic philosophy, the Greek Sophists, the agrarian laws of Lycurgus. (3.) Linguistic in general, onomatopœia, the modern Greek language, and popular poetry; accent in languages and the nature of the English hexameter. It is perhaps a little characteristic of the Scottish Professor that he has not *sorted* his essays, but thrown them into the volume pretty much as they came. They show throughout a genial spirit, a mind thoroughly fond of its special work, and consequently, we imagine, a capacity of imparting interest in it to those outsiders whose ears still ring a little with what Clough calls, with perhaps a happy confusion of metaphor—unless he meant it for slang—

"The musical chaff of old Hellas."

The author himself says, in his preface, that his essays are "the product of hard reading and hard thinking." He has written on subjects of this kind since the year 1839, and has evidently kept himself up with the advance of the times, or rather, contributed diligently towards it. The essay on accent furnishes a useful *résumé* of the question of the pronunciation of the Greek language as regards the conflict of accent and quantity. It is easy to give the unclassical reader some idea of the difficulty of the question. The Greek accents are registered by a system of notation introduced by Aristophanes of Byzantium, B.C. 250, and his marks exactly correspond to the accents used this day in every corner of Greece; but, on the other hand, if we follow that notation alone as our guide in reading Greek, all the music of the language in poetry at once disappears. Accent says

*ánthropos*, but quantity demands that the second syllable be long; and how are we to combine the two? Professor Blackie accuses all who cannot of want of ear. He ingeniously cites the English word *landholder* to show it is possible to pronounce such a word as *ánthropos*, and yet keep the second syllable long. Matthiæ long since, by printing the word with musical notes, showed the same thing. We doubt, however, the prudence of attempting, as Professor Blackie would desire, the introduction of an accentual pronunciation of Greek into English schools. In the first place, it must necessarily be arbitrary. Were we simply to take the modern Greek system, that would be perfectly intelligible and consistent; but then it is admitted, even by Professor Blackie, that the modern Greeks have sacrificed quantity; therefore we cannot take their system as it stands; and any other system can only be what the individual teacher or teachers think right, that is, in many instances, quite certainly wrong. The present writer recollects once hearing a Frenchman who had taught himself English by a certain system (probably as good as any system can be which exhibits pronunciation merely to the eye) read a few lines of English, the effect was the most indescribably ludicrous thing that it is possible to conceive; and it is not too much to suppose that our accentual quantity in reading Greek would have seemed considerably more ludicrous to an ancient Greek. Because, in the case we have related, the worthy and industrious French scholar was aided by a most elaborate and complete representation of English pronunciation for French eyes. Now the Greek accents merely mark the stress on a certain syllable, and give no key, good or bad, to help the "*Anglicum abhorrens ab Græcorum nominum pronuntiatione os*" (to apply Livy's lively description of the mistake into which Hannibal led his unfortunate guide in the attempted march to Casinum). Take accent alone, and we will not say you will do wrong. The first Greek who greets you at Athens with *καὶ σπέρα* will afford you that assistance which nothing ever can but the voice of a living tongue. Take quantity alone, and the language of Homer, though dead, still retains a loveliness in death, a sweetness and melody which is perhaps not to be found in any language still floating on the lips of mankind. But the same poetry, if accent be introduced, will, in most readers' mouths, become utterly inharmonious, and the learner also runs the great risk of losing his perception of quantity in prose, a risk which, as we have seen, has operated with fatal effects on modern Greek, and of which it is too late in the day to check the recurrence. At the same time, the study of the accents will never be omitted by a scholar who wishes to be a sound one. This study always *tends* to realize itself in the pronunciation, which in a great number of words may be hit without sacrifice of harmony.

The chapter on "the Philological character of the modern Greek language" contains much curious information on that subject. Professor Blackie shows that very many of the changes from ancient Greek exhibited by Neo-Hellenic are not corruptions, but developments, either ancient words in new acceptations, or the efflorescence of a very genuine power of growth shown in the variety of terminations of substantives and verbs, which constitutes so marked a feature of the present language. We are

not sure that we should go with him in the praise he implies of the process of restoration that has been going on under the auspices of modern Greek scholars since the establishment of the modern Greek monarchy. When the modern Greeks for centuries spoke a language they artlessly called Romaic, it had at least the charm of not pretending to be other than what it was—a strange, barbarized jargon, witnessing to various influences, Turkish, Venetian, Albanian, and what not. Now, a modern Greek newspaper reads too often like a school-boy's literal translation of an exercise by the help of his dictionary. Thus, to take the first phrase that occurs to our memory, "a tragic scene" is *tragikè skène*. It seems to show the same contrast to ancient Greek that a modern Athenian in Parisian costume does to his old-fashioned fellow-citizen in braided jacket and snow-white kilt. All these attempts happily, however, do not succeed in removing the characteristics of which Professor Blackie has adduced so many and such valuable examples, illustrative of various laws in the history of human speech generally, as well as of Neo-Hellenic in particular. Several specimens for instance show how *slang* makes its way into lexical diction. For example, *kyrios* (ancient Greek for "a master") is now used for "father," just as we may imagine, in the course of centuries, "governor" effecting a similar displacement in English. *Basileúo* (to reign) now signifies "to set," as the sun. Some poetic mind had gazed on the glories of a Greek sun-setting:—

More lovely now, ere yet his race is run,  
Sinks o'er Morea's cliffs the setting sun.

And the idea suggested itself that those bright beams seemed like the crown of the monarch of day. "He is reigning in his glory," such a poet might have said, and the expression was caught up by kindred minds, and gradually accepted by the people. *Metéorisma* (floating in the air) is the modern Greek word for "an amusing tale." *Tachý* (swift) is now used to signify "the morning." We will not stay to expand this last notion; but will remark the curious parallel of the epithet given by Homer to night—*thoë*, also "swift." Perhaps the explanation of both will be found in the rapidity of the appearance and disappearance of the light of day as we approach the tropics.

On the subject of the Homeric theology, we find, as may easily be anticipated, a great deal of ingenious discussion, backed by solid knowledge of Homer. But it is right to say, which might also be expected, that the author writes like a professor in a Scotch Protestant university, and occasionally says things that give one an idea of the danger of sending Catholic youth to study even mere literature in non-Catholic places of education. For example (p. 44), he speaks of a "far-reaching, closely-banded corporation of priests, fencing society round with a bristling rampart of artificial orthodoxy such as exists now in many parts of Christendom." Again (p. 45), Homer "has not the remotest conception that the Divine Spirit, like the electric fluid, has any exclusive preference to being conducted through a sacerdotal channel." Of course essays like these represent lectures; and the effect of such lectures upon unformed minds, eagerly

listening to the ideas of a teacher whose command of his subject, and desire to do it and them justice they would justly admire, may easily be conjectured.

Professor Blackie holds that there is nothing to show any marked distinction between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* as to religious conception, and accounts for certain traits coming out more prominently in the former, from the different nature of the subject treated. Yet it is curious to observe, that in his string of passages to prove the reference of the events of life in the Homeric writings to the Divine Providence, out of eighteen passages quoted, thirteen are from the *Odyssey*, and only five from the *Iliad* (pp. 10, 11). He brings out with considerable clearness the view, that in the Homeric system universal agency in events, evil as well as good, is attributed to the gods; and that consequently that system allowed, so to speak, no place to the idea of a devil. Mr. Gladstone, in his *Studies on Homer* (vol. ii. p. 159), endeavours to trace in the Homeric *Ate* the tradition of the Evil One as Tempter. It appears to us Professor Blackie's view—though we object to his manner of expressing himself—is in the main the truer one. *Ate*, he thinks, might have been worked out as the *Siva* of the Hindus, but “makes not the most distant approach to the Christian idea of the devil” (p. 20). In fact, if nature, with the early Greeks, was co-extensive with Divinity, and with the universe of thought and matter, there was no room left, strictly speaking, for the notion of sin. On the subject of the Thracian *Lycurgus* and his persecution of *Dionysos*, which Professor Blackie compares with the portentous figments of the Hindus, we should be inclined to differ from him. It has always appeared to us that that myth contained a fragment of real history, from the great intrinsic probability of the *Dionysiac* worship having caused trouble to rulers at the time it arose, as in fact it did, centuries later, to the Roman Senate. Thus the attempted putting-down of this worship might be represented as a direct warfare against the god himself.

We have not space to enter into the various questions involved in the myth of *Prometheus*, which forms the subject of a characteristic article in this volume. Professor Blackie begins by quoting, from a source we should hardly have expected to find referred to in this volume—Thomas à Kempis—the maxim, *Omnis Scriptura Sacra eo spiritu debet legi quo scripta est*, which he calls “a most admirable rule of interpretation, not for the Bible only, but for all books” (p. 60). It is a rule, however, involving much danger when too closely followed in certain branches of literature. People try “to throw themselves into the spirit” of authors and of ages, when that spirit is often a very bad one; and, moreover, we are by no means sure that it is always the way to get at the true interpretation. Professor Blackie himself allows the potters and torch-runners of the *Ceramicus* knew no more about the legend than we do. Did they know as much as cultivated men may probably at this day conjecture as to the spirit and purpose of a genius as far beyond them as *Æschylus*? However, the principle followed by the learned professor is, to judge of the play by what popular feeling would be, as exhibited in the earliest presentation of the myth, that of *Hesiod*; and his inference is, that the sympathies of the

audience would go with Zeus, and not with his victim. He is therefore opposed to the very natural inclination which leads one to trace fore-shadowings in that extraordinary drama of some of the deepest points of Christian faith. Here again, his manner, though guarded, is much the reverse of satisfactory. Thus, he talks of "language in reference to the mythical demi-god of Greek fiction, similar to that which Christians are every day in the habit of using with regard to the *historical founder of their faith*" (p. 69); and further on he says, "the most remarkable, and in every way the most interesting parallel drawn between the mythical tortures of Caucasus and the real agonies of Calvary, is that drawn by our countryman Shelley, in his supra-mundane poem of the *Prometheus Unbound*" (p. 71). We are not accusing Professor Blackie of infidelity, but we ask, is this the style in which a man would talk whose intellect is governed by Christianity? And if it is plainly not, is not the importance more and more clear of ancient literature, as part of education, being studied and taught by men who really have faith, which in Protestant schools and universities, seems daily more and more vanishing away?

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*Life of Father Henry Young.* By Lady GEORGIANA FULLERTON.  
London: Burns & Oates. 1874.

WE tender our most grateful thanks to Lady G. Fullerton for this truly edifying *Life* of this saintly Priest, Father Henry Young, the chaplain of S. Joseph's Asylum, Dublin. In her opening chapter, Lady G. Fullerton gives a graphic account of the family of Father Young, and tells us that his father received "a commensurate recompense for his devotion to the clergy, and his hospitality to his fathers and brethren in the faith, in the gift of religious vocation bestowed on so many of his sons and daughters. Four of his sons were chosen by Jesus Christ, the great High Priest, to minister at His altars, and three of his daughters elected to follow the Lamb as His spouses for all eternity." It was indeed a holy household, and there is "no doubt that the training they received in their paternal home prepared the way for their vocation. Rich as their father was, they had not been reared in luxury and self-indulgence. Exact obedience, strict discipline, early rising, punctuality in all their duties, and especially in their religious exercises, had been constantly enforced; and as they grew up, the society and the associations that surrounded them must have had an influence on their future lives, and impressed them with a sense of the nothingness of all that has not God for its object and eternity for its end."

It is not surprising that, under such training, Henry, the eldest of these children should, at a very early age, have gained the title of "the Saint," and the whole of his after-life proved to be in accordance with his early promise. "He seems to have never given any uneasiness to his parents,

but, from his earliest age, evinced a degree of virtue and piety which made him the example of his youthful companions." At the age of sixteen he commenced his ecclesiastical studies at the Roman College of the Propaganda, and it was here "that began his career of detachment from everything that the world considers desirable or attractive," but the course of events did not allow him to continue his studies. The second invasion of Rome by the French troops, in 1808, led to the dispersion of the students of the Propaganda. Henry Young took refuge in the house of the Vincentian Fathers, and there spent the remainder of his sojourn in Rome. He was ordained on Pentecost Sunday, 1810, and four years afterwards returned to Ireland, arriving on Christmas morning, when his first proceeding was to go to the Augustinian Church, where he said his three Masses before he saw his parents. It is indeed gratifying to read of the zeal, austerities, and missionary labours of this holy priest, of which an ample account is given in this little work, and many anecdotes are also there recorded. "His father one day calling to see him, told him that if he had any friends he should like to invite to dinner he would be most happy to entertain them; Father Young replied that he had some friends to whom he very much wished to give a good dinner. The day was fixed, and Mr. Young on his return home gave suitable orders. The hour named for the feast arrived, and so did Father Young, accompanied by a large party of the most miserable beggars. Mr. Young remonstrated, but his son settled the question by saying, 'You told me to invite my friends, Father, and I have done so; I have no other friends.'" A religious who knew him for many years, thus writes:—"I think Father Young had a remarkable grace for hiding his great spiritual gifts and talents under an abstracted and occasionally somewhat rough exterior. Though not destitute of talents, he cared little to cultivate what might attract the world and its honour." His humility was not the least remarkable of his virtues. When at Clondalkin, it was touching to see "this aged priest, from his deep love of obedience, of humiliation, of childlike and holy simplicity, handing his letters to the Prior to be opened before he would read them, or asking permission to walk in the grounds or go to town." "The tenderness of heart of this austere and saintly man revealed itself in various ways. When his brother James died, and he saw the playmate of his childhood and the companion of his labours laid in the grave, Father Young wept long and bitterly." At length, after a long life spent in the service of God, he was at the age of eighty-five, to use his own expression, "called to go home." He passed from the scene of his earthly labours on the 17th November, 1869. For an account of the miracles wrought by his intercession, we refer our readers to Lady Fullerton's work.

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*Organum Comitans ad Graduale Romanum, quod sub auspiciis S.S.D.N. Pii Papæ IX. curavit Sacrorum Rituum Congregatio. Proprium et Commune Sanctorum a FR. X. HABERL et JOS. HANISCH. Sectio I. Ratisbonæ: Sumptibus, chartis, et typis Friderici Pustet, S. Sedis Apostolicæ Typographi. 1875.*

THE frequent demands made for an accompaniment to the Official Gradual (the Ratisbon edition) is stated by the editors as being the motive for its appearance. The authors were encouraged by the success of Dr. Witt's setting of the *Ordinarium Missæ*, to undertake the more formidable task of the *Proprium de Sanctis* and the *Commune Sanctorum*.

On this part of the work two men were engaged, both intimately connected with the Gradual itself, though in different ways: Haberl, who was commissioned by the S. Congregation of Rites to revise the Gradual throughout and also to supply the Chant to the offices which, since 1615, had been added to the Missal; and Hanisch, the organist of the Cathedral at Ratisbon, who has practically, and with admitted success, worked at the accompanying of it.

Musicians know that the question of harmonizing the Plain Chant has of late years occupied some attention. Besides, different systems prevail. In France, the Chant is thrown into the pedals, and the harmonies formed on this basis. In Belgium, two at least of their best organists hold that no note is to be admitted into the harmony which is not found in the air. In Germany, Schneider never employed either sharp or flat: while Mettenleiter gives to each note its chording without any connected sequence. Still he generally keeps to the old counterpoint called *nota contra notam*. Dr. Witt, however, has adapted, as far as possible, the system of modern harmony to the modes; and where they, from the position of the semitones in the scale, present difficulties to modern art, he gets over them by uniting the accompaniment in a flowing style founded on a bass, which is maintained till some marked change in the melody demands another. This plan we can conceive the best to meet the difficulties which the *Graduale* and *Tractus*, more than any other part of the Plain Chant, present. In these harmonies not only the ordinary triads and their inversions are used, but also the diminished triad is employed, and sometimes the dominant seventh, though only exceptionally in conclusions. A characteristic of the work is the use of *suspension* and *syncopation*, giving opportunity to an organist to throw himself, by means of his art, into the singers, and carry them on with great effect. We believe that the answer to a demand often made, viz. for a treatise on the art of harmonizing the Plain Chant, is here furnished to a great degree, if only it is admitted (and the three names connected with this work give great weight to the theory) that the rules for doing it agree more or less, *mutatis mutandis* of course, with ascertained principles of modern counterpoint.

At least two-thirds of the work are now complete. The first of the two parts contains the whole of the *Proprium de Sanctis* and the larger portion of the *Commune Sanctorum*, which embraces also the Votive Masses most frequently used. The whole, when finished, will reach, we may reckon 300 or 400 pp., and the cost will be under 30s. The part needed to complete it is the *Proprium de Tempore*.

The *Graduale* and *Alleluia* are not set for the instrument, and the editor gives us the reason, that they were purposely omitted, in order to stimulate the industry of the choir to study and master that part of the Chant unaided by the organ. The very character, too, of these portions of the Mass admits less of accompaniment than the others. Besides, the size and price of the work are thus diminished.

As the late Provincial Synod has now adopted the Ratisbon editio "tanquam norma," some work at least like the above became doubly necessary.

*Vie de S. Catherine de Ricci, de Florence.* Par le REV. PÈRE HYACINTHE BAYONNE, O.P. Paris, Poussielgue Frères, 1873.

THIS truly interesting life of S. Catherine de Ricci, of Florence, by Father Bayonne, will be welcomed in this age of materialism and incredulity by every sincere Catholic who desires to know something of the ascetic life led by the daughters of him whom Holy Church addresses in the Antiphon on his Festival as the "rose of patience, and the ivory of chastity."

Although the order of St. Dominick can boast of such examples of advanced asceticism as B. Stephana di Quinzana, whose life we hope to see one day published in England, S. Agnes of Monte Pulciano, S. Catherine of Sienna, S. Rose of Lima, and S. Catherine de Raconigi, yet we have ever felt a deep devotion to this glorious saint, who received from her Divine Spouse, "the ring of espousal, and the stigmata," and who, at the age of thirteen entered holy religion as a Sister of the Regular Third Order of S. Dominick. It is true, as F. Sandrini observes, in the "Introduction to his life of S. Catherine," that no other saint has had more biographers than this glorious virgin, one of the ornaments of the order of S. Dominick, whose life we are now noticing. Her life was first written by F. Razzi, to whom we are also indebted for the life of B. Stephana, and other saints of his order, who, being appointed confessor of St. Vincent's convent at Prato, where S. Catherine was professed, and where she spent her long life, used to be so astonished at all that he heard and read of S. Catherine, that more than once he has sent for the sisters who were her contemporaries to hear the marvellous incidents of her life confirmed by them. His life of our saint was approved by Cardinal Alexandrin, nephew of S. Pius V. F. Razzi's life of S. Catherine was founded on the MS. narrative left by her confessors, F. Francis Timoteo de Ricci, O.P., her uncle, and her first confessor, and F. Tomaso Neri, O.P.; the lives by the Bishop of Fiesole,

Mgr. Francesco Cattani da Diacetto and F. Silvano de Razzi. Besides these F. Bayonne mentions five other lives of S. Catherine, one "*Breve Racolta della Vita di suor Caterina de Ricci*," written by Sister Maria Maddalena Ridolfi, who lived on terms of great intimacy with S. Catherine at the convent of S. Vincent, and who "heard the voices of the angels who celebrated her happy death." Our saint was born on the 23rd April, 1522, and on the following day was baptized at the Church of S. John the Baptist at Florence, and at a very early age, the little Alexandrine, for so she was called at home, showed signs of piety. The first words she learned to lip were the sacred names of Jesus and Mary, which she often repeated, not as a lesson, but as from an interior inspiration, "*spinta così dalla grazia*." We read that when only three years of age she spent her time in silence and solitude, so as to be absorbed in God, and lost in the contemplation of His mysteries, and, even at this early age, to quote the words of F. Sandrini, "she showed herself to be a living disciple of Jesus crucified, before even she had the power of publicly showing it." The gift of a religious vocation seems to have been freely bestowed on this family, since S. Catherine's four sisters followed her to the convent of S. Vincent de Prato, and her eldest brother became a son of S. Dominick, and was professed at the same convent as her uncle. Our space will not permit us to speak of S. Catherine's sanctity in her childhood, which was so great as to induce her stepmother to say that "she was the chosen temple of the living God, the privileged sanctuary of the Holy Ghost, and the *chef-d'œuvre* of the right hand of the Omnipotent," and that, "instead of being her mother, the child was her preceptor and master in virtue, her refuge and consolation in affliction." When very young, one of her aunts, the abbess of the convent of S. Pietro in Monticelli, Sister Lodovica de Ricci, O.S.B., struck by her precocious piety, induced her brother to allow her niece to become a pupil at S. Pietro. While here she conducted herself as a religious, although doing her duty as a pupil. F. Sandrini says, "No religious profited more than she did by the peace, silence, and recollection that reigned at Monticelli, where all was done for Heaven, and where the object of each one was to work out her own salvation with fear and trembling.

She spent the greater part of her recreation, although her saintly preceptress occasionally made her take part in the games and recreations of her school-fellows, at the foot of a beautiful crucifix in the convent chapel, bathed in tears of compassion and sympathy for the sufferings of her Divine Spouse. Dame Lodovica, seeing her affection for the Passion of Our Lord, taught her the principal Mysteries of the Passion, and during this holy exercise, "she identified herself so closely with the sufferings of Jesus Christ, that she became by the expression of her features and the attitude of her body, His living representation. During the first of the five Paters she placed herself at first upon her knees, her arms raised towards Heaven, her face pale, and suffering the anguish of the Agony; then her two arms were clasped upon her breast, with a grave and majestic air, as Jesus bound at Gethsemani. In the second mystery she remained standing, motionless, her right hand resting on her shoulder, like Jesus at the pillar of flagellation. And so of the others, always making her move-

ments accord with the corresponding scenes of the sufferings of our Divine Redeemer." In consequence of her devotion to this crucifix, it became celebrated and popular in her native town, under the appellation of "Il crocifisso della Sandrina," and the following inscription was placed at its foot, after her happy and glorious death, by Canon Salvini:—

"Beata Catharina è Ricciorum gente dùm piè  
Sanctèque in hoc virginum collegio educaretur,  
Ex adversa specula Christi crucifixi imaginem  
Hanc ex ejus tunc puellæ nomine Alexandræ,  
Exindè vocatam, non sine lacrymis et quandòque  
In extasim rapta adorabat."

In consequence of this public veneration, the sisters removed the crucifix to the chapel of S. Anthony, where, in 1871, it still continued to receive the homage of the faithful. One would have supposed that our little Alexandrine would have petitioned to be received into this convent; but she was so much afflicted by the want of their love of poverty that she even spoke of it to her mistress. It seems that on the death of an aged Religious, a prayer-book, richly illuminated, had been found in her cell, and that two of the younger Religious had actually quarrelled respecting its possession, each wishing to appropriate it to herself. The scene so afflicted little Alexandrine that she withdrew herself to a retired part of the cloister, and there thus expressed herself:—"Is it possible that the heart of the spouses of Jesus Christ, who is all sweetness and humility, can thus open itself to anger and resentment? Where, O good Jesus, are the poverty of spirit, the interior death, the detachment from all created objects? You had neither roof nor shelter in your life; and you were so poor at death that your Body was wrapped in a borrowed winding-sheet. And here are these holy virgins, your spouses, the beloved of your Soul quarrelling with each other for a few leaves of paper! What folly, for a little worthless book, to expose themselves to the danger of being themselves effaced from the Book of Life for all eternity!" On being found in tears by her mistress, she said, "Mother, how could you wish that I should not grieve? Do you not see how God is offended in this house? how religious observance is despised, not only as regards the rules, but even as to the vows, to the counsels, and even the Divine precepts? Pardon me, but I am resolved to leave as soon as I can, since I have not the courage to live in a place where the devil sows discord, and ruins charity as well as the spirit of poverty." She then, with her aunt's consent, left Monticelli, and returned home. Her father, imagining that she had been wearied with the religious life, thought of marrying her. In 1532, when she was about ten years of age, two lay-sisters of the convent of S. Vincent of Prato called on her father, who had some property there, and was then residing at S. Paolo. They had with them a donkey, which carried the alms they received. On seeing them, little Alexandrine hastened to meet them, and was so taken with their modesty and recollection (*compostezza*) that she asked her father's permission to allow them to spend a few days with her. To this her father gladly consented; and during their

visit at S. Paolo, Alexandrine watched their conduct, and discovered that the more she saw of them the more she was attracted towards them. After considerable trouble, Alexandrine obtained permission from her father, who had other views for her, to spend eleven days at S. Vincent's Convent. At the termination of this period, the little Alexandrine refused to return to S. Paolo, alleging that she belonged to S. Vincent, and requested her brother, who had been sent for her, to tell her father that she was only bound to obey God on a point which He had exclusively reserved for Himself, as the Creator and Father of our souls. M. de Ricci lost no time in going to Prato, determined to bring her back by force to the paternal roof; but his daughter was inflexible to all his persuasions, as she declared that she would rather die than leave her convent. However, when he asked her as a favour to return to S. Paolo, and spend a few days with her family, she consented, in obedience to her uncle, F. Timoteo and the prioress, Sister Margaret di Bardo, to spend ten days with her family. At the termination of this probationary period, she asked her father's permission to return; but he deferred that time so indefinitely, that Alexandrine, perceiving that he was only playing with her simplicity, became so seriously ill that her physician imagined her to be in a rapid consumption. Her stepmother, and all about her, understood the cause of her illness, which increased so rapidly that her life was despaired of. Still, during her illness, she preserved a hope of being able to consecrate her virginity to her Divine Spouse. It happened that during one of her lethargic attacks, Jesus Christ appeared to her, holding in His hand a dazzling and beautiful ring, accompanied by His Holy Mother and the glorious martyrs S. Tecla and S. Cecilia, whom he had appointed as her special protectors. Fixing upon her a look of infinite goodness, He asked her why she thus afflicted herself on the subject of her entering religion, when He himself assured her that she would succeed. Alexandrine replied to Him with the deepest humility:—"My sweet Redeemer, you know the depths of my soul; you know that I am grieved at one thing, that is to see indefinitely adjourned the happiness of consecrating myself to you." Our Lord then said to her, "It is to hasten this moment that I am come to cure you." This He did at the same moment, in giving her His blessing. Then He warned her to prepare herself to suffer in the religious life great trials, contradictions, and troubles of all sorts; that she would have to endure cruel infirmities of body, by sorrow and anguish of soul, either through the distrust and persecution of men, or the snares and attacks of the devil, and that the extraordinary graces, visions, and ecstasies, with which she would be favoured would cause her great trouble. But He exhorted her not to lose courage, assured her that He would be always with her, and that with His assistance she would triumph over all obstacles, to the great profit of her soul and the honour of God. After this, smiling upon her with great kindness, and showing her the brilliant ring which He held in His hand, He said to her:—"Here is the ring of the sacred espousals which I shall soon celebrate with you, so that you may be my beloved spouse." Then the Blessed Virgin, and the two holy martyrs who accompanied her,

approached, and addressed to her the most affectionate words for her encouragement. Then the vision disappeared, leaving her restored to health and radiant with joy. This gracious vision reassured Alexandrine ; and in a few days after, her father took her to S. Vincent's, and thus restored his daughter to her monastery. Previous to giving in detail the narrative of S. Catherine's noviciate, F. Bayonne gives a short account of the religious who were her contemporaries at Prato ; which we omit, trusting that we shall one day see this interesting life appear in an English translation. S. Catherine's noviciate was an exceedingly painful one : it was indeed a trial such as few have to endure, and those precious souls whom the Heavenly Refiner cleanses and purifies as gold and silver. During her noviciate, her mistress was Sister Magdalen de Strozzi, who had entered religion in 1514. "Her soul," says F. Razzi, "was of a perfect purity, and she was remarkable for her fervour, as well as for her humility ; zealous for the observance ; ever affable and cheerful, she did everything with that composure which is the sign of perfection." S. Catherine nearly failed in the ordinary trials of the noviciate ; for everything seemed to conspire against her, as her mistress regarded her love of prayer as the following of her own will. So that as her noviciate approached its termination, it became a question whether she should be received or not ; but she begged for her profession with such tears and bitter sobs, promising the sisters with "perfect simplicity that she hoped to receive from the Divine Mercy, for the whole time of her religious life, the strength and virtues in which she had been deficient during her year of probation." She accordingly made her final vows in the hands of F. Angelo de Diacetto, at that time Prior of S. Dominick's of Prato, and afterwards Bishop of Fiesole. After her profession, her trials became more severe than ever : she was regarded by the sisters as useless, being treated as an inoffensive idiot, and tolerated with no little pity, although occasionally the object of their innocent mirth. When about sixteen years of age, she was taken seriously ill, and so continued suffering most severely until the age of eighteen ; and yet during this lengthened period of suffering she was so gentle and patient that all were moved to tears, incapable of understanding how God, so good and just, could leave such an innocent child to suffer so cruelly and without relaxation, or how so weak a creature could continue thus racked with pain without making a single complaint or uttering a moan, by which nature would instinctively relieve itself.

The sisters had earnestly prayed to Our Lady for her cure, when they resolved to have recourse to F. Savonarola and his companions, whose anniversary was at hand. On the 23rd May, the end of the triduum which S. Catherine and the community had held in honour of Jerome Savonarola and his companions, she asked permission to remain alone in her cell on the vigil of the Holy Trinity, so as to pray with greater fervour to Savonarola and his companions. About four in the morning, being overcome with fatigue, she laid her head upon her arms folded upon the altar where their relics were lying, and fell asleep. "Then," says the convent chronicler, "three religious, wearing the habit of S. Dominick,

appeared to her, surrounded by a great halo. Sister Catherine, addressing the one in the centre, said to him, "Who are you?" "What," replied the religious, do you not know me?" "No, father," said Catherine, "I do not know you." "But from whom are you asking for your cure?" "From Father Jerome," she immediately replied. "Very well, I am Father Jerome, and I am come to cure you; but promise me first, always to obey your superiors and confessor, and then go to confession this morning for communion." He then made the sign of the cross over her, and she was immediately perfectly cured.

Shortly after this miraculous recovery, she was again October, 1540, supposed to be dying of small-pox, when she was once more cured by B. Jerome. On this occasion she composed a *Lauda* in honour of B. Jerome and his companions Dominick and Sylvester. Our limited space will not allow us to dwell on her sufferings and trials, or on the ecstasies and visions with which she was so peculiarly favoured. We shall merely refer to her mystic marriage with her Divine Spouse in 1542. We are told by her biographer, F. Razzi, that on Easter Day, 9th April, Catherine being in her cell, about dawn Jesus Christ appeared to her, covered with glory, wearing on His shoulder a resplendent cross, and on His head a beautiful crown, accompanied by his Blessed Mother, S. Mary Magdalene, S. Thomas of Aquin, and other saints of the order of S. Dominick. Her cell was filled with a radiant light, and a multitude of angels, gracefully clothed, were arranged in order, bearing in their hands various instruments of music. At the view of this majesty Catherine was seized with great fear, and having made the *obéissance* prescribed by the rule, she prostrated herself three times on the earth to adore Jesus. Then the Holy Mother of God prayed her Divine Son to take Catherine for His Spouse. Jesus joyfully consented, and when the Blessed Virgin presented to Him the hand of His humble betrothed, He drew from His finger a brilliant ring, which He placed on the index-finger of Catherine's right hand, saying to her:—"My daughter, receive this ring as a witness and a pledge that you are mine, and that you will be ever mine." And Catherine, wishing to show her gratitude, could find no expression commensurate with the favour she had received; the angels immediately drew forth from their instruments such a sweet melody, that her cell seemed to have become a paradise. Jesus then exhorted her to the practice of humility, of obedience, and all Christian virtues, and having given her to taste of the pure and elevating joys of the soul which are reserved for His beloved Spouses, He disappeared with all His cortège. This ring was always visible to her own eyes, but not always to those of others, nor did it always present to the eyes of others the same appearance.

Very soon after S. Catherine received the sacred stigmata, when only twenty years of age, and bore it for forty-seven years. Passing over the narrative of these forty-seven years, we simply mention her influence over Jane of Austria, Grand Duchess of Tuscany, and others, especially S. Philip Neri, and conclude with a reference to her glorious death. She was seized with her last illness, after compline, on January 27th, 1590. On the 31st she asked for the five turpentine pills which had been pre-

scribed for her. On taking them she said, "Jesus, I take these five pills in honour of your Five Wounds, and as they are given me for the cure of my body, may the merits of your Five Wounds serve also for the cure and salvation of my soul." Finding herself worse, she asked, on the Vigil of the Purification, for the viaticum, and prepared for it by sacramental confession. On hearing the tinkling of the little bell which announced the arrival of her Divine Spouse, coming for the last time under the sacramental form, to accompany her into His Divine presence, getting out of bed, she exclaimed, "My Jesus is coming, let us go and meet Him." She knelt on a small stool supported by Sister Maria Angela de Segni and Sister Maria Benigna Acciajuoli. "She then turned towards her sisters, who were all standing round her bed in tears, truly inconsolable for losing such a mother, and humbly asked their pardon for not having always consoled them in their trials as she had desired through the weakness of her nature. She then made her profession of faith in all the doctrines and truths taught by the Church of Rome, and received the Holy Eucharist with inexpressible devotion. In a few hours after she received the Sacrament of Extreme Unction; and then sending for each of her sisters, she recommended them to live in peace and union among themselves, to be careful in the regular observance, and not to allow the question of *meum* and *tuum* ever to be introduced into their monastery, as the question of property in a monastery was fatal to the love of God, a source of great disquietude to the conscience of every one bound by vow to voluntary poverty. Her last prayer was a *Pater Noster*. Between one and two A.M. on Friday, the 2nd of February, 1590, angelic voices were heard over the convent of S. Vincent de Prato, singing the words, 'Come, Spouse of Christ, come and receive the crown which the Lord has prepared for you from all eternity.' And at that very moment she closed her eyes, and extending her arms and feet in the sign of the cross, she gently gave up her soul into the arms of the angels, who conducted it to its Creator." We may conclude the notice of this interesting life by F. Bayonne, in the words of Father Serafino Razzi, "è priego in carita, per le mia salute è buona fine."

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*The Story of S. Stanislaus Kostka.* Edited by HENRY JAMES COLERIDGE, of the Society of Jesus. Burns & Oates. 1875.

VERY possibly many of our readers will say, on seeing the title of this volume advertised, that it is a very old story, and that they are already sufficiently acquainted with the lives of the canonized Jesuits. But if they will restrain this first impatient impulse, born of the insatiate craving for something new which is universally acting upon our literature, spreading a shallow breadth instead of a really fertilizing channel among us, they will find abundant interest in this fresh and delightful narrative. It is essentially a "Story," told in one continuous, closely-woven course, absolutely without comments, or views, or patches of any other matter. Taken, so to speak, from the raw pollen of Boero, it is so

kneaded and digested into pure honey by the Editor, as to possess a charm, both of quaintness and fitness, in the telling, that is rarely met with. And there is the further advantage, always considerable, of having what we may call the technical touches correctly given; a Jesuit's life written by a Jesuit, and supplying thus the exact values of the ideas and original expressions. The journey of young Stanislaus—born of two of the noblest Polish families, Kostka and Kriska—to Rome, and the simple way in which Blessed Canisius speaks of him to S. Francis Borgia, afford a striking contrast to our modern, noisy way of exalting the worldly condition of those who become reconciled to the Church, or who leave the ordinary way of life to follow the counsels of our Lord. "Stanislaus, a Pole, a good youth, of gentle blood," is what Blessed Canisius wrote from Augsburg; and his one strong expression to S. Francis Xavier, "I look for great things of him," has reference wholly to the future and the supernatural life, and has no allusion whatever to his birth and ancient blood, and his position in the world. It is now more than three hundred years (A. D. 1567), since Stanislaus entered Rome by the Flaminian Gate from the northern road; yet the story of his resolute firmness in leaving his home and his people is still fresh and new. From the earliest age, in fact, it may be said of him that, despising the things that were behind, he pressed forward, without once halting or looking back; and his life, in consequence, though full of simplicity, is one course of heroism. "S. Stanislaus Kostka leads the band of these youthful flowers of the Society, some of whom have been beatified or canonized, while the memory of others has remained fragrant within the body itself, though unknown to the Church at large. In one particular, indeed, he went before all the other Saints of the Society, in that he was the first to receive from the authority of the Supreme Pontiff the title of 'Blessed.'"

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*Life of Rev. F. Bernard, C.S.S.R.* Translated from the French by  
Rev. P. CLAESSENS. New York: Catholic Publishing Society.  
London: Burns & Oates. 1875.

WE always hail with pleasure the publication of such volumes as the one now lying on our table. Such Lives are calculated to do an immensity of good by displaying bright examples to the world, and showing that Holy Church still brings forth a succession of such eminent preachers as was this remarkable son of S. Alphonsus Liguori.

Father Bernard was born at Amsterdam on the 12th December, 1807. The favourite amusement of little Bernard in his childhood was "to play priest." "Scarcely a day passed in which he was not seen, in his youthful simplicity, representing the functions of the holy priesthood. When he celebrated Mass, or gave Benediction in his chapel, he required his brothers and sisters to be present, and would not permit them either to speak or laugh. The service was frequently preceded or followed by a *sermon*, as if the youthful *curé* had a

presentiment of his vocation to a missionary life. On one occasion he preached on the holy name of Jesus; of this sermon his family preserved a precious remembrance. His relatives still recall the love for Jesus, which shone forth in every word of the little preacher. Those who heard him were deeply affected, and his parents were moved even to tears.' In 1820, he became a pupil of the Hageveld Institute, where brilliant success attended him; and when ordained priest, he preached his first sermon in the diocese of Liege, where his first Superior at the Hageveld Institute was Mgr., afterwards Bishop, Van Bommel, who died a holy death at Liege on 7th April, 1852. On the suppression of the Hageveld Institute in 1825, and the establishment of the Collegium Philosophicum by William I., Bernard with his friend Beelen returned home, "determined not to enter an institute which was condemned by all true Catholics. They did not, however, interrupt their studies. Having a knowledge of Greek and Latin, they wished also to acquire that of the Hebrew tongue, which could not fail to be useful to them. They took lessons of a Jew in Amsterdam," and when they had completed their philosophy, they began theology under the direction of Abbé Bogaerts, one of their former professors at Hageveld, which they completed at the Gregorian University at Rome, better known as the Roman College; for, notwithstanding the Concordat of 1827, "the Calvinistic government found reasons to delay the execution of the treaty, and did not allow the reopening of the seminaries."

Father Bernard celebrated Mass for the first time on the Feast of S. Joseph, 1832; having been ordained on the Feast of S. Patrick, and entered the Order of the Redeemer in May of the same year with the sanction of his Diocesan, whose parting words to him were, "Go, my son; but you must absolutely return, for I wish to introduce this Congregation into my diocese." He entered his novitiate at the convent at Wienhaus, where Fathers Madlener and Doll were successively his masters in the spiritual life. "They testified that during the course of his novitiate he gave his confrères an example of every virtue, particularly of obedience and regularity, of humility and the spirit of mortification." He was professed in 1833, and sent with F. Hugues to S. Frond, where he was appointed to teach theology, and this was "the arsenal where he prepared his cannon and shot."

His first mission was at Thimister, where he and "his confrères laboured with indefatigable zeal, and by their united efforts brought forth fruits of salvation. The number of those who sought to be reconciled to God during the course of this mission was so great that it was necessary to ask for a reinforcement of confessors. Twelve fathers were occupied in the confessional from an early hour in the morning till late at night." Of the great battle of Verviers, which was commenced amidst unforeseen difficulties, he thus writes:—"I can assure you we have had, thanks be to God, our share of sufferings. But the humble period of our Congregation has passed; henceforth we shall be no longer unknown. Verviers has raised us to an eminent position. We will hold on, and, with God's grace will courageously pursue our course." In 1840, he was sent to Holland, where he laboured most successfully, and at Grave was the means

sending away a circus troupe, which had been sent for from Antwerp for the purpose of drawing away the people from the exercises of the mission. At Hulst, he defeated the lieutenant of the gendarmerie, by acting upon the advice given him by the Bishop of Liege :—"Reply to the evil-disposed by questions, and force them to submit to be questioned, instead of submitting yourself." It seems that on the third day after the arrival of F. Bernard and his two companions at Hulst, a gendarme "rang the bell at the dean's door, and asked to speak with his three guests. Father Bernard quieted his two confrères and the affrighted dean, and communicated to them the plan he had devised. He proposed to interrogate the gendarme, while his two companions filled the respective offices of clerk and usher. The Father, seated in an arm-chair, addressed the gendarme with the gravity of a judge. 'My friend, what do you wish?' 'I am sent by my lieutenant; I did not come of my own accord.' 'Do not be uneasy about that; but who is your lieutenant?' 'Mr. N., of Ghent.' 'And what does he want with us?' 'I am to inquire whether you are strangers or not.' 'Go and tell Mr. N. that we are natives of Holland, and that we exercise our ministry in Holland. And now, another word: should your lieutenant desire to know more, let him address himself to the chief authorities of the Hague; they will teach him how to treat the subjects of the king.' The poor gendarme, covered with confusion, commenced to stammer out excuses, and told his judge that he had also orders to learn the impression produced by his sermons. 'And on this point,' he said, 'I will be able to speak from experience; for, although a Protestant, I have listened to your sermons, and they have deeply affected me.' He then took a humble leave of the fathers."

Those who know the mysteries of grace and its connection with suffering and prayer, will not be surprised at the prodigious influence exercised by Father Bernard. He possessed, it is true, all the human endowments which are necessary for a great orator—"vir bonus dicendi peritus." Of majestic appearance, possessed of a strong and flexible voice, rare facility of expression, ardent language, profound science,—all were united harmoniously in his person. But his true power of expression came from higher sources; it flowed from his lively faith and his ardent love for Jesus Christ, for the Church, and for souls. This triple love was the principle of his zeal and the source of his most beautiful inspirations.

He left Southampton for the United States in 1848, but did not finally reside there until 1851, when the American House, having been made a Province by His Holiness Pius IX. he was made Provincial, and arrived at New York on the Feast of S. Joseph, 1851. Shortly after his arrival, he heard of his mother's death at Amsterdam, and he thus wrote to his brothers and sisters :—"I cannot conceal it," he says; "although for twenty years I have made to God the sacrifice of my parents and of my family, the death of my mother has not the less deeply afflicted me. Ah! I know that I was her child; the child of an incomparable mother! We have known her in life; her death has caused us to see still more clearly what a treasure the infinite goodness of God had given us in the tenderness of this cherished mother! Ah! how happy you are, you who have seen our mother on her bed of suffering; you who have been able to address to

her words of consolation, to give her the last filial kiss. It should be an alleviation to your grief to have witnessed her passage to a better life; to have been able to entertain yourselves with her. As to myself, I find no one here who understands me when I speak of this good mother, when I mourn her loss. All I can do is to prostrate myself before my crucified Saviour, and to offer Him as a son the sacrifice of the dearest of mothers. Ah! more than ever do I thank God for all she has done for you and for me. I unceasingly recommend her soul to Him. Oh! may our last end be like unto hers." He remained in America till 1852, when he was appointed Superior of the Convent at Limerick, where he resided three years, and among other missions gave what is still remembered as the Great Mission at S. Michael's Church, Dublin.

In 1855 he left Ireland, where his name is still remembered with those of F. Gentili and F. Ignatius Spencer. He died in 1865, at Montzen, near Aix-la-Chapelle, from the effects of an accident. While reciting the Rosary for the children who were to make their first communion on the last day of May, he wished "to ascend the steps of the altar of the Blessed Virgin, before which the children were kneeling: he tripped against a bench which projected, and, seeing himself about to fall to the left, he instinctively straightened himself to the other side, tearing a sinew of the knee, and fell helplessly on his back. The people came in haste to his assistance, and placed him on a chair; he continued to say, 'Hail, Mary, full of grace!' as if he had not been in the least inconvenienced by the fall. Soon, however, the pain became so intense, that by his request he was taken to the pastor's residence opposite the church." He lingered on for a few months, and we are told by his biographer that in the midst of the agonies of death he did not lose the use of his reason; and when, towards the dawn of day, his confessor asked him if he desired to receive absolution and the plenary indulgence *in articulo mortis*, he replied by a look of joy, and made the sign of the cross, as if in the pulpit. Absolution was repeated in the same manner about eight o'clock. "It was Saturday, September 2nd, 1865, about nine o'clock in the morning, when the soul of Father Bernard left this world to receive the palm promised to the faithful soldier of Jesus Christ." We would refer our readers, more especially those who remember his labours in Ireland and England, to this interesting Life, which, we trust, will have a salutary and wide-spread influence, so that Father Bernard's Mission may still be a living influence among us.

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*The Great Land Question*: being a Verbatim Transcript of the Correspondence in *Doe versus Roe*. By CHRISTOPHER CAVANAGH, B.A., LL.B. Lond.

THE Author—or, perhaps, we ought rather to call him the communicator—of this imaginary correspondence has discussed in 207 pages "The Great Land Question" in all its various branches. Primogeniture, Entails, and Land Transfer are in this pamphlet fully considered

from a legal, social, and political point of view. All that can be fairly urged on either side is presented to the reader in clear and precise language, and with a considerable amount of humour. On the one hand the advocates of *legal reform* cannot fail to appreciate the arguments of *John Doe*, whilst, on the other hand, those opposed to change cannot fail to admire the genuine conservatism of *Richard Roe*. The value of the present pamphlet, however, consists chiefly in this, namely, that by fairly representing the arguments on both sides of a great question, it affords the thinking public an opportunity of judging for themselves whether reform is really necessary and what direction it should take. For thus contributing to the formation of a *healthy public opinion* upon "The Great Land Question," Mr. Cavanagh deserves very considerable praise, and his efforts ought to receive all the more encouragement at present when there are really so few who write in an unprejudiced and impartial spirit on popular questions, or who even attempt to state fairly the arguments on both sides. That part of Mr. Cavanagh's pamphlet to which the reader will naturally turn with most interest, is where he treats of that branch of the land question which is at present engaging the attention of the Legislature, namely, *Land Transfer*. Mr. Cavanagh has made himself quite at home with his subject. In the seventh letter he as it were paves the way for the consideration of the *Land Transfer Bill* by a very full and learned account of our system of conveyancing, taking occasion to point out the defects of that system. The merits of the *Land Transfer Bill* of Lord Cairns are then set forth by *John Doe*, whose arguments are very cleverly combated by *Richard Roe*.

Of Mr. Cavanagh's style of writing we cannot speak in terms of unmixed praise. He certainly is always intelligible, but then, on the other hand, in his desire to be witty, he is now and then a little wanting in refinement. True wit, Mr. Cavanagh should remember, derives all its force from beauty of expression :—

"True wit is nature to advantage dress'd,  
What oft was thought, but ne'er so well express'd."

And when a writer makes use of wit as a weapon against an opponent, he should bear in mind that it is to be used as a finely-tempered rapier and not as a pole-axe. On the whole, however, we can recommend this pamphlet to our readers as being an elaborate and scholarly disquisition on the "Great Land Question."

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*The King's Highway ; or, The Catholic Church the Way of Salvation.* By  
Rev. A. F. HEWIT, of the Congregation of S. Paul.

"THE King's Highway ; or, The Catholic Church the Way of Salvation," is a remarkable book, and we hope it will prove successful in inducing those for whose benefit it is especially written, to inquire where the King's Highway leads, and to find the way of salvation. F. Hewit complains, and with justice, that "most of the books written in English, with the direct object of convincing Protestants of the truth of

the Catholic religion, are specially adapted to the use of Episcopalians of High Church opinions,"—a complaint we have often heard repeated by converts from Calvinism. In "The King's Highway" F. Hewit uses King James's version of the Sacred Scripture, "because it is the one with which his Protestant readers are most familiar"; at the same time taking care to ascertain "that the passages quoted are substantially correct renderings of the original texts, and occasionally making remarks to make the sense of the words used more obvious and precise." In the first chapter he refutes the Calvinistic doctrines of Particular Redemption, Election, and Reprobation, and proves that the way of salvation through the merits of Christ is prepared for all mankind; for he says, "God the Father loves all men, in a special sense, because they partake of the nature of His Son. Jesus Christ loves them because they partake of His own nature, are His race, and of one blood with Himself. This relation to Jesus Christ as the mediator, and to the Father as God the Saviour, is contracted by that generation from Adam which makes each individual man a member of the human race, and by virtue of this relationship every man is made a capable and fit subject of the mercy of God and the grace of Christ." In the second chapter he refutes the Lutheran and Calvinistic doctrine of Justification by Faith alone, and after explaining the nature and office of faith as the first prerequisite to justification, he proves the Catholic doctrine of Saving Faith. He then proceeds, in the third chapter, to speak of Regeneration and Sanctifying Grace, and says that the Sacraments are instruments of Grace. After proving his proposition regarding the Sacraments in a manner which must, and doubtless will, satisfy many an inquirer now wandering in the wilderness of Calvinism that "The King's Highway" alone is the way of salvation as revealed in the Holy Scriptures, and that it is, as the Prophet says, a "straight way, so that fools shall not err therein," and that the *Via Regia* leads to the Catholic Church, in which ALONE salvation can be found,—he concludes that "the inquiry after the true Church, the true faith, the lawful sacraments, is not one of secondary importance, relating to non-essential matters. It is a question of life and death, an inquiry after the true and only way of salvation established by Jesus Christ. The only consideration admissible by any upright and conscientious person who fears God and wishes to save his soul is, What is the truth, what is my duty? The only honest decision, when these are ascertained, is to follow them *immediately*, without regard to any temporal motives or interests."

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*The Eucharist and the Christian Life.* Translated from the French of Mgr. DE LA BOUILLERIE, Archbishop of Perga, Coadjutor of Bordeaux, by L. C. London: Washbourne. 1875.

THIS little work is simply the development of an idea which the good Archbishop of Perga has ever felt, and which must be entertained by every Catholic; viz. that the Eucharist is the centre of the Christian Life; that "it teaches us our chief desires and makes us love them; that it pervades and unites in itself all the grace that is necessary

to us ; that it communicates to the whole of religion a marvellous efficacy and a charm of which it alone has the secret" ; for His Grace says with truth, " the Holy Eucharist has so many different perfumes, and its shades are so diverse, that it is sufficient in itself to delight every soul, and render it beautiful before God."

The Holy Eucharist seems to have been the actuating impulse of the whole life of the right reverend writer, for he says, " I have for a long time had the habit, very sweet to me, of referring everything to the Eucharist." The chapters which especially struck us as the most beautiful in this admirable work are the second, third, fourth, and seventh. The Eucharist and Childhood is the title of the second chapter, and what can be more beautiful than the following passage, when he refers to the joy of the first Communion? " The child has come to the age when all that is good and noble in his nature begins to develop itself in him ; when all that is corrupt and bad still hesitates to invade him ; when he is already man in mind and heart ; while he still resembles the angels in innocence and piety. Already his young intelligence accepts the truth with joy, as his eye opens to the light of day, and the first longings of his heart draw him towards what is good ; he loves God, and he loves his mother. But especially the grace of the Lord, which has rested upon him since the day of his baptism, and which already worked within him while he still slept in the obscurity of his cradle ; this grace gives to his nature a quiet celestial beauty, this grace it is which prepares and opens the sacred refuge to which the Saviour will come. He comes—with what transport, with what generous effusion ! The golden vessels of our altars are too cold, too poor, too narrow, to contain the Sacrament of love ; the Saviour stays in them only in order to come to us. But, alas ! our own souls, disfigured by sin, worn by contact with the world, grown old in the practice of evil, are they worth more than the gold of our ciboriums ? Jesus Christ prefers the child, beautiful and living tabernacle, whose ornament is purity, and who opens to receive Him with a love unequalled. Who may tell the discourses between the child and the God of the Eucharist ! O, Christian soul, you have often communicated—is it not true that this first colloquy between Jesus Christ and you had more delight than all the others ? What did the Saviour say to you, and what did you answer Him ? This is your secret and the secret of the King. But remember that your last words were a promise. The first communion of the child is only so sweet and so important *because* it makes promise for his future" ; for, as His Grace reminds us, " The God of the Tabernacle calls children unto Him, and He opens to them the kingdom of heaven ; therefore, love to become a child at the feet of the Eucharist !" In the third chapter he speaks of the Eucharist and Prayer ; in the fourth, of the Eucharist and Labour ; and in the seventh, of the Eucharist and Charity. But we refrain from any lengthened quotations from a work which we are convinced will soon form a portion of the reading of every Catholic in the land. It is destined to do its work in this country. At the present period men are seeking and yearning for the truth ; they feel that there is no consistency save in the Catholic Church ; and they feel that as the Eucharist shows us Heaven, and it is *it* which conducts us there, so there

is no peace save in that Church which believes in the Real Presence, and teaches her children that their morning prayer should be to hear Holy Mass, and their evening prayer, a visit to the Blessed Sacrament.

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*The Orphan's Friend.* By REV. A. A. LAMBING. New York :  
Sadlier & Co. 1875.

"**T**HE poor ye have always with you," are the words of unerring truth ; and hence it is that we welcome with genuine pleasure "*The Orphan's Friend*," written by one who had formerly been the Chaplain of S. Paul's Orphanage at Pittsburg, and himself, as he says in his preface, born in great penury, and "obliged to spend the years from early childhood to manhood at hard labour, and thus learn to sympathize with others placed in similar situations ; and learn also, by painful experience, what the trials, hardships, and temptations are to which persons of this class are usually exposed, and which can never be learned so thoroughly as by actual contact with them." "*The Orphan's Friend*" is replete with instruction for children when they most require it,—viz, at that period of life when they leave the Asylum which has sheltered them, to fight the life-battle of every day, and to encounter the difficulties of their position ; for with the class for whose benefit the work is especially written there is no real sympathy, and they have no friend but God. The style of the work is simple, and especially adapted to children. The second chapter, "*On Leaving the Asylum and entering your New Home*," begins as follows :—"It is always a hard trial on young persons to change their manner of life. When a boy leaves home to enter college or learn a trade, or work on a farm, or find employment in public works, everything appears new to him. He has other masters instead of his parents, other companions in place of his brothers and sisters, another home to live in, a different church to attend, and, in a word, you might say he is in another world altogether." . . . "But the parents of these children are still living, and will not forget them." . . . "But this is not the way with you, my dear children. There are, no doubt, many who wish you well and pray earnestly for you ; but they are persons whom you seldom or ever meet, and are not such friends as others have. There can be no greater change in the world than that which happens to a boy or girl that leaves the Asylum." . . . "Nothing is the same." . . . "There will be a new master and mistress, another home, different kinds of work, other companions, a different church, and a priest to whom you are a stranger, but who loves you as he does all his people, especially the young. It is only to God and heaven that you are able to look and find no change. But this is a great consolation and encouragement, to feel that wherever you are, God is still your Father, and heaven awaits you as the reward of a good life." The work is divided into short chapters, each forming an instructive lesson, given in an agreeable manner. In that on Fidelity the reverend writer says, "A good child will do something more

than perform its duty faithfully ; it will also take an interest in its work, no matter whether it is a girl at work in the house or a boy in the shop or the field. And this it will do for several reasons. In the first place, if you love the person with whom you live, you will naturally like to see everything belonging to him go on well. Then the work a person takes an interest in appears so much easier. Besides, every boy and girl ought to feel an honest pride in being able to do as much work as other children of the same age, and in doing it as well, if not better. The good effect of this fidelity will be easily seen in the love and kindness which the masters and mistresses of such children will show them, and the great interest they will take in the children's welfare." Speaking on the "Necessity and advantage of instruction," our author says, "A very holy priest, who died a few years ago in France, used to say, when speaking to his people, 'My children, I often think that most of the Christians who are lost, are lost for want of instruction,—they do not know their religion well.'" From this chapter it is unnecessary to quote further. The advantages of placing such a compendium of instruction as this in the hands of these children will be apparent to those who have their interest at heart, or who wish to diminish crime and ignorance in the world.

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*Which is Right?* By LEE SILLOBY. London : Burns & Oates. 1875.

WE have to thank the writer of this tale for a few hours' amusement and instruction. In "Which is Right?" we have portrayed in a striking manner the onward progress of three souls to the Church. The heroine, Annie Turner, is the daughter of a Baptist minister, who, while on a visit to an Anglican uncle, Mr. Grainger, is struck by the remarks of the Ritualistic rector of Lowfields on the unity of the Church, and her attention aroused by a sermon which she hears from Mr. Hartley on the Real Presence. "The vicar's words had taken a strange hold upon her, and she could not understand the intense longing she felt to be able to believe in their truth. She was conscious that whilst listening to them a new revelation of the love of God had appeared to be unfolding before her, and that her own affections had bounded immediately in response to it. But she was shocked to think that this should have been the case ; for the doctrine which, as the vicar explained it, appeared to her so beautiful, would, she instinctively felt, be condemned by her father as both Popish and unscriptural." During this visit, Annie made the acquaintance of a young Catholic gentleman, "by whom she was very much attracted," but who suddenly left Lowfields on discovering his own attachment to her, because, having "witnessed in his own family the evil results of marriage between those who, differing from each other on questions of the most vital importance, can have no real union of heart, he had registered a vow to Heaven never to marry any other than a Catholic." Annie returned home in outward appearance "unchanged by her visit to Lowfields ; yet the result of that visit was a complete revolution of her inner life, a deep and lasting alteration in her opinions and sentiments, and a

conviction, continually repeated to herself, that she could never again be the light-hearted happy girl she had been ere it had taken place." "Before her visit, her perfect confidence in the system of belief in which she had been educated had become slightly unsettled. Now, it was shaken to the foundation, and she felt as though she were drifting out into an ocean of doubt, where, tossed about by the surging waves of conflicting opinions, she could find no plank to which she could cling, no rock on which she could plant her foot and feel secure." Soon after her return, Annie's father was induced by an officious member of his conventicle to give a course of lectures on the doctrine and practices of the Church of Rome, and to prepare himself for his task, bought several books written by Catholic authors, containing explanations and defences of their doctrines." And he said to Annie, "As they are the works of some of the ablest men of that persuasion, no doubt the very best will be made in them of a very bad cause." Had Mr. Turner known what he was doing when he placed those books in his daughter's hands, "he would surely have thrown them into the depths of that muddy-banked reservoir attached to the mill he had passed but a few moments before." These books were eagerly read by Annie, and she was anxiously seeking for all the information she could obtain regarding the Infallibility of the Church and the Holy Eucharist, when an incident occurred which, but for the Divine Grace, might have marred her course Romeward. Meeting some Catholic children, who, in answer to her questions, told her that they were taught to worship the Blessed Virgin, and deceived as to all that she heard from them, by "translating it according to her own preconceived notions and prejudices, she imagined that she had discovered a grand error in the Church which claimed to be the only true one," and, for the time, "she came to the conclusion that there is no Infallible Church after all"; and "as she walked home, she determined to read no more of those Catholic books which had affected her so powerfully." Moreover, she resolved to endeavour to be contented with the denomination to which she belonged; for since no Church was perfect, why should she not keep to this?" So on that same evening she carried back the books to her father's library, and determined to think no more about the Catholic Church. Time went on, and notwithstanding her previous resolutions, her anxieties began to unsettle her health. Her failing health was the cause for another visit to Lowfields, and while there she accepted an invitation to visit, with her cousin, a friend in Worcestershire. A railway accident occurred, her cousin was seriously injured, and was kindly received into the house of a Catholic lady, whose only son, Father Bernard, had been their travelling companion. Here our heroine became acquainted with the Catholic religion as it is practised in a pious family, and having resolved to co-operate with the grace of God, she determined to submit to Holy Church. After her cousin's recovery, and the return of the two girls to Lowfields, Annie mentioned her determination to her uncle, and, at his request, had an interview with Mr. Hartley, "whose arguments were so rapid, and his reasoning so dull, that Annie easily got the better of her opponent." Annie then wrote to her father, giving him an account of all her doubts, fears, and decision. This letter Mr. Turner answered in person, determined to use every effort to

change his daughter's purpose. He began by treating her convictions as a "ridiculous fancy," professing to believe that a little calm reasoning would dispel the "temporary delusion" under which she was labouring. "Finding that her convictions were too deeply rooted to be overturned so easily as he had anticipated, he brought all the force of his intellect to bear upon the task which he had undertaken, and very different were the arguments which he brought forward from those of which he had made use in his lectures on the Romish Church. But these, powerful as they appeared, could not affect Annie; for even when she could not confute them, she did not doubt their falsity." We pass over the trials which succeeded this interview. Annie persevered, and was at last received into the One Fold, and had the happiness of being accompanied by her uncle in her submission to Holy Church.

Having seen Annie, with her uncle, safe in the Church, we will refer our readers to "Which is Right?" as a very amusing and interesting story, and we also recommend the book to those who desire to know something of what the fruits are—rather different from those of the Holy Spirit—which are the produce of dissent. Although Miss Turner is the leading personage of the story, the doings of others may interest the reader, since, besides the double conversion of Annie and her uncle, two others of our characters find their way into the Church from different points; her cousin, who was received into the Church on her deathbed, and a young Anglican curate, whose ecclesiastical studies and Ritualistic practices brought him to a confession which shocked his vicar: "To tell the truth, I feel as though I were only just outside the gates of that Eternal City, and I do not think it will be long ere I knock and request permission to enter."

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*Margaret Roper; or, the Chancellor and his Daughter.* By AGNES STEWART.  
London: Burns & Oates.

MARGARET ROPER has been published at an opportune moment, as Rome is now considering the question of the canonization of her noble father, and the martyr Cardinal Bishop of Rochester, the Ven. John Fisher. Miss Stewart, in a short address to her readers, says that "it would be hard to separate Sir Thomas More from his daughter, so united were they in life. With the filial devotion of Margaret, and the beautiful simplicity which marked the character of her father, all must needs be charmed, and must surely grant to that great man the credit of having laid his head on the block from a firm conviction in the truth of the doctrines of the faith he professed." A sketch of the home and family of Sir Thomas More, taking us back to the society of so many distinguished personages, must be always interesting, more especially when traced by the hand of one so well qualified for the task as is Miss Stewart. One or two passages we may select:—

"I wish I had been able to discover for my reader the copies of Margaret's letters, which elicited the following from her good father,

who, amidst the distractions of a court life and the exactions the king made upon his time, yet found leisure to compose letters so full of wisdom and fatherly love. 'Thy letters, dearest Margaret, were grateful unto me, which certified me of the state of Shaw; yet would they have been more grateful unto me if they had told me what you and your brother's studies were, what is read amongst you every day, how you converse together, what themes you make, and how you pass the day amongst you; and although nothing is written from you but what is most pleasing to me, yet those things are sweets which I can only learn through you or your brother. And, in short, I pray thee, Meg, see that I understand by you what your studies are. For rather than I would suffer you, my children, to live idly, I would myself look to you with loss of my temporal estate, bidding all other cares and business farewell, amongst which there is nothing more sweet unto me than thyself, my dearest daughter. Farewell.'

Passing on to a later period of Margaret's life, we read that :—

"A young maiden she was, very young, when she became the bride of William Roper, who had received a university education, had dwelt some time in the family of Sir Thomas, and was much given to learning. Margaret had fully realized the bright promise of her childhood, she bid fair to become as the valiant woman of the Scriptures, opening her mouth to wisdom, having the law of clemency upon her tongue, opening her hand to the needy, and stretching out her hands to the poor. Skilled in the languages of the ancients, she had grown up wise as a serpent, and innocent as a dove.

"Her father had made her his almoner, and having hired a house for many aged people, whom he relieved daily, also made it her charge to see that they wanted nothing, and he made her the mistress of all his secrets respecting his private charities, which were liberal and numerous."

But the lives of the Chancellor and his daughter were not destined to pass on always so smoothly. When Sir Thomas by his upright defence of right and justice had lost the favour of his master, Miss Stewart tells us that—

"In the quiet hours of the night he slept not, but thought over the worst that could possibly happen to him, with prayers and tears begging God to strengthen him, so that in the hour of danger the flesh might not triumph over the spirit. And as his mind was fertile in devising expedients whereby his family might feel less grievously the blow when it did come, he once assembled them to dinner, having first hired a pursuivant to come and knock loudly at his door, and give him warning to appear the next day before the commissioners. Poor Lady Moore and his children started to their feet, pale as death, when the dreaded word 'pursuivant' fell upon their ears, and it was not easy for More to calm the fears he had himself excited with a view to better enable them to bear the impending calamity."

For an account of the arrest, imprisonment, and death of the Chancellor and the untiring devotion, courage, and prudence of his daughter during these heavy trials, we beg to refer our readers to Miss Stewart's interesting work, as also for the description of Margaret's after-life, and its closing scenes, and the doings and fate of those with whom she was connected :—

"In the persecution of the monks of the Charter House, Mistress Clements bribed the jailer to let her have access to them; she disguised herself as a milkmaid, with a pail on her head full of meat, wherewith she fed them, putting meat into their mouths, they being tied and not able to stir or help themselves, which having done she afterwards cleaned their prison-house, performing every duty with her own hands. After several

days, the king understanding that they were not dead, ordered a stricter watch to be kept over them, so that the jailer durst not let her in any more ; but by her importunity and increased bribes she caused the tiles to be removed from over their heads, and by a string let them down meat in a basket, approaching the same as nearly as she could into their mouths, and they did stand chained against the posts ; but they not being able to feed themselves, or at least very little, and the jailer very much fearing that it would be perceived in the end, refused to let her come any more. And so, soon after, they languished and pined away, one after another, what with the stench and misery and want of food which they there endured."

We read that "Mary, one of the daughters of Margaret, was an ornament to her sex ; she was maid of honour to Queen Mary Tudor. She translated into English part of her grandfather's 'Exposition of the Passion of our Saviour,' which he wrote in Latin. She was a great favourite with the Queen."

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The recent controversy with Mr. Gladstone has drawn special attention to the Catholic doctrine on the relations between Church and State. Under these circumstances, we await with the greatest possible interest the promised translation of Hergenröther's great treatise on the subject, which is to appear (we understand) in August or September. We trust a careful review of the work may appear in our next number ; and meanwhile we have great pleasure in placing the prospectus before our readers :—

*The Catholic Church and the Christian State, in their Historical Development, and in relation to the Questions of the present day. A series of Historical Essays on Church and State. Translated from the German of DR. JOSEPH HERGENRÖTHER, Professor of Canon Law and Ecclesiastical History at the University of Würzburg.*

THIS work is composed of eighteen connected Essays, in which various questions relating to Catholic doctrine, Church history, and Canon Law, which occupy a prominent place in modern controversies, are thoroughly discussed. The author, whose profound learning and zeal for the Church are well known, and who, as regards Ecclesiastical history, may be considered the intellectual head of Catholic Germany, has had as his especial end in this work to make the Middle Ages better known, and to point out the extreme difference between those times and our own. In doing this he shows how groundless are the apprehensions often expressed by modern Governments of the power and the teaching of the Holy See. Moreover, in the course of the discussion he cites and explains a great number of important documents, so that his work presents an invaluable store-house of materials for the use of theologians and historical students. But the work is not merely for these, but is also well fitted for the use of the general public. The questions discussed in it, as a glance at the table of contents will show, are such as must be forced on the attention of all Catholics who take any part in the intellectual and political life of their country ; and the clear and straightforward way in which Dr. Hergenröther treats them will enable even an ordinary reader to reach, without difficulty, the right conclusion.

The Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, in a letter published in the January number of *Macmillan's Magazine*, spoke of this work as follows :—  
"It will be time to discuss the Constitution 'Unam Sanctam' with him

[the writer of the article on 'Prussia and the Vatican'] when he has not only read, but mastered, Hergenröther's '*Katholische Kirche und Christlicher Staat*,' in which the Accusations of the Munich Old Catholics are fully refuted."

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